What NATO wants

While the publication of the Strategic Defence Review is some time away still and surprises are the only thing that is always to be expected in British policy for Defence, we actually have a pretty clear idea of what NATO is asking of the UK and what the UK, in broad terms, has committed to. 

Top of the list, for importance and cost both, is the Nuclear Deterrent. 

The traditional UK role in the North Atlantic area and ideally up into the Arctic follows, because regardless of how often this fact is overlooked, the UK’s vital frontline is in the north. That’s where the UK mainland and Russia are virtually “in touch”, across the sea. That’s the direction from which Russian submarine and surface threats and their long range aviation and missiles would be coming from. The UK is expected to have a lead role in controlling this sea front. 

This commitment is multi-faceted and goes from Anti-Submarine Warfare to Carrier Strike to the historic yet so often overlooked commitment to sustain northern Norway from the sea through the UK-Netherlands joint amphibious force. 

Always remember that the world actually looks like this. The UK's geography is an inescapable fact. 

Carrier Strike used to be a key component of the NATO North Flank plans in the Cold War (HMS Ark Royal IV ended her days working with US and French carriers in the Northern Strike Group) and regardless of how hard Army and RAF-inspired lobbies try to deny this, it remains a factor. 

It increasingly means delivering seafloor surveillance and protection of key underwater and surface infrastructure, too, in the North Sea and into the Baltic, where a specific NATO mission has just launched after repeated “incidents” of submarine cables being cut. 

On land, the UK and NATO have agreed, already under the previous government, that the British Army’s main role within the Alliance’s New Force Model is to resource a “multidomain Corps” as SACEUR’s “go-to” Strategic Reserve. Specifically, in the New Force Model, SACEUR is to have two highly-responsive Reserve Corps, one from France and one from the UK. The new Secretary, John Healey, reaffirmed this “multidomain Corps” commitment in his speech at the RUSI Land Warfare conference in July last year, soon after the Election. While the speech itself does not add further detail, it had been reported that during the event he further specified that the “ambition” is for a British Corps of 2 Divisions with 6 brigades”. 

The Corps is of course the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which has started the transition towards the new role as soon as its latest turn leading the NATO Response Force (NRF) concluded (1 Jan 2024 – 1 July 2024). It was indeed an important date for NATO as a whole as the NRF became the new and restructured Allied Reaction Force (ARF), which will be led, for the first 3 years, by the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA). 

The Divisions are obviously 1st Div and 3rd Div. 1st Division has only recently gotten the uplift needed to resume some credibility as a deployable 2-star HQ and has immediately been trusted into a key high-readiness role, covering the transition from the old to the new Reaction Force. 1st Division has been the lead ARF component since 1st July 2024, mainly through 7th Light Mechanised BCT, an aviation task force and an integral operational sustainment brigade supported by elements of 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade. 

The ARRC’s “evolution” towards the new role has in the meanwhile seen the resubordination under its command of key formations including 7th Air Defence Group and 1st Aviation Brigade. De-facto, in order to deliver the Corps as described, all major formations will eventually have to report to the ARRC. 

NATO also wants to see the UK acquire more credible air defence options. This is an increasingly urgent gap to fill and it is historically particularly bad for the UK which, in terms of Ground Based Air Defence, essentially only deals in SHORAD and has for decades, completely avoiding any investment in longer range missiles and any real anti-ballistic capability. 

In theory, the UK is, already since the SDSR 2015, committed to contributing to NATO-wide Missile Defence efforts with a new anti-ballistic radar to be built on British soil. This commitment is known internally as Project LEWIS (possibly from the name of the island, where the radar might be sited) and led to a request filed to the US State Department for acquisition of a Long Range Discrimination Radar. Authorization to procure it arrived in March 2022 but no evident progress has been made since, with Project LEWIS operational capability officially delayed until 2029. 

