Strike Brigades? Only if the price is right.

Let’s call things with their name, first of all. The “Strike Brigade” is a mechanized infantry brigade with a budget and planning-induced identity crisis. It is a manifestation of the famous “medium weight” force concept that has been doing the rounds for many years. The MIV, Mechanised Infantry Vehicle, is FRES Utility Vehicle given yet another acronym.

With the names corrected and put into context, we can move on to the real questions about this whole enterprise. Is the Medium Brigade a valid concept? Where does it fit in the force structure? Is the British Strike brigade worth the cuts the army is expected to take elsewhere in order to fund MIV?

The “Medium Weight”force

There is medium and medium. The US Medium Brigade is the Stryker brigade, originally born to employ 19-tons 8x8 vehicles designed within very demanding constraints in terms of volume and weight because the whole brigade had to be compatible with C-130 air transport. There was a price to pay for such an approach, and it was paid in protection and payload. The flat-bottomed Stryker proved to be too vulnerable to IEDs and mines, and it also suffered from limitations to its mobility on the difficult terrain of southern Afghanistan. To be fair, the terrain was atrocious for pretty much any vehicle and some restraints were not necessarily the Stryker’s fault, but the first deployment, in summer 2009, proved very controversial and very expensive. The vehicles were kept in use in Afghanistan under that, but when a second Stryker brigade was ordered into theatre, it was instructed to leave its vehicles behind and use MRAPs and M-ATVs instead.

Meanwhile, a programme was launched for developing a Double V Hull modification that increases underbelly protection. The dream of airlifting entire brigades of armoured vehicles using the Air Force’s C-130s was over, the reality of war had dawned.

In the meanwhile, though, a lot of money had been expended pursuing a concept of operations that was scarcely realistic, and the selection of such a light platform had introduced issues that could have easily been avoided. Among these, the failure of the Mobile Gun System variant, a Stryker with an automated 105mm gun on top, meant to provide intimate fire support to the Stryker infantry battalions. The production of this variant was eventually discontinued, leaving the Stryker brigades considerably weaker in terms of firepower.

More recently, the US Army has launched an emergency programme for partially fixing the firepower problem. With the IFV variant equipped just with a RWS with a .50 HMG, the Stryker brigade is too lightly armed to face a symmetric or hybrid fight against comparable vehicles, which in Russia and China tend to always come with a big gun on top. A new programme has been started to fit a large Remote Weapon Station with a 30mm gun on top of the IFV variant. C-130 compatibility is completely out of the window now, but at long last the heavier, much modified Stryker will have a wider usefulness. The original one had behaved well in Iraq, doing well on roads, in urban scenarios and in benign desert conditions, but it had performed badly in Afghanistan and would have been at a terrible disadvantage in any hybrid / symmetric warfare scenario.

Stryker, before and after coming to grip with the idea that the enemy will fire back. 

The US Stryker brigade is made up by 3 infantry battalions mounted on Stryker IFVs, supported by a Fires regiment with 155mm M777 towed howitzers and by a Recce Cavalry squadron also mounted in Strykers.

It is a wholly wheeled brigade structure, and with DVH and 30mm gun it is a potent formation, useful in a wide range of scenarios.

There is still a problem left to fix, however, which is the insufficient number of fault-prone Mobile Gun System vehicles. The US Army today is considering a new Mobile Protected Firepower requirement which calls for an armoured, light and highly deployable vehicle able to provide fire support to the infantry, destroying enemy tanks, bunkers and strongholds.

The requirements have not yet been fixed into stone, and the US Army is basically letting industry put its ideas forward: BAE is offering a modernized M8 Buford, which was originally developed years ago as a very light tank, capable of being air-dropped, to serve as a replacement for Sheridan. The programme eventually was killed off, leaving the American paratroopers without air-droppable armour and firepower, a gap that remains very much a concern for the airborne divisions.

