For the first post in literally years, I'm sharing the submission I've filed in the public consultation for the SDSR. The format of the consultation involved a long list of fixed questions that could be answered with up to 500 words each.
This has, of course, determined the format of my entries.
Describe the strategic context for UK
Defence
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| Strategic context begins with geography. Always remember that the world actually looks like this, and the UK's front in any Russia scenario is to the North. |
While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is
the main factor polarizing attention, the threats to UK interests go well
beyond Russia. It is in the Red Sea and Middle East that UK assets have
actually needed to open fire to protect allied installations and critical
shipping routes, and it is towards Asia that the economic and political center
of the world is shifting. While Russia represents the most obvious threat, it
is not in a position to start a direct land conflict against NATO and it would
be a mistake to allow Russia to tether UK foreign and Defence policy to a
narrow European focus.
The priority for UK defence remains
maintaining a capable, useful mix of capabilities measured against high end,
state on state warfare scenarios, that can be projected where needed, across
Europe and beyond.
Geography dictate that any threat against
the UK originates quite some distance away, and that any operation mounted by
UK forces will be expeditionary by nature and will imply thousands of
kilometres of distance to be negotiated. UK forces must be able to project over
those distances and be credible once in theatre. While the UK won’t be able to
achieve Mass on its own, it should maintain armed forces which are as much as possible
capable of “independent” action within an alliance framework. In other words,
the UK force should be able to deploy with its own means (SEA-lift, AIR-lift,
LAND mobility) and, as much as possible, able to take responsibility for a
section of a front / part of an operation without Allies having to fill
critical capability gaps. The UK contingent should come with adequate Enablers
and be able to serve as core for Allies to attach to (for example in a Joint Expeditionary
Force context).This would enable the UK to retain a leading role in any
scenario and in any theatre. UK forces could act as an aggregator that smaller
partners can join forces with, helping to generate mass, enabled by UK
strategic capabilities they might otherwise not have access to. When working
with greater partners with more mass and resources, UK forces should still be able
to provide a complete, reliable military component that can look as autonomously
as possible over a sector of the front / portion of the operation.
There can be little doubt that UK forces
which best compare on the world stage with that of other nations are Navy and Air
Force.The Army does not compare as well, nor is likely to be able to catch up anytime
soon. While the Army conditions must be improved, this must not come to the
detriment of the other Services, especially since, even in a “narrow” European
scenario, the front of most immediate interest to the UK is the Scandinavian
peninsula – North and Arctic Sea and Iceland area (in Cold War parlance, the
GIUK gap). This is the only front where Russia and UK are virtually in direct
contact, through Sea and Air.
In general, UK is fortunate in that forces which
are well attuned to their NATO role will generally be valid elsewhere too.
Propose, in order of priority, the
roles UK Defence must be capable of fulfilling 2024-2040.
If the UK will maintain its ability to
secure the North Sea / High North by forward deploying in NATO context a powerful
Air Force component while also putting to sea a capable fleet centered on SSNs and
the Carrier Strike Group, plus the Littoral Response Groups, it will meet its
vital, direct defence interest.
On Land, the UK should maintain its High
North commitment through the Littoral Response Group North and, ideally, a greater
Army component aligned to the task (at least initially it would come from within
1st Division) while working to deliver the full promise to NATO of a
Strategic Reserve Corps of "2 Divisions with 6 brigades" under the
ARRC. Obviously it will be a relatively small Corps, made of relatively small
brigades, but there is no reason why it shouldn't be capable.
The need to be rapidly deployable wherever
SACEUR needs them across Europe will in turn ensure the British Divisions maintain
capabilities and logistical readiness that will ensure the British Army can be
relevant outside of Europe too when necessary.
