Towards tomorrow's minesweeping ops

Minesweeping today

The drones

SeaFox: In 2006, the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) announced that it had placed an order worth around £35m for 16 ship sets and a war-stock of expendable mine destructor vehicles of the Seafox One-Shot Mine-Disposal System (OSMDS). Prime contractor Ultra, developer and design authority Atlas Elektronik and logistic support house Babcock was to supply the systems to the RN over a period of three years, starting in 2007.
The contract award followed the successful deployment of the system back in March 2003 during 'Op Telic' when Atlas Elektronik provided the RN with a number of Seafox rounds for operational use in theatre.

An MOD report – entitled 'Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the future' – stated that the one-shot system was 'vital to clearing the waterway leading to the port of Umm Qasr', and that 'it is estimated that the OSMDS reduced the time to neutralise a mine by a factor of four'. The Seafox system offered UK forces a simplified and quicker system, which required fewer operators.

Subsequent evaluation tests since then, both in a tank and at sea, and a live trial of the explosives against sea mines, convinced the MOD of the value of such a system, until the decision was taken, and the OSMDS replaced the PAP Mk 3 and Mk 5 remote controlled mine disposal system vehicles previously used by the Rn’s fleet of MCMVs.

The current SeaFox is actually a family of drones, with two different machines working in cooperation: the re-usable SeaFox I is the “recce” element, used to locate the mine on the seabed, while the SeaFox C is a suicide, one-shot disposal drone which is destroyed together with the mine to neutralize. The SeaFox I, remarkably, can be readied for a new mission in just 15 minutes after being recovered at the end of the previous sortie, while the shaped charge warhead used by SeaFox C is insensitive and allows for safe transport. SeaFox is operational in Sea State 5, and has a range of some 1000 meters.  

SeaFox and a mine on the seabed. Found ya!

Currently, minesweepers deploy SeaFox by a modified crane dropping the drone into the water from the side of the ship. Recovery is done by using a portable command console that a man from the deck of the ship uses to visually drive the drone onto a “fishing net” which is then lifted back up on the ship. ULTRA has a good video showing all the operations, you can see it here.

SeaFox is, currently, the main weapon of the Hunt and Sandown class minesweepers, and the system has been again used, wholly successfully, in the recent Libya operations, when HMS Bangor disposed of a 2500 pounds mine and a torpedo which had been obstructing entrance to the port of Tobruk.

REMUS 100: Again, operations in Iraq in 2003 inspired the evolution of core-role equipment for the RN’s MCM operations. The UK MCM capability deployed during 'Op Telic' was enhanced with the Australian-developed Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System (SWIMS). SWIMS was developed specifically for this operation and was the coalition's remote-controlled minesweeping equipment designed to operate in the small rivers and waterways in the south of Iraq. SWIMS uses Mini Magnetic Dyads which are towed behind Combat Support Boats to blow up magnetic mines. A mini-dyad is a floating tube, which contains high-powered strontium ferrite magnets. When strung together with a noise maker, a number of mini-dyads are able to fool the mine into thinking that a ship is passing by, causing detonation

The Dyads were acquired from Australian Defence Industries (ADI) as they were the only known influence minesweeping system self-powered and able to operate in a shallow water environment. The mini-dyads were acquired by the Royal Navy to undergo a 12 month testing period, but were rushed into service to deal with the sophisticated Manta mines laid by the Iraqi forces in the Khawr Abd Allah waterway during operation Telic.

SWIMS successfully filled a gap in the RN's shallow water capability, and after being procured against a tight timescale and delivered through the Urgent Operational Requirement process, offered very good reliability in theatre.

Interestingly, the US used the AN/ALQ-219 SWIMS system, towed by helicopters such as CH53 and MH60, a work for which Japan uses the AW101 Merlin. The Royal Navy does not have a great fondness for this kind of methods, also due to its cost, but an Aerial drone is planned as part of the future, stand-off MCM capability. It will be interesting to see what role such drone receives as part of the overall solution.

Building on the success of SWIMS in Iraq, the RN subsequently introduced a very shallow water UUV (from 30m to the surf zone) capability. The experience of operations in Iraq in 2003 is behind the decision to acquire 10 REMUS 100 vehicles. The UUVs were acquired in March 2005 from Hydroid under a £2.7m contract awarded by the UK Defence Procurement Agency. Two further systems, which have been trialed by QinetiQ, have subsequently been upgraded to the same standard as the new vehicles, giving a total inventory of 12 vehicles. QinetiQ and Babcock provide training and logistic supports for the UUVs. The REMUS 100 only weights 37 kg and is designed for operation in coastal environments up to 100 meters in depth.

REMUS 600: The MOD then procured two large UUVs to undertake MCM reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys and environmental monitoring, but they will also be capable of providing more general support to both military and civilian search and salvage operations. The contract was signed in 2007, and saw the acquisition of the US manufacturer Hydroid's REMUS 600 drone, for some 5.5 million pounds. The REMUS 600 vehicles provides a detailed maritime survey and mine detection and classification capability, and was procured for MCM reconnaissance in the 30m to 200m depth range, although the vehicle can operate down to 600m. It is fitted with a range of sensors and runs on re-chargeable batteries giving it an endurance of over 70 hours. The Remus 600 can be deployed from any vessel equipped with a one tonne crane or davit, so it is a quite easily deployable system, although they will almost certainly be mainly operated from the RN's Hunt class minesweepers. The Remus 600 weights 240 kg, and is remarkably similar to a lightweight torpedo such as Stingray, sharing even the 324 mm diameter of it.

The manned part of the deal: The other key tenant of the navy's MCM capability is of course undertaken by the UK Royal Navy's Fleet Diving Squadron (FDS). Limited in terms of numbers, the role of the FDS is increasingly expanding into new areas, and new technology is required in order to accomplish additional roles.

The FDS has a wide remit, including dealing with unexploded Second World War mines, conducting underwater surveys of ports and jetties for deployed RN ships, and clearing waterways and beaches of mines ahead of the arrival of amphibious assault forces or humanitarian aid.

The majority of the RN's operational clearance diving has been to a maximum depth of around 50m. Some aspects of MCM require a deep dive capability, such as mine investigation and exploitation, particularly in the early stages of a campaign when it is important for the MCM Vessels to know what they are up against. They can then alter their tactics accordingly.

