The UK's F-35 situation

 

The reality of the announcement: it’s not the F-35A, it’s actually TRIDENT

At present, the F-35A announcement by the UK at the NATO Summit is easily translated and summarized:

 

Since F-35A procurement cost is somewhat lower than that of the F-35B and in theory we can more easily maintain it and have it available more of the time, we are procuring 12 of them instead, replacing as many F-35Bs assigned to 207 Squadron (Operational Conversion Unit). We will train our crews on the F-35A as far as possible, and only use F-35B for the unique parts of the syllabus. By releasing aircraft from 207 Sqn and by still procuring 15 new ones, we are still going ahead with standing up a third frontline Squadron.

Since F-35A comes Dual Capable, we are seeking integration into NATO Nuclear Sharing mission planning, carrying dual-key, US owned B61-12 bombs. We will presumably send a few of the F-35A to the relevant exercises a couple of times a year.

We are not spending a penny more than strictly needed as this is literally born as a Saving measure.  Forget about any UK tactical nuclear weapon, forget about storing the bombs in Marham (that would cost a lot in infrastructure) and forget about fixing the air to air refuelling problem.

Maria Eagle, asked during Urgent Question time in the House of Commons specifically on these points, confirmed that as “it is a NATO mission”: any UK F-35A long range mission will depend on allied tanker support. She also confirmed that "this decision is not a stepping stone" towards wider tactical nuclear plans. The UK is "not looking" at “broadening range of nuclear weapons and delivery means".

 

Scratch away the hype, dig to the facts, and while other countries announced new brigades, new SAM batteries, new jets, ships, etc, the UK really took to the stage to say: "we are saving some money off on jets for the OCU Sqn and, so long as you furnish us the bombs and air to air refueling, we can help carry a few of the warheads".

 

B61-12 launch trials. 

The only reason why Starmer wasn't laughed out of room at the NATO Summit while delivering such an announcement is that UK has a Strategic Deterrent of its own, which other double-key B61-carrying european partners don't have. In theory it puts a TRIDENT other than the US one behind the B61s.

As we know, after all, multiple NATO countries have F-35A to carry double-key B61-12s and had them before this UK stunt. They thankfully even have tankers which can actually air to air refuel said F-35A and anti-radar missiles & other weapons that give those F-35A wider capability and meaning.

Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey all have an established role in Nuclear Sharing and all but Turkey are acquiring F-35As for it, carrying American B61-12 bombs. Poland, which has 32 F-35A on order, has already expressed interest in being involved.

And of course, the US own F-35A Squadrons in Europe, and beyond, are available to carry the bombs as well. Most important for the UK perspective are of course the 2 USAF F-35A Squadrons in Lakenheath, which is where B61-12s could be stored on UK soil.

In practical terms, the 12 F-35A in theory added by the UK are almost entirely meaningless. They are few, don’t come with air to air refuelling of their own, and add to a vast fleet of potential carrying aircraft which would have no problems absorbing not only every last B61 stored in Europe but the entire stock of 200+, including the ones stored in Continental US (CONUS).

B61-12 bases. 

Inert B61-12 inside an F-35A's weapon bay. The F-35C's weapon bay has the same size but there was no B61 integration program because the US Navy has been out of the tactical nuke business since the early 2000s. 

More delivery aircraft are the very last thing needed. The one thing the UK adds here is actually TRIDENT. None of the other NATO countries depending on tactical B61-12 has a Strategic Nuclear Deterrent to loom behind the tactical warheads, apart of course from the US one.

Unlike France, the UK already declares its strategic deterrent to NATO, formally offering it to SACEUR, and by integrating in the Nuclear Sharing arrangement it is technically "supplying" a TRIDENT other than the American one to loom behind the B61s.

There is an argument to be made that the government announcement has been deliberately misleading on a political level: it's not so much the UK that is acquiring a new lever of deterrence; it is arguably supplying Trident to Europe. 

 

It’s tenuous, obviously, because the B61-12s are going nowhere without US authorizations and collaboration, and while the warheads on the UK TRIDENT are sovereign, the system as a whole does not stand without cooperation with Washington. But the political message is still valuable.

  

Value in a split fleet?

In pure money terms, the F-35A is effectively cheaper than the more complex F-35B and it’s also pretty realistic to expect its availability will be a bit higher on average.

