An F-35 update

A brief summary of where we are 

The F-35B test fleet has received the F-135 engine fix that makes sure there won't be a repeat of the hard rubbing of fan blades and stator that lead to the fire on the USAF AF-27 aircraft last year. The only aircraft in the test fleet which has yet to receive the pre-trenched stator is BF-5, and that's because it spent the last 6 months inside the McKinley climatic laboratory in Eglin, to undergo extreme climatic testing. 
The whole fleet of F-35s is due to be fitted with the pre-trenched stator element by early next year. The stator element received a "trench", cut in during production, which ensures there is not excessive rubbing with the fan blades. The alternative, used to quickly fix some of the test aircraft, is to fly a series of manoeuvers planned out to gracefully cut the trench in. 
The fix is said to be effective. The loss due to the greater gap in the stator is said to be just around two degrees, which is not significant. However, engineers are considering whether a more effective change is possible, affordable and needed.

As mentioned, BF-5 has recently completed climatic testing. The results seem to have been good, and there have not been particular issues arising either from extreme heat or extreme cold, or everything in between. 

 

Sun bathing to replicate the intense heat of a day parked on a runway in hot climate zones

Icing cloud test

Flying in the freezing air

Flying without moving from the spot, including in VTOL modes. Testing the F-35B required a complex infrastructure.

In May, 6 F-35B of the USMC are due to deploy at sea on the USS Wasp for the first Operational Testing phase (OT-1). This test deployment will be a work-up to the incoming IOC, still scheduled for July. USMC F-35Bs are moving through the depots to receive the modifications they need to get up to the latest standard. As of March, 5 jets were undergoing the refit at the Cherry Point Fleet Readiness Center - East. 2 more should have already been redelivered, and other work is being done by the USAF's own Depot, in Utah. 
A total of 10 frontline aircraft will be modified in order to achieve IOC. 

F-35B Ski Jump trials have begun in Patuxent River, and are expected to finish by mid-May. The first images of an F-35B taking off from ski jump are expected soon, and this will be a significant milestone for the british and italian needs. 

AF-1 has begun flying test sorties with a very asymmetric external load (one wing with clean pylons, the other with two GBUs and one Sidewinder) as part of the work needed to clear external carriage of weapons in the Block 3F software. 
Test sorties have been flown with 4 Paveway IV and 2 ASRAAM on the wing pylons, as well, to begin the integration of the british weapons load configuration expected at Block 3F (up to 6 Paveway IV, 2 internal and 4 external, and 2 external ASRAAM). 

AF-2 and at least another F-35A have been flown in a first series of trial sorties, testing basic fighter maneouvering with the assistance of F-16s. These have been defined "dogfights" in some press reports, but it seems we are still talking mostly about testing the handling and finding where the flight control laws can be adjusted. Building on high Angle of Attack testing and departure trials, the test pilots have begun flying with and against F-16s to see what the F-35 can do. The report says that there is margin to relax the flight controls to achieve greater agility, perhaps leading to a reversal of the degradation reported a few years ago. 

AF-2 is also preparing to begin, this June, the firing trials with the 25mm gun. The gun becomes available with the Block 3F software. 

Earlier, Col. De Smit of the dutch air force and Lt Col Lee Kloos, USAF, both coming from the F-16, went on record saying that an F-35 compares nicely in terms of turning to "an F-16 with combat load". They both said that a clean F-16 will turn better, but noted that a clean F-16 has little to offer in terms of range and weaponry, and is never actually flown operationally in such a way. 
Transonic acceleration, as well as climbing and descent, are described by the two pilots as matching those of a clean F-16 Block 50.  
Later on, with the beginning of Air Combat Manoeuvre training, we will no doubt hear more. 

 
The F-35C is due to have its DT-2 period of trials at sea between august and september. This time, the carrier involved is expected to be the USS D. Eisenhower. 



Remaining issues

Issues remain in the development of ALIS, the logistic planning software. Progress is slower than desired, and this impacts on the time needed to carry out maintenance. It is also one of the problems remaining on the road to USMC IOC, as the portable, deployable ALIS terminal isn't yet ready. 

Software development also remains, unsurprisingly, challenging. At IOC, the USMC seems set to not have access to the intended "4-ship fusion", which connects 4 F-35Bs in a package able to share the complete situational awareness picture, so that any target spotted by one aircraft is made visible to the others as well. 
Fusing the sensors inputs coming from 4 different aircraft is currently causing issues, as the differences in how each aircraft see the target generate multiple symbols on the screen, effectively making it hard for the pilot to know which target mark is the correct one. 
Fusion will initially be limited to pairs, while software clear up progresses with the aim of fixing this issue by October. 

The F-35B is still dealing with the Dunlop tyres, which, despite improvements made since 2013, still wear out quicker than planned. A new tyre design will follow. 

Software aside, the greatest issue still standing is the F-35B's 496 Bulkhead, which in 2004 was switched to aluminium from its original titanium design in order to reduce weight, with the unwanted result that, during airframe durability testing on the ground, it cracked, and then severed, at just after one simulated flying life. 
In order to be certified for its intended 8000 hours life, the F-35's fuselage must survive 2 simulated life cycles, with a third life cycle planned for validating the possibility of extensions beyond the 8000 hours. 
Durability testing on the F-35B's airframe has been stopped many months ago because of the 496's failure, and a redesigned bulkhead is needed. 
The problem will not affect the F-35B in the immediate (it'll be years before any of the aircraft produced so far enters the dangerous number of flying hours), but it is to be hoped that airframe stress tests will resume soon. In April 2014 Rear Adm. Randy Mahr, deputy program manager, said that the solution to the 496 problem was known and a redesigned bulkhead will be embodied into production from the LRIP 9 onwards, with the same component retrofitted during depot maintenance on the F-35Bs of the earlier lots. It is not clear at the moment if this is still the case, or if the development of a full, effective solution has slipped. It remains one issue to work upon. 

One non-issue which instead made a lot of noise on the press is the fix to the F-35B's weapon bay in order to fit the Small Diameter Bomb II. The apocalyptic tones used in some reports are definitely excessive when the fix is actually about a small change to the passage of an hydraulic line and some wire bundles. Moreover, the F-35 cannot exactly be blamed here, since the B's weapon bay was downsized all the way back in 2004, while the SDB II, which is not yet in service, began development in 2010. The "fault" is of the weapon, but the fact is that is simpler to carry out the small modification to the weapon bay rather than try to further miniaturize the bomb. Much drama has been made about how the SDB II won't be available on the F-35 before 2022, without considering that the SDB II won't be operational before 2017 at the earliest (on USAF F-15E), which becomes 2019 on US Navy Super Hornets. 
Moreover, it is not like F-35 will instantaneously make up the whole of the US air power: for many more years there will be F-15Es and F-16s to carry out a big share of the game. No real need to panic. 

