Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Awareness of the errors made?

One of the decisions of the SDSR that irked me the most, was the bit about retiring Sentinel in 2015, as it always felt like an absurd decision to make. The Sentinel represents the smartest investment of the RAF and Army in a long time, and a capability that is nothing short of invaluable, other than being rare.
Ground Surveillance represents a hole in NATO's capability that is, at least from a decade, constantly highlighted in the reports of the top officers, but never really addressed. Until the Sentinel R1 came online, the only capability of this kind was provided, unsurprisingly, by a "small" (relatively, of course) fleet of J-STARS airplanes of the USAF, which are considered by the US armed forces one of the most precious bits of kit they have. Its popularity has been on the rise constantly ever since it made the famous radar-photo of the "Mother of All Retreats" in the Gulf War.

ASTOR is the british equivalent of the J-STARS. Smaller airframe, but sensor suite just as capable, providing a formidable stand-off ground target surveillance, which is being heavily used in Afghanistan (from even before the airplane formally entered service) and in Libya.
It is a young system, which has cost good money, and that could provide sterling service for many, many years in the future.
NATO is trying hard to fill its gap in ground target surveillance, via the AGS programme. However, this is not a replacement of ASTOR: the UK has not formally joined the AGS, instead choosing to provide the ASTOR, as it provides its own Sentry fleet, in addition to the NATO one.
AGS, besides, is a small system: it started with great ambitions, by foreseeing big and very capable "J-STARS" on Airbus 321 airframes, working in cooperation with modified Global Hawk drones. But funding, of course, was cut more than once, and the manned part of the system, the Airbus 321, was the first victim, followed by numbers of the drones as well.

The Global Hawks to be based in Sigonella air base, Sicily, for the NATO AGS, are a welcome addition to ASTOR and to the global capability of NATO in this fundamental field (the sky knows how much the AGS would have been useful in the Libya operations!) but the British Armed Forces should not throw away the valuable system they are procured and paid for.
The announcement that Sentinel was to be "retired as soon as it is not needed in Afghanistan anymore" or "anyway by 2015" came as a total surprise within the SDSR, and it caused many frowns and a lot of speculation, mainly about the performances of the system: surely, to plan to get rid of it, it had to be crap.

Speculation apparently was wrong, as often happens. Sentinel is not wrong or bad at all, but of course, the RAF wants to retain Tornado GR4 as long as possible, and so other things had to be cut to keep Tornado cuts small.
Everything is being sacrificed to keep Tornado. First the Harriers, the Sentinel, even the integration of Brimstone and Storm Shadow on Typhoon, which is not being advanced at all. This had to be the year of Typhoon in Afghanistan, and 11 Squadron trained in the land attack role specifically with a 2011 deployment in mind, with the Tranche 1 urgent improvement programme, with integration of Litening III targeting pod and Paveway bombs funded to prepare the plane's ground attack capability, earlier than what planned by other partner nations, with the deployment in Afghanistan in mind. Now, not only the 2011 deployment idea is dead, but there is no talk at all anymore about using Typhoon in Afghanistan, and it is only a case that we have the Libya crisis giving Typhoon a role. It is very hard not to feel suspects growing about how the whole Tornado story is managed, but this is another story.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stepgen Dalton has recently released an interview to DefenseNews, and there are a couple items of interest, in what otherwise is, honestly, one of those "I talk, but say nothing" interviews. Here we can see the interesting bits:

Critics say the RAF is moving in the wrong direction on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. You scrapped your MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft and the Sentinel radar plane is to be retired in 2015. Your view?

To start with, we didn't decide not to maintain the MRA4 on a whim. We looked at what we thought was the intelligence picture, we looked at what we thought was the requirement in the next few years, and we looked at what our allies had and what capabilities we therefore could perhaps ask our allies to help us out with.

If we now move into the requirement over land, and I will just point out that our defense review said when we no longer needed the Sentinel, we would then look to dispose of it.
I think what has been proven in both Afghanistan and Libya, when the whole fleet has been airborne at one time, was that the Sentinel R1 capability has proven its worth time and time again.

In terms of the Nimrod R1, we are very clear, and have committed to three of the RC-135 program - we are calling it Air Seeker - that will give us the ability to contribute to and have a unique capability in an overall ISTAR picture. With everything else, we will have a pretty good picture to be able to put together.

Will you consider improving ISTAR capabilities by putting pallets on C-130 transports or pods on A330 tankers?

As an Air Force chief, I am always looking for those good ideas and innovative ways to maximize that capability. Before we do something like that in the future, I will look at what the merits are, what the costs are, and what the support costs are, because it's all about the sustainability and the cost of that, rather than necessarily the price tag of buying it off the shelf.
I have to look at whether it's a remotely piloted system, an aircraft system or some other combination of capabilities that will give us the overall capabilities we need. And when we know that, we will then have a look at what we can do, maybe working with our allies, to produce that capability.

The talk of using air tankers as "auxiliary" ISTAR platforms is not new: there was a suggestion in this sense already a few months ago, with rumors of a RAF interest in a podded solution for the Voyager, perhaps inspired by the US Marines plan for the "everything-doing" KC130J Harvest Hawk without any doubt one of the most interesting developments of the recent years. The idea is promising, particularly if it comes at no expense for the air-refuelling role, and as an ADDITION to more specialist kit. It is a mirage to replace, without loss, the capability of Sentinel with a camera-pod under an A330's wing.


The Typhoon, born as an air superiority fighter, has been fitted with a limited air-to-ground capability but can't deploy Storm Shadow and Brimstone precision missiles. Will you accelerate fitting them on Typhoon?

The Typhoon has been operational for a number of years in the air defense role, as you say, both in the U.K. and the Falklands, and in that role, it has a formidable capability. Among the Typhoon nations, it has been fitted with the capability to operate in the air-to-ground role, and as you say, that has now been proven very successful.

We have a very clear plan where we are going to go. As the operator, I would love to accelerate the capability, but what I have been very clear about is we are progressing to a very coherent program to give us a range of capabilities. We have the Tornado [fighter-bomber] available to us, which has performed magnificently in Libya and still does so in Afghanistan. It can carry the weapons we have not yet got onto Typhoon.

The combination of those platforms with the combination of weapons they can carry have been the stars of the show in Libya. So at the moment, there isn't pressure to get that kit on the Typhoon.



Naughty me reads this as "Are you mad? If we put the weapons on Typhoon, how we justify to the Treasury the retention of 96 Tornado to keep 18 at readiness?!?". 

Note that the retention of Tornado is a real good news, actually. The Tornado is a very capable platform, and the two fleets give the RAF the capacity to do more, obviously.
What irks me is the cost we are paying to retain Tornado at all costs, from the total loss of At-Sea air power for 10 or more years, to the billions of money that are to be spent on the GR4 in the next few years, to the talk of retiring Sentinel, to the loss of Nimrod, to the, perhaps more worrisome of all, risk of yet more cuts in PR12 and beyond, as foreshadowed by this bit of the interview:



We hear the RAF is 4 billion pounds [$6.3 billion] over budget. You've been through the three-month funding review and PR '12 is starting. What will you cut to make ends meet?
What's really happened is that we have looked at the program overall in detail over the last 18 months, and we are now pretty sure that we are in a position to be able to [advance] capabilities that we think we need in 2020 and beyond.
What we're looking for now is how to ensure that we have genuine capability in depth to meet our requirement, and of course in doing that, we must assess what the lessons are from the operations we have been involved in recently.
So, I don't think at the moment that we are in a position to say that we've not got the capabilities that we need. When you look at the results of the three-month exercise, you'll see actually that we have confirmed all of those capabilities.
Is the 4 billion figure accurate?
I don't think that we know, quite frankly. There is the need to make the particular cuts in the future, there's always an adjustment, there is always a fluid plan, and we need to make sure that we know [what] those costs are. But actually, in the three-month exercise, we were pretty clear that we knew what the costs were for these, and I'm not at all concerned that we are going to have to make any significant cuts.

I think any comment to the above would be a waste of time. I can only underline that, if the 4 billion figure is true, there's no way in hell that the RAF won't "make any significant cuts".
With Tornado expected to save 7 billions if retired, against 1 for the Harrier, i continue to say that we risk paying simply a too high cost to retain the big bomber jet.
I'm absolutely clear that in a world in which retiring Tornado allows me to balance my budget, and actually perhaps be able, within five years, to spend a couple billions for the urgent adjustements (which i would use to retain Sentinel, launch the 1-billion programme for 5 Poseidon as Nimrod replacement and advance the Typhoon weapons integration programme), i keep the Harrier, even if less capable, even if it means no Storm Shadow raids in Libya the month later. We keep talking of painful decisions to make: this is one. Retaining Tornado is actually the easy choice, due to the fleet being larger and more capable.
The problem is that the greater cost of keeping it is messing everything else up.

The Apex is reached when the question touches the Sentinel R1 again:

Is the Sentinel slated for retirement because of its cost or that its capability won't be needed after 2015?

Not at all. The issue is about understanding how much that capability genuinely delivers the ground picture which is going on. Now that we have more experience with its demo stated and absolutely critical capabilities, and if we can't find a way to produce that capability, then we will seek the ability to re-engage with that platform and keep it going for longer. I believe it has demonstrated fundamentally its role and its capability and its importance to any campaign, air or ground.

Congratulations. You've discovered hot water, a new invention which humanity will be forever be grateful to you for. 


It is good to see a patently stupid decision being already regreted, just like the idea of fitting only one carrier with catapults, and doing away with Marittime Patrol airplanes.
Problem is, money still does not appear to be there.

Losing Harrier was bad. Losing Tornado now, and having none of the two, will be worse. Cutting back on ISTAR, on other vital force multipliers, and on future numbers of F35s, to retain Tornado now, would be disastrous in the long term. 


Ever since the Parliamentary Defence Committee hearings on the SDSR, the RAF has been saying they are aware of the ever growing need for ISTAR, while making decisions that reduced, and in some fields nullified the capability. Say A, do B. 
If, in the near future, the Service Chiefs are effectively given control and responsibility for their service budgets, getting to set more directly their priorities, we will finally see if the ISTAR lesson is being learned, or not. No excuses at that point.

117 comments:

  1. Hi gabby, I few points if I may.


    Some of your points are well made but ,don't forget nearly all decisions are made triservice through defence funding votes system at the defence board it's not foolproof, but I think you give too much weighting to the RAF chiefs voice. Others on the board will have to agree to these things(or at least do a deal). I'm not saying it's split 3 ways equaly, but it's much more balanced than your suggesting.

    You've got some of the timelines muddled up. 11 Sqn were looking at going to afghan but only very briefly in about 2006/7. The fleet was too small and wasn't capable enough.
    SS and Brimestone integration was a choice, timewise, made long long ago. We could do it outside NETMA but would cost too much and isn't needed. The extra cash would never come anyway, it's opertional why would you want to waste money bringing it early when there is no need? Even if you did the fleet is still way too small to carry on what it does and take over GR4 role.
    There wasn't a choice of the above as you paint it, of increased typhoon deployments/integerations or GR4 staying on. They happened long before SDSR. And why choose those two things, you could have easily chosen two others items from defence? Although naughty me says it does help people believe in 'Tornado mafias' ;-)

    The Sentinel is more a case of keeping the powder dry. You can only fight on so many fronts at once. It got a 4 year reprieve with time to work on keeping it. I wouldn't be too worried I'd say it's got a good chance of staying on reading between the lines.