Each RN MCMV currently has a diving team on board to undertake mine-clearance operations. As a result of this requirement, an RN diver can expect to spend roughly one-third of their career as a minehunter in the MCMV fleet.

Each MCMV team has three AB divers, one leading hand and one petty officer diver, as well as two specialist mine clearance divers. The divers are there as part of the weapon system of the ship along with the remote controlled mine disposal system vehicles. They are there to identify contacts detected by the ship's sonar. Once a contact has been identified, the diver can lay explosives to destroy the mine.

Towards MHPC and tomorrow’s stand-off minesweeping

The MCM, Hydrographic, Patrol Capability, or MHPC for short, previously known as “C3”, is the multirole mothership and the associated family of unmanned drones and systems that the Navy plan to use to replace its current fleet of minesweepers and the two Echo class survey ships from around 2018. The programme, with a budget currently indicated in some 1.4 billion pounds, aims for some 8 ships, which as the name suggest will combine several roles in one only hull.

They will be rather large ships (2000 to 3000 tons), with steel hulls and thus with nothing to share with current, expensive, plastic-hulled minesweepers. The Hunt class minesweepers have the (questionable) glory of being the most expensive ship per ton built for the RN. They have superb capacity of holding a steady position even in rough waters, and their Glass-Reinforced Plastic hulls allow them to slip even into minefields. However, GRP is of course not as good as steel for seafaring and for resistance, and the Hunts and Sandowns aren’t the best of ships to sail in rough seas. They are also slow and relatively short legged, which makes their deployment to the Gulf more difficult. The US Navy has been using Float On – Float Off (FLO-FLO) vessels for long range transfers of minesweepers, but this of course is not financially viable for the UK.

The MHPC will be larger, built out of steel, and with a greater range and endurance, suitable for Ocean Patrol and Maritime Security taskings, as implied by the “Patrol” part of their name. They will be ships more capable across the range of roles, and far more deployable. But they won’t have the Hunt’s capability of going into minefields.

Nor does the RN want ships to go into minefields anymore. Ever since 2005, MCM ops are increasingly of a stand-off nature, and the Combined Sweep kit used by Hunt minesweepers has been retired.   

The MHPC will have to do its MCM work from a safe, stand-off position, which might be miles away from the minefield to remove. To do this, and to cover all other missions it is asked to take over, it will have to be able to carry and operate suites of modular, remotely-controlled or autonomous kit.  

ATLAS Elektronik is the MOD’s selected main partner for working towards such an unmanned MCM “systems of systems”. If the plan is not changed, before this month is over, ATLAS Elektronik and the MOD / Royal Navy will stage a week long test and demonstration campaign, to validate the latest solutions and continue to refine the concept.

Such week of activies would build on the success of another demonstration, which ATLAS staged last July, when the company showcased its C-IMCMS system and concept at its test site at Bincleaves, Weymouth on south coast of England. Representatives from Germany, Great Britain, Canada, the USA, Belgium, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Thailand took part. During this demonstration, there was no mothership, but a containerized command centre deployed ashore, and a variety of drones deployed again from ashore. The new demonstration of this month, if confirmed, should be staged from a ship, probably a RN Hunt minesweeper.

The July demonstration, anyway, was already of capital importance, as it proved the immediate feasibility of a number of concepts indispensable for the successful prosecution of the MHPC vision. The C-IMCMS (Containerised Integrated Mine Countermeasures System) consists of several systems:

-          a portable combat management system as well as the analysis software CLASSIPHI for post mission analysis of side-scan sonar data, which, installed in a TEU container, would be easily transferable to any vessel with sufficient space provision and adequate power interface

-         the unmanned surface vessel (USV) FAST, developed by ATLAS under a 2007 contract awarded by the UK MOD

-         the autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) SeaOtter Mk II;

-          the mine disposal system (ROV) SeaFox

FAST (Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology): this USV was developed by ATLAS ELEK-TRONIK UK to carry out acoustic and magnetic influence sweeping, in which a towed body is used to emulate the corresponding signatures of a ship and thus cause the mines to detonate. The FAST was funded by the MOD with the aim of developing a replacement for the Combined Influence Sweep (CIS) capability which was dismissed from the Hunt class minesweepers in 2005. It has yet to enter service, but was trialed successfully in several occasions since 2009, and it is being used actively to shape the future requirements and systems.

According to a Sunday Mirror article, the FAST drone will be ready for adoption in service within the next two years. But the article is wrong on the 600-jobs loss and on the Hunt retirement rumor. This is a conclusion too bold: the FAST is actually intended, ever since it was ordered, to EQUIP the Hunt class minesweepers to replace them in the dangerous Combined Sweep work, not to REPLACE the vessels and their crews whole. In this sense, Babcock did already prepare plans for the modifications to the rear working area of the Hunt class, which will enable each Minesweeper to carry and deploy a couple of FAST drones.  So, while some jobs will be perhaps lost, the scenario is very different from that painted by the short article. Far more jobs are effectively at risk come 2018, when the 8 MHPC eventually replace 14 Hunt and Sandown vessels, but this is another story, and one too far away in time for advancing hypothesis about. 

Babcock has already made proposals for modifications of the rear area of Hunt minesweepers, to allow the carriage and deployment of two FAST drones

Since contract award, the role of FAST has expanded. From a more sophisticate, non-UOR SWIMS, it became an unmanned workhorse acting as a mothership itself to a range of other drones. During the July demonstration, in fact, FAST was used to remotely deploy SeaFox. SeaFox can work some 1000 meters away from the deploying platform, so it is essential to have a “taxi” platform capable to deploy it at distance and fitted with radio for relaying data to and from the SeaFox drone over the miles separating it from the mothership. And this was demonstrated in July, proving that one of the most challenging aspects of the whole concept is perfectly feasible, and indeed already working. SeaFox was for the first time remote-controlled from the container based ashore through a combination of a radio link to the FAST USV and a fibre-optic cable from FAST USV to Seafox. Both sonar and video data captured by SeaFox were transmitted in real-time via radio link.