There will be, as claimed, a short-term saving in terms of aircraft purchase, although the differences between the two aircraft and the need for a separate stock of spares etc will immediately eat away some of the savings.

The cost cutting measure will initially work, we can be reasonably sure of it.

Longer term, I’m pessimistic. Pain will inexorably pop up later whenever type-specific upgrade differences and material differences force duplications with their related costs.

It's also obvious F-35A as training jet can do most, yet not all the training of crews for the B fleet. 

 

When it comes to generating aircraft for operations, the two mini-fleets will generate their own entirely non-compatible pools of Force Elements At Readiness (the aircraft and crews actually ready to fly missions): the F-35A cannot contribute to carrier air at all; the F-35B cannot contribute to the nuclear mission.

 

The value of F-35A beyond the "training role with secondary nuclear mission" is very close to zero, if the number does not grow well above 12 over time and a number of other things aren’t funded and fixed.

 

The optimists are always quick to note that F-35A can fly a bit further on Internal Fuel and has weapon bays that are 14 inches longer than the B’s (no Lift Fan in the way) so can carry larger weapons internally. That makes them perfect for “Deep Strike”, is the usual justification offered.

However, that is only theory. In practice, the F-35A in the RAF will in fact not fly further than the F-35B. Whatever little advantage it brings in internal fuel range is completely drowned out by the RAF's inability to refuel them in flight, which Minister Maria Eagle already confirmed is not being fixed.  

As you should know, the RAF has access to up to 14 excellent A-330 MRTT tankers, the VOYAGERs, but none of them is fitted with Boom, which is what is needed to refuel USAF aircraft, including the F-35A.

The VOYAGER fleet is split in KC2 aircraft which have only the 2 drogues in pods under the wings; and KC3 aircraft which add a centreline drogue which enables the refuelling in flight of A400M.

 

A VOYAGER KC3 refueling an A400M with the centreline drogue 

The F-35A has a receptable on the spine and needs a Boom-equipped tanker to take on fuel in flight. The UK fields no such equipment. 

The centreline drogue is the one used to refuel the big receivers, which would in the past have included NIMROD (MRA4 and R1) and E-3D SENTRY. Unfortunately, over the years things have evolved the way we know and now the only big receiver left is A400M. P-8 replaced NIMROD MRA4 and needs a Boom, RIVET JOINT replaced R1 and needs a Boom (a special arrangement is in place with 100^th Wing USAF at Mildenhall to access their tankers so RIVET JOINT can go places) and E-7 replaced E-3. C-17 could also be air refuelled if the RAF had a Boom tanker.

 

In practice, the RAF literally has more platform types that it CANNOT refuel than ones it can. It's 4-3 right now (E-7, P-8, Rivet Joint, C-17 versus Typhoon, F-35B and A400). 5-3 with the F-35A.

The F-35A problem could also be fixed “laterally” by adding a probe onto it. Space reservation does exist in the fuselage, but it's the second poorest decision just above the current "doing nothing at all": it would make UK F-35As heavier and more expensive and, of course, all the strategic big receivers would remain unable to get fuel in flight.

Although the option exists, nobody took it. Those who have F-35A have Boom equipped tankers, and vice versa. 

Fitting probes rather than acquiring Booms would also mean the UK would continue to be severely limited in providing air to air refuelling support to Allies, which is not great when the 14 VOYAGERs represent a large percentage of the total number of tankers available in Europe and widely known to be insufficient.

 

There are glaringly obvious strategic reasons for acquiring Booms, the most obvious of which is the 143 F-35A in the "Nordic Air Force" (Norway, Finland, Denmark) that sits right between the UK and Russia. That powerful force is short of tanker support, and one of the best joined-up things the UK could possibly do was helping out with that by putting Booms on VOYAGERs to help THEM stay in the air and hit deep into Russia, while helping its own (and allied) P-8s to guard the North Atlantic and E-7s to deliver airborne early warning.

Instead, it is purchasing 12 F-35A that exacerbate the scarcity of tankers while bringing nothing tangible to the table.

 

The optimists assume that more F-35As will follow in the future. I’m not at all sure they will and I’ll explain exactly why, but if they do, expenditure to retrofit Booms on the VOYAGERs must be part of the plan.