To achieve this result, the British Army
structures will need to evolve and, in absence of a net growth to the overall
manpower ceiling, some infantry battalions will need to go, not because they
are unneeded, but because forming the necessary Artillery, Air Defence, Drone, Logistics
and Engineering units will be far more critical. The current structure is
dramatically short of these key enablers and this will need fixing.
 |
| The wider context of a major NATO clash with Russia has not changed much. |
In Europe, the UK's priority is dictated by
geography and will always come down to reinforcing the Northern flank of NATO,
working in close cooperation with the Joint Expeditionary Force partners and
bringing naval and air elements"up threat"in Iceland, Scandinavia and
at Sea to contain Russian navaland air elements which are a direct threat to
the UK mainland. Through the JEF, and the Littoral Response Group (North),
which also hinges on the long standing cooperation with the Netherlands' own
Marines, the UK is also committed to reinforcing the Allies ashore.
The UK is also committed to putting a British
Corps (ARRC) of eventually 2Divisions at the call of SACEUR as a strategic
reserve that can be rapidly deployed "along the entire NATO front in Europe".
This will require a well stocked, well trained
force that can move quickly and that has the necessary strategic lift in place
to get where SACEUR needs it.
UK reach and commitments to the Northern NATO
flank require amphibious capability to be sustained and ideally enhanced.
The need to protect key infrastructure at sea
and the Deterrent requite dedicate Deep Sea Data Gathering and thus put urgency
on the need to procure the planned and very much necessary purpose-designed vessel
for this (planned as the second Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance hull).
The Reserve should be reorganized to
provide a more realistic seedcorn for expansion in time of crisis. Probably the
Army Reserve would benefit from being organized in a couple of "shadow
brigades", one dedicate to supporting the Heavy armour (and thus 3rd
Division) and one (or more) dedicate to lighter,more easily regenerated light
role / light mechanized capability in support of 1st Division.
Describe how existing UK Defence capability
and the current 10-year programme match the demands of the roles and
capabilities identified for 2024-2040, highlighting and prioritising critical
gaps.
Existing equipment plans are mostly coherent
with UK tasks in Europe and beyond. Some areas that require additional attention
include:
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence: the
introduction of SPEAR 3, SPEAR EW and ECRS2 radar with jamming capability (this
on Typhoon Tranche 3) are helpful, but the absence of an anti-radar missile since
the withdrawal of ALARM in 2013 is a concern. Adoption of the AARGM ER missile
for both F-35 and Typhoon (Germany and Italy are already planning to adopt and
integrate it) would greatly increase capability. Retrofitting the ECR Mk2 radar
to Typhoon Tranche 2 should also be a priority.
Air to Air refuelling: the "nordic air
force" (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark) is THE obvious and critical
partner for the RAF in an European fight, while US and Australia are other
obvious main partners the UK will collaborate with. All these partners, and others
(Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan etc) will use F-35As that can only be
refuelled through the Boom method. The VOYAGER tankers of the RAF at present
are not fitted with boom and cannot contribute in any way (and can also NOT
refuel the RAF's own C-17, P-8, E-7 and Rivet Joint fleets). Fitting Boom to at
least a portion of the fleet would enable the RAF to offer invaluable support
to Nordic partners in Europe, and to Allies everywhere.
Ground based air defence must be enhanced at
a brisker pace and with greater ambition. Existing SKY SABRE batteries can be
quickly enhanced adopting the Extended Range variant of the CAMM missile, while
development of the even longer ranged CAMM MR with Poland should be properly
supported.
Additional SKY SABRE batteries are needed, and
the Army's air defence regiments should probably be reorganized into hybrid
regiments that, a bit like the PILICA+ batteries in Poland, combine CAMM with
SHORAD. Adding a gun in anti-drone function should be a priority, with the
PALADIN system having already been tested providing a good, UK-made candidate
for rapid adoption. Directed energy weapons such as laser and RF (projects
DRAGONFIRE, SWINTON, EALING) promise great capability which however might not
be fully reliable for quite some time, making a gun-based solution a precious
complement and stopgap.
Additional SHORAD Batteries should become an
organic part of manoeuvre brigades: in other countries, a SHORAD battery is
commonly found within the Brigade's artillery regiment, for example.
BOXER vehicles fitted with SKYRANGER gun
turrets and missiles represent a good, readily available solution to succeed to
STORMER and bring(thanks to the 30/35mmgun) increased anti-drone capability.
