SDSR
2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review
Budget
Army
Army vehicle projects - Post DSEI 2015
Royal Air Force
Royal Navy
The following is a small update to the Army's situation, with the addition of the latest updated (and non updates) coming out of DSEI. It is hightly recommended to read the previous chapter, "Army Projects and Requirements", if you aren't up to date.
The Challenger 2 problem
DSEI brings confirmation that the
British Army is increasinly aware of the big obsolescence problems of
Challenger 2. The biggest issue at hand is the decreasing efficacy of the L30
rifled cannon, particularly in the anti-armour role. The problem is well known:
the Challenger 2 uses 2-piece ammunition, which makes it impossible to employ
an APFSDS penetrator with the length and mass required to ensure lethality. The
CHARM 3 penetrator is incredibly small compared to the latest, long darts which
have been developed for the smoothbore 120 mm guns. A small dart inexorably
means low lethality, and there is little that can be done to improve the CHARM
3’s effect.
In addition, the rifled gun is now
unique in NATO, and its HESH round, which used to add useful flexibility not
matched by the rounds available on smoothbore cannons, is now more than
balanced by a whole range of novel generation multi-mission shells developed
for smoothbores.
It is increasingly evident that the
L30 is the biggest problem at hand, and at DSEI, british army officials have,
for the first time, admitted that it simply
does not meet the requirement anymore.
Already back in 2006, a Challenger 2
was experimentally retrofitted with a smoothbore L55 cannon by Rheinmetall.
Changing the gun proved to be pretty easy, but the enormous issue is the
storage of ammunition. Pretty much none of the spaces currently available can
be readily adapted to carry the longer one-piece ammunition. Especially not in
a safe way: if currently the launch charges and HESH can be stored below the
turret ring, where they are somewhat less vulnerable, one piece ammunition does
not afford that luxury. One piece ammunition need specific storage spaces,
protected with armored bulkheads and with solutions for “venting” an explosion
away from the crew, like on the American Abrams.
In practice, retrofitting the
Challenger 2 with a smoothbore cannon requires a “new” turret. That’s why the
Challenger Lethality Improvement Programme was dropped. Subsequently, plans to
adopt a more powerful and fuel efficient engine also had to be shelved. As of
last year, the LEP was heading towards a mere obsolescence-removal exercise
involving, primarily, electronics.
At DSEI, the British Army has kicked
the ball back to square one, recognizing that such a LEP would not solve the
issues. What can be done? Hard to say. It is no longer taboo to say that the Challenger
2 might be replaced. The options, however, are limited: there is talk of a
possible new-generation MBT project to be launched by France and Germany, and
it would be great if the UK could be involved, but we don’t even know yet if
the project will effectively start. We don’t know if the UK can get into it,
and we don’t know when such a new tank would be available, and at which cost.
So, what?
 |
| The Challenger 2 experimentally fitted with a smoothbore L55 gun. Storage of the ammunition is a huge issue that requires vast redesigning of the turret spaces. |
There is a very real risk that
complexity and costs will end up giving us a LEP which does not solve the big
issues. This would be a bad outcome, but it remains likely. The sad truth is
that Challenger 2 can’t do with a simple “Life Extension Programme”, but needs
a big Capability Sustainment Programme, like Warrior.
The biggest obsolescence Challenger
2 is grappling with is its main armament, and ignoring this defeats the whole
purpose of having MBTs. Add to this the obsolescence of sensors and
electronics, and the turret really could be replaced entirely, pretty much. A
new engine would also help, since Challenger 2 is a dead last in terms of speed
if not of mobility in the wider sense, especially in the “mobile fortress”
configuration which has been used in Iraq, with the installation of big add-on
armor kits.
And all the issues be solved?
Money as always will be the chief
factor. We don’t know exactly how much money Challenger 2 will get. Last year
Jane’s reported that the LEP budget had gone down from 1.2 billion to 700
million pounds. Which is a huge amount of money under certain points of view
(certainly for an electronics-only LEP!) and not quite enough under others.
One option is doing away with the
Challenger 2 entirely. There are still Leopard 2 tanks being sold on the cheap:
Poland has paid just 180 million euro for 119 Leopard 2 tanks with all
accompanying equipment. Of course, these were not at the latest standard, but
they bring the L55 smoothbore, which is the key to solving the lethality
problem.
The latest standard Leopard 2s, the
A7, obviously cost quite a lot more. Saudi Arabia was about to procure 200 such
tanks back in 2011, and the pricetag was indicated in 1.7 billion euro.
The UK needs a workable plan to put
in service at least 200 MBTs armed with the L55 smoothbore, if its heavy armor
is to remain credible.
Extra money, of course, is highly unlikely. Some room
for manoeuvre could be obtained, but only by shifting money away from other
armoured vehicle programmes. The budget for Challenger 2 is to come from within
what was, until 2014, the Mounted Close Combat Capability Change Programme,
which is now broken down into four main areas: Armoured Cavalry 2025; Armoured
Infantry 2026; Armoured Main Battle Tank 2025 and Mechanized Infantry 2029.