Light and mean, the modernized M8 is a good candidate for MPF. Its ability to be airdropped is bound to awaken interest in the Airborne divisions 

The russians have never lost sight of the importance of firepower. All their units, including paratroopers, are heavily mechanized and supported by a lot of direct and indirect fires. The Sprut is an air-droppable light tank with a 125mm smoothbore punch. Airdroppable APCs, IFVs, mortar and SAM carriers also are part of the russian para's arsenal. 

While the current Mobile Protected Firepower is aimed first of all at the Infantry Brigades, BAE clearly believes that the “new” Buford could kill two birds with one stone by gaining the interest of the airborne commanders as well.

And the birds could become 3 if the US Army decided to replace the troubled Stryker Mobile Gun System with the new MPF.

Interestingly, General Dynamics’s own entry for the MPF contest is the Griffin, a vehicle in the 28 to 32 tons range, not air-droppable, armed with a light derivative of the M1 Abrams gun turret and with the british Ascod SV / Ajax chassis as hull.  

The very first appearance of the GD Griffin, a light tank based on the Ascod SV / Ajax hull armed with the american low-recoil force 120mm gun originally developed as part of the abortive Future Combat System programme, Armerica's own FRES nightmare. Photo courtesy of Army Recognition

The Italian medium brigade is in many ways the most impressive in the western world. It is meant to be equipped with 3 infantry battalions mounted on the Freccia IFV, which comes with a turret and a 25mm gun. In the 30 tons region, offering good protection and firepower, the Freccia is an excellent platform. The Italian army also wants to give the medium infantry battalions a lot of firepower, with medium-range vehicle mounted anti-tank missiles at the Company level and long-range missiles at Battalion level. Similarly, the battalion has vehicle-mounted 120mm mortars, while the companies are due to get 81mm mortars of their own. That’s a lot of firepower. Unfortunately for Italy, procurement of the Freccia is progressing relatively slowly, and while one brigade is mostly outfitted, the second one will only be ready years into the future, while a third brigade set, once planned, will almost certainly never be funded.

The Centauro 2 brings a 120/45 smoothbore gun to the fight. 

The strength of the Italian brigade is its Cavalry element, which includes a squadron of 105mm- armed Centauro 8x8 tank destroyers, with a new generation Centauro 2 in development, armed with a 120/45 smoothbore gun and much improved V-hull and protection. The other two squadrons of the Cavalry regiment are meant to be equipped with the Freccia Scout variant, in two sub-variants: Far and Close.

The “Far” sub-variant comes with the Horus mini-uav in launch tubes on the flanks of the turret. A mast-mounted Lyra radar and long range EO/IR sensor complete the variant’s equipment.

The “Close” variant is equipped with Spike anti-tank missiles in place of Horus UAVs, and is meant to carry an Unmanned Ground Vehicle in the back.

If all vehicles will be funded, procured and put into service, the resulting capability will be very complete and will set a new standard.

The Freccia Scout "Far". The Horus UAV is fitted, while the Lyra radar is shown dismounted. 

The Horus launcher is virtually identical to the Spike ATGW launch box that equips the Freccia Close, leaving the enemy wondering. 

A reconnaissance UGV is carried by the Freccia Close 

Currently, the Italian Army is struggling with the provision of artillery to the medium brigades. Industry has proposed an ambitious self-propelled 155mm howitzer on 8x8 chassis, but for now there is not a real plan because of lack of money. 
If this gap will be properly filled, the Italian medium brigade will be a truly potent force.

The French medium brigade, under the latest “Au Contact!” force structure plan, will be a large brigade with two cavalry and 3 infantry formations. Its primary platforms, however, will not be 8x8 but 6x6 vehicles: the new Jaguar cavalry scout and the Griffon APC.    

The French have of course the VBCI, a large 8x8 IFV, but unlike Italy, Germany and the UK, they have procured it first of all to replace their tracked IFVs, rather than as a complementary capability.