The FAST (Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology) system is being developed by an industry team led by Atlas Elektronik UK, and has completed an Interim Design Review for a mine countermeasures (MCM) Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) demonstrator system under development for the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Atlas-QED industry team also includes EDO Corporation and QinetiQ. The consortium won a GBP4.3 million (USD8.6 million) contract from the UK's Research Acquisition Organisation in May 2007 for the two-year Technology Readiness Demonstrator (TRD) programme, known as Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology (FAST), which culminated in trials aboard HMS Ledbury in mid 2009.

The FAST platform is a modified Logistic Support Boat (LSB-R), sharing the hull of the proven, in-service Combat Support Boat.  The CSB is a powerful, versatile craft whose major role is to support both bridging and amphibious operations.  The FAST platform builds on the success of the CSB while incorporating significant performance improvements to meet the demanding requirements of this programme. 

A graphic of FAST, shown in its main roles: as "taxi" for SeaFox, and as Combined Influence Swep drone

 

The FAST system’s main features are:

• Flexible
• Configurable 2/3-Electrode magnetic sweep and Integrated Coil
• Cable design includes replaceable electrodes
• Easily configurable for alternative noise source(s)
• Design accommodates multiple towing configurations
• LSB-R - New Engines/Jets, Hamilton blue ARROW Control
• Clip-on sweep system
• Integrated Sweep Payload control

• Agile
• Remote/Autonomous Control
• Combined Planing/Displacement hull
• Revolutionary Waterjet/Control system

• Sweeping
• Enhanced ITT Power Generation Unit
• Waveform Generation
• New Sweep Cable design

• Technology
• Fly-by-wire
• Open Standards
• Common Interfaces
• Collision Avoidance

Evolving the SeaFox: this year, SeaFox has evolved. Presented also at the DSEI show, the new concept was introduced by Atlas Elektronik, teamed with ECS Special Projects Ltd. The new idea was to install a stand-off EOD killer effector on the re-usable SeaFox I. The COBRA (Clip-On BX-90 Re-loadable Assembly) can be fitted to the re-usable SeaFox vehicle offering Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability from surface to 300m depth, removing the need for the SeaFox C, and providing a reusable disposal system  offering multiple target prosecution / multiple target initiation by remote means. In addition, SeaFox has now been evolved to be deployable even from a RHIB, allowing stand-off, automated operations away from the mothership.

These two new capabilities will be priceless, and in addition to FAST, will provide the Royal Navy with an effective, wholly remotely-operated mine disposal capability. An unmanned FAST, properly kitted, could deploy from the mothership, to which it’ll be connected by radio link, enter the minefield, and deploy (and then recover) the SeaFox I drone fitted with COBRA for the disposal of the threat. The advantage of COBRA is also in the inferior time that will now be required for disposal, as the RECCE element will be now capable to dispose of the mine by itself, without need for a second vehicle to be launched and vectored to the target. SeaFox is now an “hunter-killer” asset, evolving in the same way the Predator UAV has, by changing from an unarmed scout to a long-endurance killer.

Cobra is a “mask” worn on the front end of the SeaFox vehicle. For mine disposal, Cobra attaches itself to the mine while the SeaFox vehicle manoeuvres away. Attachment can happen in three ways: nail attachment units, harpoon for soft-skinned targets, and magnetic grabs. In this way, only the COBRA is disposed of, while the SeaFox I returns to the ship for recovery, providing a considerably cheaper and easier solution for disposal of mines.

An unmanned, Stand Off MCM solution taking shape: So. REMUS 100, 600, SeaFox, perhaps “tomorrow” used with COBRA, and FAST seem to be an excellent “terminal” section of the Minesweeping operation. They also are a mature and proven solution, which can provide a very solid base for development of a containerized, ship-agnostic MCM capability for the future navy. Arguably, these systems are modern enough that at least some of them are very likely to migrate from the current Hunt ships to the MHPC, assuming that the MHPC is not delayed by decades as sadly happened with recent ship programmes.

But, of course, before employing these systems, we have to discover where the minefield is, something that, currently, is done largely by the sonar of the minesweeper. If we have to remove the minesweeper from the equation, we have to offload the sonar payload to a remotely-operated, unmanned platform as well. MHPC or Type 26 will of course have sonar themselves, but we still are not going to want them scouting in a possibly mined area, for obvious reasons. The excellent, Thales 2193 sonar, adopted in 2004 for the Hunt fleet, has the capability to detect and classify an object the size of a football at a range up to 1,000m, but this distance is far shorter than the desirable one for the future.

ATLAS Elektronik, has demonstrated to the MOD their own solution, which is based on their Sea Otter MK2 autonomous underwater drone. This 1-ton drone can be equipped with a high-resolution side-scan sonar. In addition, it can be fitted with other mission payloads, including a powerful MCM synthetic aperture sonar, as it has a 160 kg useful payload. It has a search endurance of 24 hours at a 4 knots speed. It can dive to 600 meters, and is some 3,45 meters long. Once a drone was selected and kitted, it would need a containerized launch and recovery solution, to make it easily deployable on the Mothership, and this should not be an issue. In this sense, Think Defence’s own article about Minesweeping can provide more info. 

The Sea Otter MKII is a solution for the problem of finding the mines with sonar searches.

Other possible platforms for the role could emerge. One alternative could be BAE System’s Talisman. But a larger Unmanned Surface Vehicle, launched from the mothership, could also be the way to go to provide a platform to send in harm’s way, carrying the sophisticate sonars, such as the Thales 2093 variable depth sonar used on current minesweepers. Indeed, France looks set to follow this very path, even if FAST, due to its smaller sizes, has the advantage of being more readily carried by pretty much any kind of vessel, including the Type 26 frigate in the Mission Bay aft. The French unmanned boat is much larger, and could pretty much only be carried by the 2-3000 tons motherships they envision to replace their own minesweeper fleet.

French connection

MCM systems are an area of possible collaboration highlighted following the Lancaster treaty between UK and France, and in the sea environment, there is a surprisingly similar timeframe and requirement which could make such collaboration possible on a very large scale.

France is in fact planning to start replacing its current MCM fleet in 2018, with a fleet of multimission motherships of as many as 3000 tons, employing a standoff suite of MCM drones and systems. Roughly, the same target that the Royal navy is pursuing. The French effort comes under the name Système de Lutte Anti Mines – Futur (SLAM – F) and aims to a “system of systems” capable to operate in a minefield 10/14 miles away from the mothership, even in Sea State 5.

