A different angle to difficult choices

First, a premise. I really hate the “difficult choices” refrain that is constantly brought up when talking about UK armed forces. It’s right up there with “sacred cows” and other rhetoric figures which 99% of the time are empty of actual meaning other than making the speaker sound real deep and wise. In the end, it seems to only ever lead to arguing in favor of cutting off everything but your pet project of the day. 

If there is something that years of cuts have made clear is that in the UK the problem is not making “difficult choices” (its Draconian acts of self-mutilation are "admired" worldwide), but making difficult choices that make sense in an integrated defence policy and not in isolation. 

What the UK constantly fails at is taking difficult decisions that adhere to one coherent vision. Again and again, Defence starts investing on one particular area, then eventually, when it is more or less ready to reap the benefits of decades of work and investment, ruins everything by going with another short-term knee jerk decision in the desperate attempt to save some money. Savings which are often ridiculous compared to the damage inflicted to capability.

I’ve already written some time ago a longer dissertation on the cyclical suggestion of “cutting the PARAs and Royal Marines”, and explained just why that makes very little sense, so I’ll just point you to that article, while repeating once more that the really difficult and key question the UK must finally find an answer to is what kind of country and military power it wants to be. 

You can’t separate ambition from how much you are willing to spend.

Once a level of ambition is defined, the new SDSR should completely ignore the empty rhetoric of sacred cows, which are mostly just the latest evolution of inter-service bickering, and assess instead what the UK absolutely needs to do, first of all, and immediately after determine what it can do well, and specifically what it can do with what it already owns. Instead of wasting capability that already exists in pursuit of nebulous new ambitions, it should ensure that the maximum possible output comes from what is already available, for once.

If it is not possible to do everything, you should stick to what you are good at. If your money is not enough to purchase all you’d need, at least start by using well what you already have, and have already paid. The UK is extremely well positioned to deploy a very competitive and powerful naval task force; and owns most of the equipment needed to field a powerful airmobile army capability. It would be absurd not to capitalize on strengths built up with much effort and expenditure over decades.  

When you are “poor”, the last thing you should do is waste what you do have.

Instead of trying to convince the world that tanks are no longer needed; that wheeled APCs are the future; that air manoeuvres are now unfeasible and amphibious capability does not require landing craft and surface manoeuvre, and getting offended when the world does not agree; the UK should use a bit of actual realism and go for the real soul searching.

There are unpleasant questions that I never hear asked but that are staring us all in the face. One is about the wisdom of sinking so much manpower and money into 1^st Division, which has more than half the Army’s infantry under command but that will have absolutely zero supports once the last set migrates to 3^rd Division to enable the second STRIKE brigade. 4 Royal Artillery, 27 RLC, 2 REME, 2 Royal Signal and 32 Royal Engineer are the last CS and CSS resources that remain to enable the “Vanguard Light Brigade” that is organized rotationally from the 4 brigades that make up 1^st Division (4^th, 7^th, 11^th and 51^st).

All of those regiments, and indeed presumably one of the brigade HQs as well, are going to be taken out to create the second STRIKE brigade, leaving 1^st Division as truly nothing more than a container for spare Light Role infantry battalions that support Public Duty and Cyprus rotations and the “regional stand-by battalion” commitment at home, which has been expanded all the way to a 5 battalion requirement in recent times.

One actual difficult question to be asked is whether this use of precious finite resources is in any way efficient and wise. Over half of the Army tied down in “fake” brigades with no combined arms capability for complete lack of Combat Supports and Combat Service Supports is, to me, a complete folly, regardless of how many battalions you intend to justify by committing to penny packet presence projects all over Africa, or sandbag filling in the UK during floods.

And this brings me to an even harsher question that needs to be formulated: are 16 Reserve infantry battalions in any way justifiable?

Army 2020 hoped to squeeze more useability out of the Reserve. At one point, it literally cut down several infantry battalions from 3 to 2 companies each with the hope that Reserves would be sufficiently available to fill the gap.

That project never worked out, and eventually the Army has rebuilt the missing companies thanks to the manpower removed from the Specialised Infantry Battalions (which are just 267 strong and thus have released quite a few soldiers back into the system).

The Army Reserve was supposed to relieve the regulars of a number of those standing commitments that absorb so much manpower, but the results have been frankly far from stellar. Reserves have in a few occasions provided much of the Falklands Islands Roulement infantry company; and in February this year “history was made” by building up a Company group, 240-strong, with reservists from 7 RIFLES and 5 RRF for a six month UN peacekeeping turn on the Cyprus Green Line.

