Earlier posts on the subject of future army structures:
Army 2020 Refine: a proposal
British Army 2025: a proposed concept and structure
After the SDSR: Strike Brigades, a big deal?
In detail: the Combined Arms Regiment
In
this post I provide a graphic which helps in visualizing the Combined Arms
Regiment I’ve been proposing as a solution to the British Army’s current heavy
brigade headache. How do you square three brigades into two, and how do you
deal with the insufficient number of Warrior vehicles to be upgraded under the
Capability Sustainment Programme, while also delivering a workable, credible
force structure?
My
reply is: with the Combined Arms Regiment. This mirrors, in some ways, what the
US Army has been doing for years in its Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, which were
composed of two such regiments (then grown to three in exchange for a reduction
in the number of brigades).
Israel
also combines infantry and tanks within the same armoured regiments, albeit in
a different way. Italy used to, in better days for its army.
The
British Army does it regularly… but only on deployment and during training. The
Combined Arms Regiment is, in the end, a formalization of the “2+2” square
battlegroup that the British Army knows all too well. 2 tank squadrons
supporting 2 armoured infantry companies.
The graphic uses vehicle profile drawings from ShipBucket.com. Credits for their realization to users Darth Panda, Glorfindel and Sgtsammac. Click on the link to see in full size at Pintrest.com
The graphic uses vehicle profile drawings from ShipBucket.com. Credits for their realization to users Darth Panda, Glorfindel and Sgtsammac. Click on the link to see in full size at Pintrest.com
I
feel confident in saying that it is time to make this structure permanent. The
one good thing of Army 2020 is that armoured infantry and tank units are now
all based in the same place, on Salisbury Plain, which virtually removes any
remaining logistic / infrastructure reason against such an approach.
The
two Heavy Brigades in Army 2025 would restructure each on 3 such permanent
battlegroups, and rotate them into readiness, one by one, making the force
generation cycle quite straightforward and greatly reducing the need to pull
pieces from this regiment, that battalion and that other company over there,
which is the current norm.
With
the CAR, the British Army:
-
Maintains the same number of MBTs it
had in Army 2020, replacing 3 “Type 56” regiments with 6 binary “battalions” (a
handy trick to avoid capbadge issues!) of 28 tanks each. The number of
frontline tanks is unchanged, at 168.
-
Has more tanks per brigade, 84 versus
56.
-
Has an even balance of tank squadrons
and armoured infantry companies. One problem of the Army 2020 armoured brigade
is lack of tanks: only 3 squadrons to support as many as 9 companies of
infantry (6 armoured, 3 mechanized).
The
CAR also “avoids” an otherwise unavoidable cut from 6 armoured infantry
battalions to 4: with 245 “turreted” Warriors expected to be upgraded, there
simply isn’t enough of them for six battalions. Make the count by yourself: 6x3
companies, and 14 Warrior per company, would require 252 vehicles. And that’s without
counting any in the Fire Support Companies, and without any in reserve and in
the training fleet. Simply unworkable.
The
CARs reduce the number of infantry companies on Warrior to 12, for a total of
168 vehicles. More are used within the six Fire Support Infantry companies,
leaving an uncomfortably small margin for the training fleet and for attrition,
but at least fitting within the 245 figure. A much needed injection of realism.
The
CARs also require 135 men less than the Army 2020 structure (6 infantry battalions
of 729 and 3 tank regiments of 587 versus 6 battlegroups of 1000 each).
The
graphic shows the distribution of manpower and vehicles. One important piece of
the puzzle is the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle, the replacement for the
ancient FV432 family of vehicles. The ABSV programme hasn’t been launched yet,
but remains on the army list for the next future.
In
my CAR assumptions, I’ve inserted the hope for a firepower boost in the form of
120mm mortars and, finally, a vehicle-mounted anti-tank missile capability
(complementing, not replacing, the dismounted Javelin teams carried in the
back).
ABSV, also known as "turretless Warrior", is a programme that is attempting to take off from well over 10 years. It is fundamental to get it on the move, because FV432s aren't getting any younger. |
ABSV: it was around when Alvis was still kicking... |
The
CAR makes up for the relative weakness in infantry numbers by fielding an
exceptionally large and capable Fire Support Company, shaped to attach mortar
and ATGW sections not only to the infantry companies, but also to the tank
squadrons. Mortars, after all, can be extremely useful in setting up smoke
curtains and suppressing enemy ATGW firing positions, thus helping and
protecting the tank’s ability to manoeuvre.