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  2. I very much remember the assumption that by 2011 Typhoon would have deployed in Afghanistan. It was more than a fleeting madness, it even made it on italian aviation magazines as a news.

    "We could do it outside NETMA but would cost too much and isn't needed."

    Ah. The urgency of integrating early the LITENING III and Paveway then, how is it justified?

    "There wasn't a choice of the above as you paint it, of increased typhoon deployments/integerations or GR4 staying on."

    My option was to keep Harrier and retire Tornado. And - eventually - integrate weaponry before 2014, the current (if it has not been pushed back further) planned date.

    And the choice did totally exist and was possible. It was a matter of choosing a different area to neglect: instead of air power at sea and inherent reach and flexibility, a shorter gap of max 4-5 years in the capability of firing Storm Shadow, as Brimstone could have been operative on the Harrier in months at most.
    Do you honestly believe that 10 years of gap in ops at sea and 4 billions of overspend are worse than 5 years without Storm Shadow-capable platforms?

    You merely judge that Tornado is indispensable because you want to do what Tornado does, in terms of numbers and capability.
    It is not any different from what i think about other weapon systems: retiring Tornado would have limited what can be done in a different way.
    A way i deem less damaging than what is emerging from the choice made.

    Arguably, the Parliamentary Defence Committee report broadly agrees with me, too, as they went short of calling for the return of the Harrier only due to the retirement having made too much damage already to make it possible to bring it back.

    "And why choose those two things, you could have easily chosen two others items from defence?"

    Not really. This is quite an unique case, with no equal in the SDSR planning.

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  3. Maybe for the Italian airforce but not for the RAF that's for sure.

    I don't think they were integrated any faster than the planned timescale. It was done years ago to save money by all the Partner nations integrating at a set time to keep costs down.

    Your going into the done to death harrier/Gr4. My point was about Typhoon.

    I don't merely judge anything, I'm just pointing out the choices made here and now and no doubt in the future work in a different manner than how you imagine them to.

    They could have but we won't ever no that for sure, you want it back so did plenty of others, even those wearing light blue believe it or not.

    Again I was talking about typhoon options which were long before SDSR, not about the harrier/gr4 debate.

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  4. Oh what's with the 'hot water' joke I'm not sure I get it.

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  5. Hi Gabriele.
    I agree with you. No one want's to see the loss of any aircraft, but the choice was, harrier save 1 billion, tornado save 7 billion. Keep harrier and retain navel strike, keep tornado retain a weapon system.
    To me that is a no brainer, in the long term it means that now the RAF will get fewer, if any F35's, and maybe will have to make further cuts.
    The FAA may end up having more operational fighter aircraft than the RAF!
    But they are not alone in being masters of there own destruction!
    Regards
    Phil

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  6. Absolutely no. Tranche 1 Block 5 of the RAF, and only of the RAF, were given an urgent, UK-only air ground capability under a 73 million pounds contract known as ‘Austere Air to Ground’ programme (also known as CP193), called austere because it represents 80% of the planned final LGB capability, which will be reached not earlier than next year with integration of Paveway IV.

    Italian, Spanish and German Typhoons are only now starting to get AG weaponry. Priority within the Alliance was to get AA role. The UK did things on its own and gave Typhoon early AG capability after retiring the Jaguar.

    http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/07/14/225407/farnborough-2008-typhoon-fighter-bomber-declared-operational.html

    In 2008, after the Typhoon was cleared for AG work, it was anticipated that 11 Squadron would relieve the Harrier in Afghanistan.
    "Casually", the plan was abandoned and the Tornado was sent instead.

    In 2009, the RAF offered to scrap the Harrier when asked to make cuts, and the First Sea Lord had to threaten to resign to avoid the loss of the air power capability. (So much for your "tri-service" decisions!) In the end, JFH survived, but was cut back (along with some Tornadoes) and Cottersmore was closed, with transfer to Wittering. I'm sure you'll remember that one.

    As to the "hot water" joke, i guess in the UK it is not common... Anyway, it is simple: when in Italy someone says something blatantly obvious, we say that they "discovered hot water".

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  7. in the long term it means that now the RAF will get fewer, if any F35's, and maybe will have to make further cuts.
    The FAA may end up having more operational fighter aircraft than the RAF!

    Not sure how you come to that idea, could you explain that?

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  8. I guess £73m was found in what was considered a priority. SS and brimestone being a lot more expensive and longer was not consider so. But it does prove my earlier point of needing to go outside netam and finding extra cash.

    The rest of the article with regards to Afghan is wrong. GR4 was the only real replacement the decision was made earlier than that sometime in 2006/7.

    Not like that I don't no either way it's water under the bridge. Take the mick if you like but it's upto you if you believe it or not. It doesn't make it any less true. I suppose with the angle of the blog I guess it's easier not to.

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  9. Here is a couple links to articles of the time about the Typhoon-Afghanistan plan.

    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1559773/RAF-prepares-to-use-Typhoon-in-combat.html

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7482638.stm

    Oh, and to complete the picture, we have to remember that, due to the 2009 reduction in the force of the Joint Force Harrier, the RAF was able to tell mr. Cameron during the latest hours of the SDSR planning that the Harriers "weren't enough to deploy to Afghanistan", in order to prove the need for a large fleet of Tornado instead.
    This, while true (it would have been hard to meet harmony guidelines if the Harrier was to return in Stan), was a problem that could be solved by retaining more Harrier personnel, as it is personnel, more than airframes, the problem.

    This argument was probably the main weapon that made possible the famous "late change of heart" which saved Tornado, even after the decision-making project had been long inclined towards the Harrier.

    "you want it back so did plenty of others, even those wearing light blue believe it or not."

    Its pilots wanted it to stay for sure, but the higher officers of the RAF, no. The harrier had long been their choice whenever cuts were required, and the 2008 battle with the FSL proves it.
    As to me, i do not want it back: i recognize it is now kind of unfeasible.

    I merely say the wrong decision was made. And i fear the yet-to-be-seen consequences, more than the effects that can already be seen as of now.

    "in the long term it means that now the RAF will get fewer, if any F35's, and maybe will have to make further cuts.
    The FAA may end up having more operational fighter aircraft than the RAF!"

    Actually, it is worse: it means that the UK, not the RAF, will have less F35C, and 60% of them will still be RAF marked, regardless of them being needed for proper air ops at and from the sea.

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  10. ah right thanks for that, thought it might be something along those lines. Thought I'd better make sure!
    Dalton's smarter than you give him credit for, he'll have been well aware of the Sentinel choice, like I said earlier I really don't think it will go in 2015.

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  11. Topman, i really don't know where you do get the conviction that GR4 was "the only choice", when all evidence says the opposite.

    http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/litening-for-uks-eurofighters-01264/

    http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/04/24/213418/typhoons-zero-in-on-afghanistan.html

    It was planned to go either in Iraq in place of Tornado, or in Stan, with Stan being the preferred solution.
    They had their Multi Role certification by participating in an Afghan-scenario training in Nevada, come on, mate, we cannot ignore history that cheerfully!

    "I guess £73m was found in what was considered a priority."

    Just as 40 millions were found to upgrade Tornado and buy a new type of ECM pod prior to deployment.
    And you tell me that, in the event of Tornado being retired via SDSR, it would not have been possible to bring forwards already-planned Brimstone and Storm Shadow integration, with integration completition on Harrier (it was halted in the imminence of the SDSR, other case, i'm guessing...?).

    It is totally not realistic, mate. The sole money now set to be spent on Tornado GR4 update/life extension would have covered that.

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  12. "Dalton's smarter than you give him credit for, he'll have been well aware of the Sentinel choice, like I said earlier I really don't think it will go in 2015."

    That technically makes it a lie made to the NSC.
    A welcome lie, but a lie.
    To avoid cuts, they have promised to cut something in the future... thinking/hoping not to cut it in the end.


    Anyway, now they have to find a way to fit in the budget.
    If Sentinel is not to go, you can expect two (or more) squadrons of Tornado to go as soon as the last two Typhoon squadrons are stood up, if not earlier, as there is nothing else to cut, and not enough money to complete the trick.

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  13. Found this too, on http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-272314.html:

    http://www.rafnews.co.uk/default.asp?channel_id=117

    Latest Typhoon squadron forms Eurofighter Typhoons could be deployed to Afghanistan in the ground attack role to support British forces opetrating there as early as next year. Speaking at a parade to mark the re-formation of 11 Squadron at Coningsby, Wg Cdr Gavin Parker said: 'We will be prepared and ready to deploy to Afghanistan next year. It has not been timetabled, but I expect that when we are prepared, we will go.'


    The link to the RAF News edition is no longer valid, i'm trying to see if i can dig the original edition up from somewhere else. But there are little doubts on the seriousness of the Typhoon - Afghanistan plan.

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  14. I'm sure there are plenty of other articles on it. Doesn't mean they are right, but by 2008 when those exercise were taking place the GR4 fleet was already preparing for Afghan. I remember a meeting I was present in, telling us for the first time it was happening. 'Dual ops' was the buzzword Afghan and Telic at the same time. IIRC this was about 2007 time and I think the choice was made by PJHQ about late 2006. Various things started to happen large scale preprations were made. It was done on the quiet, we were told not to tell anyone and certainly not to start blabbing about it on the internet. Why I really don't know.

    Why or how those articles go that impression I can't say why, but they aren't true. At that point they were only 2 ops sqns anyway; 3 and XI not enough to do QRA and Afghan and both were very 'young' on type. So it really was a none started for a sustained deployment.


    That's all about harrier/gr4 I didn't bring that up, and made no point (or at least tried to) about it. It's been done to death and no-one here or anyway else will think any differently to how they think now, either way.


    I wouldn't worry about markings as I understand it the contract is more about availabilty. The type of contract will be one never seen before.

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  15. If Sentinel is not to go, you can expect two (or more) squadrons of Tornado to go as soon as the last two Typhoon squadrons are stood up, if not earlier, as there is nothing else to cut, and not enough money to complete the trick.

    That's assuming it's all about the air budget ;-)

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  16. "That's assuming it's all about the air budget ;-) "

    It would be criminal to rob the other services for paying for Sentinel. They have their own problems as it is, especially the Army.

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  17. I did say they were looking to go, and maybe there was more intent than I previously thought. But still it doesn't change the main point GR4 was to go and went all steam ahead from 2007 onward, seems strange no?
    Why ramp up a force and put everyone on notice to go, if they aren't going if as you suggest it was Typhoon that was to go?

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  18. 'Rob' them odd term to use, it's a joint requirement if I remeber right and jointly manned. I know you'd like the idea that tri service desisions (and therefore budgets)are made but still..

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  19. To avoid cuts, they have promised to cut something in the future... thinking/hoping not to cut it in the end.

    Yep that's the world of senior officer politics!

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  20. I don't like the idea of someone else being cut not to cut Sentinel, as much as i want Sentinel to stay, because of how good a job it does.
    I find already disgusting that the Sea King MK7, despite being flogged in both Afghanistan and Libya, is risking not to be replaced in 2016, and perhaps not even in 2020 if things continue to go this way, for example.
    That would be capability just as valuable (if not more, in several ways and aspects), thrown away just as stupidly.