I know I will bring even more hate upon myself for posing this question, but I think it can no longer be avoided: is this output actually enough to justify 16 reserve Infantry Battalions?

I don’t blame reservists: they should be rightly praised and thanked for offering their spare time to their Country and I couldn’t respect them more. But the Reserve must be re-assessed for overall value for money, and for functionality. The problem is easily understood: a volunteer who depends on a civilian, full-time job cannot, no matter how well meaning he might be, be available often for long deployments and operations. It’s just unfeasible, unless the volunteers and employers are supported in a whole different way, which however would make the Reserve a whole lot less cheap. It is not an easily solved problem.

But if Regulars cannot be relieved in a meaningful, enduring and assured way from the variety of secondary, enduring tasks, what is the point?

Resilience and Regeneration in times of major crisis is the other big reason for having a Reserve, but again there is an enormous and majorly unpleasant question that no one is considering: is it really feasible, for the UK, to Regenerate combat mass in a crisis in this era?

What magnitude of crisis would make it conceivable?

What would the timeframes look like?

Could it realistically be done in any scenario short of an existential struggle?

If the UK was to be involved in a large scale operation abroad, which required a Division in the field for more than the 6 / 12 months at most that 3^rd Division could sustain, is there any realistic chance of rebuilding enough mass to relieve the deployed Division with another, for example?

Obviously, 1^st Division would have to be rebuilt into a formation capable of actual Combined Arms Operations. What it would overwhelmingly need, however, would be the CS and CSS units it does not possess, not 16 Reserve Infantry Battalions. The Division already has regular infantry, it is everything else that it lacks.

What level of capability could be regenerated, beyond the lightest and most barebone of formations? There is not any significant amount of equipment in storage that could be brought out and issued to Reservists. For example, even assuming the Challenger 2 LEP goes ahead, which in the current budget climate is in no way a given, the number of vehicles being mentioned wouldn’t even be enough for fielding the Royal Wessex Yeomanry in the field, no matter how dire the situation. The regiment has been uplifted to have the capability to put into the field complete, formed crews, but the UK would extremely quickly run out of tanks to give to those formed crews. Do the math by yourself: we have been told numbers that range from around 140 to 167. Even if every single vehicle was issued for operations, it still wouldn’t suffice for a third Type 58 regiment to hit the field.

Warrior CSP, assuming it goes ahead, also will deliver barely enough vehicles for the Regulars, if that. There is zero margin built in into any purchase, and the UK, unlike other countries, has the habit of getting rid of the fleets it removes from active service, to avoid having to spend on its storage and upkeep.

I’ve quoted the heavy armour bits, but the situation does not in any way change by looking at lighter AFV fleets, or other major bits of equipment.

The cupboard is literally empty, there is nothing behind the glass to be broken in case of emergency. What is in storage is needed to equip the regulars, and considering that just four facilities held the majority of the stores, vehicle fleets and munitions, it is hard not to think that in a major, existential crisis the enemy just needs to land good long-range hits on Ashchurch, Monchengladbach, Kineton and Donington to not only knock back any regeneration effort but to maim the regular force itself into near paralysis.

If we are not prepared to imagine a scenario in which an enemy will try to hit those targets, by default it implies we are not prepared to imagine an actual existential scenario / new major war. With all what descends from this.

I always struggle, as a consequence, to imagine Regeneration actually happening, regardless of whether the Army Reserve ever hits its 30.000 trained personnel target (in the near term it won’t, by the way).  

Even if Reservists were called out en masse and were to be actually available for operations, the ability to kit them out for a meaningful operation is next to inexistent.

I am not in a position to know whether Telford and Merthyr Tydfil could possibly be able to start producing whole new vehicles in a hurry in a major crisis, but output and timeframes, if not overall feasibility, are doubtful at best. Even if equipment could be sourced from the US (the only Ally which might be in a position to help, thanks to the huge number of items it keeps stored and its active production lines), a lot of precious time would still be needed to actually train and prepare units.

When it comes to “difficult decisions”, instead of looking at chopping the best manned and best recruiting regular units in the Armed Forces, I’d recommend looking at how the Armed Forces actually plan to fight, and at their true resilience.

A majorly unpleasant decision to be taken might indeed involve the Army Reserve, because those 16 infantry battalions look like a true white elephant. 

The SDSR might want to reassess Reserve numbers and, even more importantly, roles. 

Excellent results come through reservists contributing their specializations to the Army (medical units being just the most visible of examples); but the outcome from the infantry units seems hard to justify.