The F-35B modification will be part of Block IV work, and the Joint Project Office is designing the fix keeping track of the requirements for partner weapon requirements as well. For the UK, this includes Meteor and SPEAR 3. 



British Status of Play

On a british-specific perspective, the 17 (R) Squadron stood up in Edwards AFB as the F-35 OEU squadron. For now it is equipped with BK-1 and BK-2 only. These aircraft came out from depot maintenance and received the latest modifications. 
BK-3, which is not instrumented, is in Beaufort as training aircraft, embedded in the USMC training squadron 501. 
BK-4, the next aircraft to be delivered, is instrumented and will joint 17(R) Sqn as third and last test platform. 

Procurement of a first batch of 14 aircraft has been authorized. The expected LRIP split is 4 in LRIP 8, 6 in LRIP 9 and 4 in LRIP 10. This should lead, by end-2018 or 2019 to the following situation: 

- 5 F-35B training fleet in Beaufort
- 3 F-35B test fleet in Edwards
- 9 F-35B in 617 Sqn, to RAF Marham 

Where to find F-35s in 2018

Speaking of RAF Marham, more than 300 million pounds have been assigned for infrastructure preparation in the base. Back in June 2014 it was announced that 3 Landing Pads will be built in order to practice vertical landing. A runway renovation is planned. The current Hardened Aircraft Shelters used by IX squadron with Tornado GR4 are due to be modernized ahead of welcoming 617 Sqn when it arrives from America (although the extension of the service life of the third Tornado squadron on base complicates somewhat the management of spaces as the major building work begins). 
Marham is also expected to receive an Integrated Training Centre which will train british pilots from 2019 and that will welcome other european crew training needs too, probably beginning with Norway's. 
Again, Marham is expected to eventually include a MRO plant for maintenance and upgrade, and this will require a large hangar and serious infrastructure. Another hangar complex is needed to host the stealth coating maintenance and the RCS testing laboratory which certifies the Low Observability after each coating re-application. 

Meanwhile, a Virtual Analysis Laboratory has opened in Ampthill, UK, to allow british-based software experimentation, analysis and development through simulation. The work done here will inform and direct software development carried out at the ACURL (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory) at Eglin, in the US.


In Culdrose, funding is expected soon to rebuild the current Flight Deck training facility (the "dummy carrier" HMS Siskin) so that it ceases representing an Invincible class deck and enters the Queen Elizabeth age instead. The 14 Sea Harriers currently used for deck handling training are also expected to be replaced as they do not "impersonate" the larger and heavier F-35B well enough. A small number of F-35B mock-ups will be procured instead, for the handling and parking proper, while an option for deck runs and engine-on rolling training is getting back some ex-RAF Jaguars, which are thought to provide a more F-35B like feel. 

A Navy News graphic shows the existing HMS Siskin, surrounded by the shade of what Queen Elizabeth's deck would look like. In reality, it seems that there will not be a whole deck mock-up, but just the stern area, up to and including the first elevator.

A busy HMS Siskin training deck handlers. This is where you can still see Sea Harriers engines in action, although none of the aircraft can fly.

 
The 5-strong F-35B training fleet is expected to move out of the US to begin operating in Marham in July 2019. That's when US-based training of british F-35B crews is expected to end. 
Actually, the last of a planned 24 british pilots to be trained at Beaufort is expected to complete the course by May 2018. 

There is not yet a date for the standing up of the second frontline squadron, 809 NAS. For now, the stated purchase target stands at 48, including the test fleet. Greater clarity is hoped to come from the new SDSR. 



Where do we go from here? 

The beginning of the F-35B in british service will be relatively modest, at least compared to what the aircraft will be able to do later on. With Block 3F, the F-35B at IOC in 2018/19 will be able to carry 2 ASRAAM externally and up to 4 AMRAAM internally in a fighter role; or 2 AMRAAM and 2 Paveway IV in internal-only configuration, or up to 4 AMRAAM, 2 ASRAAM, 4 Paveway IV, or again 2 AMRAAM, 2 ASRAAM and 6 Paveway IV using both internal and external carriage. 
 
The gun pod will be available as well, provided that a new "no gun" budgetary stunt is pulled, like that, then aborted, which was played with the Typhoon.  

Block 3F capabilities

Block 3F comes with some limitations to the use of the EOTS as IRST sensor; and with no video-downlink capability, which is unfortunate as in recent years this has become a key factor in providing air support to the troops on the ground, sharing imagery with the JTAC. 
In defence of the F-35, it must be said that when the requirements were written and development started, the ROVER video-downlink did not exist yet. Clearly, the capability to share sensors imagery with the troops on the ground will be high on the list of priorities for development of Block IV, the software load for the 2020s. An IR pointer is also likely to be added. 

At entry in service, the F-35 will be able to share targeting information through self-determined GPS position data. Not quite the same thing as having full imagery, but it should be enough of a beginning. 

A notional road map for future developments

The capabilities will expand a lot going forwards with the Block IV software. Last 17 march, the deputy manager of the F-35 programme, Rear Adm. Randy Mahr, provided a document explaining some of the planned next steps. The presentation includes a table of enormous interest about british weaponry plans.

Block IV apparently is now going to comprise 4 different software releases, and I can’t quite say at the moment how this relates to the earlier assumption of having two stages, Block 4A in 2021/22 and 4B in 2022/23. 

March 2015 document showing the list of candidates for Block IV integration.

The four releases will incrementally add new weapons to the F-35, and for the UK the first candidate is SPEAR 1 – Penetrator, which is the new bunker-buster warhead developed for the Paveway IV bomb. This new warhead, which keeps the external shape of the current one but comes with an hardened penetrating body inside, is the de-facto replacement for the current 2000 lbs Paveway III used on Tornado GR4. The III is destined to go out of service alongside Tornado, it seems. Raytheon Uk and the MOD have been working on the new warhead option for the Paveway IV for a while now, and a production contract is expected soon.

The second candidate is “SPEAR seeker”. The definition is somewhat puzzling and not detailed, but I believe it probably refers to the proposed addition of an IR Imaging seeker again on the Paveway IV, in order to dramatically improve its ability to hit moving targets.

Spiral development of Paveway IV is all included in Selective Precision Effects At Range Capability 1 (2 being the Brimstone developments, and 3 the whole new weapon by the name of Spear).

There is also a “ASRAAM new build” candidate, which suggests that the Royal Air Force thinks it is time for a Capability Sustainment Programme for the ASRAAM. This has been loosely planned for years, and is supposed to build on what is being done for the CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile, itself an ASRAAM derivative.

Most important is the planned addition of Meteor. Integrating this weapon is particularly crucial to make best use of the F-35’s stealthness, firing from very long range. Moreover, integrating Meteor on F-35 is an indispensable step to move if the AMRAAM is to effectively leave british service in the near future.