    "Why ramp up a force and put everyone on notice to go, if they aren't going if as you suggest it was Typhoon that was to go?"

    I suppose you can read it the other way, too. Why spending to prepare Typhoon to go, train the crews, build up expectations, then deploy them... nowhere, nor iraq nor afghan.
    Wasn't for Libya, which casually popped up, the 73 millions for the Urgent Upgrade would have been really, really thrown down the sink.

    Again, from the outside i'm tempted to say that, being the Tornado at risk of being cut and the Typhoon being essentially safe... Well. A deployment puts the aircraft type in a strong position during negotiations, so it makes for a good solution.
    I'm possibly cruel and naughty, and that's not what happened. But it does appear that way.

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  21. And you say it yourself: "Yep that's the world of senior officer politics!"

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  22. Why spending to prepare Typhoon to go, train the crews, build up expectations, then deploy them... nowhere, nor iraq nor afghan.

    I suppose it's a matter of greyness that's hard to read and come across in an article. The work up which seemed big training and the such wasn't really a thumbs up/go light more of a question mark, with a slim chance of going. They went on one heavy bombing exercise. This might seem big but in the scheme of things it's very run of the mill.

    I don't think £73m spent some 5 years ago would worry many top brass, as dead money. They could piss x10 that much away and not even blink, it's small fry to them. The person that signed off on it would have moved and it was a nice to have that capability not sure how vital they were in Libya. Although the figures of the split between the 2 fleets (ordinance wise) at GdC has been decided it isn't for public reading.


    'being the Tornado at risk of being cut and the Typhoon'

    Ah but at the time it wasn't sdsr was just a twinkle in DC's eye.

    On a serious point, what is it about GR4 that brings out people's needed to believe in all sorts of wacky ideas, people seems to start with answers 'It's all the tornado mafia' and then work back from there. It's some I just can't get my head around.

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  23. "Yep that's the world of senior officer politics!"

    Yes I did, I'm not naive enough to think it doesn't happen, however it does have it limits now it's much more limited than say 30 years ago when it was rife and had much more sway. I also know it goes on now and in (roughly) equal amounts.
    However looking at some people they are naive enough to think it is; 95% RAF and always the winner, navy and army 5% always the plucky loser.

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  24. "However looking at some people they are naive enough to think it is; 95% RAF and always the winner, navy and army 5% always the plucky loser."

    You know, the RAF wins it quite often.
    And you are not going to get many people agreeing with you on the RAF having no political power just as a RAF officer gets assigned Joint Forces command, you know...

    Is there in history a case of the RAF ever having a big loss out to the FAA or Army?
    Plenty of aircrafts moved from FAA to RAF. Not many did the travel in the other sense.

    And TSR2 and Harrier are two wounds that nothing will ever close, i'm guessing.

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  25. I'm possibly cruel and naughty, and that's not what happened.

    If you think it didn't happen, why say it in one of your blog entries, and I don't think it's the first time either?

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  26. "and that's not what happened"

    That's supposed to be sarcastic.

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  27. And you are not going to get many people agreeing with you on the RAF having no political power

    Did I ever say that?

    Is there in history a case of the RAF ever having a big loss out to the FAA or Army?

    Last two rounds of redundancies hit the RAF far harder than the other two services. Merlins are going to the navy, with the RAF getting possibly nothing. JHC is run by the army, AT is 'jointly' controlled by the army through it's weight in Dmovs.

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  28. That's supposed to be sarcastic.

    Sorry it was lost on me. Really despite the evidence. Fair enough, even if that decision pre-empted another by several years? The only way that could happen if you think some people in the RAF could see into the future!

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  29. And TSR2 and Harrier are two wounds that nothing will ever close, i'm guessing.

    That I will agree with you on. People will bring up Harrier in decades to come.


    You know, the RAF wins it quite often.

    I guess I should take that as you admiting it's not just one service that plays politics?

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  30. "Last two rounds of redundancies hit the RAF far harder than the other two services. Merlins are going to the navy, with the RAF getting possibly nothing. JHC is run by the army, AT is 'jointly' controlled by the army through it's weight in Dmovs."

    How is it 14 Chinook, with the fleet reaching 60, nothing???? The Puma upgrade?
    Are you contesting the Merlin move too? What, were we supposed to throw to hell the amphibious helicopter force too?

    Joint Helicopter Command controlled by the Army: i have my doubts on how effective that control is, but i see absolutely nothing wrong in that.
    Indeed, in another country, the helicopters would be of the Army, end of it. There would be no JHC (an absurd duplication): the air force would have, perhaps, a C-SAR/Special Ops helo (Puma HC2, say), while the Army Aviation would have Attack and Utility helos, with the Naval Aviation would use the amphibious and ASW/ASuW helos.

    I really wouldn't complain about either thing, as this is water of roses. Wanting to be cruel, i'd say that JHC is due to the blatant evidence of the fact that utility helos are used for Army maneuvers, but being said helos RAF marked, the Army had to be given some control on them in another, imaginative way.

    There shouldn't be a JHC at all. Helicopters should be in the AAC.

    "Fair enough, even if that decision pre-empted another by several years? "

    You talked about 2007. Typhoon AG weaponry integration work was launched in 2006. Your pre-emption of several years, i'm afraid, does not really exist.

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  31. just as a RAF officer gets assigned Joint Forces command, you know...

    oh as an aside, have a look on navy net, a few fisheads who works with him now rate him highly. And if a fishead rates anything RAF you know it must be good!

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  32. "I guess I should take that as you admiting it's not just one service that plays politics? "

    I would hope they do.
    Indeed, i hope they begin playing a bit better, because i think that in the years their losses have caused some bad damage to the overall force of the UK.

    Instead, i see the RN desperately trying to be friends with the RAF on the F35 and Carrier... which horrifies me, thinking of how the Joint Force Harrier political adventure developed, with the First Sea Lord having to almost resign to stop the "Joint" force from being cancelled without him even being listened on the matter.

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  33. "oh as an aside, have a look on navy net, a few fisheads who works with him now rate him highly. And if a fishead rates anything RAF you know it must be good!"

    I hope he is, and probably he is. He wouldn't have made the road he made if he wasn't capable. You probably genuinely think i hate the RAF, but believe it or not, that's not true.
    I'm not opposed in principle. I'm worried by how things tend to go, and a RAF officer in that place in a time of budget crisis... well. It kind of gives me the chills.

    I hope he proves me wrong.

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  34. I'm still not 100% that they will turn up.

    No I'm not contesting it. You asked for something where the RAF lost something to the other services I gave them.

    I didn't make anything for or against those points.

    Your point was GR4 went in to safe guard it against SDSR. My point was this conclusion was incorrect. The decision was made before SDSR was formulated. Therefore it can't have been the reason.

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  35. "I'm still not 100% that they will turn up."

    Indeed, which is scary to no end.

    "Your point was GR4 went in to safe guard it against SDSR. My point was this conclusion was incorrect. The decision was made before SDSR was formulated."

    It was sent to be safeguarded by cuts, generically. Cuts that have been coming at least since 2008, along with the awareness that an SDSR was incoming, and that it was going to be painful, unsurprisingly.

    It didn't take that great a genius to smell fire in the air thinking of the future, even if a date for an SDSR was not set.

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  36. And how come the RAF top brass are so sucessful they have been hammered in the redundancies and the last round in 2005?

    I thought you said the win most battles?

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  37. It was sent to be safeguarded by cuts, generically. Cuts that have been coming at least since 2008, along with the awareness that an SDSR was incoming, and that it was going to be painful, unsurprisingly.

    Well like I said it was in 2006, they must have had bloody strong sense of smell! ;-)

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  38. "Well like I said it was in 2006, they must have had bloody strong sense of smell! ;-) "

    We already saw that it is not really that way that things worked.
    In 2006, Typhoon was preparing to go as well, and up to 2008 it was very possible that it might be the one going.

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  39. You probably genuinely think i hate the RAF, but believe it or not, that's not true.

    No I don't, without being rude I just think you get taken in by some of the anti RAF stuff. But then you probably think I'm under the sway of the RAF and the GR4 as I'm usually quick to defend it's performance. And you might be right.

    I've been involved with it for years now, and from my viewpoint people are always quick to knock it and give it little to no credit. So I probably am bias but then I suppose we all are to a lesser or greater amount.

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  40. I think we might have to leave the dates thing, I don't think we will ever agree on the dates.

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  41. We all have a bias of some kind, depending on our point of view about what is most important.
    I believe my idea of what the UK armed forces should be like is a balanced one, actually... It is my fear, that is of seeing a final, real product that is not balanced at all, nor really suited to the job, that makes me speak.

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  42. Not to seem to chest poke, but what about my earlier point about the RAF redundancies this round and 2005? That to me is a big lose and a sore point.

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  43. "Not to seem to chest poke, but what about my earlier point about the RAF redundancies this round and 2005? That to me is a big lose and a sore point."

    I sincerely do not think they change the balance at all. Also, the current RAF redundancies aren't that massive, nor any bigger of those suffered by the others.
    5000 + 1500 option in 2020 against 5000 + 1000 for the Navy, and some 20.000 for the Army. I don't see what gives the RAF the right to cry misery.

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  44. Well the last ones were bigger and it's not just redundancies plenty of natural wastage, numbers are falling not just through redundancies. Maybe I'm too close to it, but it's sore point when my job is on the line.

    Anyway shouldn't it have been really small or zero since the RAF always win?

    I suppose my point is there is proof that the top RAF bosses don't 'win' as much as you think.

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  45. Sorry if the above is a bit personnal, it is getting on a bit. It's been nice chatting.

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  46. Gabby, I do think you sometimes view the issue through the lens of some evil plotting by the RAF but when a service has constantly, since its formation, been subject to the other services and a whole a host of camp followers trying to do it in, is it any wonder a knack of self preservation will develop

    But this only goes so far and to characterise the service as being wholly interested in itself is grossly unfair and it gets very tiresome.

    Things just dont work like that, decisions are always joint, its just the way it works in reality.

    As Topman has pointed out numerous times the deployment of Typhoon to Afghanistan was cancelled was made for very good reasons, sound financial, manpower and operational reasons which has been fully vindicated.

    Tornado protected at all costs, you have to be kidding, have you seen the force reductions.

    All services have been hammered in SDSR, no doubt there, but playing games by comparing who has been hit hardest is a fools errand and fundamentally fails to appreciate the realities of joint capabilities in real scenarios.

    Have we missed Harrier over Libya, no I dont think we have.

    Would it have been better, of course it would, no question there either.

    Lets also not forget the majority of JFH was actually light blue not dark and the conspiracy theories of people like Sharkey Ward and the PTT have been completely discredited.

    Will we miss Sentinel, obviously, yes we will, I agree with you that it was the most inexplicable decisions to come out of SDSR and I do hope it can be retained long term.

    I agree with Topman by the way, look at the actual combat history of GR4, its bloody magnificent.

    On Harrier, the fleet was shagged out and its nothing to do with harmony guidelines why they were replaced with Tornado

    Keeping Harrier and bining the whole Tornado fleet would have been a most ridiculous decision.