Moreover, Resilience / Regeneration should be approached in a more systemic and realistic way. A good way to start could be to try and provide 1^st Division and its Brigades with the supports they lack, using Reserve or Hybrid formations. 

If even that proves unfeasible because of low availability, the future of the Reserve might be smaller and more niche. 

No matter how comparatively “cheap” the Reserve is, if it can’t deliver a meaningful output outside a few specific areas, it might still not be worth its cost.

Light Role Infantry battalions and Regular - Reserve integration

As the re-ORBAT process picks up pace within the army, with battalions and regiments shifting to their new Army 2020 structures, some information starts being available to paint a picture of how things are going.

Most affected by Army 2020 changes, the Light Role Infantry battalions are restructuring to reduce their regular manpower, and integrate reserve contributions to make up for part of the loss. The full unit establishment, all-ranks, all-corps, for a Light Role Infantry battalion in Army 2020 is just 561 men.
The reduction has had the most visible effect on the Rifle Companies, which are all losing a Rifle Platoon (from 3 to 2), which is to be replaced by a platoon supplied by the paired Reserve battalion.
The third regular platoon from each Rifle Coy is being re-roled to a Manoeuvre Support Platoon armed with 6 GPMG with Support Fire equipment. The end result is that the Machine Gun Platoon in the Manoeuvre Support Company vanishes, replaced by three platoons assigned directly to the Rifle Coys.
An experiment was run to make these platoons Fire Support Groups including also Javelin anti-tank missiles and GMGs, but eventually a decision was made to keep the two things separate, and task-organize the Fire Support Groups for training and operations.
This simplifies the training and preserves specific experience, as the Anti-Tank Platoon can focus on achieving best effect with Javelin and with the Grenade Machine Gun.

The battalions are using part of the manpower of the Machine Gun Platoon to re-form the Assault Pioneer platoon which in recent years had practically gone away. In many cases (if not in all, i haven't been able to verify for all battalions), the Assault Pioneer platoon is also the Drums / Pipes / Bugles platoon of the battalion.


The Recce platoon within the battalion has seen a downsizing from 32 to 24 men in three sections. 

1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment, "The Vikings", has been running an Army Reserve Integration Pilot since July 2013 and is leading the way on Army 2020 restructuring. The battalion is paired to 3rd Battalion Princess of Wales Royal Regiment (3 PWRR) under the Army 2020 structure.
Its ORBAT is indicative of the new Light Role Infantry structure:


1st Royal Anglian

A (Norfolk) Coy 

2 Rifle Pl 

1 Manoeuvre Support Pl with 6 GPMG 

[3rd Rifle Platoon supplied by paired 3 PWRR Company]  

B (Suffolk) Coy 
2 Rifle Pl 

1 Manoeuvre Support Pl with 6 GPMG 

[3rd Rifle Platoon supplied by paired 3 PWRR Company] 

C (Essex) Coy 
2 Rifle Pl 

1 Manoeuvre Support Pl with 6 GPMG 

[3rd Rifle Platoon supplied by paired 3 PWRR Company] 

D (Cambridgeshire) Support Coy  

Mortar Platoon 
Recce Platoon - Reduces from 32 to 24 men in three sections

Sniper Platoon

AT Javelin Platoon (also employs GMG)

Machine gun SF Platoon - is it vanishing, replaced by the Manoeuvre Support Platoons in the Rifle Companies

Drums Platoon - was in the GPMG SF role; now re-training to take up Assault Pioneer role; learning Explosive Method of Entry (EMO), water purification, concreting etcetera

HQ Coy

Motor Transport Platoon  

Quartermaster Department – Under Army 2020 all quartermaster deps are receiving an embedded 1^st Line Optimisation team of 4 men from the Royal Logistic Corps

REME LAD – barracks manning steady state 16 other ranks; increased to 2 officers and 48 ORs with 4 Close Support REME Battalion uplift for the training deployment in Kenya; indicative of operational situations 

Communication Information Systems (CIS) Platoon

 


The integration pilot is important as it was meant to show if and how the Reserves would be able to provide the third platoon in an acceptable way. A Coy trained with its Reserve component in the UK,

in several events, including a 2-day exercise on Salisbury Plain and Live Firing in Warcop. At the end of this preparation stage, the Reserves Platoon would deploy to BATUK in Kenya, integrated in the regular company, and immediately face the Combined Arms Live Firing Exercise (CALFEX) there. 