The UK has been authorized to procure a Long Range Discrimination Radar set for Project LEWIS 

NATO has also made increasingly clear and public that the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. This is something that has been made clear at the SDR table, along with one simple, albeit perhaps unwelcome reality: there is not an “Indo-Pacific tilt” that can be cut to free up substantial resources, no matter how many times the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary have claimed otherwise during their pre-Election speeches. It would be both strategically illiterate and financially useless to cut what little the UK has committed to the “East of Suez”, and this point at least seems to have been understood by government: Lammy and Healey have both long ceased to attack the “Indo-Pacific tilt”, indeed changing tune entirely. Their most recent speeches invariably underline the indivisibility of the two major regions of concern. 

NATO is also going to increasingly make clear that, as far as it is concerned, “3 (% of GDP) is the new 2”, but it doesn’t look likely the UK will be among the eager proponents of this new target, this time around. We are unfortunately still far from sure that even just the 2.5% target will be reached before this Parliament ends. 

What does it all mean in practice? 

Again, only assumptions can be made because the fact both logic and NATO are asking for some actions do not in any way imply the British government will follow those directions. 

In theory, Carrier Strike is safe and sound. NATO continues to value the commitment to provide Carrier Strike in the North Flank context and beyond, and the carriers are paid for. In general, no matter how some lobbies in the UK continue to campaign for it, NATO is not going to ask for existing capability to be cut in favour of dubious savings and even more dubious investments to follow in something else. The government’s confirmation of the Fleet Solid Support procurement with all 3 vessels confirmed through the new deal with Navantia also logically suggest Carrier Strike remains very much central.

ASW, including submarines (SSN-AUKUS) also remains critical and thus, again in theory “safe”. 

The amphibious role in Norway remains in demand and is part of some of the oldest multi-national commitments the UK has in place (with the Netherlands and with Norway) but this has not been enough to spare the ALBION-class LPDs from early removal from service, again confirming that logic can only ever go so far when it comes to British plans for Defence. 

Again in theory, the expectation is that we will see plans for a second, purpose-built Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship confirmed. This vessel is planned with a very specific role in mind: “Deep Sea Data Gathering”. It will be more complex, more specialized and more expensive than RFA PROTEUS and will replace HMS SCOTT, the critical deep-sea survey vessel that is fundamental to ASW and the Deterrent. Between the subsea surveillance needs, NATO-wide, and the critical relevance of that survey capability to the Deterrent and the ASW mission, the construction of this vessel should be a certainty but, i can never stress this enough, British defence plans are a weird and mysterious world apart. 

It is no mystery that, whatever the difficulties RAF and Royal Navy face (which we can summarize primarily with the single word “personnel”), the most uncertainty, risk and trouble is to be found on Land given the absolutely horrible shape the British Army self-mutilated into through the STRIKE Brigade disaster. NATO is understanding and knows it will take time to recover, and understands the “British Corps” will (probably?) never be quite a Corps like the Alliance intends. 

What NATO will invariably demand is that the ARRC and its assigned combat units are properly enabled. This means they need to have credible artillery, air defence, ISR, logistics, engineering, EW, CBRN and medical capability. What NATO expects from the Reserve Corps is clearly a “self-contained” force that, when directed into action by SACEUR, is able to adapt to the situation and the terrain and act “independently”, without needing all sorts of backfill from other Allies to plug capability gaps. 

What the UK is being asked to provide is, indicatively, the 8th largest land component in NATO. It’s a substantial ask, but should not in any way be seen as something beyond the realms of the possible. The brigades, to some extent, already exist. 

In case some of the readers are not familiar with the British Army’s current structures, there are currently 2 armoured infantry brigades (12 and 20), a Light Mechanized brigade (7th) and an Air Assault brigade (16th) which, while not without problems and shortcomings, have a full roster of capabilities including key enablers. One major, major exception is proper artillery for the armoured brigades because at present the British Army has just 14 ARCHER 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, ex-Sweden, after accelerating the withdrawal of AS90 to pass the whole fleet to Ukraine. This is however supposed to be fixed in the coming years procuring BOXER RCH155s (Mobile Fires Platform project). 