    The right decision, in the context of none of the options being desirable, was made.

    You also perpetuate the myth that Typhoon was born as an air superiority fighter, sorry, that's complete nonsense. In addition to the fighter role was also a replacement for Jaguar, this was ALL WAYS the case and seems to be forgotten about, somewhat conveniently.

    Trials have shown it will be a superb CAS system, better than either Tornado or Harrier for that matter.

    JHC is not an outrageous duplication at all, its a joint service command initiated precisely to avoid duplication. It might be a bit of a typical British fudge but its better than the alternative. Equipment is not a toy to be protected at all costs from the other bigger boys, its about the management of a joint capability in the most efficient manner that is reasonably possible.

    Gabby, you are entitled to your views of course but I think they are a little out of step with reality and far too prone to the vision of the RAF as some plastic shoe wearing, white socked mafia (sorry Topman) that sees its primary role as that of self preservation

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  47. Hi TD,

    Things just dont work like that, decisions are always joint, its just the way it works in reality.

    That has been my main point throughout my postings. Despite my best efforts with Gabby and using evidence he seems so difficult for him to believe.


    I agree with Topman by the way, look at the actual combat history of GR4, its bloody magnificent.

    Yep people seem to forget it's been on desert ops for 20 years, what else can match that?

    white socked mafia (sorry Topman)

    Ha ha :-) no problem.

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  48. The Typhoon, by all means, borns as an air superiority fighter, and it is thanks to the UK that it is to be made a swing role: partner countries like Germany had no interest in AG work for it when everything started.
    I'm absolutely aware of the Typhoon's capabilities in strike role, and indeed i'm waiting for them to be completed. But those 73 millions, really, at this point could well have been expended somewhere else. There was plenty of more urgent work.
    Instead of meddling with software on Tranche 1s, i would have used all of the 73 millions to buy more targeting pods, which are always in demand. Or anything else.

    As to decisions always being joint, i've just got the feeling that that is what SHOULD be like, not what IT IS like.

    As to JHC, it remains the fact that if helicopters were spread in the "conventional" way, as in other nations, it probably wouldn't be there at all. It is a fudge, and i'm not exactly sure that it works that well, sincerely, also because it ended up developing its own harmony guidelines, which casually are shaped on those valid for RAF personnel.

    From my point of view, it just does not look that way, TD.
    And as i constantly say, it is not a matter of Tornado not being up for the job. Save for the at-sea thing (which is, in itself, a pretty big hole), it is the best in the role.
    But there would be no PR12 nightmares if Tornado had been sacrificed.
    The Navy has been forced to accept reductions in what it can do. Unwise and dangerous reductions at that, and we are only lucky that Libya popped up, and not something worse and more sea related.
    I really do not see why the RAF, for some holy reason, can't be forced to have her own gapped capability. It is a matter of priorities.
    Priority one was to balance the books. Was it done? No.
    What else will be lost on the way, as the service is forced into a finite budget?
    That is the big issue.

    @Topman

    No worries, i understand the personal implications. Or, at least, i imagine them, as probably i'd need to live it to really know what's like.

    But if you allow me, i must point out that from at least 2 decades in defence, "winning" for a service means containing the damages.
    No one can be expected to get 0 cuts: that truly would be mafia, and kind of evident at that!

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  49. I really do not see why the RAF, for some holy reason, can't be forced to have her own gapped capability. It is a matter of priorities.

    Really? No gapped capabilities?

    Thanks no problems.

    Really I see it as all three services taking roughly equal cuts, still can't see why you think otherwise.

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  50. "Really I see it as all three services taking roughly equal cuts"

    Not really, when the retirement of the Harrier hit the Navy the hardest and gapped no RAF capability, merely reducing it to the same Tornado.

    Nimrod MRA4 also is more a problem for the Navy than for the RAF. I don't know if and how seriously C130s are flying over the sea, i suspect not much is being done in that regard since they are all very busy elsewhere, doing their job. And government now expects Merlin and Type 23s and SSNs to do Nimrod's work too. Don't even get me started on that.

    I just cannot agree on the "equal" vision of things. The SDSR cuts were everything, but equal. In the air, albeit at smaller scale, the UK can still do all what it did pre-SDSR. On land and on the sea, it is a mess.

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  51. Apart from VSTOL, and a large chunk of people to get rid of, yeah it was nothing... MRA4 I disagree more of an issue for the RAF massive capability loss and again manned by RAF nearly wholely.

    I'd say if anything land got away the lightest with only small reductions in numbers. Top marks to the generals.

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  52. 20.000 men and several battalions to go, plus some RE and RA and RLC regiments to disappear and perhaps 1RTR is, in your opinion, light...?

    Sorry, but we will really never agree.

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  53. I didn't know that the final numbers had been released. Even so relatively yes they have been untouchable for years now. So even with this, over say the last ten years of reductions they have done very well out of it.

    Yep on that we can agree.

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  54. Gabby, to answer a couple of points mate

    Not sure how many times I have to say this, Typhoon was ALLWAYS intended for a ground attack role, right from its inception and the original air staff target.

    The nations involved in Eurofighter set their objectives and agreed a common development profile to keep costs down, it was a common aircraft and any cost savings would have been destroyed by each nation doing their own thing. We have actually been hampered to a degree by this but commonality across the larger fleet is a discipline that it needed to realise the benefit of a multi national programme.

    We did not turn it into a swing role aircraft but merely accelerated our implementation in response to what we thought at the time were genuine future requirements. You cannot just wave a magic wand and capability appears, its a long road. It seems that those requirements changed and the rest is history but it is not some scheming by the RAF.

    The RN lost nothing with the withdrawal of Harrier, the UK joint defence capability was reduced, or in other words, the JOINT capability was lots and in reality, if you want to look at it like that, the RAF lost more because it constituted the lions share of JFH.

    Targeting pods?

    Are they in short supply, not sure we have noticed that on operations, do you know differently?

    You may get the feeling that the joint defence decision making process is somehow skewed in favour of the RAF but does not make it so, where do you get this feeling, the PTT?

    I know you have a bee in your bonnet about harmony guidelines but they are regularly breached in all three services and reflective of the different traditions and needs of the three services. I expect the new engagement model will bring them closer together so people like you can look in from the outside and feel all smug that those slackers in the RAF are finally doing a hard days work, hope it makes you happy.

    As for JHC, you evidently have no understanding of why it was formed or the benefits that accrue, lets go back to helicopters being 'owned' and managed by all three services independently, good idea, I think not. As for other nations doing it differently, I don't give a stuff because those other nations either have greater budgets or never do anything real in an operational context so they can continue to build their little fiefdoms and carry on spunking money up the wall. For all its faults, JHC, like JFH Harrier and all the other joint capabilities across defence are a sound idea, rooted in reality.

    Difficult decisions have to be made, no one likes the idea of not having a sea based fast jet capability but in the wider context, looking at their actual operational worth on the last ten years, the likelihood of future operations and how they might be conducted, amongst a sea of bad choices, was the right one.

    If you seriously think that binning Tornado would have somehow magically made the PR12 issue go away you are living in some sort of fantasy world and you might equally say, lets cancel CVF, stop production of Type 45 and disband all the infantry regiments, yep, problem solved.

    All services have been forced to make painful decisions, cancel projects, lose personnel and I simply fail to see the evidence that your constant moaning about how the RAF seem to be some golden special case, immune from cuts because, is matched by any sort of evidence.

    Real evidence that is, not third hand pub talk from people who in some cases are responsible for the mess we are in now.

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  55. Hi Gabby,

    I haven't read the other comments yet, but there was an interesting mistake (I take it to be a slip-up in putting the answer together with copy paste):


    1 Sentinel/Shadow 2
    1 Sentry 2
    2 Sentry/Sentinel 2; why together and repeat?

    Read only Shadow will be gone and also number of squadrons unchanged?
    - 2 at the end is the RAF main group responsible for the said squadrons & kit

    Cheers,
    ACC

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  56. sorry, omitted to say that it was a "mistake" in recent Parliamentary answers

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  57. @AAC, i hadn't noticed the mistake in that written answer, but yes, i now see.

    You probably know that 5 Sentinel R1 and 5 Shadow R1 are operated by 5 Army Cooperation squadron RAF, with the Sentry E3Ds having been brought all together under 8 RAF Squadron. Until 2009, the Sentry had been used by 8 and 23 squadrons, but the two were later amalgamated, and 23 was closed.

    I have no idea of how the figures ended up being repeated and mixed up that way, but i wouldn't read anything specific in that. I think it is a mere mistake.

    However you read it, there are two ISTAR squadrons: 8 and 5(AC), one with Sentry, and one with Sentinel/Shadow.

    Apparently, the SDSR "retire Sentinel R1 in 2015" included the Shadow R1 as well, despite lack of direct mention, suggesting that 5(AC) would be disbanded.

    If the plan changes, it is too early to say. I hope it does change: both planes are very useful, and relatively inexpensive compared to other platform types, especially considering what they can do.

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  58. @TD

    Calm down, man. I see things in a different way, and i have all rights to say it. And stop bringing in the PTT, i have my own eyes and ears and mind, and i do not need someone else to tell me what to think.

    It might look to you like i say things that have no sense, but you should be aware that, to me and others, your talk of giving the FAA role to the RAF is the most demented proposal ever, for example. As your constant CVF moaning, which in my opinion goes against all and every interest of the UK.

    Your statements and "i think", have no default value higher than mine "i think", you know.

    "Real evidence that is"

    Well, so long as you decide what's real evidence and what isn't, it is pointless to even try. Even numbers and evidence that have been provided elsewhere has been played down with "numbers aren't the whole picture". From the evidence that in all operations the UK's been part of in the years, from Iraq to Afghanistan to Libya, thanks to CdG, have seen the lion share of the air work done by carrier borne aviation, for example.
    Comparisons of cost, included the expected savings from retiring Tornado, that as a matter of fact in five years time would have done a lot to balance the budget. Estimates made by the government and MOD, not by me. Still, they are not valid to you.

    "The RN lost nothing with the withdrawal of Harrier"

    Save the remaining of one hundred years of fixed wing air power at sea experience, and the capability to deploy air support and air cover where necessary, away from the UK.

    As to Harmony Guidelines, yes. They bug me too. It takes too much men and airframes for the RAF to do jobs that are often the same of what's done by Army and Navy personnel.
    Why should a RAF helicopter pilot deploy for 4 months and be rotated out of theater while a Navy helicopter pilot can do more than six month, and deploy far more frequently than any serviceman of the other arms? Why must the JHC chose the 4 months rotation of crews, only to note, about operations in Afghanistan that - oh, surprise! - Army and Navy pilots are forced to break those guidelines anyway.
    Why can't we do something more ambitious, if not like the Navy's guidelines, but at least those of the Army? Already, there would be several improvements in availability of deployable force.

    "If you seriously think that binning Tornado would have somehow magically made the PR12 issue go away you are living in some sort of fantasy world"

    Those who think they could make the issue go away by recognizing "financial reality" and making the "hard choice" of killing for 10 years any fixed wing aviation capability at sea for saving a meager billion, where do they live?
    What has the Harrier and Ark Royal cut achieved, TD? What did it do to recognize "financial reality"?