The Navy's Type45s should be equipped with new-production
ASTER 30 Block1 NT missiles as soon as practicable. Low-volume production of
these new and improved missiles would help realize the much needed "always
on" model for key weapons production in the UK.
Logistic lift is known to be insufficient. The
number of MAN SV EPLS trucks capable of carrying containers, for example, even
if recently uplifted, remains more than 700 short of the endorsed Land
requirement. This should be addressed, including by standing up new regiments
to fill known gaps (for the support of 1 DRS BCT and 4 Light BCT, for example).
Propose how UK Defence's contribution
to NATO should be enhanced as a driving requirement of capability and activity,
including through prioritising defence export potential.
The UK contribution to NATO should be
centred on the two Key roles:
- The
protection of the Northern Flank, with a focus on Carrier Strike Group
operations, ASW, maritime urveillance, air defence and amphibious reinforcement
of Scandinavia (Littoral Response Group North, in cooperation with the Netherlands's
own amphibious force)
- The
provision of a credible British Corps to SACEUR for the Strategic Reserve role.
It might seem counter-intuitive and
politically unpalatable, but to improve its contribution to NATO the British
Army needs to offload the commitment to Estonia to other partners. The British
Army is simply not large enough to deliver, at the same time, an armour-centric
Battlegroup in the Forward Land Force (with commitment to uplift to a full brigade
in time of crisis) and the Strategic Reserve role.
This is not debatable but rather fact: 3rd
Division is the only heavy division the UK has, and only comprises 2 armoured
brigades. If one of them is committed to Estonia, it cannot at the same time be
available as a strategic reserve for SACEUR. Double-hatting is not serious and
is not workable.
Partners should be approached in a mature way
and the Forward Land Force role in Estonia should fall on another Army within
the new NATO Force Model. Other countries are due to take Regional defence roles,
and this should include replacing the british element in Estonia so the British
Army can, in turn, ensure SACEUR's critical reserve is truly available and
ready to deploy when and where needed.
2 Army programs in particular stand out for
export potential in a NATO context and possibly beyond: the Technology
Demonstrator 5 project to integrated advanced lethal and ISR payloads into
GMLRS rockets and PrSM missiles would result in a massive capability growth and
most likely in substantial export orders.
The other project with great potential is the
Mounted Close Combat Overwatch project centered on ground-launched Brimstone
for long-range anti-armour capability. This has in some ways already obtained
an export win of sorts with Poland having selected Brimstone for its own long
range ATGW need.
There is obvious potential in several of
the UK's drone projects as well: uncrewed adjunct aircraft, the HYDRA armed drone,
one-way strike solutions and the PROTEUS uncrewed helicopter for the Navy could
all prove successful in securing export deals.
DSTL’s work on an uncrewed, highly mobile ultra-lightweight
127mm gun on the LAMP mobility platform should also continue as it would answer
the need of Marine, Para/Airmobile and Mountain troops in particular and could
secure interest in multiple countries.
Describe how the current support to
Ukraine is integrated into UK Defence programmes and activities and propose
measures in priority order to sustain and enhance this support to at least
2027.
The UK could provide aid to Ukraine while improving
its own defences in multiple ways, as the decision to restart manufacture of
large calibre barrels in the UK proves.
With GMLRS rockets being a key asset for the
British Army as well as one of the most successful weapons employed by Ukraine,
the UK should look at establishing production at home. Lockheed Martin
reportedly was willing to bring GMLRS work to Ampthill and this should be a
priority.
Again on GMLRS, the already mentioned Techical
Demonstrator 5 could be a game changer: Ukraine could probably benefit from
early access to some prototype systems, which in turn would support spiral
development for the UK's own needs.
There is great scope for even more
cooperation on drones, lethal and not, and on electronic warfare, including
C-UAS jammers.
Ukraine is also continuously in need of anti-air
missiles. France and Italy have supplied SAMP-T batteries firing Aster 30 B1
missiles, and MBDA UK will soon be remanufacturing existing Aster 30 missiles
of the Royal Navy into B1s. There might be potential to increase production
capability in the UK and help keep Ukraine's batteries armed.