The Divisions as they emerged from Future Soldier. Some things have changed since as some units have re-subordinated (most notaly 16 Air Assault has come under 1st Division, while 8th Engineer Bde and 7th Air Defence Group have moved directly under ARRC), but the lack of enablers has remained.

The Army also fields a small Army Special Operations Brigade (ASOB) with 4 Ranger “battalions” (not really battalion-sized at all), which in NATO context will have a stay-behind / deep reconnaissance and target acquisition focus. The UK is to lead NATO’s Special Forces component and the ASOB will be fundamental in providing the lead SOF component in 2026 as part of NATO’s regular rotations. 

4 Brigade at present is a “bag” of regular infantry battalions with dubious access to Reserve-manned enablers (artillery, logistics, engineer). This is not credible and would need fixing by building the missing enabler battalions. It would also need, in time, to be given appropriate vehicles: most realistically, a mixture of FOXHOUND and the future Land Mobility Medium – Troop Carrier Vehicle that is supposed to be procured. 4 and 7 could thus both serve as “Light Mechanized” formations. 

Another brigade that won’t count as a manoeuvre brigade in NATO’s eyes (in everyone’s eyes, really) is 1st Deep Recconnaissance and Strike Brigade (DRS). This is really a glorified, super-sized Divisional Artillery Group with organic recce Cavalry at present, devoid of infantry, engineers and logistics. It has fantastic firepower thanks to 2 regiments of GMLRS (3 Royal Horse Artillery and 26 Royal Artillery) and at least for now also controls the ARCHER / RCH155 regiments (1 RHA and 19 RA) which however are, de facto, there to support 12 and 20 Bdes, but the absence of organic Logistic regiments makes its useability doubtful. The artillery component, particularly the GMLRS launchers, would consume fantastic amounts of ammunition and its not clear, to say it charitably, how the Army believes that ammunition will be moved. 

ARRC has since taken under direct control 7th Air Defence Group, 8th Engineer Bde and 1st Aviation Bde as well 

1st DRS could be turned into an acceptable manoeuvre formation relatively easily. At present it is planned to have 2 Cavalry regiments with AJAX. If 2 BOXER-mounted infantry battalions were moved into the formation, it would assume the structure that had been imagined for the abortive STRIKE brigades. It would need the addition of a Close Support engineering battalion, a dedicate Close Support Logistic regiment and, realistically given the Army’s intention to compensate its other weaknesses through increased reliance on deep strike means such as GMLRS, a dedicate Logistic regiment to move the rocket pods for reloading the M270s. 

Last of the “non-brigades” is currently 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, a formation made up by 4 “non-battalions” (they are less than half the size of a real infantry battalion) specialized in delivering training and mentoring. This is not, by all means, a useless service, but it’s clear that it counts for nothing at all against the main “design driver” of building up a “credible” Corps. 

Unsurprisingly, all rumours agree on the fact that 11 Brigade will change shape and role. I’m insistently hearing whispers of 11 Brigade being transformed into a sort of lightweight counterpart to 1st DRS (which is of course part of 3rd Division, the heavy one) to, presumably, serve as 1st Division’s own “eyes” and “hammer”. 

This is interesting, but raises concerns on what exactly the Army is attempting to do. The hints point to a structure in which 3 Div fields 12, 20 and 1 DRS brigades while 1 Div would have 4, 7 and 11 DRS, with 16 Air Assault presumably leaving 1st Division and resuming her previous “independence” as a high readiness force. Depending on how this was done in detail, it would be either a more ambitious plan (with 7 rather than 6 “credible” brigades) or less ambitious one in which, at beast, 5 brigades would be credible as ground combat formations (12, 20, 4, 7 and 16) with the two DRSs being artillery brigades by any other name. 