The UK once planned to get rid of AMRAAM by 2017, but Meteor delays have forced a rethink. I would expect (and hope) that AMRAAM stocks will be extended a little more, to bridge the gap on the F-35, even after Meteor becomes the weapon of choice for Typhoon (should happen from 2018).

Finally, SPEAR 3 is expected to become available. Decisions regarding SPEAR 3 are expected in the coming months: MBDA is progressing with the design of the new SPEAR missile, but final development and production is expected to cost several hundred million pounds. There is a risk that the MOD will accept the Small Diameter Bomb II as SPEAR Capability 3 solution. However, this is not desiderable, as it would hurt the ability to design and produce complex weapons at home and moreover because the SDB II is a gliding weapon, while Spear has its own turbofan engine, offering greater range, greater Acceptable Launch Zone, more flexibility and greater range. All these advantages are crucial if SPEAR 3 is to provide, among others, a Destruction of Enemy Air Defence capability (DEAD) to compensate for the removal without replacement of the ALARM anti-radar missile. 

A single MBDA SPEAR missile seen on a Typhoon during development work

 

The end result the programme aims for. 2 Meteor and 8 SPEAR 3 will make for a powerful and versatile weapons load.

It becomes dubious if there will ever be a Storm Shadow integration on F-35. It won't happen that soon, and in the meanwhile the missile is aging. According to french budgetary documents, the Life Extension Programme for Storm Shadow / Scalp EG, which is a joint cooperation initiative between France and UK, is supposed to begin moving this year. We will have to see if the programme starts and how it goes. The number of missiles updated and life extended and the new OSD date will be crucial to understand if the F-35B will move on directly to the Storm Shadow future replacement. 

The SDSR 2010 imposed stock cuts on the Storm Shadow holdings for some 170 million pounds, according to the Telegraph. This is likely to have resulted in the removal of 170 to 200 missiles. Around 100 more have been used between Iraq and Libya, maybe more, leaving possibly around 600 rounds in stock. 

Brimstone is also not mentioned, at least for now. Brimstone, even in its Brimstone 2 iteration about to enter service is a rail launched weapon, so that internal integration is a problem (you need to eject the missile downwards and clear out of the weapon bay before its rocket motor ignites). However, SPEAR might include further developments of Brimstone, and if the missile continues to be the weapon of choice for CAS into the future, it will have to be added in at some point. 

Not mentioned in the table, but planned, is the addition, on the sole F-35A, of the tactical nuclear capability with integration of the B61-12 bomb for internal carriage. It does not concern the UK, but it is a factor in planning for Italy, Netherlands and, reportedly, for Belgium as it begins evaluating its options for replacing its F-16s.

Looking further into the future, the US are already planning years ahead, in particular by basing the research for new, more effective jet engines for the future on the F-135 powerplant. The future Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) engine will be retro-compatible with the F-35, and is expected to bring massive advantages, in particular to combat range through much greater efficiency. The engine is expected to adapt to the various phases of flights to optimize its power output and fuel consumption. 

Funding is already being provided for cyber / electronic warfare capability insertion. In particular, a "cyber warfare" pod is in development already. Although not officially confirmed, the cyber payload will probably be carried into the TERMA-produced "multi-role pod" which is currently best known for containing the B and C's 25mm gun. 

Serious consideration is being given to directed energy weapons, in particular to lasers, but all this is of course quite a few years into the future.

   

On the way to the SDSR

It is quite depressing and alarming to be navigating towards an uncertain election with even greater uncertainty about what will be left of the armed forces afterwards, even while the events in the world most certainly signal that the assumptions of the SDSR 2010, and the belief that State on State warfare was (kind of) no more, were both wrong.
It is also quite embarrassing, and there can't be another word for it, that the UK seems set to miss the 2% defence spending target barely months after rightfully and wisely campaigning for the NATO members to strive to achieve that level of investment. Not the Tories nor Labour are giving assurances about maintaining the 2% line, and they aren't even giving real assurances about sticking at least to a flat in-real-terms budget with a 1% increase on equipment spending, which is the absolute minimum level of spending the MOD was promised when Future Force 2020 was devised. With the extremely significant caveat, by the way, that the flat-in-real-terms budget has to be calculated, of course, starting from a base amount. And the base MOD budget has been falling significantly each year since 2010. Depending on which fiscal year serves as base for the calculation, the budget over five years changes by several billion pounds.
Even worse, there seem to be almost certainty that there will be new, vast cuts to the budget. Something that, inexorably, would entirely wreck Future Force 2020, changing yet once more the plans, imposing new cuts even before the last ones are completed. And putting a very big nail in the coffin of Britain's role as a military power. If not the final nail, close to it.

The british GDP has been growing at a rather imposing rate, so the 2% budget target would indeed equate to a significant increase in defence spending, something that is supposedly not doable due to the need for more austerity. Curiously, the same isn't said of the 0.7% target for Aid Budget. In 2013 aid spending soared above 13 billion pounds, and it will keep growing. While the armed forces will be gutted to save a few billions. Effectively, more than closing the deficit, part or all of the money removed from the armed forces will just head completely out of the country, spent in "aid".
I think it is nothing short of criminal, but you are free to think whatever you want. Just, please, don't say that Britain can't afford to keep its soldiers employed. It could. The money is there. It is just going to be used in other ways. And not even at home. Not for education, or the NHS, or even welfare. No. For aid programmes which, often, don't even work, and at times are actually counterproductive.


The 2% target's greatest importance is in its serving as a sort of rock bottom. For decades it has been the barrier supposed to prevent the complete dismantling of the armed forces. What i fear the most, is what happens when even that "rock bottom" is smashed through. There is no anchor left afterwards. The risk is that it becomes a true free fall. Especially because there most evidently isn't the maturity to set out a strategy, articulate what the minimum range of capabilities needed are, and stick to it for more than a few months. Future Force 2020 is already an exercise in a definition of the bare minimum force which can still serve the political purpose of keeping Britain militarily relevant. It is a very bare minimum target in some ways, something that many do not understand. The current level of ambition requires, for example, the ability for Britain to deploy a brigade-sized force enduringly. It takes five brigades taking 6 months tours to do that without completely wearing out men and equipment, and Army 2020 delivers those five brigades. Just. In theory. In fact, already as it is, the last two brigades of the 5 are pretty weak, very light in terms of vehicles and protection and firepower, and somewhat bare of the support elements needed. There is a recognized shortage of Logistic support and, even more, of Signals support. All Light Role Infantry battalions now are understrenght by design, and need a company's worth of reservists trained and available for deployment just to achieve a complete, standard structure on three rifle companies of three platoons each.