Similarly, CAMM/CAMM ER, much needed to increase
the British Army's GBAD capability, could be key to help meet Ukraine's needs
as well.
The recent work to increase the ability to produce
ammunition in the UK and manufacture artillery barrels is welcome, but one
critical weakness remains unaddressed: the production within the UK of
energetics and propellants. A core capability in country would be fundamental
for resilience in times of crisis when supply from abroad might dry up.
Describe and recommend how the UK
Defence homebase is made secure and resilient in confrontation, crisis and
conflict, including in enabling full mobilisation and campaign endurance when
needed.
Ther esilience of the UK realistically depends
on factors other than military. Increased capacity to produce energy
domestically, reduced reliance on imports would be the most decisive factors.
The military specifically, and the UK’s
ability to mobilise for a major war are afflicted by excessive centralisation as
a result of decades of efficiencies. A successful long-range missile strike that
managed to hit a few critical installations (for example Lossiemouth, critical
to QRA, maritime patrol aircraft and AEW), Waddington, Ashchurch (most of the
Army’s vehicle fleet is to be found stored there), Donnington (general stores)
and Kineton (ammunition) would be enough to have an absolutely crippling effect
on the ability to properly mobilise in the first place.
Strengthening Ground based air defence can
help, but there are not enough resources to attempt a complete coverage. For
sure, a resident SKY SABRE battery at least in Lossiemouth and other key
locations on the eastern coast would not be a bad investment. Longer range air defences
would help, but would require massive investment.
Project LEWIS for a new anti-ballistic
radar would provide early warning to the UK and to the benefit of the whole of
NATO, assuming the Government remains committed to it.
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| Project LEWIS has seen the UK secure US authorization for the procurement a Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) (for construction on the island that gives the project its name...?), but it is one of those background programs no one ever talks much about. It's also a promise to NATO formulated years ago. |
The best defence against such an attack,
which at present can come only from Russia, will always be to deploy the Armed
Forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force, “up threat” to intercept Russian
ships, submarines and long range aviation over Scandinavia and the North Sea.
Forward deployment of the carrier strike group and of RAF jets to Iceland and Norway
would no doubt be an early measure taken at the first sign of serious crisis.
In general, the worst threats to the UK
will manifest not so much directly against the UK mainland but abroad. The Red
Sea shipping crisis is an eloquent example. Even in a “Russia” scenario, the UK
will be defended first of all at range up in the High North, not so much directly
from its shores. Geography dictates this.
As a consequence, it is non-discretionary to
maintain military force that is expeditionary and has the logistic “legs” to
deploy where needed.
Propose measures in priority order
that establish how UK Defence transitions to the optimum balance of regular,
reserve, civil servant, and industry people across all standing tasks and
commitments and on mobilisation. Recommend the recruitment, education, training
and retention measures required to achieve this.
The topic of Reserves for the UK is complex,
again because of the geo-political truth that dictates that state threats to
the UK will manifest away from the homeland. The frequent mention of Finland’s
reserves, or Poland’s territorial units is of limited relevance to the UK:
light infantry formations for local defence have little to no relevance for the
UK, unlike for those countries who would be fighting on and for the very home
turf. Units equal to Poland’s territorials could be formed, but in any war
scenario they would have to be lifted across Europe to the point of need,
unlike Poland’s own.
The old Territorial Army used to have a
demonstrable ability to deploy to the Continent in support of regulars during the
Cold War, but it’s undoubtedly harder to do that now, and it is proving
difficult to deploy formed bodies of Reservists during “peacetime”. There are a
few cases, but all pretty small scale and relatively sparse over the years.
The matter of Reserves is tricky and not easily
solved. It’s true reserve infantry battalions cost a lot less than regular
ones, but that is of little relevance if their output is not only much smaller
but also relatively unpredictable due to uncertain availability of people. Any
expansion of their combat role, in addition, would require equipment and
vehicle fleets that at the moment simply do not exist.
A serious assessment is needed to determine
what the Reserve can actually do in “peacetime”(it would be fairer to say in times
of competition/confrontation short of all out war) and what they can be expected
to do during major mobilisation.