Following studies started in 2009, France is currently considering a mothership of around 3000 tons, which will deploy a large multifunctional Unmanned Surface Vehicle “taxi” that will deliver the Mine Countermeasure assets from the mothership to the danger zone. 

The target is to build some 5 Motherships, each capable of deploying two or three “Taxi” vehicles. They are considering a catamaran vessel for the mothership role, offering higher speed than current Eridan minesweepers and larger deck and working areas. 

And this might be an issue: even if the MHPC design of the Royal Navy is far from taking on a concrete shape, a catamaran solution might cause some eyebrows to rise in a traditional organization where monohulls are preferred.

Another possible issue on the way of collaboration is represented by the philosophy and sizes of their Unmanned Surface Vessel, as it is a stealthy catamaran displacing some 24.5 tons, 17 meters long and 7.5 meters wide, presenting some challenges regarding launch and recovery, particularly in rough weather, and anyway making the USV hard to deploy with anything other than its intended motherships, differently from the much smaller FAST. France, in studies dating back to 2009, assumed that the final USV design would be made compatible with the Mistral LHDs as well, but carrying USVs would still almost certainly require the sacrifice of some of the landing crafts, making it a far less than optimal solution.

Of such USV, they have built a prototype, already being tested at sea, the Sterenn Du. The unit was launched in 2010, and this year it should move into more advanced testing, with a towed array sonar planned for it, plus a number of submarine drones to be used for validating launch and recovery systems and procedures.  

There is obvious difference between the Sterenn Du and FAST

FAST and Sterenn Du are very different, but share the same notional mission (even if, at the moment, it does not appear that the Sterenn Du would run Combined Influence Sweeps, differently from FAST) as remotely operated “taxi” for underwater drones. They both are set to be the vital link between the mothership and the deployed underwater drones, with which the mothership very hardly could communicate without such a relay node in the middle. SeaFox, after all, works only up to a kilometer away from the launching ship, and the standoff operations envisaged for the future require the mothership to stay well further away than that. They have both advantages and faults: FAST is small, and this allows it to be employed also from the future Type 26 and possibly by other vessels of the Navy. But its small sizes are also a limit to what can be installed on it.

However, there is certainly scope for collaboration. France is trying to fuse its SLAM-F with the European Defence Agency’s project of studies into future MCM means, which involves some 13 nations, reportedly awakening some real interest, which is only going to get greater when the Sterenn Du eventually begins to successfully prove the concept and to do its job.

Ideally, collaboration could be expanded to the Mothership, with each other’s design being informed by the work of the ally. And possibly, in time, UK and France could end up deciding to pursue a single, high-commonality design for the vessel, in order to pursue savings and financial efficiencies in the building phase that both countries direly need. Which does not necessarily mean aiming for a “no differences” common solution. To be not just safe from problems stemming from national requirements incompatibilities, but also exportable, the new system should be as modular as possible, allowing each nation to, for example, select its own fit of radars, weapons and even engines for the Mothership, and of course drones for the proper MCM suite.

This year, anyway, and very possibly this very month, should provide us further news about the new MCM concepts, and about SLAM-F. It will be interesting to read into the results of the ATLAS demonstration to the MOD, when news come out.

I’ll ready to post all significant updates when time comes!   

Bad, bad news - Updated

For how much i've criticized the SDSR, for how many decisions about defence have made my eyebrows arch, still i had an incredible amount of confidence in one person: Liam Fox.
I honestly believe that he's been nothing short of formidable in fighting defence's corner in the very best way he could, and my greatest regret is to have seen him taking over Defence at a time in which, simply, there was no alternative to cuts.
Years ago, or hopefully in the future, in quieter days, Liam Fox, i believe, would have been able to deliver great improvements in matters of UK defence.

I'm very sorry, and really worried, while reading the letter with which Liam resigns from his post. 

Dear David,

As you know, I have always placed a great deal of importance on accountability and responsibility. As I said in the House of Commons on Monday, I mistakenly allowed the distinction between my personal interest and my government activities to become blurred. The consequences of this have become clearer in recent days. I am very sorry for this.

I have also repeatedly said that the national interest must always come before personal interest. I now have to hold myself to my own standard. I have therefore decided, with great sadness, to resign from my post as Secretary of State for Defence - a position which I have been immensely proud and honoured to have held.

I am particularly proud to have overseen the long overdue reforms to the Ministry of Defence and to our Armed Forces, which will shape them to meet the challenges of the future and keep this country safe.

I am proud also to have played a part in helping to liberate the people of Libya, and I regret that I will not see through to its conclusion Britain's role in Afghanistan, where so much progress has been made.

Above all, I am honoured and humbled to have worked with the superb men and women in our Armed Forces. Their bravery, dedication and professionalism are second-to-none.

I appreciate all the support you have given me - and will continue to support the vital work of this government, above all in controlling the enormous budget deficit we inherited, which is a threat not just to this country's economic prosperity but also to its national security.

I look forward to continuing to represent my constituents in North Somerset.

Yours ever,

Liam

In a time of deep crisis and change, with so many challenges still to be addressed for the future of defence, i'm really worried by the loss of a minister that, i believe, did a very good job, considering the storm he found himself in the middle of.

The future for the Armed Forces is still dangerous and full of challenges, and i fear that Liam Fox's dedication and willingness to fight harshly with the treasury, with the prime minister, and with everyone to ensure that the forces are not maimed, will be sorely missed.

This is a very bad news.
I just hope we won't have to regret it too painfully.

UPDATE:

New defence minister is Philip Hammond, previously Minister for Transports, where he will be replaced by Justine Greening, a junior finance minister. 

He is a Treasury friend, but in the sense that he's been a supporter of cuts to public spending.  And this is a very bad start. 

Commentators describe him as a "reassuringly boring" appointment to calm the waters at the MoD, and this worries me even more, since this is definitely not a time for "reassuringly boring" leaders.

I can only wish the new minister good luck, and hope he proves a good lead for the Armed Forces in this terribly challenging time. But much as i try not to judge him before he even does something, i'll say it again. 
I'm worried.  