 

Why am I so sceptical of the possibility of more F-35A Squadrons following?

Money, timelines, infrastructure, personnel.

 

What has been done right now is taking existing Tranche 2 procurement plans for 27 new F-35, which have been in the works since 2022, and split them into 12 A and 15 B, not adding a single extra jet.

Tranche 2 plans as known to spread the purchase and deliveries all the way to 2033 and at the moment we have been given no indication whatsoever of an acceleration.

In theory, in 2035 GCAP/TEMPEST will be entering service. Even assuming F-35 assembly lines will still be happily going by that date 2035, GCAP will be absolutely bleeding the budget dry.

It is not overly difficult to imagine GCAP not being ready by 2035, but that does not change the picture much: it will still be devouring a huge share of the budget, making it extremely difficult to imagine the RAF being still busy building up F-35 Squadrons by then.

 

Tranche 1 deliveries should conclude this year, in theory. The last of the first batch of 48 F-35Bs for the UK are coming out of Production Lot 17.

In theory, Tranche 2 buys could begin right away with Production Lot 18, the definitive contract for which is expected really soon. Lot 18 and 19, in fact, were due to have a combined contract award announcement this very month, so either it comes on Monday or it has slipped slightly.

 

Long Lead orders covering most of the material (and cost) for production lots 18 and 19 have been signed at various dates from December 2022 onwards.

The US DoD doesn't break down allocation of jets by country when announcing those orders and MoD/UK Gov in their usual mud-like clarity haven't provided info about when Tranche 2 starts.

 

At present we do not know for sure whether Lots 18 and 19 include any UK jet at all or whether there is a gap before new orders are placed. Tranche 1 ends with Lot 17 but it's not clear if T2 starts right away in Lot 18 or gap was/is expected.

We can only go by hints and clues: as funding for Tranche 2 was delegated to the RAF in early 2022 and the very first Long lead Items contract for Lot 18 was eventually awarded in December the same year, the assumption is that the UK is involved.

 

We do not yet know the full composition of the Lot 18 and 19 orders. Lot 18 Long Lead contracts were awarded in 2023 for a total of 147 jets, but the latest contract modification on 20 December 2024 only had 145.

In those 145 there was a single F-35B for “partner nations” and 7 F-35Bs for Foreign Military Sale nations. The 7 FMS ones should belong to Singapore and Japan, but the lone partner B is for the UK or for Italy? Given precedents, the 2 jets partly funded through earlier awards could be Italian ones, to re-emerge as contract modification later (it’s already happened in the past that timelines diverged somewhat), but we do not know.

So 0, 1, 2 jets for the UK...? We will have to see. Even if they were 2, that’s still clearly not a quick procurement pace at all.  

The exact same uncertainty exists for Lot 19 as well.

IF there are UK jets in lot 18 and 19, they are almost certainly going to be F-35Bs.

In fact, some significant Long Lead order has already been placed for Lot 20 as well, and if the UK funded anything in that, it will have been for B aircraft, again.

In practice, there are good chances that the first UK F-35A only happens in Lot 21, which roughly equates to order in 2027 and delivery in 2029.

Maria Eagle, speaking in the House of Commons, says the government is “hopeful” the first F-35A deliveries can happen “before the end of the decade”, which sounds like a confirmation of sorts.

 

It doesn't matter one bit how many times politicians insist on talking about 138 jets. Unless the next lots show a substantial acceleration in procurement rate, it's not going to happen. 

We have already been told, including by Chief Defence Staff himself, not to expect much for circa 2 years. Virtually nothing “new” is coming before 2027 at earliest, simply because no actual new money appears before then.

The only realistic hope of a greater F-35 fleet beyond 74 jets in 3 Sqns plus OCU lays in a drastic acceleration to the purchase rate beginning in FY2027. I don’t see how you can build any other Sqn otherwise.

The known plan of “27 jets by 2033” implies spreading the order across a minimum of 8 Lots, 18 to 25. Lot 25 would be ordered in 2031, and deliveries would wrap up in 2033.

If 2033 was actually the year of last order, we’d be looking at a spread across 10 Lots and last deliveries in 2035, indicatively. That means an average purchase rate of 3.3 jets a year in the best case, 2.7 in the worst.