EBRC Jaguar

Griffon

One lesson of Mali (and Afghanistan too) was that insurgents make a large use of high caliber russian weaponry, from 14.5mm machine guns to the ZSU-23 23mm guns. Having big guns to reply is important, and when tanks begin to be part of the scenario, the medium force needs the means to respond if it has to have real ability to move quickly, fight and win. 

Ironically, the French operations in Mali which are the main inspiration behind the British Army’s renewed craving of 8x8s were carried out in large part with 6x6 and 4x4 vehicles: the AMX-10RC with its 105mm gun; the Sagaie with its 90mm, and then the 4x4 VAB APC. The VBCI, of course, was also deployed and did well, but it was just a small component of the combined task groups fielded in the country.

The French Medium Brigade appears to me to be headed towards a Stryker-like firepower deficit. The Griffon comes with just a RWS, and the EBRC will be armed with a 40mm CTA gun and MMP anti-tank missiles. The 105 and 90 mm guns that so well did in Mali, being highly mobile and able to hit hard and at long range, will not be there once the AMX and the Sagaie have been replaced by the EBRC.

For a while, France has worked on a low-recoil 120 mm gun that was to be used as part of the effort to replace the AMX and Sagaie, but the plan seems to have been shelved, and this might one day prove to be a big issue.

Artillery-wise, the French brigades will be supported by the CAESAR autocannon, a 155mm howitzer mounted on the back of a truck. The CAESAR is not a proper self-propelled system (the gun crew has to dismount; the gun has a very limited traverse and can basically only fire forward over the truck’s cab), but it is a more than reasonable solution in most scenarios.

The British strike brigade is still, in many ways, a floating question mark. It will probably be January 2017 before the Army announces anything substantial about its new force structure decisions and its new doctrine, that general Carter named “Integrated Action”.

The chief of staff has however anticipated that they are looking at brigades including two infantry battalions mounted on MIV and two battalions equipped with Ajax, with the Ajax acting as the “medium armour” element.

This anticipation is very worrying and raises a number of points right away:

-          The Ajax fleet is now expected to form 4 rather than 3 regiments, without an increase to the number of vehicles purchased. This suggests that the two Armoured Brigades could lose their cavalry reconnaissance regiment.

-          Ajax is built as a Scout, with just a 40mm gun, because as soon as 2010 its role was reaffirmed as reconnaissance for armoured and mechanized formations. General Carter was Chief of Staff already.

-          A Medium Armour variant of the FRES SV / Ajax was originally part of the plan. It had to have a 120 mm gun. Remember the Griffin that GD is offering the US Army? Bingo. Of course, Medium Armour was cancelled from the british plan. Now the Scout variant looks set to be forced into Medium Armour role, without truly having the firepower for doing it.

-          Just two MIV-mounted infantry battalions per brigade, when the binary structure for combat formation has again and again proven to be a failure, being abandoned once more by the US Army in recent times after years of Brigade Combat Teams with just two battalions each.

-          4 battalions of MIV means just 1 more than was planned under Army 2020, when one Mechanized Infantry battalion mounted on Mastiff was included inside each of the armoured infantry brigades.

-          Is the British Army seriously going to deprive itself of one armoured brigade in order to gain just one “extra” mechanized battalion and slightly better vehicles for them? Seems like a spectacularly negative trade.

-          Reportedly, the MIV will be an APC with a RWS with a .50 HMG. Like the Stryker originally was. Like the French Griffon. Like the polish Rosomak APC variant. But we should not forget that the US Army is now correcting that decision, as is Poland which is retrofitting unmanned turrets with 30mm gun and Spike AT missiles to its Rosomak APC.

The british Strike Brigade, according to the little that has been revealed so far, sounds like a cut more than an upgrade. My fear is that the army is about to mutilate itself in order to, basically, make some 8x8 manufacturer happy by filling its pockets with cash.