One
relatively unique feature of the proposal is the reconnaissance element.
Armoured Infantry and tank formations have so far enjoyed the support of recce
troops equipped with 8 Scimitar vehicles, and it was assumed that these would
be replaced with an equal number of Ajax. However, the British Army is now
looking at forming 4 regiments on Ajax, but all destined to the two Strike
Brigades (an approach I do not personally support, but so it is).
Even
a more reasonable scenario based on an Ajax regiment in each Heavy and each
Strike brigade would still require forming a fourth regiment, out of the same
number of vehicles to be purchased. So, the vehicles have to come from
somewhere.
My
CAR proposal thus does recce with Warriors carrying dismounts, and with the
support of the sniper pairs. This collaboration is, again, nothing really new.
The sniper pair’s use of quad bikes for independent battlefield mobility is
also something that already happens.
The
Assault Pioneers, 4 sections mounted each in a Warrior (3 crew + 6 dismounts
following the upgrade), stand ready to offer their support.
The
REME Light Aid Detachment is expanded to account for the big fleet of vehicles,
including tanks. Its structure is a hybrid formation built from the REME
elements found in the current armoured infantry battalions and tank regiments.
The
HQ Coy is also considerably larger, to account for a bigger echelon with the
greater number of trucks needed to support the battlegroup. The HQ Coy is composed of HQ element, Signal Platoon, Quartermaster platoon, Motor Transport platoon, catering and other supporting elements.
Supported by a capable artillery battery from the brigade’s Fires regiment; a logistic group and an armoured engineer squadron, a CAR is a ready-made battlegroup.
In
a future post I will explore the difficult topic represented by the fourth
battlegroup, the cavalry one, tasked with reconnaissance and screening. The
Army’s need to put some flesh on the bones of the mythological “strike brigades”
has given birth to the questionable idea of moving Ajax into those, leaving a
big question mark floating on the future scouting element within the armoured
brigades.
What
the Strike Brigade really needs, but isn’t getting, is the cancelled FRES SV
Direct Fire variant, also known as “Medium Armour”. The army had plans for
procuring this medium tank variant, armed probably with a 120mm smoothbore gun,
but the plan was cancelled years ago as part of the infinite wave of cuts.
Now,
Ajax is being asked to play the part of “medium armour” within the Strike
Brigades, but armed only with a 40mm gun, and at the cost of leaving the
armoured brigades short of recce support. A failure from one end to the other.
This also signals a further move towards recce by force rather than by stealth, and it would as a consequence require additional firepower to enable the cavalry to manoeuvre, scout ahead and act as an effective screen even in presence of enemy armour.
The US Army cavalry squadron within armoured brigade combat teams is swapping out all 4x4 in favor of more Bradleys and is also being given a tank company (although, for now at least, this is robbed from one of the combined arms regiments rather than being additional).
The italian reconnaissance cavalry is also an interesting example. It is wheeled, not tracked, but nonetheless includes a tank-destroyer squadron to be equipped with 8x8 Centauro 2 vehicles armed with a 120mm smoothbore.
If the British Army wants to be able to manoeuvre against a capable enemy, a regiment of sole Ajax with 40mm will not do: the heavy brigade reconnaissance regiments should have a Challenger 2 presence; while the Strike Brigades should include the Medium Armour variant of Ajax. (or, better still, use a wheeled tank destroyer and recce vehicles, to better match the rest of the brigade that is to be mounted on 8x8).
This also signals a further move towards recce by force rather than by stealth, and it would as a consequence require additional firepower to enable the cavalry to manoeuvre, scout ahead and act as an effective screen even in presence of enemy armour.
The US Army cavalry squadron within armoured brigade combat teams is swapping out all 4x4 in favor of more Bradleys and is also being given a tank company (although, for now at least, this is robbed from one of the combined arms regiments rather than being additional).