France looked into HMS Queen Elizabeth

It has been officially confirmed that France, following publication of the british SDSR10, containing the statement that the first CVF vessel would have been mothballed and potentially sold in 2020, launched a study in the cost effectiveness of eventually purchasing HMS Queen Elizabeth as solution for their PA2 requirement. 

The bond between CVF and PA2 is antique. During the design and development phase of the CVF class, France, until 2008, contributed money and expertise. Some 100 million euro were poured by France into studies for ensuring that CVF was catapult capable; studies that ensured that the design could be converted during life (option initially chosen by the UK, prior to 2010 switch to Cats and Traps) and that, on the french side, generated the CVF-FR design, to be built under the name Richelieu. 

In 2008, France quit the CVF programme and delayed decision about the building of PA2 up to 2012. Problems in the joint programme had emerged, with France pressing for a more powerful propulsion plant, which would have besides used LM2500 gas turbines instead of the british, mandated Rolls Royce MT30. France probably was also irked by the refusal of the UK to have blocks for the CVF built in French shipyards.

It is not surprising, then, that a study was launched into the possible selection of QE as PA2 solution. 

Hypothesis of a "fair" deal

It is interesting to read into the French concept of "fair deal" about the eventual acquisition of QE. According to the respected publication 'Mer et Marine', France expected that, in exchange for their purchase of the QE, the UK would have commissioned french shipyards to build the new Fleet Tankers to be purchased (according to the latest plans heard, by 2016) to replace the remaining, ancient RFA oil replenishers. And of course, why not: they want to sell the UK Rafales as well! 

Talk about "fair" deals!

The Fleet Tanker programme, once envisioned as a 6-ship buy (with a first order of 4 vessels, with space for subsequent order of another and then a last one), is now seen as a "4 ships at most" contract that the Navy is trying hard to resuscitate (indeed, the RN tried to get it to advance in EVERY Planning Round in the last few years, but without great luck). The order, expected to eventually come in the shape of a "2 + 1 + 1", would fill the first requirement of the 3-classes MARS programme for the modernization of the RFA. 

MARS is part of the wider "Carrier Enabled Power Projection" main programme, which comprises CVF and JCA-F35, even though MARS is needed for the fleet as a whole, and not at all as a mere CVF-support tool. 

Indeed, the ancient, single-hulled tankers still in use, such as Black and Gold Rover, were planned to leave the service by 2010! 

The MARS FT (Fleet Tanker) is indeed planned to use hulls built abroad, so France might well be a possibility anyway. The ships would be built abroad, and only brought in the UK for final kit to be installed. 

On 10 December 2007 the MOD issued an "Invitation to Participate in Dialogue" to industry to for up to six fleet tankers at an expected cost of £800 million.

On 21 May 2008 the MOD announced the results of the invitation, indicating that four companies had been shortlisted:  Fincantieri (Italy); Hyundai (Republic of Korea); Navantia (Spain) and BAE Systems with BMT DSL and DSME (Republic of Korea). 

No french yards had been selected for the final competition.

Ever since, these selected possible builders have remained in the race, but someone else appears to have entered the frame. According to an answer of Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Gerald Howarth, dating back to last March, the bidders have increased to 6 during the latest attempts of resurrecting MARS and getting the long awaited go-ahead for it. 

The Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) programme is in its assessment phase, and the Ministry of Defence issued an advertisement for an international competition in October 2009 for the MARS tankers. Following expressions of interest from industry, six bidders were invited to submit outline solutions. In October 2010, the bidders were invited to submit more detailed solutions and the resulting bids are currently the subject of discussions between the MOD and the bidders. On current plans, final bids are expected to be requested later this year.

I've been unable to find out what new builders have entered the frame, but it is very possible that France's DCNS is one of them. 

As a matter of fact, the Fleet Tanker element might well be built in France anyway, regardless of QE's situation, if France's offer is valued as the best one. 

A whole different story is buying Rafale...!

So, is it happening?

Hard to give a definitive answer. A possibility remains. 

But the UK government has lately been very clear that selling QE off is considered a very remote hypothesis. The aspiration is to keep her in service even past 2020, and retrofit her with Cats and Traps during her first major refit, around 2022. 

To make such a selling option further improbable, besides, France itself is expressing big doubts about the feasibility of such an acquisition. Even before considering emotional and political implications of such an agreement (and we are talking of a very big implication, you can bet), the french have assessed the cost of the option, and judged them far too high. 

The Admiral Guillard, head of the french Navy, reported the results of the study on QE to the Defence Committee of the National Assembly of the french republic on 5 October, just a few days ago.

His assessment is that QE would be expensive to purchase, judging its cost to be 30 to 40% higher of the cost it would have to build an identical vessel in french shipyards. And to this, there's to add an estimate of 1 billion / 1.5 billion euro of expense for converting the vessel to Cats and Traps, making for an expense of over 4 billion euro for France, which he compared to an expected (but probably optimistic, i'd say) price tag of 3.5 billions for a PA2 built in french shipyards. 

And it is not enough. 

While in 2004 France had chosen to pursue a conventional-propelled PA2, in 2008 they changed their mind, and nuclear propulsion came back for a revenge, apparently returning to be their favorite solution. 

Add to this the fact that french shipyards are definitely not going to accept to lose the massive workshare and revenues that the building of a new carrier implies, and you have a big, big obstacle on the way of any possible QE acquisition. 

But moreover, this years the budget crisis killed any attempt of looking again into PA2. Next year, the situation is unlikely to change, and the Presidential elections will represent another big issue to contend with. 

And finally, the chef d'état-major des armées français (CEMA), the supreme organization that controls the French armed forces on behalf of the President and of the government, have been very clear and definitive: 

PA2 remains an aspiration, a requirement, and a need. But simply, currently, it is not financially feasible.

But...

But, i will add. 

3.5 or 4 billions might be out of reach, as the bill for retrofitting QE could be a real problem for cash-strapped Britain, even come-2022, as the Successor SSBN programme by then will be sucking up money like a vacuum cleaner, particularly when you listen to its detractors. 

But if the UK and France collaborated to share the cost of retrofitting cats and traps to QE, the expense for each country could be in the region of "just" some 5 hundred millions, a whole different story. 

And it would give the two fleets the "second carrier" that both countries need but can't afford. 