In order to release some manpower for fixing some of the greatest problems with the Strike Brigades formation, the army is also going to turn five infantry battalions into “Defence Engagement” formations numbering as few as 350 men each. We might learn which battalions are chosen as early as next month.

But the real bad news haven’t yet emerged. Thinking about the lines Carter has given, it is clear to me that the conversion of one of the three armoured brigades into a Strike brigade is pretty much certainly going to entail further reductions to the number of AS90 artillery pieces, which are tracked, bulky and too heavy to fit into these wonderful “highly mobile” and “self deployable” Strike thingies.

One Challenger 2 regiment is also very much at risk. It could end up converted into the fourth Ajax-mounted formation, with the number of tanks in the british army dropping below 200 and with just two regular regiments of tanks left in total. There is a (unlikely, if you ask me) possibility that the cavalry regiments re-organization could instead re-role current Light formations, but it is hard not to fear a further Challenger 2 reduction. With no extra manpower on the way, either Jackals or Challenger 2s (or both) will have to take the hit in order to shift resources elsewhere.

As we said, it is hard to imagine how Ajax can be expected to provide 4 regiments for the Strike Brigades and still deliver recce to the two armoured brigades as well, so this could be yet another blow to the heavier portion of the army. If I were the optimist type, I’d dare suggesting that the Army might want to form two “hybrid” reconnaissance regiments using a few Ajax and the Challenger 2s from the regiment of the brigade that converts, but the MOD’s often completely absurd decisions have destroyed my optimism years ago.

The number of armoured infantry battalions also remain uncertain. Technically, there are six, but with just 245 Warrior IFVs expected to be upgraded that number could drop to four, or anyway generate two “virtual” battalions effectively devoid of vehicles.

All this, for mounting 2800 men into lightly armed wheeled APCs…?

General Carter says that he thinks of the “Strike Brigade” as a “new concept” based on greater “mobility and reach”. He is enamored of the French columns racing back and forth through Mali routing insurgents, but the Strike Brigades he is proposing are a mix and match of tracks (Ajax, Terrier) and wheels (MIV) and lack the tools the French had in Mali, firepower first of all. It is also highly questionable whether the Mali experience is applicable anywhere else. In the “2 Ajax, 2 MIV” structure that has been mentioned so far, these brigades are also quite pointless in any hybrid / symmetric scenario. Purchasing 300 MIVs will cost billions of pounds, partly funded through cuts to what the Army already has, and I really can’t see a single good reason for going down this path.

“Reach” has to include firepower, and this goes from the weapons installed on the MIV itself up to artillery, passing from the battalions’ mortars.

The Royal Artillery is aware of the need for firepower and has reportedly launched (more precisely, resurrected) a number of requirements meant to finally modernize the army’s Fires. But it is not clear how many (if any) of these programmes have any real funding line available.

How to make it even worse: selecting Boxer

The Times has written an article during last week saying that the British Army intends to purchase the german Boxer as MIV solution. Best way to make the whole thing even more painful. The Boxer is the end result of the Multirole Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) multi-national programme that the UK abandoned in the early 2000s, with the loss of 48 million pounds already expended, and selecting it now would look considerably stupid, especially since the world is full of viable alternatives, several of which also happen to be cheaper.

Boxer is very heavy and quite complex. The modules in the back can be swapped out, but this adds complexity and weight that are not really compensated by any real gain. It is an expensive beast, and while a turreted IFV variant has been proposed by industry, the first vehicle in such a configuration has yet to be built and tested, needlessly complicating the path to a true wheeled IFV purchase if the army ever decides to fix the firepower problem.

And finally, the UK is about to enter two years of complex negotiations with the EU to determine the terms of Brexit. The EU is already behaving with hostility and chancellor Merkel herself made sure to, basically, declare economic war on the UK, causing a sharp drop in the value of the pound. Does the army really wish to spend the next bunch of years pouring billions into the pockets of a country that can be expected to build obstacles on the UK’s way at each and every chance it gets?