The budget for the MCC
super-programme, was last indicated in 17.251,83 million, but spread over many
years, towards 2030. The budget covers the whole life costs, not just
procurement, and also includes simulators and initial support packages. It is
very hard to guess how this figure breaks down, and thus nearly impossible to
tell how much money could be shifted to Challenger 2.
In addition to Challenger 2, this
pot of money must provide for the FRES SV / Ajax programme, the Warrior CSP,
the ABSV if it finally kicks off and the Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (MIV)
which is the new name of what once was FRES UV, so we should not be fooled into
thinking that there is any real abundance.
Fixing the Challenger 2 programme,
however, is a big priority, in my opinion. An MBT which is no longer lethal is
no longer credible, especially not out to 2035 or 2040, which are the dates
towards which the Out of Service moment should be pushed thanks to the LEP.
Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, WCSP, Ajax.
I hoped DSEI would bring news about
this key programme, which represents the way out from the ancient FV432, which
currently has a 2030 OSD which would give it a good 70 years service life. It
is ridiculous that the Army is still stuck with this old workhorse, which was
once supposed to be replaced by Warrior, and which to this day is still seeking
a successor. Unfortunately, little to no news came out of the show.
The ABSV might have to wait until
2017 to hit Main Gate, with deliveries of an unknown number of vehicles in an
unknown number of variants due to be completed, in the Army’s “aspiration”, by
2026.
Armoured Infantry 2026, the name of
the programme, is also, in one short phrase, the objective the Army has:
renewing the armoured infantry by 2026, rolling into service the Warrior CSP
and the ABSV.
My frustration with the Armoured
Vehicles strategy of the Army are well known. To this day, the degree of
uncertainty surrounding not just ABSV but WCSP is astonishing, and throws
ridicule on the notion that “armoured infantry is the core of Army 2020”.
For now, the WCSP plans to upgrade a
mere 380 Warrior, of which only 245 are Section vehicles with the new turret
and gun. These numbers are flat-out insufficient for the six battalions planned,
and Lockheed Martin UK, which assembles the turrets, says it is “hopeful” that
more will eventually be ordered.
It is also not clear what the
variant split is regarding the remaining 135 vehicles. Several news releases
mention a “command” variant which has never existed in the Warrior fleet. There
are Infantry Command vehicles, which are minor variations of the Section
vehicle, and thus part of the 245.
There used to be a Battery Command
variant used by Royal Artillery AS90 batteries, but only 19 were produced and I
understand they have ceased to be used already years ago, with a number
converted in ambulances for use in Afghanistan.
What’s left is the FV514 variant,
the Artillery Observation vehicle. Not clear what, if anything, will happen to
these. Until at least 2011, the plan was to have a FRES SV Joint Fires variant
AND upgraded FV514, made into Joint Fire direction platforms as well.
Whether this is still the case, is
an unknown. The FV514 was going to receive only the basic mechanic and
protection upgrades under WCSP, with the RA supposed to fund a separate upgrade
to the mission equipment, to turn the FV514 into a platform capable to direct
mortar, artillery and air attacks from under armour. The Royal Artillery
experimented possible configurations at least into 2011, but what happened
afterwards is a mystery. 23 Ajax in Joint Fires configuration are on order, but
the number is pretty tiny, considering that each AS90 battery, alone, used to
employ 3 FV514.
If it depended from me, I would NOT
bother with a FV514 upgrade. The FV514 has a dummy gun, so it won’t get the new
turret. Even if it was “dressed up” so that it continues to resemble other
Warriors, the additional sensors needed for the Joint Strike role would make it
recognizable all the same. Another problem is that, unless the Royal Artillery
manages to get the Joint Strike upgrade incorporated into WCSP, the FV514 would
have to go to factory a first time for WCSP, then again for the separate
upgrade. How many years would it take, and how long would the units be left
without their vehicles?
Moreover, is it worth it in any way
to try and jam so much modern equipment into an old horse like Warrior, even
after it gets a modernized architecture under WCSP?
If I was the one making the
decision, I would forget about FV514 and purchase a few more Ajax Joint Fire
variants. More modern, less cramped, and with a working gun.
The FV514 hulls would be very useful
for ABSV, which should convert “surplus” Warriors into mortar carriers, APCs,
ambulances, maybe command-support vehicles (“true” Command posts should come
via FRES SV / Ajax, in the form of the ATHENA C2 variant) and Anti-Tank Guided
Weapon carriers.
The insufficient number of Warrior
getting the new turret and gun is a major concern. One way to reduce the need
for Warriors is via ABSV: if the ATGW variant materializes, the Anti-Tank
Platoon will not need Warriors (unlike now). An ATGW variant allowing the
launch of missiles from under armour, as well as the carriage of dismount Javelin
teams, would be a massive improvement in the Army’s capability.