After all, as HMS Bulwark trains in Scotland landing French Marines ashore, tomorrow QE could operate a mixed air group of Rafales and F35Cs, filling in the gaps left by PoW and CdG going into refit or being unavailable for any reason.

Admiral Guillard had already put forward this proposal in an interview a few months ago. And i think that, while not entirely optimal, it makes for the best solution by far. 

After all, we do not live in an optimal world.

Ready when the order comes

The Royal Navy has been subject to heavy criticism in the past for not intervening actively against Somali piracy, but critique had to go against not the Service and its men, but against the politicians who did not authorize military intervention, or that did (and do) set ROEs that are often nothing short of demented.

And now, while the - largely unsung - infamous "notice to quit" is delivered by Italy to NATO personnel - mainly RAF - at Trapani Birgi airbase, the Special Boat Service does us a great service by freeing the merchant ship Montecristo, captured by pirates off Somalia.

The Montecristo was carrying 23 crew members - seven Italians, six Ukrainians and 10 Indians - when it was attacked on Monday.

The operation was carried out by two navy ships - one British and one American as part of Nato's Ocean Shield anti-piracy force. The 11 pirates on board were arrested after they surrendered, the ministry said.
Britain's Ministry of Defence confirmed that the Royal Navy "was involved in a compliant boarding" - in which the pirates indicated they would surrender and sailors boarded the vessel to take them into custody.

"The danger of piracy has increased," said Italian Defence Minister Ignazio La Russa, making one of his great finds. He's the most inadequate minister for defence in an history full of inadequate ministers, but i won't rant about it now.
According to the Italian press, La Russa talked directly to Liam Fox before the raid on the Montecristo was authorized and the troops were given the order to go in.

Pirates flourish off largely lawless Somalia by attacking passing ships, taking hostages and demanding ransoms to free them and the vessels.
The ship's owner, D'Alessio Group, said that the attack had occurred 620 miles off Somalia as the crew was hauling scrap iron to Vietnam on a journey that had begun on September 20 in Liverpool.

According to italian newspaper "Il Sole 24 Ore", the crew of the ship had been able to find refuge in the protected, sealed-up citadel of the ship during the assault, thus preventing the pirates from taking any hostage: by far the best situation for launching a military intervention on board, with minimal risks. 

Currently, Task Force TF 508, fighting piracy off Somalia, is lead by Italian admiral Gualtiero Mattesi, on board of the 'Andrea Doria' destroyer (Horizon class, the ship born from the once tri-national programme that the UK abandoned for a national solution evolving into the Type 45), and the task force comprises a couple of US warships, 'USS Carny' and 'USS Devert', and a portuguese frigate, the 'Francisco de Almeida' as well.
However, only RFA Fort Victoria, which only recently made route for "East of Suez" ops, after supporting the naval segment of Operation Ellamy in Libya by resupplying HMS Ocean and HMS Liverpool, had on board a ready team of Special Forces, deemed the adequate solution for the raid.

According to the "Sole 24 Ore", SBS men from RFA Fort Victoria raided the Montecristo. The pirates surrendered, and the crew of the ship was released, without suffering a scratch.

Well done lads, as always.

Makes it even more embarrassing that Italy at the same time is causing trouble regarding airbases and Libya ops...  

Operating from someone else's base

This Thursday, October 13, the NATO forces currently crowding the airport of Trapani-Birgi, in Sicily, will have to leave after the italian government delivered a rather infamous notice to quit to the allies. The reason, quite simply, is that Trapani-Birgi is both a military base and a civilian airport, and the agreement for NATO use forced the temporary termination of civilian traffic on the runway.

Reportedly, the local administration is concerned by losses for the local economy, heavily dependent on tourism, which has been severely damaged (up to 10 million euro of damage as of recent estimates) by the interruption in the flow of planes loaded with tourists flocking onto Birgi. Differently from Hotels and shops around Gioia del Colle, which are all too happy to make money on the sizeable RAF presence in the area, the 200 men based at Trapani do not have as much of a good impact for the economy: too few to make up for the lack of tourists and for the runway fees that civilian companies used to pay to the local administration.
Ryanair, the air company which used the runway the most, has been making pressure for all this time to obtain the re-opening of the base to civilian usage.

And so the RAF, which on Trapani Birgi bases some 200 men supporting its deployed force of VC10 air tankers and E3D Sentry AWACS planes, will now have to leave, and relocate somewhere else, possibly Cagliari Elmas, or Decimomannu, both in Sardinia, with evident issues and new costs to be faced.

As Italian, i can only express my embarrassment for yet another shameful decision which makes things harder for our allies.

At the same time, i can only underline, once more, that this is the issue with having to depend on foreign countries and governments for getting an air base for operations.
Nations do not have friends. They only have interests. And this makes things harder and always ensures that uncertainty is part of the picture.

Malta has insisted to stay out of the Libyan matter, Cyprus asked for the RAF not to base combat airplanes in Akrotiri for Libya ops, even Italy itself has been an issue in providing bases, from the very start of the operations.

So much for your "we currently have all airbase support abroad that we need"...!

Enduring mystery

I've been subject, more than once, to heavy criticism for my position on the Tornado and Harrier issue, harmony guidelines considerations, and general wisdom of maintaining the Tornado fleet over the Harrier, despite the much larger savings on the same five years period that retiring the GR4 would have made possible.

Without going back on the whole matter of the Tornado savings and without re-presenting the whole story of the duel which the Jump Jet eventually lost, i'll link an interesting 2010 written answer which helps giving an idea of the differences at play: Harrier and Ark Royal combined will have saved, by 2015, 1.1 billion pound, 1.3 in the most optimistic projections. 

In the same time we have:

The Tornado aircraft fleet, consisting of the GR4 ground attack and F3 air defence variants, is supported by two availability based maintenance contracts. The Availability Transformation: Tornado Aircraft Contract (ATTAC), for which BAE Systems is the prime contractor, provides Depth Support until 2016 and has a total value of £1.5 billion. The Turbo-Union RB199 engine which powers the Tornado aircraft is supported by the RB199 Operational Contract for Engine Transformation 2 (ROCET 2) awarded to Rolls-Royce until 2025. The contract has a total value of £690 million. There are no penalty clauses in either contract. However, both contracts include a number of conditions that allow for early termination. Any costs associated with the implementation of these conditions following the SDSR outcome are being negotiated with the contractor.