And there are other rather dramatic capability gaps as well. The most unacceptable is the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft, ASW capable. The SDSR also badly damaged CBRN resilience dismantling the Joint CBRN regiment and withdrawing the Fuchs recce vehicles from service. A very bad decision, which i questioned from the very beginning (and i wasn't alone in doing so, i'm sure) and which eventually was reversed. 9 Fuchs are being returned to active service, albeit with significant challenges to be faced still, due to lack of money and loss of skills and knowledge. They haven't been gone for a very long time, but i'm told that the dismantling of the Joint Regiment resulted in a severe loss of know how in several ways.

Even scarier is, i believe, the awareness of just how much more capability seems to be hanging by a thread due to budget shortages and aging equipment which might go out of the door without being replaced. The defence spending stories that appear on the press are often not taken seriously due to how they seem to talk of imminent war against Russia, or other major crisises that do not sound realistic, that get downplayed easily. I've already written about this problem, and about the not very helpful input of defence top brass which only seem to speak once they are retired.
I was often warning people about Russia in discussions already back at the time of the war in Georgia, if not earlier. Unlike too many others, i do not undervalue Russia. And i think it must return to be a serious element to consider in strategic planning. But i wouldn't suggest using Russia in a too direct way to write stories which otherwise end up almost ridiculed as scare tales. Besides, there is no need to. Hard realities, numbers and facts are more than enough to sound the alarm. Actually, they do it better.

I think it is pretty scary that the Royal Navy has a young LPD tied up in port, in controlled humidity seal-down, because there are not enough men and pennies to let it sail while her sister ship also serves. But this isn't the worst. It is scarier that much of the army's mechanisation still depends on the FV432 vehicle, which dates back to the late 50s and early 60s and has an official out of service date set for 2030. And the worst part is not even the 70 years career of this vehicle, but the fact that it could go out of service earlier than planned, and anyway without being replaced. The army has a programme (kind of), the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle (ABSV) to replace it by removing turrets from surplus Warriors and convert them in APCs, mortar carriers, ambulances and other sub-variants needed. But uncertainty and shortage of money rules supreme, and who knows what will actually happen. Even in the best case, ABSV will replace the FV432 Bulldog just from the armoured infantry battalions. A number of other FV432s will keep soldiering on, as ambulances in Armoured Medical Regiments, in HQs of other mechanised units such as brigade and division HQ, but also command battery of 12 Regiment Royal Artillery, for example. Their replacement will be a problem once more left for later. In the uncertainty. And this, as of today, is assuming that ABSV can be funded and delivers.
Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme, another one up for much uncertainty. There are 227 tanks left, enough for 3 decent regiments plus training fleet. But the number could fall further, or anyway only a part of those might get the LEP. And even the best case scenario left on the table, anyway, has long lost any ambition of fixing the rifled gun issue, or replacing the engine.
The Warrior CSP programme itself has not reached the point of contract signature yet, so is quite exposed as well. And the numbers circulating regarding how many vehicles get the upgrade are depressing, since they would suffice, at most, for 4 battalions plus training fleet allocations. So, on paper the british army has 6 armoured infantry battalions. In reality, it might soon enough have enough vehicles for four at most. Even before new cuts eventually happen.

Wherever you look, a little bit of scratching the surface reveals potential gaps just about to burst open. I will make some more examples. A very big one is the fact that both the major vehicle depots of the Armed Forces, Ashchurch and Ayshire Barracks in Germany, are heading towards closure in the coming few years. They have already appointed the company tasked with planning the redevelopment of the Ashchurch area. Very little is known, instead, about where the forces will be supposed to park their vehicles after the current depots close. In 2014 the army made it known that they envisage building a new "UK Vehicle Hub". Inevitable, really. The vehicles need a place where to stay, in controlled humidty storage, looked after, protected and maintained. They must be in a well organized depot from which they can pulled out quickly and efficiently, and carried, by rail or truck, or driven towards their parent units and the ports and airports from which they will move onwards to the crisis zone. The problem is that there is no MOD decision on how, when and where to proceed with such a new hub. No plan in motion. I don't even know how it is possible to plan for closure before setting out a plan for relocating the vehicle fleets in a logistically sound way.

F-35, a major programme where uncertainty rules. Will there be 48? Will the hoped-for additional purchases ever happen? Or will even the meagre 48 number be slashed even further?
Tornado GR4 will be soon gone, and while i can only welcome with a huge sigh of relief the fact that there is now a contract to integrate Brimstone 2 on Typhoon (although just 2 launchers, for 6 missiles, at least for the moment), i must point out that any delay in integration (or a speeded up Tornado GR4 withdrawal, say) would still leave yet another gap. Moreover, there's at least two other areas where a capability loss is, at the moment, assured: bunker-busting, and tactical reconnaissance. With Tornado, both the RAPTOR recce pod and the Paveway III 2000 lbs bunker buster will be gone. And there is no recce pod in sight for Typhoon; while the bunker-buster variant of Paveway IV (which by the way, being a 500 lbs weapon, fails to convince me that there won't be a capability loss, even accounting for much more modern warhead design) is not yet on contract either.
Not to mention the ability to suppress enemy air defences: the ALARM anti-radar missile is gone from 2013, and with it much of the kinetic part of the RAF's SEAD capability. A key weapon, SPEAR 3, which is supposed to partially remedy to this weakness and also keep alive UK design and industrial capability in the sector of complex weapons, is another one of those bits at risk. SPEAR could be sacrificed to save the development money, settling for the US Small Diameter Bomb 2, which is cheaper but a glide-only weapon. SPEAR 3, having its own engine, can be launced from a greater distance and with less limitations due to weather, altitude, flight profile. All these things make a huge difference to the ability of SPEAR to serve as SEAD/DEAD weapon and destroy enemy missile batteries. With ALARM gone, it is important to have that kind of capability. 

Type 26: contract signature target date widely missed, a "demonstration phase" gimmick launched which contains long lead items for just 3 ships, leaving all the uncertainty about how things will progress. MARS Solid Support Ships: who the hell knows what the status of the programme even is. The equipment plan documents, as i've already explained, are deliberately bare of any detail and specific programme indication, so things can appear and disappear without proper tracking of changes. 

At times my warnings get played down by "what are you saying, we have 6 Type 45s, 2 carriers, best kit in the world, Typhoon...". And it is true. In part. But there is too much hype, and too little realism. The carriers aren't yet safe. Two are being built, but will both make it into service? Will they be blessed with a decent airwing? So much could still go wrong.
Type 45 is a great ship, but with its own very clear limits. Very single role due to missing equipment fits, which second-hand Harpoon (for 4 ships only) is only partially fixing. Harpoon itself hangs by a thread: it could go out of service in 2018, and the road to a replacement is a huge, floating question mark right now.
Sea Skua will go out of service with the Lynx MK8, in 2017, and it'll be at least three years before the replacement starts being available. Come 2018, the Royal Navy could be, at least for a few years, completely without anti-ship missiles of any type. Which is quite amazing, in a bad way.