With the (unjustifiably late, it was always exceedingly unlikely) realization that the Armed Forces manpower totals will not grow, the Army’s only hope of making its brigades “credible” and finding personnel to man increased numbers of M270 GMLRS and new Air Defence batteries (possibly a 3rd regiment to be added in the role) will come from ruthlessly cutting everything that does not help fill the gaps. Not munching words: in order to create additional artillery, logistics and engineer battalions, infantry battalions numbers will have to decrease. 

The attempt to hold on to 7 "brigades" through reconfiguration of 11 is highly unlikely (euphemism) to include the measures of painful realism needed to redistribute manpower and rebuild the missing enablers. 

The current 32 regular infantry “battalions” (as mentioned earlier, many already are much smaller than true battalions) are unsustainable and (largely) unjustified. The desired 6 brigades force, plus ASOB and standing tasks (2 battalions in Cyprus, 1 committed to Public Duties, 1 in Brunei, 1 experimental unit and 1 UK Special Forces Support Group) require no more than 26. It’s tight, unpleasant, difficult and will require years to build new units and manage the progressive redistribution of manpower, but if the total headcount stays at circa 73K there is simply no alternative. 

NATO will not be fooled into calling brigades formations that have no hope of actually going into the field as one. While the UK government strenuously refuses to release even a “curated” version of the regular NATO Defence Planning Capability Review reports, those will keep coming and will keep pointing out every area in which promises are not being kept. Elsewhere, the Netherlands Defence Planning Capability Review has been released in curated, unclassified form, showing planning assumptions and the areas where NATO identified shortcomings. The Netherlands have since enacted a number of procurement programs to cure those issues. 

Observation of what is happening in the Netherlands and elsewhere leaves us in no doubt at all about NATO being very explicit about the need for Brigades and Divisions and Corps to have their own enablers. Sweden, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy are all busy building or re-building the missing enablers of their brigades and divisions and there are zero reasons to believe the UK is not being given the exact same instructions. 

This, by the way, quietly but surely involves also “details” such as ensuring mechanized infantry battalions have appropriate firepower. The Netherlands, again, have visibly responded by initiating procurement efforts to put turreted BOXERs with 30 mm guns in their formations. Do we believe for one second the UK isn’t being told the same things...? 

As of the Major Projects report 2023/24 (current to last march), the Army’s 2 main AFV programs (AJAX and BOXER) have a combined cost of just short of 14 billion pounds, with a combined total of 1212 vehicles in production. That this veritable treasure doesn’t yet contain any proper “battalion set” of infantry carriers with suitable armament, mortar vehicles and anti-tank solutions is the measure of the failure of the Army to plan a sensible structure for itself. 

It is time to fix both the sclerotic AFV plan and the equally confused Army structure. I understand the Army’s preferred way out of the mess it has created for itself would be adding a tail of ARES infantry carriers, fitted with a suitable crewless, non-hull penetrating turret, to the AJAX production to equip the 4 infantry battalions in 12 and 20 Brigades. This would, ideally, release a substantial number of BOXER hulls for other roles (mortar and recovery modules are supposed to be ordered “soon”) while, ideally, also delivering a couple of BOXER-mounted battalions for 1st DRS. This would be the most “logical” and overall not overly expensive, way out of the mess. Whether the SDR will give the green light to this approach or not, we don’t yet know. 

International Armoured Vehicles conference will be this week, but I’m not optimistic we’ll get an answer (yet). 

NATO would be equally fine with putting a turret on BOXER itself, but one solution or another will be needed. In one way or the other, AJAX and BOXER will have to coexist and, however sub-optimal that is, the Army needs to make this combo work. 

And regardless of how unpleasant it is, the Army also needs to re-balance its headcount to put manpower and resources towards much needed enablers. Make-believe plans are not going to get a pass from NATO, and the quiet and polite “displeasure” of the Alliance might eventually materialize with the British Army finding its role within the Alliance changed to properly reflect what it is and not what it would like to be. 

In a non-distant future we might well see the UK quietly pushed out of high prestige roles, most notably Deputy SACEUR, if the UK output quality keeps collapsing. 

What NATO wants is mostly clear. What the British Army and British government are able and willing to do is not.