Under the Capability Upgrade Strategy (Pilot) programme approved in December 2007, 96 Tornado GR4 aircraft will receive capability upgrades between 2011 and 2014 at an estimated cost of around £300 million. This number of aircraft is sufficient to maintain the operational capability of the Tornado GR4 Forward Available Fleet until OSD.

That makes 2490 million pounds already, with cancellation of an upgrade programme and early termination of just two contracts. Even assuming some costs for contract termination, we have already far overcome any Harrier related saving by a good margin, and the list of voices is still long. 

Not so hard, now, to see why the Tornado retirement was projected at some 7 billions of total savings.

It is also worth summarizing some other facts as well, to make it further clear what is the source of my doubts:

The 96 Tornado GR4 remaining, projected to be retired by 2021 after the SDSR changed the previous 2025 date, will provide 18 Force Elements at readiness (airplanes deployable/usable to support an operation) by 2015, going down from previous target of 40 with a fleet of 132 - 140.  

Other answers and documents disclose that only 17 Tornado GR4 have been kitted, by UOR, for ops in Afghanistan, with an increase in their number due to the increase from 8 to 10 deployed planes. 

Before, 15 UORed Tornado has sustained Afghan ops, just as 15 Harrier had been UORed before to do the same job. The addition of two more UORed airframes costed some half a million pound. 

This is another blow in the face of the argument that the Harrier fleet was too small to support ongoing Afghan ops.

18 Force Elements at readiness, interestingly, were those that the Harrier GR9/9A fleet used to provide, until 2009, with a fleet of 75 – 79 airplanes. This was reduced to 10 elements at readiness with the cuts delivered to the Joint Force Harrier in 2009, however: in December 2009, minister Bob Ainsworth announced that RAF Cottersmore would close, and one of the squadrons of the 4-strong JFH was to be disbanded. IV(AC) Squadron indeed disbanded following the announcement, even if its colors passed to the Harrier OCU, which had before had the colors of 20 Squadron. The fleet was reduced to as few as 32 frontline planes strong. This very cut has subsequently been used, post SDSR publishing, to justify the early retirement of the Harrier.   

How was the 2009 cut reached?

Early 2000s. The Sea Harrier future is sealed by the upgrade to its engine being judged too expensive. The upgrades that were deemed too expensive for recent SHAR FA.2 were made onto GR7 airframes: this included even the MK 107 improved, more powerful engine, which had been dreamed for the Sea Harrier by the Navy, with 40 engines having been ordered in 1999 for 150 million pounds of value. It took 112 million pounds in modifications to the airframe of the GR7 in order to install it, and 150 millions to acquire engines and support, for a total of 262 millions.
For the SHAR, the cost had been calculated in 230.

The justifications are that the GR9 is better suited to strike missions, the “hot thing” of the day, and by a study which promises that, once updated to GR9 standard, the Harrier will be able to use ASRAAM, Brimstone, Paveway IV, and even Storm Shadow.

Attractive, isn’t it…? Awesome, I’d dare saying. It is all backed up by a study, the BRCP 821, aimed at increasing the all-up mass of the Harrier GR7 to 34,000 lb, and perhaps beyond, to cover heavyweight roles such as Storm Shadow. The study dates 2002 – 2003, and gains the go-ahead. The GR9 upgrade is the way.  

What happens after that is the well known Joint Force Harrier. The last 3 fixed wing squadrons of the Navy, flying SHARs, are disbanded, with two planned to reform, on RAF structures, manning and under RAF control, as part of Joint Force Harrier. Only 800 NAS will be able to stand up again, however, with 801 failing to raise enough officers to fill the new, additional posts imposed by the RAF structure. Elements of 800 NAS and 801 fuse into the Naval Strike Wing, which only in 2010, shortly before being killed, reverts to the identity of 800 NAS.

As late as 2006, Parliamentary documents about the GR9 upgrade still talk about Storm Shadow. The evidence is in the Parliamentary report "Delivering Front Line Capability to the RAF", dated 2006, at upgrade already undergoing (indeed, the upgrade was contracted for in 2003, physically began in 2004 and had to be finished by 2007). Everyone with enough patience to do so, can scroll down to Page 15 of the report and read it here. 

Later, this would have proven to be bullshit, as part of the wing was apparently found to have to be removed (!) in order to install the Storm Shadow, which continued to present problems anyway as the Harrier had not enough power, even with the new Pegasus 107 engine, to bring eventually not-launched Storm Shadows back on the deck of the carrier at the end of a mission. To land, the plane would have had to ditch the 800.000 + pounds missile!

Storm Shadow integration is promptly abandoned, but the study (who the hell did it? How could they not see such two massively evident issues??? What have they looked at? Didn’t they see how the wing and missile were shaped? Did they massively overvalue the power that the MK107 would be able to provide??? How can it even happen?) in the meanwhile had done its job.  

By the time the Harrier GR9 upgrade had reached Capability E (including a Link 16 communications link and other improvements), the GR9 upgrade had cost 728 millions. 

By November 2008, the Harrier GR9 had swallowed a total of 860 million pounds from Opposition-supplied figures, but was finally “complete” (save for the Brimstone, the integration of which somehow ran aground after even some flight tests had already been successfully done, with the full integration pushed to the right “to 2012”) and arguably at its absolute best.  

Meanwhile, in June 2008 it had been confirmed that, early into 2009, the Harrier Force would have been replaced in Afghanistan by a force of Tornado GR4.

December 2008. The RAF, asked to make cuts in their budget, “offer” the Joint Force Harrier for the chop. First Sea Lord Sir Jonathon Band is forced to threaten to resign in order to save the “Joint” force he was supposed to be co-leading. A struggle which was still going on well into 2009. It was more than the short term provision of air power at sea: at the time, the proposal of the RAF meant that the Fleet Air Arm fixed wing branch would be killed off, with RAF-only crews filling the decks (eventually) of the new carriers after 2016, making the attempt even more poisonous, for obvious reasons, for the Navy.