If all-out war ever happened, there is
every reason to believe the Reserve would show up in decent force, but at
present it is at best questionable whether it could be equipped and actually
employed as anything other than individual / small sub-units replacements and
some degree of augmentation. There is an obvious shortage of combat vehicle fleets,
for example. Formed reserve units would only be of the lightest kind.
There will probably need to be a more
neatly “separated” plan for those Reserve individuals and units which are available,
willing and indeed needed in “peacetime” and those formed bodies which would only
realistically come together for occasional major exercise and ultimately in
case of a real major crisis.
The latter formations, which should
probably be organized as coherent brigades for best effect, would need to have a
well defined, realistic role attuned with what equipment will be actually available
in the depots or in a realistic emergency procurement/production plan to outfit
them.
It would probably be beneficial to organize
a “shadow” heavy brigade of Reservists, recognizing however that as things stand
the armour to make them deployable as a formed unit simply does not exist in
the inventory. They would deploy essentially as augmentees / casualty
replacements.
Light brigades could be organized to be
“deployable” in a specific format which will not be equal to that of regular formations
and should thus develop its own Concepts, much like Poland’s territorial formations
but with the difference, again, that UK Reserves would be deployed to fight far
away from home.
It might yet prove to be the case that a larger
Reserve is not in fact the right answer if larger doesn’t work out to more available/capable.
More capable will require dedicate vehicle fleets and equipment holdings which
will rapidly make the Reserve far less financially attractive overall.
Roles and expectations must be defined
first.
Propose how the maritime (including
littoral) domain is developed to contribute to an Integrated Force,
recommending measures that accelerate modernisation and transformation and
identifying existing capabilities and programmes that do not support this.
The development of uncrewed assets such as
PROTEUS (rotary wing), VIXEN (fixed wing) and SEA PROTECTOR (MQ-9B modified
with the wing-king for short take off and landing on the carriers) would
massively enhance the carrier strike group's ability to deploy and fight up-threat.
SEA PROTECTOR could be ready within a few years and, equipped with suitable
podded radars and sonobuoy launchers, could bring extremely long endurance
airborne early warning cover against missile attacks and long range, persistent
anti-submarine patrol.
PROTEUS will help make up for the
insufficient numbers of manned MERLIN helicopters.
Carrierborne F-35B (the expansion of the fleet
to atleast 74 jets in 3– ideally at least4 – Squadrons should remain an
absolute priority) and drones ensure the UK can confidently deploy far from
home with the indispensable air cover.
The Littoral Response Groups give the UK a
persistent forward deployed force around which larger operations can take
shape. In a NATO context, the Littoral Response Group North represent the
continuation of cooperation with the Netherlands and assistance for the Nordic
Allies. The future Multi Role Support Ship will need to be more survivable than
current amphibious ships while preserving the ability to lift and send ashore
even the heaviest Army vehicles. The new vessels will need to combine both
aviation capability and heavy surface lift capability, with a well dock sized
for LCUs and mexeflotes operations. Room for containers, including on the
weather deck, will give flexibility to embark modular weapons (a modular CAMM
missile system should be a priority) and capabilities (Role 2+ and 3 medical
facilities) for deployment.
Frigates, destroyers and submarines with
land strike weapons will contribute to the suppression of enemy air defence and
will strike high value targets. They have a great deterrent value as well.
General purpose frigates and pureOPVs are no longer particularly useful in a new
context of state on state warfare risks: the new generation vessels should have
space and services reserved for embarking drones and modular mission payloads /
containerized weapon systems that make them more useful combat platforms by
expanding their base fit.
The MCM component is currently based on
small ships which are not very deployable nor very useful beyond their
specialized role, but the transition is already underway. Drone-based systems
for MCM are more capable and more flexible but the necessary motherships to
project those drones at range have not yet been built. If they were, the
transition could be accelerated further. Swift procurement of a first
mothership would allow the return of the currently employed BAY-class vessel in
the Gulf to the amphibious role.
Modular capability, such as CAMM missiles in
containers (NavyPODs) and portable lasers can help ensure the new Multi Role
Support Ships and MCM motherships can deploy with the necessary defences on
board, while saving on build costs. Such modular capability could also follow the
Marines ashore, delivering further effect very efficiently.