The italian reconnaissance cavalry is also an interesting example. It is wheeled, not tracked, but nonetheless includes a tank-destroyer squadron to be equipped with 8x8 Centauro 2 vehicles armed with a 120mm smoothbore.
If the British Army wants to be able to manoeuvre against a capable enemy, a regiment of sole Ajax with 40mm will not do: the heavy brigade reconnaissance regiments should have a Challenger 2 presence; while the Strike Brigades should include the Medium Armour variant of Ajax. (or, better still, use a wheeled tank destroyer and recce vehicles, to better match the rest of the brigade that is to be mounted on 8x8).
Meanwhile,
the bids are in for the Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme, an enterprise
which now faces a couple of years of Assessment Phase, hopefully with two rival
industry teams selected for the demonstration programme as “soon” as this
October.
The
widest possible range of budget figures have been quoted for this programme,
going anywhere from 250 to 1200 million pounds. Hard to say what kind of room
for manoeuvre Army HQ might have in funding the obsolescence removal from
Challenger 2. After years of false starts, the consensus is (or maybe was…?)
that the gun and powerpack would not be replaced, despite being the two biggest
weaknesses of the tank. But there was a most impressive and interesting
development when Rheinmetall
filed its bid and boldly promised that their “innovative solution” will
enable the switch from the rifled L30 to the smoothbore L55.
A new turret bustle? The image from Rheinmetall does not provide a definitive answer, but suggests so. |
To
understand the Challenger 2’s gun problem it is important to underline that the
heart of the matter is not so much the fact that it has a rifled barrel, but
the fact that it uses two-piece ammunition. This unique feature means that the
current ammunition storage spaces are far too short to take the long one-piece
shells used by everyone else in NATO; and it also means that the Challenger 2
crews can store the explosive rounds and the launch charges beneath the turret
ring, where they are generally safer. In exchange for this, the Challenger 2
does not have the extensively protected and blast-venting ammunition storage
compartments found, for example, on the M1 Abrams.
Switching
the gun is very easy, and has been trialed and validated already years ago: the
problem is that the ammunition storage needs to be completely re-thought, and
vast internal modifications become necessary.
Rheinmetall
does not elaborate, for now, on how their proposal work. Extensive rebuilding
of the turret seems inevitable, and the one CGI image they have published might
provide clues to it: the Challenger 2 in the picture seems to have a new turret
bustle, which also houses a new independent thermal sensor for the commander
(compare the position in the picture with that of the current system to see the
difference). Rheinmetall might be suggesting, effectively, a complete
reconstruction of the rear of the turret.
There
is no telling how much it could cost, and whether the army could face that
cost, but I think the Army will be very interested in hearing what Rheinmetall
has to say on the matter.
The
Challenger 2’s gun is fundamentally handicapped by its use of two-piece
ammunition, which makes it pretty much impossible to adopt new, longer
armor-piercing darts, putting a hard roof to lethality that is already assessed
as problematic and will only get worse over time. In addition, while in the
past the HESH round for the L30 added a flexibility that smoothbore tanks did
not match, now the situation is fundamentally reversed. There is now a whole
variety of ammunition available for smoothbore guns, including novel tri-mode
HE shells with airburst and anti-structure capability, and the Challenger 2 is
locked out, lost in its own little sea of aging shells with their own
exquisitely unique logistic tail. An oddity in NATO, with all what descends
from it.
On
the engine front, the current powerpack is not powerful enough, especially with
how much heavier the Challenger 2 add-on armour kit have become, pushing combat
weight as far upwards as to 75 tons. It is also not commendable in terms of
reliability.
It
is my opinion that if these critical weaknesses can’t be solved, the whole LEP
expenditure might become questionable at best. Alternative approaches would
have to be considered, with the LEP cancelled and all the money moved across
towards the Ajax family, to restore the Medium Armour variant.
FRES SV variants that will never (?) be: ambulance, medium bridgelayer, and Medium Armour / Direct Fire |
Being
lighter, the new tank would never be able to match the formidable survivability
of the Challenger 2 and would inexorably have less passive protection, but it
could at least be rolled into service with a smoothbore gun, up-to-date electronics
and a powerful powerpack. And if a suitable number of them was procured over
time, both Heavy and Strike brigades could have their hitting power secured.