In the kindest way possible: if the procurement rate stays at those levels, forget any fantasy of more Squadrons. You will be deep into GCAP funding era by then.

 

What if more Squadrons were to happen?

I want to make one thing clear: I have nothing against the F-35A in isolation. I know about the larger bays, I know about the greater range on internal fuel. You don’t need to tell me things that, respectfully, I’m likely to know better than you do.

The problem with a split buy from a UK point of view is that the number of jets and the number of Squadrons are not large enough to make a split buy sensible. The end result is a B fleet too small for what it has to do and an A fleet also too small to make any real difference.

 

3 frontline Squadrons are the complement of a single carrier, and they would only ever all deploy in a major emergency, of course.

3 Sqns are the size the JAGUAR fleet was withdrawn from service at. 2 Sqns is the size the HARRIER GR9 fate was sealed at. It’s not wise to have these numbers at the beginning of a long service life. Those are end of life numbers.

I do not think a split of 3 and 1 Sqns is in any way smart, period. 3 and 2 is also not very good. I’d rather have a single fleet type of 5 Sqns to generate force elements from, frankly. The individual characteristics of the airframe type are little more than a distraction when all other factors are considered.

 

Moreover, we have already seen this movie multiple times in UK defence history, and the end is always sour. Two fleets locked into fratricide battles each time there’s a need for concurrent but fleet-specific upgrades or other expenditure result in disasters. We have seen it again and again and again, most recently with SEA HARRIER and HARRIER GR7 and then with the contrast HARRIER versus TORNADO. To get into that position again for no good reason is absurd.

 

Any “deep strike” advantage F-35A brings is only theory, for the UK. It is only theory because if the Air to Air refuelling situation is not cured, F-35A will actually be far shorter legged in practical terms than F-35B. Nevermind the fact you can sail F-35B thousands of miles closer to whatever you need to hit.

 

The weapon bays advantage is also pure theory. At present there is not a single weapon, in service or planned, which fits the F-35A’s weapon bays but not the B’s. It either fits both, or is too large and fits none.

The F-35B could carry 1,000 lbs stores, but the UK does not have any bomb larger than the 500 lbs Paveway IV at this point.

Does it help anyone that F-35A could potentially carry 2,000 lbs stores?

No, unless new weapons are procured. There is nothing in the UK arsenal or existing plans that can take any benefit.

 

Also, any weapon integration process will be at least partially duplicated, to account for the differences between the two aircraft types. METEOR integration, for example: the UK is leading the F-35B process, with Italy leading for the A.  

There is a very real risk that the UK F-35A will have to partially repeat integration work (and expenditure) just to “port” Paveway IV and ASRAAM across from the B.

I have a suspicion, unconfirmed for now, that as long as the whole buy is 12 aircraft for the OCU, the UK won’t even try to get ASRAAM and Paveway IV cleared on the A.

Also, of course i suspect no ammunition will be procured for the 25 mm gun, considering gunpods for the B fleet have not been procured at all so far. 

 

The external "heavy load", innermost pylons are rathed for the same loads, so the F-35B should be able to carry Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon externally, just like the F-35A. Internally, it won't fit either. AARGM ER, JSM, 2,000 lbs guided bombs could give a sense to the larger bays on the A, but none of these weapons is in the RAF arsenal nor in its plans. 
There might (or might not) be a possibility for the A to carry 6 rather than 4 Meteor internally, but we don't know. 

And there is yet another issue, in terms of infrastructure: RAF Marham has "obvious" room and Hardened Aircraft Shelters sufficient, with modernization work, for taking 4 Sqns. Project ANVIL fixed the South HAS area for the needs of 207 and 617 Sqns; the much delayed Phase 2 to finally go under contract next year is going to focus on the East HAS area to finally give 809 NAS adequate infrastructure and, hopefully, to prepare the space for the 3^rd frontline Sqn, which will also be the fourth Marham sqn (207 OCU, 617, 809 and the as yet unnamed Sqn to come).

Can Marham take more? Possibly, but without HAS (there are only 24 in total, each can take 2 jets once modernized) and with the need for further, substantial and expensive infrastructure work.

The alternative, even more expensive, is to activate another F-35 base.