The Littoral Response Group will need long
range strike weapons that can be inserted from the sea and then used from land,
against the land and against the sea. GMLRS and PrSM missiles, common with the
Army, would achieve this but would ideally require a lighter, more deployable launcher
like the defunct LIMAWS(R) on Supacat platform, or the uncrewed ROGUE of the US
Marines.
If the Marines can go ashore with GMLRS and
CAMM, they can create safe havens for the fleet and prove a real strategic
concern to the enemy.
Propose how the land domain is developed
to contribute to an Integrated Force, recommending measures that accelerate
modernisation and transformation and identifying existing capabilities and
programmes that do not support this.
Land will contribute through growt of Long Range
Fires, primarily through the Land Deep Fires programme to grow the number of
M270 launchers and their ammunition.
- GMLRS
ER, which should include Alternative Warhead to restore area-attack capability,
150 km reach
- PrSM
missile 500+ km
- Land
Precision Strike will deliver extended overwatch
- Technology
Demonstrator 5, a UK effort, to integrate advanced payloads into GMLRS and
perhaps PrSM, including reconnaissance drones and intelligent sub-munitions,
mines, ISR sensors, EW devices and jammers. If realized, these capabilities would
be transformational and are sure to gain export orders.
Further long range strike options will come
through drones. Lethal drones are needed at all tactical levels:
small ones such as D40 would restore
infantry’s ability to deliver HE on indirect trajectory.
Fires have to make up for lack of mass. The
PHALANX model for Platoons and Companies, which pushes JAVELIN and 81 mm mortar
down to Coy level, should be adopted.
At battlegroup level, adoption of 120 mm
mortars and Mounted Close Combat Overwatch is key.
A battery of M270 should become organic to
each Heavy brigade, alongside RCH155, primarily for Land Precision Strike
overwatch. This seems the correct tactical level where to employ this new
capability.
GMLRS ER and PrSM would primarily be used
by the GMLRS Regiments held within Deep Recce Strike BCT if not even aligned
directly to Corps level.
Another GMLRS regiment should be added,
equipped with a lightweight launcher (like USMC’s ROGUE or resurrected LIMAWS-R)
to ensure 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigades have access to this strategic
system and can more easily move it (including under slung by CHINOOK).
GBAD will need to grow. CAMM ER should be added
to SKY SABRE urgently; more batteries should be formed.
Each Brigade should grow an organic, mobile
SHORAD battery, on BOXER Skyranger in the Heavy formations. 30 / 35 mm gun adds
cost-effective counter-drone capability.
Directed energy weapons work should continue
towards a useable capability to be fielded as soon as practicable.
12 and 16 RA regiments probably need to evolve
mixing SKY SABRE with SHORAD, both for their own survivability and for improved
effect. Guns (such as PALADIN from British company MSI, which has already been
tested) would add resilience against drones.
In order to deliver the “British Corps”, 4 Brigade
will need to be rebuilt, with Combat Support and Combat Service Support
regiments it currently lacks.
4 and 7 Brigades should both be made medium
mechanized with FOXHOUND and a circa-20 tons Troop Carrier as planned within
the Land Mobility Programme.
Ideally, 1st Division should have its own
lightweight Deep Recce Strike formation. Resources are highly unlikely to be
sufficient, so 16 Air Assault Brigade could be adapted to deliver this role
where applicable while preserving its more unique deployability aspects.
3rd Division’s armoured brigades would
benefit from putting a remotely operated turret on ARES and adapting the
internal fit of these new vehicles to restore a degree of IFV capability.
BOXER would then deliver supporting roles
by adapting the current plan for Mission Modules. A 120 mm turreted mortar and
SHORAD should be priorities.
Ideally, 12 and 20 brigades should be “square”
and composed of Combined Arms Regiments of CR3 and ARES. At an absolute
minimum, the current 3 regular MBT regiments should be preserved by cancelling
plans to convert King’s Royal Hussars from MBT to Armoured Recce.