    Financial reality is that Tornado retirement was projected to save up to 7.5 billions.
    Harrier + Ark Royal 1.3 billion.
    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1298871/RAF-Tornado-fleet-faces-axe-bid-save-7bn.html

    Someone read that 1.3 as 13? Because otherwise, in my world, financial reality means the hard decision is taking the first option, unpleasant as it is.

    You justify the harrier decision on financial reality. True.
    I justify the Tornado decision with the same reasoning.
    But i save 7 billions, and you save 1.

    You have a 4 billions hole in PR12, perhaps i don't.
    WHY should i accept that your vision of things is NECESSARILY the correct one. To me, it just CAN'T be.

    Because now Tornado has been firing Storm Shadow over Libya?
    Well, the UK wouldn't have done that. True financial reality is THIS. Perhaps it would have opened the eye of politicians.

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  59. @TD chapter 2

    "For all its faults, JHC, like JFH Harrier and all the other joint capabilities across defence are a sound idea, rooted in reality."

    This is purely your assessment. Plenty of others believe otherwise.
    As for Army-owned and operated helicopters, the first example i can make is Italy, which uses in Afghanistan a composite squadron of purely Army helicopters, augmented by detachments of Navy and Air Force helos.
    To no less effect of the JHF Afghanistan. Indeed, it is very similar in composition, only with Mangusta in place of Apache and AB205 in place of Lynx MK9A, plus Merlin of the Navy and AB212 or SH3 of the Army force SAR squadrons.
    You might not give a stuff about what other nations do, but your assumption that they are wrong and squandering money is, pardon me, arrogant and misinformed. Especially since you have no evidence backing the claim up.

    To me, JHC looks more about defending the status quo of Chinook squadrons that - oh, horror! - can never, never transfered to the Army, than anything really revolutionary.
    Far better to give RAF the Apache and Naval Aviation because "it flies", no? The first transfer would "break something that works", while the second, oh, no, no. That's not damaging. That's about removing duplication.
    It just doesn't exist. In no world. Not on Mars, not in Fantasy world.

    Disagree with me all you want and whenever you want, TD, but keep in mind that your opinion is still an opinion and a belief, just like mine is. And without providing any evidence, you have basis weaker than mine, to come here and say that JHC is all smart and good while the rest of the world is crowded by idiots who haven't realized how much smarter it is to have utility helicopters in the Air Force and a Joint, Army-lead command in addition to bring it all together.
    Go tell the ALAT, or AVES, or other Army Aviations in Europe and elsewhere (and no, i really do not think they have that bigger a budget than JHC, probably the opposite) that they are doing it wrong.
    Or tell the US, who just scrapped their own Joint Forces Command, that it is a smart idea.

    Smart idea is having a joint AirSea strategy as they have prepared, with the Army doctrine fitting into the picture accordingly.
    Yet another "joint HQ", on its own, is just another chair for a big officer, with no certainty of ever meaning something, but with the inexorable awareness that it will cost money.

    I may live in a fantasy world, but you do not appear to be any better at all.

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  60. Why should a RAF helicopter pilot deploy for 4 months and be rotated out of theater while a Navy helicopter pilot can do more than six month, and deploy far more frequently than any serviceman of the other arms? Why must the JHC chose the 4 months rotation of crews, only to note, about operations in Afghanistan that - oh, surprise! - Army and Navy pilots are forced to break those guidelines anyway.
    Why can't we do something more ambitious, if not like the Navy's guidelines, but at least those of the Army? Already, there would be several improvements in availability of deployable force.


    Crews on Chinooks don't deploy for 4 months their pattern is 2 x 2 months every year currently. The four months that you quote is for NFU personnal that deploy away.

    As to guidlines don't forget they are looked at not just at afghanistan but as part of a whole career. This issue has been brought up reapidly to the level of ministers and the defence board and over probably more than ten years are happy with it.

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  61. Hi Gabby,
    My drift was that someone was copy-pasting from documents, one saying somewhere in the title "As Is" and the other "To Be".

    When you don't know what the aircraft are/ do, you let it pass (the Minister would not know, either).

    Yes, agreed "However you read it, there are two ISTAR squadrons: 8 and 5(AC), one with Sentry, and one with Sentinel/Shadow", except that
    - without Shadow, for sure
    - based on Libya experience, ready to deploy as mixed squadrons?

    Cheers, ACC

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  62. It takes too much men and airframes for the RAF to do jobs that are often the same of what's done by Army and Navy personnel.

    Don't forget alot of the airframes are different and often more complex. Look at say a gazelle and a Typhoon in complexity, along with the fact that the figures are notoriously difficult to nail down. Eg not all people in the AAC have anything to do with aircraft, and not everyone who has anything to do with aircraft is in the AAC.


    To me, JHC looks more about defending the status quo of Chinook squadrons that - oh, horror! - can never, never transfered to the Army, than anything really revolutionary.

    Like I said above it may look that way to you, but lots of people and the top are happy with it, such as Land command the defence board, several defence mininsters, PJHQ etc, if not individually but at least collectively as an organisation as it was impellmented fairly quickly and no real moves to rebrigade it into the army. On this you may well be just plain wrong.

    And how do you know you could even man it, I don't think many in the RAF would fancy being forcably moved into the army, I know I wouldn't, what then when the majority of the personnal hand their notices in? You've got no experience the AAC have nowhere near the manning levels to cope, you'd be stuffed for years to come.

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  63. I'd dare saying that the Shadow R1 would be a big, even if less noisy, loss.
    If they are to go, why not retiring older and less capable Islanders of the AAC and keep the Shadow R1 in their place?

    At least part of the AAC Islanders should have a role very similar to that of Shadow, and i'd be inclined to say that a replacement would be feasible.

    As to the mixed squadrons, i wouldn't know. I'm not sure if there would be any real advantage at the end of the day in mixing things up.

    @Topman

    2 deployments of two months each still make for 4 months tours in a 12 months period.
    The change is that, if you are right, the 16 months break between tours is no more. In a way, thankfully.

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  64. "And how do you know you could even man it, I don't think many in the RAF would fancy being forcably moved into the army, I know I wouldn't, what then when the majority of the personnal hand their notices in? You've got no experience the AAC have nowhere near the manning levels to cope, you'd be stuffed for years to come"

    Have you made it present to TD when he suggests moving the FAA and AAC into the RAF?
    Because it is the same, if not worse.

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  65. No I didn't realise he had, nevertheless, putting it to both of you, I repeat the above question.

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  66. It would be a big mess. For a few years, manning the squadrons would be complex, to say the least.

    But this means only that transferring the helicopters is an horrible enterprise to tackle, not that it is correct to have them where they are.
    The future utility helos fleets, and the Chinook replacement above all, could well be built up into the AAC to correct the issue.

    As on the effective happiness of Land command about having the transport helicopters in the RAF, i wouldn't be so sure.

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  67. 2 deployments of two months each still make for 4 months tours in a 12 months period.

    Why isn't that enough?

    The change is that, if you are right, the 16 months break between tours is no more. In a way, thankfully.

    I don't think so, it a bad thing we should be making sure we look after people. Everyone should be looking to the best tour lengths not go down to the worst. Don't forget these people need to be looked after for their whole career, not grind them down through 'tour fatigue'.

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  68. It would be a big mess. For a few years, manning the squadrons would be complex, to say the least.


    Yes very much to say the least, that really would need to be handled carefully, if it even could be at all. But fair enough your, if not happy at least content with the risk.



    The future utility helos fleets, and the Chinook replacement above all, could well be built up into the AAC to correct the issue.

    Well anything is possible, but I'd say it was unlikely, I think the aac would be interest but not really at the top of the army.


    As on the effective happiness of Land command about having the transport helicopters in the RAF, i wouldn't be so sure.

    Well I've not heard anything serious, have you? They've got the budget and alot of control, based on that and no real moves to change it, I'm pretty happy in stating they are happy with it.

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  69. "Why isn't that enough?"

    Because that is a "one in five" rule. It takes five men to deploy one.
    The Navy does with a "one in three" rule.
    The Army also uses a "one in five" rule, but with six months deployments.

    JHC, as of 2009, had an official Guideline "wish" of tours of maximum 3 months, followed by 12 months of rest.
    Apache crews were not meeting those, but the number of crews was building up.
    The navy did not meet them at all, and rightly so i may add, because to meet them it would need to recruit more people, something financially impossible.
    http://books.google.it/books?id=2XSqFzpV5ckC&pg=RA1-PA20&lpg=RA1-PA20&dq=Joint+Helicopter+Command+harmony+guidelines&source=bl&ots=9u3ArYagvI&sig=wGoxMOESZJz5ZVPRsItdi6x52-o&hl=it&ei=Tql8TrmIJYOzhAek_PgN&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Joint%20Helicopter%20Command%20harmony%20guidelines&f=false

    I know the Navy is a special case, and people is aware of what they are destined to when they join.
    But if they can do it, with some effort the others could do a bit more as well, and that would be important to improve availability of helicopters to troops during deployments.

    I'm totally aware of the obvious implications for families and life. But this is not an ideal world. It is a world in which defence is struggling hard to fit into the budget.

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  70. The Navy does with a "one in three" rule.

    Having looked, briefly, at the link, it seems they have gone the right way like I said above bring the ratios up not down. I don't think it financially impossible or anything desirable, the fact that they struggle to man to the right levels isn't anything to be proud of. Sounds like the navy needs to look at manning issues.



    But if they can do it, with some effort the others could do a bit more as well,

    I'd say they aren't, they are undermanned that's
    a)because they can't recruit

    b)because they can't retain

    either way they've got a problem and sending people away at the rate they are doing isn't going to do them any good in either the short or long term.

    That report says to me, in big bold letters, the navy are out of step and had better get a grip of the manning situation rather rapidly. Not as you suggest move everyone down to 1 in 3.


    m totally aware of the obvious implications for families and life. But this is not an ideal world. It is a world in which defence is struggling hard to fit into the budget.

    With respect I'm not sure you do. I see it quite often on TD and on others, most people are quite happing talking dry stats about all sorts of pieces of equipement but spend almost no time at all talking about the people that operate and support them, it's as if half the time people think they are mindless robots. Without the people all the kit in the world may as well be piles of junk at the bottom of the sea. 'It's all about your people' I believe is one of the first things taught on the higher staff course.

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  71. Which bit specifically?

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  72. The Navy was doing 1 person deployed against 2.5.
    Perfectly within her guidelines, which are 1 against 2. They are not undermanned, and they haven't experienced any exodus to be worried about.

    I'm sure they'd like to be at home longer and more frequently, yet, they make do. I think they deserve the greatest respect for it.

    And i also respectfully disagree on the people bit. I do not believe i've ever suggested anything undoable, nor do i take pleasure in suggesting to make shorter rest times.

    I try to propose a different balance that makes it possible to do more, with less.

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  73. For it's fleet yes, but for JHC (brought in by the navy) 1 in 5 is needed the adm in your link says so 'The rule of 5 ... that i created.' It's needed because it's sustainable and robust and needed to endure over the next 15 to 20 years (taken from the report). When it drops below it the rear adm 'becomes enormously concerned' Fair enough if it's doesn't bother you it, bothers the adm in the report and no doubt plenty in JHC and further afield.