 

Project ANVIL was heavily focused around the South HAS area. We expect the new contract to be centered on the East HAS area. The potential for squeezing more Sqns into the base to avoid activating another is unclear. 

In short, an expanded F-35A buy, in order to make even just one lick of sense, requires:

 

-         Not only buying more jets, but buying them much faster, to avoid going into "full conflict" with GCAP’s own funding needs just as they reach their peak

-         Adding Boom to VOYAGER

-         Procuring new weapon types, otherwise the larger weapon bays will mean absolutely nothing in practice

-         Infrastructure spending potentially including activation of a second operating base

 

Unless the Defence Investment Plan in Autumn has something serious to offer in regard to these needs, the infamous “138” F-35 number will almost certainly remain fantasy.

 

And in absence of Booms and adequate weapons, the F-35A is in fact of no substantial relevance for any “Deep Strike” mission you might try to imagine.

 

And that is if we completely ignore the wider issue of substantial duplication and inefficiencies that come from running 2 small fleets, and the risk of another fratricide relationship ending in tragedy a few years into the future.

 

None of the problems are impossible to solve. But for the specific UK situation, they are very unlikely to be solved, and that’s unfortunately what matters.

What NATO wants

While the publication of the Strategic Defence Review is some time away still and surprises are the only thing that is always to be expected in British policy for Defence, we actually have a pretty clear idea of what NATO is asking of the UK and what the UK, in broad terms, has committed to. 

Top of the list, for importance and cost both, is the Nuclear Deterrent. 

The traditional UK role in the North Atlantic area and ideally up into the Arctic follows, because regardless of how often this fact is overlooked, the UK’s vital frontline is in the north. That’s where the UK mainland and Russia are virtually “in touch”, across the sea. That’s the direction from which Russian submarine and surface threats and their long range aviation and missiles would be coming from. The UK is expected to have a lead role in controlling this sea front. 

This commitment is multi-faceted and goes from Anti-Submarine Warfare to Carrier Strike to the historic yet so often overlooked commitment to sustain northern Norway from the sea through the UK-Netherlands joint amphibious force. 

Always remember that the world actually looks like this. The UK's geography is an inescapable fact. 

Carrier Strike used to be a key component of the NATO North Flank plans in the Cold War (HMS Ark Royal IV ended her days working with US and French carriers in the Northern Strike Group) and regardless of how hard Army and RAF-inspired lobbies try to deny this, it remains a factor. 

It increasingly means delivering seafloor surveillance and protection of key underwater and surface infrastructure, too, in the North Sea and into the Baltic, where a specific NATO mission has just launched after repeated “incidents” of submarine cables being cut. 

On land, the UK and NATO have agreed, already under the previous government, that the British Army’s main role within the Alliance’s New Force Model is to resource a “multidomain Corps” as SACEUR’s “go-to” Strategic Reserve. Specifically, in the New Force Model, SACEUR is to have two highly-responsive Reserve Corps, one from France and one from the UK. The new Secretary, John Healey, reaffirmed this “multidomain Corps” commitment in his speech at the RUSI Land Warfare conference in July last year, soon after the Election. While the speech itself does not add further detail, it had been reported that during the event he further specified that the “ambition” is for a British Corps of 2 Divisions with 6 brigades”. 

The Corps is of course the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which has started the transition towards the new role as soon as its latest turn leading the NATO Response Force (NRF) concluded (1 Jan 2024 – 1 July 2024). It was indeed an important date for NATO as a whole as the NRF became the new and restructured Allied Reaction Force (ARF), which will be led, for the first 3 years, by the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA). 

The Divisions are obviously 1st Div and 3rd Div. 1st Division has only recently gotten the uplift needed to resume some credibility as a deployable 2-star HQ and has immediately been trusted into a key high-readiness role, covering the transition from the old to the new Reaction Force. 1st Division has been the lead ARF component since 1st July 2024, mainly through 7th Light Mechanised BCT, an aviation task force and an integral operational sustainment brigade supported by elements of 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade. 

The ARRC’s “evolution” towards the new role has in the meanwhile seen the resubordination under its command of key formations including 7th Air Defence Group and 1st Aviation Brigade. De-facto, in order to deliver the Corps as described, all major formations will eventually have to report to the ARRC. 