On paper, Future Force 2020, especially after the 2014 U-turns and adjustements (Fuchs resurrected, Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 extended to 2018, Reaper extended to 2019) is still a good force, with some world class capabilities. But much of Future Force 2020 exists only on paper and depends on key programmes which are almost always exposed to huge risks in the coming review. Other capabilities remain, effectively, tied to a time-bomb. For example, Sentinel R1, which is an immensely effective and precious bit of kit, is still at risk, only having gained a life extension out to 2018, not that far away.

Future Force 2020 is quite decent, and could be good if some major weaknesses in it were fixed (and i will write an article setting out such an "Adjusted Future Force 2020" as a second part to this piece). But Future Force 2020 is very much at risk of being torn apart by the new SDSR. A huge number of key components face risks and extreme uncertainty. Numbers which look decent now could be dramatically revised downwards, or anyway be badly compromised by the cancellation of some key programmes.
This is the big issue.

I wouldn't worry about the 2% per se, if there was a mature approach to defence and a firm committment to stick to the plan for once. But that maturity is nowhere to be seen, and so arbitrary spending levels must be advocated, so that at least there can be, finally, a bit of stability over which building is then possible.
Mind you, there is still room for efficiencies (the real ones), and more must be done to squeeze more buck out of the MOD's bucks, because the budget is indeed still sizeable, but quite often does not seem to deliver as well as the french budget, which is the most closely comparable. The MOD definitely has a role and a responsibility in spending better. The SDSR 2010 has introduced some welcome financial discipline and improved several habits and methods, and the good trend must continue.
But it is really, really important that the armed forces are given a stable and reasonable budget, if they are to stay effective and relevant.
 

Royal Logistic Corps of Army 2020

Thanks to a Freedom of Information Request, the answer to which has been published today, it is finally possible to map the sub-unit structure of the Royal Logistic Corps of Army 2020.

RLC Squadrons in Army 2020 by GabrieleMolinelli

1 Regiment, 3 Regiment and 4 Regiment are Close Support Logistic regiments, part of 101 Logistic Brigade and assigned to the Reaction Force. They are aligned respectively with 20th, 12th and 1st Armoured Infantry Brigades.
9 Regiment, 27 Regiment and 10 The Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment are Theatre Logistic Regiments, again assigned to 101 Log Bde in the Reaction Force and aligned with the three Armoured Infantry Brigades. 27 Regiment contains the last remaining Tank Transporter squadron in the army. This particular sub-unit, for obvious reasons, supports all of the heavy brigades.

6 and 7 Regiments are described as Force Logistic Regiments and are assigned to the Adaptable Force, staying under 102 Logistic Brigade. They are meant to provide the logistic element of the Adaptable Brigades which get deployed in the fourth and fifth tour of an enduring operation abroad.

The list does not include 132 Aviation Support Squadron, which supports the Army Air Corps and is part of 7 REME battalion. The RLC involvment in the Royal Marines Commando Logistic Regiment (the Log Sp Sqn within the regiment) is also not detailed for some reason.
Interestingly, there is no 65 Squadron listed within 13 Air Assault Regiment. The squadron was brought under command in July 2013, and 15 Air Assault Squadron was disbanded as a consequence. Now 65 Logistic Support Sqn is nowhere to be seen, for some reason.  


UPDATE: i've received confirmation that 65 Sqn remains active and in 13 Air Assault Regiment. For some reason, the list is not complete in this regard.

Knowing when to talk

Ex-British service chiefs have just been slapped by Cameron about launching loud warning on defence, basically accusing them to do that “to sell books”. I hate him for the remark, but the worst part is that he is (kind of) right. He’s being given too easy a job in slapping down ex-service chiefs, because those same chiefs did not speak when they were in charge. If British top brass invariably wait until after they retire to sound their warnings, they become less credible for it. It is when you are serving that you must show some guts. Even if it means putting your careers at some risk. Do dare: fight your corner in public, not just behind multiple closed doors. You are given chances to do so without necessarily asking for the Telegraph to interview you: use the hearings of the Defence Committee in Parliament. Granted, the committee has little actual power, but it is supportive, and will add its voice to yours if you finally speak up. The hearings with serving chiefs are normally facepalm-worthy, filled of visible embarrassment and void of the courage needed to answer sincerely to the questions, and make the problems known. At times it gets abysmally depressing. One of the last hearings I watched had the MOD Deputy Chief for military capability unable to spell out the number of Typhoon squadrons and the number of C-130s and A400. Either you are completely incompetent, or you are all too valiantly following the line of the government. In either case, you are entirely useless and should be removed from post immediately. Apologies for my bitterness, but the poor showing of the, let me say It again, deputy chief in charge of delivery of military capability was nothing short of horrendous. Even more so because he is an Air Marshal, so the question touched his very own service. You can’t possibly be that ignorant.

Armed forces chiefs hold a big share of the blame for the sorry state of the armed forces. The focus is all too often entirely pinned on politicians, but the direct responsibilities of the MOD should not be denied. The feeling is that the whole thing is rotten and basically resigned to fate. It doesn’t show just in the embarrassed “I don’t know” in front of the Defence Committee, it shows even in planning and, after the SDSR 2010, even in the force structure of the army.

The MOD plans for the future are murky at best. They are vague, they lack details, they are left for later. Take the fabled equipment plan. It is about as vague as it can get. It names purchases and programmes only after they have happened, and for the rest provides only the most indeterminate description of how the money in the graphics is due to be used. There is no public commitment to procuring anything specific that isn’t already under contract. There is not even an acknowledged requirement. “We plan this many of this, we need that many of those.” It is obvious that numbers change and that money will ultimately determine how much of the requirement is covered. But here there is not an expressed requirement. Specific program voices aren’t even revealed. “We promise there will be this much money for helicopters”. That’s it.

There is no visibility about what actually happens to equipment programs. When we hear that the “equipment programme will be protected”, we effectively don’t know what it means. Also because, of course, even assuming that the equipment budget is protected for real, it will still have to change if the personnel is dramatically cut and there is no one left to operate the kit. The whole thing smells of travesty.

Some more information is given to the elite of officers and press which has access to some particular conferences and events, but even in these, details are becoming increasingly rare. I’ve been given access to a presentation document used at a recent armoured vehicles conference event. There is not a single number regarding Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme (CR2 LEP), no detail on Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP), even less on Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle (ABSV). A planned presentation about the Multi Role Vehicle Protected was cancelled entirely. A very restricted number of persons seem to be aware of what is going on. This way, there is no way to track what is happening, and cuts can happen without outsiders even realizing it. This is no operational secrecy: this is a deliberate effort to cut by stealth. Chop things off without it being known. And it is being done with the silent cooperation of service chiefs.