    I know you don't, but still I guess I wish people would chat about those behind the kit and give them as much consideration as they do worrying about, say ,if a missile's range is 10 or 11 miles and so on. Like the adm says 'because the people are the greatest single
    factor'


    The only thing you usually get with less is less.

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  74. For the navy the 1 in 3 rule has been working for a long time, and continues to work. You will note that the officer present for the Navy confirms it.

    I don't think they would ever oppose the comfort of a 1 in five rule, but this requires a massive uplift in personnel for doing the very same things, and this is not financially feasible, and they are aware of it.

    Then again, submariners make 10 months tours East of Suez these days, and a South Atlantic tour can run in the 7 months.

    Either the navy is given a rest because they all are superheroes, or the others do some more as well, i say.
    And at some point, you can expect that such "some more" will be requested, with how the budget situation is.

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  75. For the navy the 1 in 3 rule has been working for a long time, and continues to work. You will note that the officer present for the Navy confirms it.

    For the fleet yes, for JHC 1 in 5 is needed. I know you think 1/3 is ok, but the RN elements in terms of JHC plan and think 1 in 5 is best for those in JHC.

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  76. Why must the JHC chose the 4 months rotation of crews,
    Why can't we do something more ambitious,

    Well at least it answers you're earlier questions, rather than an raf hatchet job. It's actually a RN idea.

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  77. Hi Gabriele
    I was surprised when I noticed 75 comments!
    As it has been said, theses are only opinions, and have not effect on reality.
    As I see it, we will soon have a RN with 19 surface combat ships, a regular army of 80.000, and an RAF with 78 operational combat aircraft.
    If rumours are to be believed, the army and The RAF, and maybe the RN are struggling even to cope with the budget for even this cut down force.
    I expect to hear of further sticking plaster cuts soon, then more serious ones in SDR 2015. It wouldn’t surprise me to see the RN reduced to 16 or 17 surface combat ships, the army further reduced in manpower and equipment, and the RAF reduced to around 60 operational combat aircraft, FF2020 being revised accordingly.
    The hard fact is that money is tight, and all 3 services are having to make some very hard choices.
    In my opinion, and if history is anything to go by, the armed forces will only be getting smaller, there will be fewer ships, fewer soldiers and fewer aircraft. The hard facts are, the RN may get the Type 26, but it will not be 13, the army may have 5 multi role brigades, but they will not have the new equipment and vehicles they so desperately need, and the RAF will have fewer operational combat aircraft by 2020, and even fewer by 2025.
    How a country with the 4th largest defence budget has managed to get itself in such a mess is a whole new subject.
    But can I just point out, that it is the guys at the front that suffer in the end, until recently soldiers were driving in armoured vehicles that were designed for another war over 30 years ago. The army has vehicles in service with front line battalions that are even older!
    Situation, creek, sewage, and lack of paddle!
    Regards
    Phil

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  78. But can I just point out, that it is the guys at the front that suffer in the end, until recently soldiers were driving in armoured vehicles that were designed for another war over 30 years ago. The army has vehicles in service with front line battalions that are even older!

    Spot on phil, I can remember working with the army and Ptes were first parading vehicles that were older than their parents.


    I was surprised when I noticed 75 comments!

    He he, and I reckon it's got some legs yet :-)

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  79. "For the fleet yes, for JHC 1 in 5 is needed."

    It is desirable.
    But it could well be 1 in 3 like for the FAA and fleet.

    "Well at least it answers you're earlier questions, rather than an raf hatchet job. It's actually a RN idea."

    Because you think that the RAF and Army would have accepted being imposed, by a Navy officer landing at JHC, to adopt the 1 in 3 rule?
    Very likely. Please. Let's be serious.
    III world war incoming if he dared suggesting something like that. Don't be ridiculous with the "RN" idea, when you see by yourself that the RN has no intention nor possibility to adopt such a rule. Besides, where did the "Land Command" and "joint decisions" dream go? Now a Navy officer decides what the Army and RAF do...?
    Not on this planet.

    1 in 5 would be best for Navy personnel as well, and even for submariners, as they all are men.
    How do your concerns about wellbeing of the servicemen suddenly vanish by stating that someone is fine with a 1 in 3 when the others absolutely need 1 in 5?
    Are the 1 in 3 guys magic?

    This incompatibility of guidelines is also going to be an issue for carrier aviation, as i've already said more than once.
    We will have ships that can be at sea 9 months carrying squadrons which do 4 months tours, with the airgroup changing 2 times in each cruise or inexorably breaking guidelines, with associated "build up" time after the changes biting away efficiency (or worse we'll have decks empty), and horrendously low availability of planes to employ.
    DEMENTIAL.

    While a FAA-subject squadron would sail and return with the ship, having the same general guidelines of the sailors, and would do the same amount of work with 3 men per role instead of 5.
    There are reasons why no air force planes go on carriers elsewhere in the world.

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  80. It is desirable.

    Nope required, to my words or idea, the adm running JHC at the time who brought the rule in.


    They have every Don't be ridiculous with the "RN" idea, when you see by yourself that the RN has no intention nor possibility to adopt such a rule


    Wrong Rear Adm Johnstone-Burt brought it for all those (including naval personnel) in JHC. See answer to Q114.

    Besides, where did the "Land Command" and "joint decisions" dream go?

    Nowhere he didn't have to tell the raf to man 1/5 they were already there. It's the navy that need to catch up.


    How do your concerns about wellbeing of the servicemen suddenly vanish by stating that someone is fine with a 1 in 3 when the others absolutely need 1 in 5?
    Are the 1 in 3 guys magic?

    Now you're making things up did I ever say that? I was crystal clear 1/3 to me is too much 1/5 is what we should be aiming for.


    Because you think that the RAF and Army would have accepted being imposed, by a Navy officer landing at JHC, to adopt the 1 in 3 rule?

    It was never on the cards the navy know for JHC 1/5 is best, that's why the rear adm brought the 1/5 rule in.

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  81. "Now you're making things up did I ever say that? I was crystal clear 1/3 to me is too much 1/5 is what we should be aiming for."

    Then why the rest of FAA and indeed the sailors shouldn't?
    Why the Commando Helicopter Force should be asked to work 1 in 3 for sea ops and 1 in 5 for ops on land under JHC?
    It just can't be done without a MASSIVE uplift in budget that will NEVER happen.

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  82. 1 in 5 is EVIDENTLY best for everyone.

    However militarily and moreover financially, to meet requirements for deployment, it is unfeasible.
    I expect harmony guidelines in the Army and RAF to get more demanding in the coming years, not the RN ones getting softer.

    To dream about spreading of a 1 in 5 rule everywhere is wishful thinking at its best.

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  83. Then why the rest of FAA and indeed the sailors shouldn't?

    Work load a non op deployment would be less work thus easier to sustain on longer basis. That's why it's sustainable at a lower level 1/3 rather than 1/5.

    Why the Commando Helicopter Force should be asked to work 1 in 3 for sea ops and 1 in 5 for ops on land under JHC?

    Like I said a normal sea draft is a lower level of work. Afghan higher hence the requirement for more people, the Adm at JHC knew this that's why there are two separte rules for harmony within the FAA.


    As you didn't come back on the rest of my points
    I'll take it I've managed to get through to you.

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  84. To dream about spreading of a 1 in 5 rule everywhere is wishful thinking at its best.

    Best you tell the MoD that's what they aim for in most areas. Fleet not being one of those.

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  85. I expect harmony guidelines in the Army and RAF to get more demanding in the coming years, not the RN ones getting softer.

    I doubt it, it's a key area looked at, it's in that report when it drops below that level for those deploying on ops it becomes a great concern. You need more for those regularly deploying through ops, you've got to think long term right through to the end of people's careers.

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  86. "Work load a non op deployment would be less work thus easier to sustain on longer basis. That's why it's sustainable at a lower level 1/3 rather than 1/5."

    As far as i'm aware, fleet units Separated Service guidelines and Deployment guidelines are roughly the same.
    Also, i have my doubts that a Somalia deployment is that easy, soft or risk free.
    Also, being away for most of the year is deleterious for them as for everyone else, in peacetime as in war, regardless of the workload.
    Again, the RAF Separated Service guideline is 140 days in 12 months. If non deployment work is lighter, surely this could be lenghtened?

    I'm assuming that you'd expect RAF F35 squadrons to do peacetime cruises of 6 to 9 months at sea, if they are "less work".

    "As you didn't come back on the rest of my points I'll take it I've managed to get through to you."

    What points?
    The bit about RAF already having 1 in 5 rule? Of course it already had.
    I've been saying all along that JHC works to make it possible for the RAF to keep its very comfortable guidelines.

    I don't think there's anything to reply about that. You see it as a good thing, i see the allure of the 1 in 5 rule, but i do not think it works, all things considered.

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  87. Also, i have my doubts that a Somalia deployment is that easy, soft or risk free.
    Also, being away for most of the year is deleterious for them as for everyone else, in peacetime as in war, regardless of the workload.


    I doubt it is that easy, but compared to an afghan deployment it would be. And not every sea deployment would that, plenty of nice trips overseas as well don't forget. Not all either but some.


    Again, the RAF Separated Service guideline is 140 days in 12 months. If non deployment work is lighter, surely this could be lenghtened?


    The only non ops work for the RAF is the FI, it's not like the navy with tours to the far east and the carribean and oz. I'm not knocking btw it's just that not every service has so many non ops deployments, yes they are long. But you were talking of 10 month dets, no way could you keep going at a typical afghan det for 10 months, not a chance trust me on that one.


    I've been saying all along that JHC works to make it possible for the RAF to keep its very comfortable guidelines.


    Now come on you not that's not true, your own link said otherwise, the JHC rule for all was brought in by a RN officer because it worked and was needed. Deny it all you want it's in black and white.


    You see it as a good thing, i see the allure of the 1 in 5 rule, but i do not think it works, all things considered.


    Well like I said you're on the wrong side of the arguement, to virtually everyone in defence regarding JHC deployment guidelines. The RN officer in charge wanted it, the army are trying to get there even borrowing people to get there. The RAF are there already. They all think it's acheiveable and worth doing and required. You don't, but your on your own thinking that way for JHC and it's deployment rules.

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  88. "the JHC rule for all was brought in by a RN officer because it worked and was needed. Deny it all you want it's in black and white."

    Oh, come on. Please wake up from fairy tale land. If everything high officers and politicians said was true, things would always be "challenging" but also "changing" and "working fine".
    We both know it is not true.

    "The only non ops work for the RAF is the FI, it's not like the navy with tours to the far east and the carribean and oz. I'm not knocking btw it's just that not every service has so many non ops deployments, yes they are long. But you were talking of 10 month dets, no way could you keep going at a typical afghan det for 10 months, not a chance trust me on that one."

    Let's say it is fair enough.
    But when the RAF will be doing carrier tours on board Navy ships, i'm hoping they will sail and return with the vessel, even if it means 6 months or more.
    Should be fine, no? Just like the FAA. It's no Afghanistan.