NATO also wants to see the UK acquire more credible air defence options. This is an increasingly urgent gap to fill and it is historically particularly bad for the UK which, in terms of Ground Based Air Defence, essentially only deals in SHORAD and has for decades, completely avoiding any investment in longer range missiles and any real anti-ballistic capability. 

In theory, the UK is, already since the SDSR 2015, committed to contributing to NATO-wide Missile Defence efforts with a new anti-ballistic radar to be built on British soil. This commitment is known internally as Project LEWIS (possibly from the name of the island, where the radar might be sited) and led to a request filed to the US State Department for acquisition of a Long Range Discrimination Radar. Authorization to procure it arrived in March 2022 but no evident progress has been made since, with Project LEWIS operational capability officially delayed until 2029. 

The UK has been authorized to procure a Long Range Discrimination Radar set for Project LEWIS 

NATO has also made increasingly clear and public that the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. This is something that has been made clear at the SDR table, along with one simple, albeit perhaps unwelcome reality: there is not an “Indo-Pacific tilt” that can be cut to free up substantial resources, no matter how many times the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary have claimed otherwise during their pre-Election speeches. It would be both strategically illiterate and financially useless to cut what little the UK has committed to the “East of Suez”, and this point at least seems to have been understood by government: Lammy and Healey have both long ceased to attack the “Indo-Pacific tilt”, indeed changing tune entirely. Their most recent speeches invariably underline the indivisibility of the two major regions of concern. 

NATO is also going to increasingly make clear that, as far as it is concerned, “3 (% of GDP) is the new 2”, but it doesn’t look likely the UK will be among the eager proponents of this new target, this time around. We are unfortunately still far from sure that even just the 2.5% target will be reached before this Parliament ends. 

What does it all mean in practice? 

Again, only assumptions can be made because the fact both logic and NATO are asking for some actions do not in any way imply the British government will follow those directions. 

In theory, Carrier Strike is safe and sound. NATO continues to value the commitment to provide Carrier Strike in the North Flank context and beyond, and the carriers are paid for. In general, no matter how some lobbies in the UK continue to campaign for it, NATO is not going to ask for existing capability to be cut in favour of dubious savings and even more dubious investments to follow in something else. The government’s confirmation of the Fleet Solid Support procurement with all 3 vessels confirmed through the new deal with Navantia also logically suggest Carrier Strike remains very much central.

ASW, including submarines (SSN-AUKUS) also remains critical and thus, again in theory “safe”. 

The amphibious role in Norway remains in demand and is part of some of the oldest multi-national commitments the UK has in place (with the Netherlands and with Norway) but this has not been enough to spare the ALBION-class LPDs from early removal from service, again confirming that logic can only ever go so far when it comes to British plans for Defence. 

Again in theory, the expectation is that we will see plans for a second, purpose-built Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship confirmed. This vessel is planned with a very specific role in mind: “Deep Sea Data Gathering”. It will be more complex, more specialized and more expensive than RFA PROTEUS and will replace HMS SCOTT, the critical deep-sea survey vessel that is fundamental to ASW and the Deterrent. Between the subsea surveillance needs, NATO-wide, and the critical relevance of that survey capability to the Deterrent and the ASW mission, the construction of this vessel should be a certainty but, i can never stress this enough, British defence plans are a weird and mysterious world apart. 

It is no mystery that, whatever the difficulties RAF and Royal Navy face (which we can summarize primarily with the single word “personnel”), the most uncertainty, risk and trouble is to be found on Land given the absolutely horrible shape the British Army self-mutilated into through the STRIKE Brigade disaster. NATO is understanding and knows it will take time to recover, and understands the “British Corps” will (probably?) never be quite a Corps like the Alliance intends. 

What NATO will invariably demand is that the ARRC and its assigned combat units are properly enabled. This means they need to have credible artillery, air defence, ISR, logistics, engineering, EW, CBRN and medical capability. What NATO expects from the Reserve Corps is clearly a “self-contained” force that, when directed into action by SACEUR, is able to adapt to the situation and the terrain and act “independently”, without needing all sorts of backfill from other Allies to plug capability gaps. 

What the UK is being asked to provide is, indicatively, the 8th largest land component in NATO. It’s a substantial ask, but should not in any way be seen as something beyond the realms of the possible. The brigades, to some extent, already exist. 