If I look at the Military Programme Law in France, or even to a degree in Italy, not to talk of the exceptionally transparent and detailed US documents, I do see what is being funded, and what the targets are. France’s military law document is pretty detailed about what will be ordered and what is expected to be delivered during the year, and out to the end of the 5-year period. What do we know about what the MOD is due to get in any given year? Very little. We know something of the very larger programmes, and some information can be obtained by the yearly NAO report, but that's it.

Months ago the purchase of a 9^th C-17 was reportedly almost done. It came quite out of the blue, as the requirement wasn’t really acknowledged in public before (although the hope was, reportedly, that there would be 10 C-17 in the end). And in the deep blue it sunk again afterwards, dying presumably a silent and unannounced death.

WCSP is another example. Numbers are a complete uncertainty. Was over 600, then 445, now possibly just 380, and there are rather vague indications of how many will be IFVs, with the new turret, how many repair, how many recovery, how many artillery observation posts. Turret numbers is assumed to be “around 250”, but it is like there wasn’t a plan, there wasn’t a requirement. 250 vehicles is absolutely insufficient to equip the planned six battalions, but there is no stated requirement. Not even the effort to say “we need this many to equip these formations”. 

No. Silence, until eventually, after much budget raiding, a contract will be signed (hopefully) and only then we will know (maybe) how many vehicles of each variant will be handed to the army.

Type 26 frigate. “We are aiming for 13, but, really, we’ll decide… sometime. Don’t you worry.”

SSBN? That would be four, but maybe 3, or even zero.

ABSV? We really, really need to replace ancient FV430s in a wide variety of roles, but we can’t say how many vehicles we need and in which variants. We will just wait until we know if we can start the programme, because we aren’t even sure about that.

MARS FSS? Who knows what the hell is going on with that one…

 

A detailed list of equipment deliveries as for Military Programme Law in France. It is perhaps not necessary to publish the number of every single missile, but the MOD's way of doing things in the dark is right at the other extreme.

There isn’t even an attempt to plan. There is no acknowledgement of requirement. We had an SDSR, we decided we will have six battalions, surely we can say what requirements come from it? No. Not in public, at least. Say nothing, cut at leisure.

And no, it clearly isn’t about protecting military capability. Because when the numbers are finally announced, anyone with a little bit of experience in the field will know if two battalions worth of vehicles are missing from the count. Any potential enemy will easily know. The only ones who will be fooled are in the general public and in the parliament’s benches, as they will not be able to understand on their own how much of a hole there is.

Even Army force structure seems to have embraced this desperate “live for the day” method, in recent times. The Adaptable Force in particular seems to me to be “adaptable” in the sense that it is a container of battalions and brigade HQs “ready” to be cut when the budget is chopped. Seven brigades, each with just bits of the capability of an actual brigade, meant to be “put together” to generate, with well over a year of notice, a light deployable brigade, and another one six months later, just so the army still has (barely) the ability to keep a brigade in the field for a long period without entirely messing up the harmony guidelines for troops (6 months in the field, 24 resting and training before going again, requiring 5 people to keep 1 constantly deployed over the long term). Seriously? Seven brigades that actually equate to two. A pure political trick to mask up the cuts and to limit the number of disappearing capbadges, because, of course, capbadges are what really makes the news. There’s more infantry battalions than strictly needed for the brigade-level ambition, but that’s just because the numbers of battalions cut has been kept artificially low by depleting the strength of each and making every Light Role battalion dependent on having a whole company worth of reserves to get back to decent strength.

General Carter has recently made it all even more facepalm worthy by saying reserves are for “national emergencies” only. Clarity will be needed on this point, and on what a national emergency is supposed to be in the army’s plan. Because 14 of the army’s battalions now depend on reserves showing up to get to a decent, standard structure of 3 companies of 3 rifles platoons each, plus support company. Not to talk of support elements, where reserves also have a big weight, and the Light Cavalry regiments too. An enduring brigade-sized deployment is to be considered a “national emergency”? If not, Army 2020 does not work, because a very significant reserves component is needed in the fourth and fifth deployment of any enduring operation lasting over 18 months.

It is all very depressing. It is the image of armed forces which seem resigned, even prepared to die a slow (perhaps not even so slow, we’ll see with the new SDSR) death by a thousand cuts.

Service chiefs, we need you to talk when you are in charge, not when you are retired and can be easily ignored and even ridiculed.

A good alternative to SSBNs...?

A new proposal has been put forwards as an alternative to the Successor SSBN programme which is due to produce 3 to 4 new submarines as replacement for the current Vanguard class, with entry in service beginning in 2028. The effort is known to the general public as "Trident replacement", but it is a very misleading name for the project, as what needs replacement is the submarine, not the Trident missile.


Successor - a quick summary 

The same Trident 2 D5 missiles currently in service will continue to be used at least out to 2042, so it is most definitely not a matter of replacing Trident. The warheads are also good out to 2032 at least, as they are subject to a life extension programme which brings them to MK4A standard. A decision on an eventual replacement is not expected to be required before the late 2030s, and it is to be assumed that, if possible at all, efforts to eventually replace the warhead and the Trident missiles themselves will be coordinated in the 2040s.

The four Vanguard submarines, on the other hand, can no longer be life extended safely and effectively. Their useful life has already been stretched and the first of the class is now due to soldier on until 2028, but it is assessed that extending further is not desirable.
Main Gate for the Successor programme, which will finally place a formal contract in place for the acquisition of 3 or four new generation submarines, is planned for early 2016, but design activities and procurement of key long lead items (included the new PWR3 reactor core and the special steel for the hulls) are already underway, with a spend ceiling of 3.3 billion pounds by 2016. As of december 2014, 1243 million pounds have already been committed. Notably, 206 million are for the upgrading and restructuring of the Barrow shipyard facilities which are key to the UK's ability to build submarines, and the usefulness of this investment goes beyond the Successor itself.
The new PWR3 reactor, more advanced than the current PWR2, builds on very significant amounts of technology shared by the United States. Its features include a far longer unrefueled service life (the american equivalent reactor project for their own new SSBNs aims for a 40 years unrefueled service life, versus a target of 25 years for the PWR2) in order to minimize in-service costs during the life of the vessel; and enhanced safety.

In October 2014, a notable long lead contract has been placed, with a 59 million dollar contract signed with General Dynamics Electric Boat for the production of the 12 Trident launch tubes for the first SSBN. The US Department of Defense, in the same contract, has ordered a first batch of 5 tubes for its own SSBN.
This unprecedented level of collaboration is part of the Common Missile Compartment initiative. The CMC is being designed in 4-tube modules which are then integrated into the submarine at build: 3 sections will form the british CMC compartment (12 tubes in total, down from 16 in the current Vanguard class), while the US SSBN will have four sections (16 tubes, down from 24 in the current Ohio class).
The first 4-tubes module should be assembled beginning in August 2016; the first launch tube is expected to be delivered for installation in the module during November the same year. The 1st Quad Pack module should be completed in April 2018, with deliveries of all the 17 tubes currently on order completed by November 2017.
Initially, it had been thought to "future proof" the tubes by producing them with a 97 inches diameter, but this idea was shelved to save money, and the diameter will stay at 87 inches: whatever missile eventually replaces Trident 2 D5 will have to share the same diameter.