    Yet i'm willing to bet it won't happen that easily. Indeed, Sea Harriers squadrons had the 1 in 3 rule.
    Joint Force Harrier of course not.
    And Sea Harriers squadrons of the Navy had less officers, but going under RAF structure they had to increase the number of posts.
    To do, effectively, shorter tours than they used to do at the times of the fully-navy SHAR.

    Talk about efficiency.

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  89. We both know it is not true.

    Well you provided the link, and evidence in there helped me come to that conclusion(along with other things). You don't agree clearly, so what evidence do you have to prove it was brought in for the RAF's benefit, and what is the adm's motivation for lying? and why are they all aiming for this lie? Why would he say he brought it in if he didn't?


    And Sea Harriers squadrons of the Navy had less officers, but going under RAF structure they had to increase the number of posts.

    This point again there are reasons for it, but I doubt, looking at the way this thread has gone, you would ever believe them. So I'll agree with you, yes it's an raf ineffeciency idea designed to make things easier for them.

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  90. "This point again there are reasons for it"

    There are only reasons for increasing the number of people if you want to adopt 4 months tours and rule of the Five.
    Sea Harrier squadrons always used to work with the rule of the 3. And did well.

    Naval Strike Wing personnel ended up working in Afghanistan with RAF-style tours, but followed by Navy-style work when back in the UK, reducing the advantage for them and for the armed forces as a whole to pretty much nothing.
    Save for their RAF counterparts that could so continue to work to their own guidelines.

    As a matter of fact, i just cannot agree with you indeed.

    "Why would he say he brought it in if he didn't? "

    I don't doubt he brought the rule into being.
    But this is 0.1% of the story.
    HOW was the decision taken? What kind of pressures came in from the three services? We have two services with Rule of the 5 (albeit with differences) and one with Rule of the 3.
    What kind of support could he hope in, to put the rule at 3, when this would have meant more work for Army and RAF, which, you can well imagine, they do not want as long as they can avoid it.
    It is OBVIOUS that he didn't wake up that morning and decided by himself the rule and put it in place, and that was it.

    Reading the black on white is easy. At times you have to read past that, and - at least try - to see what's under the surface.

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  91. HOW was the decision taken? What kind of pressures came in from the three services? We have two services with Rule of the 5 (albeit with differences) and one with Rule of the 3.
    What kind of support could he hope in, to put the rule at 3, when this would have meant more work for Army and RAF, which, you can well imagine, they do not want as long as they can avoid it.


    He wouldn't need tri service support, he is in charge. Tri service desisions are a fantasy that I've made up, according to you. But no matter...

    So to you there is no chance, even the smallest, that he is telling the truth about his concerns and plans about manning guidlines for JHC, and you're happy that everyone else is either wrong (army/raf) or a liar (rn) compared to you. Does that not strike you as odd?



    There are only reasons for increasing the number of people if you want to adopt 4 months tours and rule of the Five.

    Are you sure about that? Read your last paragraph back to yourself.


    reducing the advantage for them

    Well if they did as you said it would mean they went to afghan the same as the raf which would be less, so that would be an advantage for them.

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  92. Btw is this the most comments you've had?

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  93. Gabby,

    Those that comment here and over at TD has a vested interest in the defence of the UK, you have an interest. Now having an interest is great, I applaud you and let’s not forget we can agree to disagree but still be friendly but your pig headed and increasingly arrogant approach is getting rather trying.

    I am not sure how being a Google ninja or reading a load of defence news feeds and copying them into a blog post qualifies you to lecture someone like Topman, whose current and relevant experience is self-evident, at least to me. You should be learning from him, not hectoring him and his patience with you and willingness to engage with you is something you should appreciate.

    When I discussed disbanding the FAA and AAC it was from a position of seeking to minimise duplication to drive down costs, I question the need to maintain 3 helicopter operators, 3 light infantry units, 3 police functions etc but I do it from a position of logic, I do not think it demented, an extreme thought, yes, agree, but it comes from a desire to maximise output from a finite and reducing defence vote. Every time I have discussed this I have asked if the operational consequences of this would outweigh the financial benefit and this is an entirely valid question. The FAA and AAC are tiny in comparison with the RAF so the general logic would be for the larger to absorb the smaller, like every merger.

    The larger organisation in general, will find it easier to absorb the smaller although there is no fundamental reason why it couldn’t go the other way. Except in practice, aviation in the RN and Army would always come second fiddle so that is why the world’s first independent air force was born, perhaps you should Google it.

    I do not underestimate the impact this would have either, again, these are real people but organisational change of this nature has happened before and with careful management and a sympathetic timeline I don’t see any fundamental reasons why it could not work, with the proviso that the potential cost savings on offer were of a magnitude to outweigh the possible operational penalties and transitional risk.

    I have an open mind but then I don’t dismiss it as ‘demented’ either.

    Jointery is a half way house, a sensible compromise that maintains the ethos of each force yet seeks efficiencies by making helicopters a strategic asset to be managed on a tri service or joint basis.

    Again, entirely logical, you remind me of some 4 year old, wanting their sweeties and not wanting to share.

    All three services participate in a number of joint capabilities, it makes basic, old fashioned common sense but you can believe what you like. So you think JHC is about defending the status quo of Chinook in RAF service, the same RAF that is the acknowledged premier operator of Chinook that maintains an availability rate higher than any other operator. Good idea to give another complex airframe to the AAC just so you can be happy.

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  94. It’s like banging my head against a brick wall with you on Tornado. Of course we would have saved more by binning Tornado than Harrier and that would be fine if we were comparing apples and apples, but as I and numerous other people have explained ad infinitum, the two fleets were wholly incomparable in terms of capabilities, numbers, serviceability and sustainability to a notional co-terminus OSD.

    The loss of Harrier was of course painful but less painful than losing Tornado and since you don’t save anything by keeping both fleets but reducing them both, the obvious answer was Harrier.

    Hard decisions have to be made, the majority of people that were impacted by the decision were RAF, not FAA by the way, I can assure you that the decision would not have been made just to spite the RN, that would be childish and to be honest, you insult those charged with making those decisions by thinking otherwise.

    As I said, we could have solved the black hole by disbanding the Armoured Corps, or halving the infantry establishment, easy, job done, but nit such a good idea. Any idiot can lose weight by cutting a leg off.

    As for losing 100 years of sea power or whatever it is you said, ridiculous frothing hyperbole that has no place in the debate. The forces have lost much more than that over the years, regiments with several hundreds of years battle history, whole capabilities gone, never to recover.

    You need to stop being so sentimental and realise that the issues are not about who gets to play with what toys.

    I don’t care about other nations naval or land aviation capabilities, I care about our strategic objectives and how they can be delivered. You, on the other hand, seem to fixate on sorties rates and harmony guidelines, there is a bigger picture out there you know.

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  95. Your other point about what we have lost by withdrawing Harrier, “the capability to deploy air support and air cover, where necessary, away from the UK”

    So I suppose the continuous operational deployments of Jaguars, Tornado’s, Typhoons and Apache for pretty much most of the last 20-30 years from land bases has passed you by. And if we are talking about sea deployments, Apache seemed to do pretty well in Libya.

    Your constant reference to harmony guidelines displays a combination of supreme arrogance coupled with complete naivety. Harmony guidelines are just that, guidelines. They are there to sustain a force over a long period of time and change, different trades might have different guidelines but the fact is they are breached on a regular basis. I am actually not very happy about this because it has personal consequences for those involved and operational consequences as a whole, this is real people we are talking about, not some figures in a spreadsheet.

    I expect the New Engagement Model will seek to inject more flexibility and maybe some harmonisation, we will have to see.

    I nearly spat my coffee out when you said ‘with some effort the others could do a bit more as well’

    I am sure if you mentioned that to someone in their post operational tour leave from Afghanistan and reminded them that they should put a bit more effort in and do a longer tour just so they could match those hard working matelots you would get an interesting response.

    Again, I hope the NEM addresses the very different sustainability requirements of different trades when looking at tour lengths or you comparing a high threat C-IED operator to a steward on CVF in terms of ‘effort’

    Topman has patiently explained about recruitment and retention but these seem alien concepts to you. You also fail to realise the difference between operational and non operational deployments where demand on personnel will be very different.

    Manning is an extremely complex subject, managing the demands of operations, family life, contingencies, cost, career planning, training, inflows and outflows, all set against a moving target of unit establishments and overall force levels occupies whole teams of people and cannot simply be reduced to the glib statements about ‘well the navy do it, keep up you slackers’ and to think any other displays total and complete ignorance of the issues.

    The reason I bring PTT and the like into it by the way is because they have the same over sentimental, childish and service centric world view as you, where the RAF is evil and the poor old RN needs a bit of tender love, every decision made is about preserving cushy RAF jobs and the overwhelming objective of the Air Staff is to destroy those plucky, extra hard working chaps in the FAA.


    Sorry, its just not like that but I guess your mind is made up

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  96. "two fleets were wholly incomparable in terms of capabilities, numbers, serviceability and sustainability to a notional co-terminus OSD."

    That is what YOU and Tornado supporters say.
    Harrier supporters can put forwards data that points in the other direction, including reported issues with Tornado availability and with a rather alarming rate of mission aborts.
    I await official data about the Libya campaign, but i believe at least in four occasions GR4 landed for emergency in Malta and aborted missions, the last event i'm aware of being only a few days old.
    It is in no way as straightforward as you make it, i fear.
    And much of the "common sense" in the choice will be clearer when we start learning what else is going to be cut to pay for that.
    Today i hear BAE is about to slow down Typhoon production due to partner nations slowing their orders and export orders not coming yet, for example.
    Little thing, if the 4 billions overspend in 2012 is true. Far worse coming.

    "tour lengths or you comparing a high threat C-IED operator to a steward on CVF in terms of ‘effort’"
    I did NOTHING like that.
    I've been comparing fighter pilots (Sea Harrier versus Harrier) and helicopter pilots (Sea King vs the rest).
    Might i point out, just to tell one, that men from 857 NAS, which came back home from an Afghan tour late December, were at sea for six weeks in the spring, and deployed on Ocean to Libya for another 4 months wartime tour and are just coming back now, to soon go and replace their mates in Afghanistan again?

    Besides, I might be wrong, but i find it real hard to believe that an Helicopter pilot has it harder than frontline infantry, and needs shorter tours, sorry. I just can't believe it. As a matter of fact, i believe C-IED operators make 2 months tours.
    Same tour lenght of Chinook pilots.
    I mean, really...? You can't tell me this is right! C-IED operators have the worst job of all out there, along with MERT personnel, who sees some pretty nasty things all days and need rest.

    You make me look like a monster who has to grasp of human feelings or need, TD, but that's not quite how things are.

    "qualifies you to lecture someone like Topman, whose current and relevant experience is self-evident, at least to me."

    Coming from the same one who likes to tell Admiral Woodward to shut up and tells him what he needs for the job and how he should do the job, really.
    I don't know if i should laugh or what.

    Make me a favor, avoid to bother with telling me over and over again the same sentences, coming from above like from the Gods, without any factual evidence backing them up.
    You assume things are right this way. I do not think so.