In case some of the readers are not familiar with the British Army’s current structures, there are currently 2 armoured infantry brigades (12 and 20), a Light Mechanized brigade (7th) and an Air Assault brigade (16th) which, while not without problems and shortcomings, have a full roster of capabilities including key enablers. One major, major exception is proper artillery for the armoured brigades because at present the British Army has just 14 ARCHER 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, ex-Sweden, after accelerating the withdrawal of AS90 to pass the whole fleet to Ukraine. This is however supposed to be fixed in the coming years procuring BOXER RCH155s (Mobile Fires Platform project). 

The Divisions as they emerged from Future Soldier. Some things have changed since as some units have re-subordinated (most notaly 16 Air Assault has come under 1st Division, while 8th Engineer Bde and 7th Air Defence Group have moved directly under ARRC), but the lack of enablers has remained.

The Army also fields a small Army Special Operations Brigade (ASOB) with 4 Ranger “battalions” (not really battalion-sized at all), which in NATO context will have a stay-behind / deep reconnaissance and target acquisition focus. The UK is to lead NATO’s Special Forces component and the ASOB will be fundamental in providing the lead SOF component in 2026 as part of NATO’s regular rotations. 

4 Brigade at present is a “bag” of regular infantry battalions with dubious access to Reserve-manned enablers (artillery, logistics, engineer). This is not credible and would need fixing by building the missing enabler battalions. It would also need, in time, to be given appropriate vehicles: most realistically, a mixture of FOXHOUND and the future Land Mobility Medium – Troop Carrier Vehicle that is supposed to be procured. 4 and 7 could thus both serve as “Light Mechanized” formations. 

Another brigade that won’t count as a manoeuvre brigade in NATO’s eyes (in everyone’s eyes, really) is 1st Deep Recconnaissance and Strike Brigade (DRS). This is really a glorified, super-sized Divisional Artillery Group with organic recce Cavalry at present, devoid of infantry, engineers and logistics. It has fantastic firepower thanks to 2 regiments of GMLRS (3 Royal Horse Artillery and 26 Royal Artillery) and at least for now also controls the ARCHER / RCH155 regiments (1 RHA and 19 RA) which however are, de facto, there to support 12 and 20 Bdes, but the absence of organic Logistic regiments makes its useability doubtful. The artillery component, particularly the GMLRS launchers, would consume fantastic amounts of ammunition and its not clear, to say it charitably, how the Army believes that ammunition will be moved. 

ARRC has since taken under direct control 7th Air Defence Group, 8th Engineer Bde and 1st Aviation Bde as well 

1st DRS could be turned into an acceptable manoeuvre formation relatively easily. At present it is planned to have 2 Cavalry regiments with AJAX. If 2 BOXER-mounted infantry battalions were moved into the formation, it would assume the structure that had been imagined for the abortive STRIKE brigades. It would need the addition of a Close Support engineering battalion, a dedicate Close Support Logistic regiment and, realistically given the Army’s intention to compensate its other weaknesses through increased reliance on deep strike means such as GMLRS, a dedicate Logistic regiment to move the rocket pods for reloading the M270s. 

Last of the “non-brigades” is currently 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, a formation made up by 4 “non-battalions” (they are less than half the size of a real infantry battalion) specialized in delivering training and mentoring. This is not, by all means, a useless service, but it’s clear that it counts for nothing at all against the main “design driver” of building up a “credible” Corps. 

Unsurprisingly, all rumours agree on the fact that 11 Brigade will change shape and role. I’m insistently hearing whispers of 11 Brigade being transformed into a sort of lightweight counterpart to 1st DRS (which is of course part of 3rd Division, the heavy one) to, presumably, serve as 1st Division’s own “eyes” and “hammer”. 

This is interesting, but raises concerns on what exactly the Army is attempting to do. The hints point to a structure in which 3 Div fields 12, 20 and 1 DRS brigades while 1 Div would have 4, 7 and 11 DRS, with 16 Air Assault presumably leaving 1st Division and resuming her previous “independence” as a high readiness force. Depending on how this was done in detail, it would be either a more ambitious plan (with 7 rather than 6 “credible” brigades) or less ambitious one in which, at beast, 5 brigades would be credible as ground combat formations (12, 20, 4, 7 and 16) with the two DRSs being artillery brigades by any other name. 