Other design features of the british SSBNs aren't yet known in detail. A CGI image released by the MOD suggests that an X configuration for stern control surfaces is being planned, like in the US for the SSBN(X). Despite having less launch tubes, the new SSBN is expected to be as large as the Vanguard, and possibly slightly heavier. Growth is being contained, however, with the aim of reducing to a minimum the need for infrastructure changes in Faslane and Coulport. What is good for the Vanguards must be good for the Successor as well.
In a similarly pragmatic decision, according to 2013 data reports, the Successor will draw largely from the Astute class SSN, sharing the same sonar and combat system, the same torpedo tubes arrangement and the same mast sensors. A Common External Communications System is also being acquired, which will use the same launcher and Comms buoys for both Astute and Successor.
It has been suggested that much of the crew will be able to seamlessly transition from SSBN to Astute SSN at any time, due to the great commonality.

As part of budget cuts, the SDSR 2010 has mandated a new round of reductions in the number of warheads and operational, embarked missiles. Currently, the Vanguard class SSBNs deploy at sea with no more than 8 Trident missiles equipped, in total, with 40 warheads. Each Trident missile can be fitted with up to 12 warheads, so the current totals are far, far reduced from the original 16 missile / 192 warheads load envisaged for the Vanguard. The number of operational, availlable warheads has also been reduced, to a maximum of 120 (was 160 before the SDSR), our of a total of 160 (was 225 before SDSR). 

The Trident 2 D5 missiles are exactly the same used by the US Navy. Indeed, the UK has access to up to 58 such missiles (not clear if the few expended in trials over the years have been replaced or not), which are maintained as part of the US Navy's total. To safeguard the independence of employment of the deterrent, the nuclear payload is british.

For comparison purposes, France maintains a total of 300 nuclear warheads; three sets of 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles for it's four SSBNs and 54 air-launched ASMP-A missiles.

Even with all these measures to contain costs and achieve maximum efficiency, the Successor programme remains expensive. The December 2014 update to Parliament assures that the programme for now promises to respect the original 11 to 14 billion pounds pricetag set in 2006. Adjusted for inflation, that means 14.21 to 18.09 billion pounds in 2014 money (Bank of England calculation). We will assume a price range between 15 and 20 billion pounds for four submarines as a measure of prudence. A price which, of course, many charge of being still too optimistic.


Centre Forum steps in

Toby Fenwick, former Treasury and DfiD civil servant as well as RAF Intelligence reservist between 1995 and 2009, has written a paper, published a few days ago by Centre Forum, to argue for the abandonement of the plan for a continuation of Trident and a cancellation of the SSBNs, in favor of an air-dropped nuclear deterrent which would cost less and deliver much greater conventional capabilities in exchange for a diminished nuclear arsenal.

The list of recommendations made by the document are the following:

It is evident at first read that the nuclear arsenal resulting would be much weaker than the currently planned one, but at the same time it is evident that the proposal would bring much enhanced conventional military capability in the air and at sea.

The proposal is to adopt the free-fall B61 nuclear bomb, which is deployed in Europe as part of the NATO Nuclear Sharing deterrence concept. The B61s are tactical, free fall bombs meant for supersonic carriage, and a part of the arsenal is made available to allies for employment on their own aircraft: for example, Germany and Italy have Tornado IDS squadrons with a nuclear strike role, and the F-16 is also used. Other B61s forward stored in Europe are available for use by USAFE aircraft.

The B61 exists in several different variants, but the US has launched a costly refurbishment programme which will leave only one type of weapon in operation, the B61-12. This is obtained employing the B61-4 variable yeld warhead and introducing a new tail kit which, while not adding actual precision guidance, dramatically improves accuracy on the target and gives a modest "stand-off" range in a high speed toss towards the target. Some 480 bombs in total will be refurbished, at a cost estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars.
The B61-12 is to be integrated for internal carriage on the F-35A.

A B61-12 being tested in the wind tunnel

The proposal is to seek integration of the B61-12 on the F-35C as well, which is physically feasible since the weapon bays have the same size (not so with the shorter bays of the F-35B), so that RAF and Royal Navy can procure 138 F-35C, to be used as dual capable aircraft.

The document also contains indications on the expected price of the proposal, which to be workable requires considerable investment in conventional capabilities surrounding and enabling the deterrent.

It is to be appreciated that the document keeps track of the need for aircraft carrier embarkation and delivery in order to make the deterrent capable to strike back against any enemy, and that it consequently makes provvisions for enhancing the surface fleet to provide more appropriate escort, adding more Type 26 frigates and Hawkeye radar aircraft.

It is also good to see that the author did not ignore the need to provide Barrow with more SSNs to buy in order to keep the yard active and it's key skills alive: one of the roles of the Successor programme is also to bridge the gap between the construction of the Astutes and the future project for their replacement. Years and years of inactivity destroy the workforce and squander the precious skills required for building submarines. It is a lesson re-learned at the cost of much money and great delays to the Astute project: after years of inactivity, the design team ended up having to ask the americans for help in order to finalize the Astute's design. So, if SSBNs aren't built, SSNs must take their place, or the cost could well be the loss of the nation's ability to build any at a later date.

The passage to catapults for the carriers brings an evident boost to capability and is required since only the F-35C can hope to carry the B61-12 internally. The purchase of Hawkeye is key to giving the air wing  and the carrier itself the survivability they need.


The problem

A nuclear deterrent based on the B61-12 would be much less capable than Trident, this is definite. The key issue is not the power of the warhead, but the certainty that an enemy anywhere in the world can be reliably hit. Any possible existential enemy of the UK must be keenly aware that there is a credible deterrent which is unquestionably able to strike back and make him pay a price which cannot be possibly accepted.

The reach of the B61-12 is the main problem. The document says that F-35C launched from UK bases could strike 2500 nautical miles away with Voyager tankers support, and goes some way in explaining how, using british bases overseas and the carrier's air wing the reach can be made sufficient to strike virtually anywhere. There are obvious difficulties with such a scenario, and there is pretty much the admission that any delivery flight would be more or less a suicide.
Then again, if it ever came to flying a real nuclear bombing mission, coming back to base might not be an option anyway.
The key, as always, is not doing it for real, but showing in a convincing way that it could and would be done. The deterrent must be credible in the sense that an enemy must be convinced that cornering the UK would result in a devastating nuclear revenge which would make any conquest ultimately futile. The deterrent must represent an implied, unacceptable price to pay that forces an enemy to drop the idea of acting in the first place. If we get to the actual use of nuclear weapons, it means the deterrent has failed, even if it later succeeds in delivering nukes on enemy towns.