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  97. I noticed that it's nearly 100 comments!
    I am sure Dr Fox has read all these comments with great interest.
    But the sad fact is, further savings have to be made. I ask what will the RAF cut to save 4 billion? Maybe it would have been better to bite the bullet earlier, but who knows.
    As an ex pongo, I should be moaning about cuts to equipment and disbandment of regiments, but I know further cuts are coming, and those nice new vehicles are going to be few in number, if any!
    I'd bet my bath tub on it!
    Doing my bit for the comment record!
    Phil

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  98. "I am sure Dr Fox has read all these comments with great interest."

    I don't think so, but i'm kind of the idea that he already had to deal with this kind of debates plenty of times.
    Indeed, it did not get much coverage on the press and elsewhere, but the SDSR and subsequent talks apparently contained a doomsday option of folding the RAF into the other services.
    Liam Fox ultimately delivered a speech last July saying that it won't happen.

    http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7084236

    Apparently, the idea was tied with the retirement of Tornado, at least in part, as the RAF was seen as losing the needed mass to remain independent if the fleet of the GR4s was retired.
    Also, it would appear that the merge was judged too extreme, but it "informed" the subsequent formation of the new joint command, for which a Four Stars general was expected as leader, but got a RAF officer instead in the end, and for which ISTAR seems to be the main issue.
    Right choice? Fudge? I know we'll never agree, everyone has its own ideas after all.

    An ISTAR focus is welcome news, as it seems that it will be the new advocate for retaining Sentinel and improve capabilities in the area, such as extending Reaper past 2015, to cover the role until Telemos arrives, hopefully in 2018.

    One has to hope that the less glamorous but not less effective Sea King MK7 flying hundreds of missions over Libya and over 1000 on Afghanistan is not forgotten out of the picture, though, as MASC does not seem to get that great political support despite its importance, and despite a planned 2016 Sea King OSD that gives the programme a certain urgency.

    So, for the joint Command, in terms of ISTAR, the priorities are, in my opinion and not necessarily in this order:

    - Retain Sentinel
    - Extend Reaper and work on Telemos
    - fight to the death to get a new maritime patrol aircraft up to the job
    - Secure Sea King MK7 replacement
    - Ensure that Telemos is carrier capable.

    This, added to Watchkeeper and the smaller drones, would make for a genuinely joint and capable ISTAR instrument working in all scenarios.

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  99. Been reading a few promising and good posts on this site...
    then this one...
    Urgh.... after reading all these comments; I'm confused - despite the heroic information Gabs has gathered and admirable work regarding HM forces, he's blown his credibility away with these arguments... you remain looking through that letterbox view of a foreign military force.

    I just cant take it anymore - this sharkie-ward-esque 'information' I've been reading without no quatar given to other peoples information,
    You expect it on 'PRUNE' or service forums, but not on a defence forum that covers all.

    Gabs, sometimes you look at one part of HM forces with rose-tinted glasses and the other with beer-goggles. And then through a letterbox. Rather than fight those who disagree/have info on the contary, you should study it and even add it to your posts, like TD does.

    Sadly, this experiance makes it difficult to take any of your posts on force structure seriously anymore :c which is a shame because you do good work and study, but I just cant when you have this huge slant on things.

    I'm sticking with TD

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  100. Gabby, I am not a 'supporter' of any aircraft and to phrase it in these terms implies it is some sort of competing game, nothing could be further from the truth.

    Harsh facts are they, just because you and others don't like them doesn't make them any less factual and I kind of assume the only people in possession of all the facts are the ones making the decision.

    Reported poor availability rates and an alarming abort rate you say, is that what we might call an insinuation?

    A sortie could be aborted for any reason and not because of some inherent fault, maybe the target set changed or any numbers of other reasons.

    Its not about what is hardest by the way, its about what can sustain a safe level of activity with a look forward through a persons career with the intention of retaining them in service.

    The difference between me moaning about the drivel spouted by ex something now in the pay of the defence industry and you berating Topman is that in the former, they were talking about something which they have no current experience of, and in the later, Topman is explaining something to you from a position of current experience.

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  101. Your freedom to do as you please.

    I've looked at Harmony Guidelines. I've reported facts, looked into official cost estimates, looked at the emerging costs of Libya ops and compared what i could with what happens elsewhere in the world.

    And i just can't take for granted that "JHC does a good job and makes sense".
    Really? Are we sure? What makes you say so?

    Was Tornado the right choice? Really? It has pros and cons.
    I belive the cons are pretty big cons, others do not agree.

    You see my doubts and hostility against some of the things that are done as hate for the RAF.
    That is most evidently not true.
    It is not a matter of slant, nor hate.

    It is a matter of not seeing real evidence suggesting that actually good choices have been made/are being made.
    Indeed, i see far more convincing evidence of the fact that BAD choices have been made.

    Budget remains a problem.
    Air power at sea is gone until 2020 at the earlier.
    The UK has busted MILLIONS on pointless 900 km transit flights from Gioia del Colle and yet other MILLIONS on flights from Marham, that still no one has provided a justification for.
    Bringing some Storm Shadows to Gioia, no? Asking us italians for some, as we have them too, no?
    Too smart an idea? Too cheap?
    Why flying 9 hours and 4 Air Refuelings to fire a bunch of Storm Shadows?
    When someone will explain this kind of decisions in a credible and detailed way, i'll listen with great attention.

    Until then, i must remind you that the Parliamentary Defence Committee in its SDSR analysis made clear:

    1) Both carriers should be converted to cats and traps
    2) They found evidence suggesting that Harrier should have been retained, and they go shy of calling for re-introduction merely because too much damage has been already done to make it possible at acceptable cost.

    My "slant" as you call it has not yet met a single convincing argument that makes me move away from the conclusions i'm sadly forced to make.

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  102. "Harsh facts are they"

    WHICH facts????? I've yet to see one.
    "JHC and Joint Force Harrier make sense and are sound decisions" is a statement, NOT a fact.

    "Reported poor availability rates and an alarming abort rate you say, is that what we might call an insinuation?"

    Until i find documents providing a break down of data, i guess we could say so.
    I've read MPs expressing worries at Afghan performances of Tornado in terms of responsiveness and availability, and i've read things such as "more mission aborted in one year than Harrier did in all its years in Kandahar" and "CAS is being asked 1 day before it actually comes", which, if true, are obscene realities to grapple with.
    I've also read of Tornado having Hot and High issues limiting its effective load of weaponry and kit in missions.
    And the Tornado landing in Malta with the undergear on flames, delaying civilian flights take offs a few days ago was definitely real.

    I look for further information about all these issues. I talk on the basis of what i know, which is by no means complete info. But at least i have some.

    On costs, i've no doubts. I've seen documents released by Parliament and MOD.

    "The difference between me moaning about the drivel spouted by ex something now in the pay of the defence industry and you berating Topman is that in the former, they were talking about something which they have no current experience of, and in the later, Topman is explaining something to you from a position of current experience."

    Sorry, but i find this "difference" factually a bit weak. Also, with all respect for Topman, but quite frankly, to me he is just a nickname on the internet.
    I believe to him on basis of trust and confidence, but i think you might see why i take my reserves.

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  103. if you really think the RAF is demanding 1 day notice to carry out a TIC CAS task in Afghanistan then I have to just laugh, I know where you have read this and I know it is complete and utter piffle, like 99.9% of the other content in that same place. The very fact that you cite this with a staight face says more about you than anyone else.

    You might have heard know nothing MP's tabling questions at the request of those with a vested interest but have you read the answers

    Cone on Gabby, there is always the story underneath the story you know

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  104. You ask me to believe face A over face B. I cannot, in conscience, decide arbitrarily like that. I'd just love to see evidence. I've no vested interest in things being in a way or in the other. I want what's best, and i'd just want to know how things actually are.

    As of now, nor I nor you can say to know the truth.

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  105. I also note that the issues that, i bet, you are assuming i read on PTT or Sharkey's blog come from a conservative MP, Mark Lancaster, who is a TA bomb disposal officer and spoke reportedly basing itself on a document shown to Parliament about Tornado reliability and availability.

    Unfortunately, the document is classified, but it is said that it caused "concern" in the Army, and it does not appear to contain good news.

    I do not think i am in the position of doubting the assertions of said MP, having not seen the document myself.

    http://www.conservatives.com/People/Members_of_Parliament/Lancaster_Mark.aspx

    http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=11147

    Interestingly, a NAO report was planned for winter 2008 on the opportunity of sending Tornado to Afghanistan.
    I'd love to read it, but i'm unable to find any such report, funnily enough.

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  106. The NAO report is mentioned here, among other places in this interesting debate of Lancaster and then minister Kevan Jones about the Harrier - Tornado switch.

    http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2008-11-19b.89.0

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  107. Hi gabby.

    The UK has busted MILLIONS on pointless 900 km transit flights from Gioia del Colle and yet other MILLIONS on flights from Marham, that still no one has provided a justification for.
    Bringing some Storm Shadows to Gioia, no? Asking us italians for some, as we have them too, no?
    Too smart an idea? Too cheap?
    Why flying 9 hours and 4 Air Refuelings to fire a bunch of Storm Shadows?

    I think that was looked at but the Italian gov, said no. The reason it was done was they don't want them operating from their soil, in this specific mission. On the face of it, it does seem odd, but that is Itailian politics for you (or to me as a non Italian). It has lots of disadvantages and no advantages for the RAF it's a drain and something they would like to not have to do, but have to. Best people to ask would be the Italian MoD. If you do, could you ask them where the NATO money for maintenance of GdC went?


    confidence, but i think you might see why i take my reserves.

    I'm not sure what you mean.



    You ask me to believe face A over face B. I cannot, in conscience, decide arbitrarily like that. I'd just love to see evidence.

    With regards to TD's point of TIC waiting times you never will. No government will put out how TIC's are responded to.
    But, not to go over dead ground again, surfice to say it's not correct. TIC's are reponded to with the upmost urgency in all cases. With regards to the MP, I wouldn't worry at all about his information, it's wrong. Although I would like to know what his angle is, and who's priming him this false information.

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  108. I've also read of Tornado having Hot and High issues limiting its effective load of weaponry and kit in missions.

    No issue at all, in any weather, time of year or time of day.

    Which can't be said for some of our nato allies' aircraft...

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  109. "I'm not sure what you mean."

    I mean, very simply, that i don't know you other than as Topman, and i -guess- you've been (or are) in the Royal Air Force.

    It's not like i can trust wholeheartedly whoever talks to me on the internet. Nicknames are wonderful, but behind them there can be pretty much anyone.

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  110. Ok I understand no problem.

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  111. Interestingly, a NAO report was planned for winter 2008 on the opportunity of sending Tornado to Afghanistan.
    I'd love to read it, but i'm unable to find any such report, funnily enough.


    Have you tried contacting them, I doubt they would hide it. They have been pretty good at publishing everything they produce. Are you sure one was planned? Although it would be interesting I'm not sure they have the power to look at documents from other countries. Would be interesting if they could, particularly with regard to delayed deployment of GR4 to KAF.

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  112. I've found multiple announcements about a report being due in "the winter", but i searched everywhere, including in the NAO lists of published reports, and i found nothing.

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  113. Winter 2008, of course. Not finding it, I searched in the year 2009, even in 2010, but there seems to be no sign at all of such a report.

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  114. Have you tried contacting them? I haven't dealt with them, but I believe they are very good at dealing with such requests.

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  115. I might try in the next few days.

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