British Army and the Boxer: a love-hate relationship...?

It would be immensely stupid. I’m still hoping that The Times got that one wrong.

Should the UK even procure a MIV at all?

Medium Brigades have their uses, and an army structure on two heavy and two medium brigades is not a mistake in itself. All depends on the cost. How much is the rest of the army going to suffer to make the MIV purchase possible? For all I can see so far, way too much.

I’d very much avoid those self-inflicted cuts, and spend the little money available on fixing what is already available. The Strike Brigades could still be formed, but equipped with the likes of Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound, at least for the near future. An 8x8 is clearly better, under many points of view, than Mastiff, but if the MIV turns out being just a lightly armed wheeled APC, it is too little of an upgrade to justify such cuts.

In my opinion, the British Army should certainly reorganize to correct some deficiencies of Army 2020 and to better reflect its own doctrine. For one, it should move back to a structure based on two deployable divisions, because it makes no sense to bang, in doctrine, on the need for a 2 star HQ handling the strategic situation in theatre if your force structure only has one such deployable element.

It should re-organize heavy armour in six Combined Arms Regiments and proceed with a Challenger 2 Capability Sustainment Programme that addresses the current two-piece ammunition problem.

It should re-organize its reconnaissance cavalry to give it the ability to fight for information, to screen the main force and deliver enhanced ISTAR. The cavalry regiments should be expanded, and the Ajax should be supported by an heavier hitting vehicle, with a 120 mm gun. In the armoured brigades, the Cavalry regiment should include a number of Challenger 2s, while the medium weight formation should introduce a Medium Armour variant of Ajax itself, to keep within the relevant weight limits.

The new cavalry structure would expand the Army 2020 regiments mounted on Ajax from 528 men to 652, with three large sabre squadrons each with two Scout Troops (4 Ajax, 2 Ares); two Tank troops (4 Challenger 2 / Medium Armour each); a Surveillance Troop with 2 Ajax Joint Fires for the direction of artillery and air strikes plus 2 Ajax Ground Based Surveillance variants with mast-mounted radar and EO/IR sensor, one ABSV ambulance and a Support Troop with 2 ABSV mortar carriers and 2 Ares Overwatch with anti-tank missiles.

Each squadron is a self-contained maneuver unit, ready to be assigned to a battlegroup, easing the force generation cycle.

This new structure would require the return to service of a number of Challenger 2s and a change to the Ajax production run: less Scout vehicles in exchange for a new variant (Medium Armour) and a slight increase to the number of Joint Fires and Ground Based Surveillance sub-variants. Four such cavalry regiments would require:

48 Challenger 2 (in two regiments)

48 Medium Armour (in two regiments)

96 Ajax

24 Ajax Joint Fires

24 Ajax Ground Based Surveillance

24 Ares Overwatch

24 ABSV mortar carriers

Obviously, more vehicles of each type would be required for training and back-up, but currently there are 245 Ajax and sub-variants on order, and I believe that number could be maintained.  

On the artillery front, my suggestion would be to prioritize the AS90 replacement over the quest for a wheeled artillery system for the Strike Brigades. I believe the benefit of a wheeled self-propelled howitzer would not really justify its cost, considering the budget difficulties the forces grapple with. A single programme could solve both problems at once: industry offers the DONAR, an highly automated artillery system, based on the Pzh2000, installed upon an Ascod SV / Ajax hull. Lighter and easier to deploy than the AS90, it offers logistical commonality with the Ajax and is in the same region in terms of mass. This makes it suitable for use in the strike brigades even if it does not ride on wheels.

A 155/52 self propelled howitzer on an Ajax chassis. Decent solution to two problems at once. 

As AS90 replacement, it offers decent protection, tracks for maximum mobility and, crucially, a 52 calibre gun with greater reach than the AS90’s 39 cal.