With the (unjustifiably late, it was always exceedingly unlikely) realization that the Armed Forces manpower totals will not grow, the Army’s only hope of making its brigades “credible” and finding personnel to man increased numbers of M270 GMLRS and new Air Defence batteries (possibly a 3rd regiment to be added in the role) will come from ruthlessly cutting everything that does not help fill the gaps. Not munching words: in order to create additional artillery, logistics and engineer battalions, infantry battalions numbers will have to decrease. 

The attempt to hold on to 7 "brigades" through reconfiguration of 11 is highly unlikely (euphemism) to include the measures of painful realism needed to redistribute manpower and rebuild the missing enablers. 

The current 32 regular infantry “battalions” (as mentioned earlier, many already are much smaller than true battalions) are unsustainable and (largely) unjustified. The desired 6 brigades force, plus ASOB and standing tasks (2 battalions in Cyprus, 1 committed to Public Duties, 1 in Brunei, 1 experimental unit and 1 UK Special Forces Support Group) require no more than 26. It’s tight, unpleasant, difficult and will require years to build new units and manage the progressive redistribution of manpower, but if the total headcount stays at circa 73K there is simply no alternative. 

NATO will not be fooled into calling brigades formations that have no hope of actually going into the field as one. While the UK government strenuously refuses to release even a “curated” version of the regular NATO Defence Planning Capability Review reports, those will keep coming and will keep pointing out every area in which promises are not being kept. Elsewhere, the Netherlands Defence Planning Capability Review has been released in curated, unclassified form, showing planning assumptions and the areas where NATO identified shortcomings. The Netherlands have since enacted a number of procurement programs to cure those issues. 

Observation of what is happening in the Netherlands and elsewhere leaves us in no doubt at all about NATO being very explicit about the need for Brigades and Divisions and Corps to have their own enablers. Sweden, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy are all busy building or re-building the missing enablers of their brigades and divisions and there are zero reasons to believe the UK is not being given the exact same instructions. 

This, by the way, quietly but surely involves also “details” such as ensuring mechanized infantry battalions have appropriate firepower. The Netherlands, again, have visibly responded by initiating procurement efforts to put turreted BOXERs with 30 mm guns in their formations. Do we believe for one second the UK isn’t being told the same things...? 

As of the Major Projects report 2023/24 (current to last march), the Army’s 2 main AFV programs (AJAX and BOXER) have a combined cost of just short of 14 billion pounds, with a combined total of 1212 vehicles in production. That this veritable treasure doesn’t yet contain any proper “battalion set” of infantry carriers with suitable armament, mortar vehicles and anti-tank solutions is the measure of the failure of the Army to plan a sensible structure for itself. 

It is time to fix both the sclerotic AFV plan and the equally confused Army structure. I understand the Army’s preferred way out of the mess it has created for itself would be adding a tail of ARES infantry carriers, fitted with a suitable crewless, non-hull penetrating turret, to the AJAX production to equip the 4 infantry battalions in 12 and 20 Brigades. This would, ideally, release a substantial number of BOXER hulls for other roles (mortar and recovery modules are supposed to be ordered “soon”) while, ideally, also delivering a couple of BOXER-mounted battalions for 1st DRS. This would be the most “logical” and overall not overly expensive, way out of the mess. Whether the SDR will give the green light to this approach or not, we don’t yet know. 

International Armoured Vehicles conference will be this week, but I’m not optimistic we’ll get an answer (yet). 

NATO would be equally fine with putting a turret on BOXER itself, but one solution or another will be needed. In one way or the other, AJAX and BOXER will have to coexist and, however sub-optimal that is, the Army needs to make this combo work. 

And regardless of how unpleasant it is, the Army also needs to re-balance its headcount to put manpower and resources towards much needed enablers. Make-believe plans are not going to get a pass from NATO, and the quiet and polite “displeasure” of the Alliance might eventually materialize with the British Army finding its role within the Alliance changed to properly reflect what it is and not what it would like to be. 

In a non-distant future we might well see the UK quietly pushed out of high prestige roles, most notably Deputy SACEUR, if the UK output quality keeps collapsing. 

What NATO wants is mostly clear. What the British Army and British government are able and willing to do is not.