Security Force Assistance Brigade should be
sacrificed to free resources. In general, rebuilding needed CS and CSS
formations is priority and in absence of manpower growth, accessory missions
should be scaled back to recoup posts for more urgent priorities.
Propose how the air and space domains
are developed to contribute to an Integrated Force, recommending measures that
accelerate modernisation and transformation and identifying existing
capabilities and programmes that do not support this.
The Air Force contribution to the
Integrated Force is fundamental, but its ability to intervene in the face of
powerful enemy anti-air defences must be increased if this is to continue to be
the case even in high intensity warfare. EW, uncrewed aircraft companion for
crewed jets, SPEAR 3 and SPEAR EW are going to be fundamental, and it would be
extremely important to retrofit the ECR Mk2 radar with jamming capability on
the Tranche 2 Typhoons too, since they make up most of the RAF’s numbers.
The procurement of AARGM ER anti-radar
missiles, as already pursued by allies, should be the next step.
MQ-9B PROTECTOR’s potential overland is
threatened by its vulnerability to enemy action. As it stands, PROTECTOR is
virtually helpless against any enemy attack: procurement of a Self Defence pod
should be a priority.
PROTECTOR should then be developed with
suitable radar and podded sonobuoy dispensers to become an adjunct maritime
patrol solution supporting P-8 Poseidon, especially in the High North.
PROTECTOR should also be equipped with the
Short Take Off and Landing wing-kit to enable it to deploy directly on the
aircraft carriers. The addition of suitable radars in pods would enable SEA
PROTECTOR to deliver high altitude, long endurance Airborne Early Warning; in
Maritime Patrol configuration it would deliver long duration anti-submarine
patrols. In both cases, this would ease the burden on the insufficient number
of MERLIN HM2 helicopters, which could then go back to focusing on ASW. In AEW,
PROTECTOR would deliver greater capability than CROWSNEST and could in part
supplement the insufficient number of E-7 WEDGETAIL too.
It would be highly beneficial to pursue a
capability similar to the USAF’s RAPID DRAGON: pallets that can be air-dropped
from cargo aircraft to launch multiple cruise missiles. A single A400 could be
made to launch as many Storm Shadows as 4 or perhaps even 8 Typhoon, at far
greater ranges from the UK, with next to no need for air to air refuelling. For
a modest investment, this would bring quasi-strategic bomber capability back to
the RAF’s roster.
Probably the most transformational
capability that can be pursued, however, is the ISTARI multi-ISR constellation
of Low Earth Orbit satellites. The OBERON-type satellites, with their radar
sensor, will be particularly important to gather intelligence and targeting in
all weathers. The use of laser to securely transmit huge amounts of data
(TITANIA demonstrator) could also be game-changing.
In general, while LEO satellites are small
and individually less capable than larger satellites so far favoured by most
nations, they present advantages:
-
The UK industry is one of the
main LEO small satellites producers worldwide
-
The use of multiple small
satellites makes the constellation more survivable
-
It is conceivable that
additional LEO sats could be “rapidly” deployed into orbit in time of need
-
The maturation of launch
options directly from UK soil open up an opportunity to have UK satellites,
launched from the UK, delivering sovereign intelligence capability
It would be highly beneficial to procure a
number of air to air refuelling pods for A400M, to open up the ability to
refuel MERLIN HC4 (Littoral Response Group) and CHINOOK (Army, Special Forces)
in flight as well as have extra AAR capability for jets in times of need.
As mentioned elsewhere, adding Boom to at
least some VOYAGER tankers would be a massive force multiplier by opening up
options to extend E-7, P-8, RIVET JOINT and even C-17 in Flight, as well as
making the RAF capable of supporting its main partners, including the F-35A of
the “Nordic Air Force” in Scandinavia.
Propose how UK Special Forces are developed
as part of an Integrated Force and in support of UK National Security and
resilience.
In a high intensity warfare context, the
role of Special Forces is likely to primarily revolve around deep
reconnaissance and target acquisition in favour of the integrated force. The
Army Special Operations Brigade, in particular, should have this as a key role
for its Rangers, which should thus be organized and equipped with the necessary
mobility, sensors and communications to scout deep beyond the Forward Edge of
Battle Area.