A wheeled GMLRS launcher shouldn’t even be considered, in my opinion, because it would, again, be a sub-optimal use of money. Yes, the M270B1 is tracked. But tracks are already part of the brigade anyway. Mass-wise, the M270B1 is lighter than both Ajax and any likely MIV candidate, so it fits the frame without problems. Being tracked it might be a bit trickier to move over long distances (the famous “self deploy” dream), but it would still be the last of the issues needing solution.

British mechanized infantry right now: is it wise to sacrifice so much to move from these to an 8x8? I don't think so. 

In the meanwhile, the mechanized infantry should ride on Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound. They are not faultless vehicles, but they are available and paid for, and they do their job pretty well. If replacing them with a more mobile 8x8 requires mutilating the rest of the army and still obtain such a poor result as the currently envisioned Strike Brigade, it is simply suicidal to pursue such replacement.  

The Infantry of Army 2020

This is the first post of what could become a series for which i invite any reader interested in collaborating to step forwards and contact me. I will welcome suggestions, information and thoughts at the same way. This article is intended both as a take on the always actual, still-evolving Army 2020 situation and as a kick-start for what will hopefully become a wider reasoning over the future of the british Infantry in the modern scenarios.

Some Written Answers in Parliament in the last month and in June are painting a possibly quite depressing picture for the future of british Infantry battalions, which are possibly set for a marked downsizing as part of Army 2020 restructuring.

On 13 July 2012, in fact, minister Nick Harvey, answering to a question about the future of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, dispelled the myth, created by The Telegraph, that the surviving Scottish battalions would have their establishment downsized to around 400 or 450 in exchange for their survival. This, both fortunately and unsurprisingly, is not the case, as creating such small battalions, so much smaller and different from the others within the army would have been a severely damaging move.

Harvey makes clear that the establishment of each battalion will in future depend solely from the role to which it is assigned and added that, under Army 2020:

Any battalions that are in the Armoured Infantry role will have a full unit establishment of 729 personnel;

Any battalions that are in the Mechanised (Heavy Protected Mobile) Infantry role will have a full unit establishment of 709 personnel;

Any battalions that are in the Light Protected Mobile Infantry role will have a full unit establishment of 581 personnel;

Any battalions that are in the Light Infantry role will have a full unit establishment of 561 personnel;

[Official Report, Column 415W]

The Light Protected Mobile Infantry role is a novelty of Army 2020, represented by 6 infantry battalions which will be mounted on Foxhound vehicles, while the other three roles all already exist, even if the 3 Mechanized Infantry Battalions (currently 4^th Rifles, 1^st Royal Anglian and 1^st Lancs) will have their vehicle changed as part of Army 2020 from FV430 MK3 Bulldog (now) to FRES UV (not earlier than 2022, possibly around 2025) with the Mastiff vehicle, brought into Core Defence budget after Afghanistan as interim solution.

The Armored Infantry battalions will go down to 6, but will continue to work on Warrior vehicles, although modified under the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, with first deliveries of the upgraded IFVs in 2018, IOC in 2020 with an Armoured Company fully operative and deliveries completed by 2022.

Nick Harvey fails to provide a Full Unit Establishment for Air Assault battalions, which as part of Army 2020 might go down to just 2 (from four until now: 2 and 3 PARA plus 1^st Royal Irish and 5 SCOTS). Currently, the full establishment for such battalions should be 582 all ranks, all trades.

According to the data I’ve managed to collate, the new establishment present some differences with the current ones, and most of these differences are not good ones.

According to Charles Heyman’s “The British Army Guide 2012 – 2013”, and ArmedForces.co.uk, the full unit establishment of a current armoured infantry battalion is 741, so that, if data is correct, Army 2020 implies a reduction of 12 men. At the moment, there’s no telling how this might be achieved, as there is not an evident source for the reduction in manpower (as would have been the case if, for example, the Warrior upgrade had walked down the road of Overhead Remote Weapon Stations and reduced the turret crew of Warrior from 2 to 1). One possibility is a reduction in the strength of the REME Light Aid Detachment, but this is only a wild guess.