The report of the experience is, unsurprisingly, a mixed account of success and failure. As is to be expected, reservists had trouble in attending all the UK training events, and it was hard, and often impossible, to have everyone present in one place to face training events such as Live Firing in Warcop. The platoon, however, made it to Kenya as planned, and took part in the CALFEX. We don't have and probably won't have the details anytime soon, but the report we have acknowledges that the platoon took part in the very same training events as the regulars: again, as was to be expected all along, the reservists weren't as prepared as the regulars and could not employ all the weapons and equipment. The soldiers of today are loaded with a huge amount of kit, all of it quite complex and specialised: all of it comes with huge manuals and important training needs attached, and it can't surprise anyone to learn that the reservists struggle to take it all in the limited time they have to train and prepare.

Despite the issues, the short report, contained in CASTLE, the journal of the Royal Anglian regiment,

comes with positive tones. At the very least, however, the army is faced with the problem of a two-speed force, which comes with limitations that will have to be known, managed and mitigated as best as possible. 

The short article covering the Integration Pilot. It won't be easy to learn from the army how serious the problems actually are, of course. The article appeared on CASTLE, journal of the Royal Anglian Regiment: http://www.royalanglianregiment.com/castle.html

In order to provide support to their paired battalions, the Reserve is changing its own ORBAT. Army 2020 Reserve battalions are being progressively standardized on an establishment of around 400 men in one HQ Company and 3 Rifle Companies (which means several companies have been cut off and/or merged). Each Rifle Coy comes with a Support Weapons Platoon and 2 Rifle Platoons. 

The output of the Reserve battalion, once fully adjusted to the planned Army 2020 structure, should include 6 Rifle Platoons, one Mortars platoon, one Javelin missile platoon, one machine gun platoon and one assault pioneer platoon. The HQ company includes the Quartermaster department, a Motor Transport element and a CIS Platoon. 

A Reserve battalion, once fully structured and manned, should be able to provide the 3 Rifle Platoons needed to integrate the paired regular battalion, plus a number of reinforcements for the other components of the unit. The reserve battalions apparently continue to hold a supporting relationship with their regiment, as well as that with the paired regular battalion. As the 1st Royal Anglian - 3rd PWRR pairing remind us, the pairing is often done with units of another regiment entirely. 
The second Royal Anglian battalion is paired to 3rd Royal Anglian, but this is not at all the rule for all units.

On the equipment front  

The battalions are being equipped with the FIST 1A sights, in particular the Lightweight Day Sight (Elcan Specter 4x), but also the night vision equipment. The new General Service Pistol, the Glock 17 Gen 4 (L131A1), is in delivery and apparently the new fighting knife is already being issued, as well. 

Next year there should be the first deliveries of the VIRTUS tactical vest and load carrying equipment, which are for now in use only for testing and development. Selected groups in the Army are being issued the kit to try it out and make their evaluations and provide feedback ahead of the final choices. 

The L129A1 Sharpshooter rifle is being taken into the core budget, but the latest report suggests that the weapon is still searching its actual place in the Army of the future. The Small Arms School Corps, tasked with developing the training and methods for best employment of the weaponry of the Army, say that, despite the welcome the rifle received by the troops on the ground, the L129A1 isn't showing the dramatic performace improvements it was supposed to deliver. 

Its effectiveness out to 800 meters, the distance for which its 7.62x51 mm calibre was believed to be indispensable, is being questioned. The rifle is reportedly not showing particular improvements over the L86A2 Light Support Weapon, the long-barreled brother of the L85A2 assault rifle. 
The L86A2 during recent firing trials ended up being the best performing weapon out to 500 meters, and more than held the comparison with the L129A1 out to 800.

One thing that is given as certain is that the ACOG 6x sight is part of the problem of the L129A1. It is not ballistically matched to the rifle, so that it represents a less than optimal solution. Funding has been provided to modify the graticule in the sight to ballistically match it to the weapon and to the 16 inches barrel. The modified sight should be in testing already, and it should eventually enable a repeat of the tests and competition with the L86A2 to write down a final assessment and decide the way ahead for the two weapons.  
The selection of the ACOG 6x for the sharpshooter requirement was done under Urgent Operational Requirement, of course, but one has nonetheless to wonder if a better experimentation before making the purchase wouldn't have been possible.
 
In the meanwhile, the L86A2 is indeed making a comeback already, being reassigned to the infantry sections in the sharpshooter / support role. It is being re-rolled into service in numbers, and there is potential for upgrades to better perform in the role. the Small Arms Corps has been testing an upgraded variant, with the old bipod replaced by the same used on the L129A1 and a completely reworked forestock coming with picatinny rails, like already done with the L85A2. 