A number of B61-12s hitting major enemy towns and installations would represent a cost too high to be accepted, by anyone and in any circumstance, even if the target hit wasn't the enemy capital itself. On this i can agree.
Where the credibility gets shaky is in the delivery. A Voyager tanker can trail 4 fighter jets for 2800 miles in a transfer flight, but an actual stike mission, especially if a return to base is at least envisaged, is a whole different matter. Even bringing all 14 tankers in service (instead of just 8 + 1 transport only and 5 tankers "on demand" at 90 days notice) and fitting them with booms and receptacles so they can juggle fuel between themselves and work cooperatively, it remains dubious that it would be possible to trail a real strike package over the great distances likely to be involved. Particularly because, in order to deliver the strike with gravity-fall bombs with a stand-off reach of 40 kilometers in the very, very best case, you need a large attack squadron, knowing that many aircraft are likely not to make it to the target, even with the F-35's stealth.

Would it ever be possible to make this construct credible enough to serve its purpose? 

At one point the document talks about a snap launch of 72 aircraft in the space of little more than 2 minutes in answer to a detected nuclear attack. But it is clear to me that there could never be 72 aircraft at readiness, never mind at a 2 minutes readiness, not even if there was a significant "warning" period of worsening international situation beforehand. And moreover there would never be enough tankers to trail them to a distant target anyway.
Besides, if the vast majority of the improved tanker fleet and of the larger fighter jet fleet are tied into nuclear readiness, the potential advantage they bring in terms of conventional capabilities is lost because they aren't available for other missions. If the end result is having less tankers and less aircraft readily available for conventional operations, the whole idea is self-defeating.


Costs

The idea falls apart further when costing is examined with greater attention. The procurement of 100 "anglicized" B61-12 weapons might be simply impossible, at least in the terms envisaged in the document. The B61-12 is built by refurbishing existing bombs, and there is only a finite number of them.
It would of course be possible to purchase the new Tail Kit, which is a new production element, but all the rest, and not just the warhead, would likely have to be new. This calls into question the timings and costs estimated.

Moreover, the document assumes a 30% cost increase for the Successor programme based on the Astute's earlier mentioned troublesome birth. The assumption that costs will grow is admittedly pretty realistic, unfortunately, but i cannot help but question the method. It seems a bit unfair to inflate the cost by 30% right away, and base the comparison on this figure. A 15 to 20 billion programme cost is assumed in the document and then brought up to a 24.8 - 33.1 billion affair. Sincerely, i find this skews the discussion. Expecting cost growth and doubting of estimates is one thing, but this seems way excessive.

Again, the document assumes that building 5 more Astute SSNs will cost 5 billion pounds or less, while also enabling the adoption of the PWR3 reactor, or at least of part of its technological improvements. It seems to me like a shot in the dark. You can't assume unchanged or indeed diminished pricetags for an SSN if you also assume that you will change its very heart, the nuclear reactor. It would seem only fair and prudent to me to assume that trying to take in PWR3 tech would require quite some design work, and consequently costs.

The purchase of 138 F-35C is also described as a saving of over one billion. But this is sadly unjustified, simply because the UK does not have a budget for 138 F-35B as of now. Not even close. So, even assuming the F-35C as effectively cheaper to purchase and to operate, several billion pounds are missing from the count.

The purchase of 8 P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft for 700 million pounds also look like a miracle to me, considering that Australia is going to pay 3.6 billion USD (around 4 billion AUSD) for the same amount of the same aircraft (and the supporting elements and infrastructure, but it is not like you can leave those out of the picture). It is a mistake i've already seen in other occasions: you can't just take the unitary price tag from a US multi-year mega contract and expect your purchase to come at that same price. What about spare parts, training, support, infrastructure, and everything else?
I wait to see how much Japan will pay for the 4 E-2D Hawkeye it has ordered, but i sincerely believe 900 million pounds might well prove insufficient. 

Modifying the Voyager tankers with booms is something that could indeed be done in a few months per airframe, and probably with a modest investment. But adding in the receptacle might not be as simple, and the cost suggested, i fear, is likely again overoptimistic.

The C-2 Greyhound is no longer in production, and the surviving examples are high in demand in the US Navy. Moreover, even if some could be acquired, the US Navy has estimated that their useful life will expire by 2028. A refurbishment programme which would replace the wings, the engines and the avionics and make them more common to the E-2D has been proposed, but the US Navy has not been convinced and has instead decided to procure 44 MV-22 Osprey for the role.
The document also suggests converting the Greyhound to serve also as tankers to extend the range of the F-35C embarked squadrons, but this has never been done before. I would suggest that the US Navy would have already done it, if it was that straightforward.
The MV-22 will have a tanker kit by 2017, and the navy variant, HV-22, is likely to be fitted with external, conformal fuel tanks which would also increase available fuel to give away... but this is another story, and would have a whole different cost from what the document proposes with the C-2.

I think there is too much optimism regarding infrastructure as well, since counting on old 1969-era structures dating back to the V force seems a bit risky to me, but i'm not able to make an estimate myself.
What looks clear to me is that there is no real consideration given to the greater manpower and annual budgets which would be required by having far more squadrons of jets than planned, more tankers in continous service, more SSNs and more frigates. Even assuming that current SSBN-related personnel can cover completely or almost completely the crewing needs of 5 new SSNs, i think a lot is missing from the picture.


Conclusion

The boost to the conventional forces that an air deterrent would bring is certainly tempting. If the costing was realistic and actually feasible, i would sincerely be tempted to support a proposal like this. The credibility of the deterrent would be menaced, but i think it could be made to stay at a reasonable and thus acceptable level: i would like to think, after all, that no country in the world would consider "a few nuked cities" as an acceptable price to pay in any scenario. My way of thinking suggests to me that the demonstrated ability to deliver nuclear strikes at range, even with difficulties and limitations (it would never be the same as a 10.000 miles Trident missile launched literally out of the blue, where you can't touch it beforehand) would be enough, if balanced by such a healthy increase of conventional firepower as a byproduct.

The problem is that to stay credible, the air deterrent would tie down almost entirely those additional F-35C squadrons and, critically, the Voyager tankers. To deploy them on conventional operations will dramatically reduce the capability of the deterrent, and to keep them at nuclear QRA means badly hurting conventional capabilities. 
And moreover, the cost estimates seem to be wide off the mark, making the whole thing unachievable in the shape and budget proposed.

In the end, the SSBN once more remains as the most cost-effective and most credible deterrent solution.