The FRES SV / Ajax family is
supposed to include an Overwatch variant providing long-range, guided weapon
firepower. Unfortunately, it seems most likely that this will end up being just
an APC carrying dismount Javelin teams: this should be corrected by adding a
vehicle-launched weapon too, ideally with greater range.
The use of dismounted, 2.5 km
Javelin in the Overwatch role is a downgrade from Striker, which until 2005
provided vehicle launched Swingfire missiles with a 4 km reach.
Much curiosity remains about the
Ground Based Surveillance sub-variant of Ajax, too. In a world in which armies
are modernizing and adopting mast-mounted sensor heads combining radar and EO,
the Ajax does not look much innovative at all.
There is the risk that the GBS
sub-variant ends up being just an APC carrying 3-4 dismounts and their sensors,
and this would be very underwhelming.
Mechanized Infantry Vehicle
The Army really wants a 8x8 APC.
Indeed, it wants more than 300, so it is preparing to a new attempt at
procuring them after the utter failure of FRES UV. The vehicle, coming in
different variants, is meant to replace Mastiff and Ridgback, which are the
current interim solution equipping the 3 “Heavy Protected Mobility Battalions”
spread across the 3 heavy brigades.
A 8x8 combat vehicle is going to
bring better capabilities than Mastiff, particularly in terms of mobility, but I
have to sincerely say that I’d very much encourage the army to get the armoured
infantry right, before getting bogged down in another major, expensive
procurement programme.
While I’m not blind to the
advantages offered by an 8x8 solution, I believe that replacing Mastiff is not
quite so high on the list of the urgencies. I say this especially considering
that the army is most likely to procure only APCs armed with nothing more than
a .50. These vehicles are going to be an upgrade over Mastiff in a
low-complexity scenario, but not much of an upgrade in a more complex scenario.
Ultimately, since there are so many issues left to be solved in the heavy
armour area, I would focus my efforts there.
Non-Articulated Vehicle
– Protected (NAV-P)
Not an armour programme, but a key one. Any vehicle
the army might field will mean little if there are holes in the logistic area,
and the missing replacement of DROPS is potentially a huge hole. DROPS is
fundamental: it carries a vast variety of key payloads which include the
ammunition for the artillery. The army is in the absurd situation of having
declared DROPS out of service last year, while still using hundreds, alongside
with a small fleet of EPLS, exactly because it cannot do without them.
NAV-P cannot be delayed forever. It should sit high
on the list of priorities. Despite the obvious urgency, no noise from DSEI.
Multi Role Vehicle –
Protected
The first purchase of MRV-P vehicles might be
drawing nearer, with Main Gate expected in 2017. Industry is preparing to
compete, and General Dynamics will put forwards both the Eagle and the
Foxhound, the latter probably in the form of its cheaper steel-hull variation.
The first purchase is reportedly expected to include
500 or more “general service” troop transports plus 78 ambulances and 27
recovery vehicles.
Obviously, if the Foxhound can be made cheap enough
to be affordable (at the current pricetag, it has no real chance) it is an
obvious favorite, due to fleet commonality considerations.
Much has yet to be seen and decided regarding MRV-P.
As discussed earlier, the requirements suggest that 2 variants, one “short” and
one “long” might be necessary, so much so that both a 4x4 and a 6x6 variant
might be procured.
The high level of uncertainty, however, suggests
that MRV-P remains at risk of further delays. Anyone of the other vehicle
programmes could be given higher priority and push MRV-P further to the right.
Going into the SDSR, the Army’s top
priorities on the vehicular front, in my assessment, should be:
-
Upgrade
Challenger 2 seriously, or replace it early. If the upgrade can’t fix the
lethality problem, go for replacement. A L55 Leopard 2 is to preferred to
Challenger 2, at this point in time.
-
Increase
the number of Warrior Section Vehicles towards 300, the bare minimum needed for
six battalions. Consider that a training fleet would also be necessary,
ideally, especially due to BATUS swallowing up a battlegroup’s worth of
vehicles.
-
Proceed
with haste with ABSV, including the ATGW variant.
-
Ajax,
WCSP and ABSV are deeply interconnected: make sure they are run with coherence!
Do not duplicate where there is no need to. Complex roles like C2 and Joint
Fires should be left to the newer vehicle. Adjust the numbers to ensure that
the three fleets complete each other.
-
Do
not waste the big investment made on Ajax by cutting corners on Overwatch and
Ground Based Surveillance: provide adequate tools for the job. Mast mounted
sensors and a longer-range, under-armour precision weapon capability are both
necessary.
-
Procure
a NAV-P solution. More EPLS, or anyway a solution using the MAN SV truck as
base would have obvious logistical benefits.
-
MIV
and MRV-P are both needed and welcome, but they look lower priority to me, and I’d
accept a hit in these areas in order to achieve better results elsewhere.