 

From top to bottom, the L86A2 in its traditional configuration with SUSAT sight; the modified L86A2 with new forestock, bipod and muzzle (possibly even the barrel has been changed?) and ACOG 6x sight; and finally, the L129A1 with ACOG 6x.

 

The L129A1 was at one point expected to be removed from the infantry sections and assigned as Sniper No2 weapon, to fullfil the Sniper Support Weapon requirement. The latest Small Arms School Corps report suggest that this decision has been reversed: the L129A1 has not been accepted as long-term solution to the requirement, which is now being formalized to then launch an acquisition programme.  

The L129A1 in Sniper Support Weapon configuration, with suppressor and ACOG replaced by a Schmidt & Bender 12x magnification sight

 

Sniper No 2

Despite the apparently brilliant start, the L129A1 is struggling to secure a role for the future. It is another chapter in the never-ending controversy that pitches the 5.56 round against alternatives of all kind, from nearly designed "intermediate calibres" up to the traditional 7.62.

Among the equipment to soon be replaced, there is also the famous M18A1 Claymore mine. The evaluation process is complete, and the new Fixed Directional Fragmentation Weapon will be assigned to units in training this December. ISD is planned for September 2015. 

The FDFW is virtually identical to the Claymore in general look, concept and effect, but with an improvement in lethality. The new mine is produced in Finland. There are no details available, but probably the new mine will also respond to other requirements such as inert explosive for safety, and hopefully weight reduction, which is always welcome. 

The army is working to introduce a Tactical Hearing Protection System capable to automatically protect the user from excessive battlefield noise; new laser targeting and mortar fire control computer and an experiment is ongoing to verify the tactical merit of having suppressors available for the whole range of weapons employed by the infantry, including the GPMG. A whole platoon equipped with the suppressors will test them during a two-weeks firing programme planned for Novembe. 

For all of 2013, the 60mm Light Mortar continued to be part of the training for the infantry battalions, but the weapon is expected to have to go after operations in Afghanistan conclude. The mortar was procured as UOR to reintroduce a capability that had been available for ages in the Platoons, thanks to the 51mm mortar. It was phased out believing that the introduction of under slung grenade launchers would provide a proper replacement, but the experience on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan proved it wasn't quite the case. 
Last year, the Army said that the Platoon Mortar would eventually leave the army again, with the weapons mothballed. Only the PARA and Commando units would retain a number of them in use, to preserve their capability and to keep alive expertise of their employment. 
This is another example of cut corner. It is to be hoped that the decision will be reversed, like it has happened in other cases.

Considerations 

The integration concept has merit, and in theory it should enable the delivery of strong deployable battalions, even after the harsh manpower cut. The question is: how much can effectively be squeezed out of the reserve, and how reliably? Is it going to deliver what is needed, when it is needed? The Army needs to be aware of the limitations of the concept, and plan accordingly.

My thoughts on some parts of Army 2020 have not changed. The manpower limits are tight, and are causing serious issues and lots of compromise. Many corners have been cut in the attempt to fit into a piece of cloth just too small to get everything covered. 

As we know, the government did not want to deal with the outcry connected with the loss of capbadges and specifically ordered the Army to remove no more than 5 battalions of infantry from the ORBAT, and avoid the loss of any regimental badge. In my opinion, this has had a disproportionate effect on Army 2020, forcing the Army to stitch together a plan as workable as possible, while being forced to maintain more battalions and brigade HQs than it can actually man, equip, support and train. It has to be said, Nick Carter and his team came up with quite a good plan, probably the most convincing they could put together given the political constraints... but for the good of the army and of the nation, it would be better to adjust the plan in the near future, because capability matters more than capbadges. 

As i've said several times over the past two years or so, i believe it would be better for the army to have less battalions, but with more adequate establishments. The number of brigades should also be tweaked, and support units (such as Signals, in particular) should have to be uplifted to re-align better with a structure that, in my opinion, would have to primarily focus on six brigades (the three reaction ones, and three adaptable ones, all three "complete" instead of the current arrangement of "3 to make 2") plus 16 Air Assault brigade. This is doable, i believe, within the manpower figure for Army 2020, if the Army is allowed to employ that manpower freely instead of under such severe capbadges constraints. 3 homogeneous armoured infantry brigades and three lighter brigades would enable a more effective and rational force generation cycle, and deliver, in each year, two brigades trained at suitable level to engage on operations, helping to meet the defence guidelines set by the SDSR, which assumes up to 3 simultaneous, significant operations. 

But i will discuss in detail my proposal for the army in a future article. I would like to make a series of proposals for the three services ahead of the SDSR 2015. So, watch this space.