With the same source of data about the current battalions, it seems the 3 Mechanized Infantry Battalions are getting a very significant uplift in manpower, instead, from 667 to 709, hopefully with the increase made up as much as possible by fighting troops. Might have to do with the fact that a Mastiff 2 or 3 can take up to 12 men aboard, even though normally it is described as a “2 + 8” vehicle which, in the case, would provide no evident justification for the manpower increase, since Bulldog is a 2 + 8 vehicle itself.

As said before, the Light Protected role is new, so there is no comparison to be made. One consideration to be made is how the Light Protected battalion will work, and how much of its strength will effectively be mounted in Foxhound vehicles and protected. How will it all be arranged? Foxhound is a 2 + 4 vehicle, and we could reasonably assume that the driver at least won’t count as a Dismount, while the commander perhaps will.

This would open the door to a fireteam of 5 instead of 4 men, but even if the Section stays 8-strong, there will be a need for 2 Foxhounds for each Section. That would mean as many as 28 Foxhound vehicles per each Rifle Company.

And numbers at that point do not work, because many more Foxhound vehicles would be needed over and above the 300 on order (even before the toll that Afghanistan will eventually take)[at least 35 for a training fleet] and the provision of drivers would become a problem.

Also, the Foxhound vehicles on order this far are all in the basic patrol variant, while a Battalion would arguably need weapon carriers (so the WMIK variant of Foxhound, or perhaps Jackals), an ambulance, ideally on the same chassis and with the same battlefield mobility (perhaps the Husky ambulance variant can be used in the short term, assuming that Husky is brought into Core post Afghanistan), a command post and so along.

Of course, this problem would not exist if substantial follow-on orders for more Foxhounds (in more variants) were to arrive, but for quite obvious reasons I find it hard to be that optimist.

Another reason not to be optimist is the comparison of the establishment of the Light Protected and Light Role infantry battalions: just 20 men of difference suggest that there won’t be that many vehicles, possibly, as the need for drivers and maintenance would suggest a much higher figure otherwise.

It will be very interesting to see how these Light Protected Mobility Battalions are actually organized: it might come down to having the capability of moving one Rifle Company in Foxhounds, for the look of it, and I frankly hope in something better than that.

But the real worrying part is the Light Role battalion itself, because a Full Establishment of 561 seems very low. According to the same sources named earlier, currently a Light Role infantry battalion full establishment is 630.

That would mean a cull of 69 men from each battalion, likely to imply a significant impact on the fighting force of the battalion, which will be balanced, on paper, by the famous “pairing” with reserve battalions. The Army 2020 document, presenting a force of 14 Light Role regular battalions, seemed to go in the direction of a possible “one to one” pairing, since the TA has exactly 14 Infantry Battalions.     

The Army 2020 document also showed the Foxhound battalions paired up with TA battalions, though: will the Reserve expansion offer room and scope for a further 6 TA infantry battalions? I doubt it for many reasons, mainly for the fact that, was that the case, there would have been an easy solution for government in the delivery of the cuts: the names and badges would be saved by moving into the TA.

Since this has not been done, taking the usual flak connected to the loss of “historic” names, room for optimism is very small.

As you can easily see, there are some very hard questions left in search for an answer. The Telegraph was wrong when it reported that the Scottish battalions would go down to 450 men establishments, but the reduction in manpower might have been enforced army-wide, with the oddity represented by the Mechanized Infantry expansion. 

This, of course, while we wait for better and more accurate data. I have no real reason not to trust the sources quoted earlier, but I’m taking them with some prudence.

However, there is another, indirect element in support of the downsizing fear: a look at the current Establishment.

The Establishment is different from the Full Unit Establishment. FUE is the total strength of the battalion, all-trades, all-ranks.