Special Forces will of course retain their
shock action and direct assault capability as well.
Propose how to improve financial
management and administration across Defence, meeting HMG standards of
accountability and identifying how more rapid adoption of digital technology
will modernise culture, organisation and ways of working.
The one reform that would have the greatest
effect on the handling of Defence budget would be one that favoured flexibility
over rigid annuality parameters and that created a planning mechanism more akin
to the Defence Planning Law in France. Government and Opposition alike need to
have more visibility and more say on how long-term defence plans are set out
and should vote regularly on those plans to ensure neither side can offer big
promises while in Opposition only to deliver the opposite if Elected.
A more credible, long-term commitment to
capabilities, programs and structures would give the Services and Industry the
confidence needed to approach programs in annual increments. Currently, UK
defence spends years and years trying to plan every financial detail of
enormous, decade-long programs, generating famine periods followed by gigantic
monolithic contracts which later invariably encounter problems due to inflation,
unforeseen events, changed requirements and the delays that end up regularly
being inflicted upon programmes to fit within annuality requirements. Enormous
amounts of equipment are purchased in big contracts because Industry doesn't
trust the government to come back if a project is split in tranches, and the
Services are terrified of losing their chance (and budget) is they don't commit
it. This needs to change. Industry and Services alike must be put in a
situation in which they are more comfortable ordering 100 or so vehicles a year
within a framework, rather than order 523 BOXERs in one go, to make an example.
This would make it easier to control expenditure year on year on big projects
without the need for shock cancellations.
Requirements must be set, endorsed, voted
upon by both sides of the House, and then delivered incrementally year on year
with industry and armed forces reasonably confident that the entire thing won't
collapse the moment there is a new General Election and yet another SDSR
looking for cuts.
Propose how UK Defence can build
relationships with allies, partners and alliances as a strategic strength for
the UK
AUKUS is the most impressive example of
mutually beneficial relationship, and GCAP will do much in turn to keep Japan
and Italy close to the UK.
There is obvious scope for more
cooperation. BOXER with Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, for example.
With Germany, synergies have been found in the TRITON program to jointly
procure a replacement for the M3 rig; in the joint development of ammunition
for Challenger 3; in the RCH155 artillery program, in FOST naval training, and
hopefully in the future this can continue through the UK procuring the
Skyranger turret for BOXER, like Germany already is doing, to enhance anti-air
and anti-drone defence.
Type 26, if selected by Norway, could
represent a formidable area of cooperation in the context of ASW on the
Northern flank of NATO. There is potential for cooperation over P-8 POSEIDON
too, and on MQ-9B PROTECTOR, particularly once it is fitted to also deliver
maritime patrol / ASW. Norway has a known interest. Both countries employ the
Sting Ray torpedo and this might continue in the future should Norway decide to
follow the Mod 2 development now started in the UK.
Poland ties are strong thanks to CAMM / SKY
SABRE and the joint development of the new CAMM MR munition. Poland has also
acquired BRIMSTONE. Further synergies can be built upon these capabilities.
Poland is about to become the second user of APACHE helicopters worldwide and
the British Army Air Corps could do much to assist them along the way. The two
nations would benefit from joint armament purchases for the APACHE fleets and
from joint development of conceps and capabilities relating to the AH-64E.
Poland has also acquired AW-149s which the
UK is considering as New Medium Helicopter solution.
I again stress the importance of TD5 and
the advanced payloads for GMLRS rockets: this project could be a real winner in
the field and on the market, and more GMLRS users should be involved as soon as
possible to help build momentum.
These are some of the main examples. Those
equipment points of contact bring mutual advantages, ease interoperability and
create a wider user community to share the costs of modernisation with, while
deepening mutual understanding and favouring common solutions.
The UK should consider more direct
purchases from partners in return for defence sales. For example, cooperation
with Norway on the VANGUARD concept for large motherships would deliver a good
solution for the Royal Navy requirement while probably representing a welcome
return for Norway's eventual selection of the Type 26 as its new frigate.