In 2009, the famous “scrap for buying” announcement was in the end made. Cottersmore was to close, the JFH was to lose IV(AC) squadron, Nimrod MR2 would be retired early, leaving a gap of at least one year before Nimrod MRA4 came online, and a further jet squadron “Harrier or Tornado” squadron would also be cut, but only prior to confirmation in the SDSR 2010, to pay for 22 (+ two losses replacements) new Chinooks and the 7^th C17. The Chinooks, in the meanwhile, went down to 12 + 2 as we all know. The Tornado squadron, in the end, was not cut, but SDSR 2010 had to cut two as we know.  

In the words of the BBC:

Plan to reduce the RAF Tornado and Harrier force by a further one or two squadrons, with final decisions to be taken in the defence review due next year.

SDSR, October 2010: reportedly, the plan agreed by the NSC is, initially, to retire the Tornado fleet, but this changes “at the last moment”, according to some sources after dialogues of RAF top brass directly with David Cameron. The official mantra becomes that the Harrier force is too small – funnily enough, due to the latest, 2009 cut stemming from a 2008 RAF “offer” of scrapping the whole force – to sustain ops in Afghanistan. To try and compensate for the ridiculously small saving, 2 Tornado squadrons are also closed (June 2011), but with most of the personnel moving out to the 5 remaining frontline squadrons, which are to have an uplift in crew numbers.

The MR2 gap also becomes a permanent hole with cancellation of its successor.

How can I not suspect…? It just seems like the SDSR10 cuts were piloted, at least from 2009, with roots of the sad story going far further back in time.

Even without making theories about the infamous “Tornado Mafia”, the numbers make for a sore reality. And tell a sad story in which lots of things did not work.

The quest for answers

I try to be objective as much as possible, much as i'm accused of reasoning out of bias or even RAF-hate, or perhaps "Tornado-hate" (which never fails to amuse me, considering the number of books, reviews, posters, photo and models of Tornado that you can find in my room...). As the above shows, i've linked all the sources and provided evidence of what i'm saying.

I've always used official sources were possible, to explain my doubts and opposition to the path that's been chosen. An exercise that gives me no pleasure at all, as the last thing i'd want to do is to call for a premature demise of the "Europe's miracle", as Tornado was once fittingly nicknamed. 

Due to the (obvious) difficulty at getting around to good information (that's usually restricted or classified), i've had to read into de-relato news, as exemplified by the rather heated-up exchange between PM Mark Lancaster (conservative, TA bomb disposal officer)  and then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Kevan Jones (Labour MP). This 2008 discussion includes alarming observations about issues with Tornado availability, among other things, and MP Lancaster openly formulates the hypothesis that the switch in Afghanistan is meant to protect Tornado from the incoming financial slaughter.

The exchange contains several items of news: for example, a 31 million pounds cost per month for the Tornado detachment compared to 30 for an equally sized Harrier unit. It would appear that cost might actually have been closer to 40 millions, and this was before the number of deployed Tornadoes was increased. At least 42 million pounds also were expended in UORs (including early integration of Paveway IV - advanced from planned 2011 to 2009, plus a number of new IR self-defence and countermeasures pods) to prepare a number of Tornado for Afghan role. In the meanwhile, integration of Brimstone on the Harrier was delayed and effectively stopped. 

The debate between the two MPs hints to documents released to Parliament, and other data that i've sadly been unable to see with my eyes, but contains several worrisome observations, if they are true. 

I've been told informally that the document the Under-Secretary and MP talk about is "wrong" and overstates the Tornado problems, but i honestly struggle to see why the RAF (which would be heavily involved in the redaction of such a document, I’m assuming) would ever supply Parliament with wrong and self-damaging data, or even permit at all that such a damning report was released. It certainly would be grave if this had effectively been done, deliberately misguiding the Parliament. It must also be noted that the Under-Secretary never denies the data presented by Lancaster. 

Perhaps he hadn't bothered reading the document. Perhaps he was fooled too by its wrong nature... But i must believe to what i read here until better evidence comes.

I've tried to get more information, to try and keep faith to my aspirations of objectivity and honesty, and noticed, all over the internet and in the already quoted dialogue of the MPs, several hints to a NAO report on the switch from Harrier to Tornado in Afghanistan ops, due for publication in Winter 2008. 

An example of the several hints i found, talking of a report “in the making” and apparently on the way for release: 

The MP, who is a major in the Royal Engineers, TA, is not the only person looking into this move. The National Audit Office is working on an investigation into spending on the Harriers and the decision to withdraw them from Afghanistan. The report is due out in late winter. Lancaster remarked that it stands to be "pretty damning" for the RAF.

DefenceManagement website 

Such report, knowing the NAO documents, would probably provide good answers, so i've immediately tried to locate said report. 

And here is the problem. Said report apparently was never actually completed and released. I checked the Publications lists of the NAO reports from 2007 to 2011 included, for good prudence, and no such specialized report came out. I tried seeking the data as part of other reports related to Afghanistan ops, maybe the study ended up in a larger report. But again found nothing, other than a 2007 report in the progress of mainteinance process on Tornado and Harrier, which does not, however, provide any answer to the current questions.

Ultimately, i surrendered last Friday, and decided to send a mail to the NAO asking for indications about the report.

Today, i received the answer, which sent me to this report: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/high_intensity_operations.aspx, dated May 2009 and not Winter 2008.

I had already checked it over rapidly, and found nothing, so it left me puzzled, but since the NAO itself indicated it to me, i tried again, going through the pages with more patience and attention. 

Lots of good info about Chartered flights, logistical issues, waiting times for spare parts, harmony guidelines, Mastiff availability, helicopter support, every aspect of the UK operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Definitely worth a read... But. There's a big but. 

Close Air Support, for some reason, is totally absent from the report.

The word "Tornado" recurs exactly ZERO times in the whole report.

The word "Harrier", only appears in this paragraph: 

The current high level of operational commitments is affecting the ability of the Royal Air Force to train for general warfare. In order to focus on current operations, the Royal Air Force has had to “hibernate” certain skills by minimising the number of personnel trained and is therefore carrying an element of risk until they have time to regenerate capabilities. Examples include Harrier pilots landing on aircraft carriers at night and helicopter pilots training for fighter aircraft evasion.

Which tells me nothing new, of course. I can't even understand why i was linked to this report, which clearly has little to do with my question. 

The mystery continues. The sad story remains.