The Establishment instead is a figure that only comprises those soldiers from the unit’s specific Arm or Corps, excluding any supporting components from other Corps. The Establishment of an infantry battalion, in other words, is the count of the sole Infantry personnel, excluding REME, clerks, cooks and all other figures.

Current Establishment for a Light Role battalion hovers at around 530 men.

For an Armoured Battalion, it goes from 599 to 608, roughly.

For a mechanized battalion it is around 570, and for an Air Assault battalion it is 554.

Assuming, once more, that the figures from “The British Army Guide” are correct, there’s a 132 men difference between Establishment and Full Establishment for Armored Battalions, of which up to 90 are made up by the Light Aid Detachment (REME personnel).

The difference reduces to 97 for a Mechanized battalion (including a smaller REME component).

Some 100 man are the difference in Light Role battalions (a bit high, admittedly, since Light Role should not have that much in terms of supporting elements), reducing to just 28 for an Air Assault battalion.

If  the figures are correct, the Army 2020 Light Role battalion might have an Infantry establishment of just 460 men from the Infantry. This is, obviously, highly undesirable, and goes against operational experience which very much calls for bigger battalions (an expansion to over 700 has been assessed as necessary already long ago).

The US Infantry battalion in an Infantry BCT has a strength of 685 men.    

A Royal Marines Commando battalion full establishment is 692 men all ranks, too, even if the Royal Marines are semi-mechanized, with normally a Wheeled and one tracked (on Viking) “stand-off combat” companies plus 2 Close Combat Companies.

Looking at the strength and ORBAT of the infantry battalions, mainly the Light and Light Protected Mobility ones, will be very important to understand how much compromise the Army has had to accept, and how much damage the infantry’s capability has eventually taken.

I’ll keep my eyes open, as always, to try and catch any other useful information regarding this subject.

At the same time, there are questions we could try and reason about, for coming up with a realistic, desirable design for the infantry battalion.

Questions to be faced include:

-          The Maneuver Support Company is valid in its current form? In Afghanistan it is very often broken down into Fire Support Groups, made up of sections of HMG, MG Sustained Fire, Javelin Anti-Tank, Mortar, Sniper. These sections are organized on the lines of a Platoon and assigned directly to the Rifle Company, giving it the firepower it needs to .

Normally the FSG will use the 60 mm Light Mortar, and the 81 mm mortars will be kept at Battalion level. In some cases, the Maneuver Support Company remains, albeit in a different form, including the RECCE element, a Fire Support Group and a Fire Support Team (the latter being the 6-man team for the direction of Joint Fires, be it mortar, artillery, rocket or an air attack). A Fire Support Team is assigned at Company level on deployment.

Are these “ad hoc” structures indicative of long-term trends?

What and how should be made permanent in the force structure?

-          Mortars and guided ammo. 81 mm forever, or shift towards 120 mm? Is a mortar-cannon the best Fire Support Weapon, combining direct and indirect effect?

-          Fire Support Team: vital direction for the whole range of support fires in a complex, joint environment. Definitely need more, how to integrate them in the force?

-          The Load Carrier. At Platoon level? How many? Manned or unmanned?

-          UAVs for the Infantry, how many, where, for what roles?

And, no doubt, many others.

With a major focus in thinking being the reduction in the weight carried by the soldier out on a mission. Current weight levels are way too high, and a substantial reduction is absolutely necessary.

Other issues include bandwidth and communications, especially in urban areas and C2 on the move, and this brings us straight to another problem closely connected to these: provision of power for all the optics and systems. Which means considering ergonomics of wiring, load carriage, and other issues. 

The graphic shows the organization of the Royal Anglian battlegroup in its deployment in Afghanistan. The restructured Maneuver Support Company, and the Fire Support Groups in which it broke down are well evident. Also, the Fire Support Team at Company level.

A very complex and ample subject, so let’s start thinking.