SDSR
2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review
Budget
Army
Royal Air Force
Royal Navy
Having already written something
about the Budget and my vision for fixing Army 2020, I decided to continue with
more posts summarizing the situation ahead of the SDSR 2015 and exposing my
thinking about what the priorities are. In this post, I’m going to cover the
main areas of Air capability.
Built around and in function of ISTAR
I will start this piece by quoting a
key document,
presented recently by Group Captain Paul Godfrey, RAF. The subject technically
is the F-35 and how its “combat-ISTAR” capability can be best exploited to
ensure that the new aircraft isn’t just considered “the new jet in the stable”,
but is exploited more widely, as a catalyst for change within the force. The
passages that most interest us at the moment, however, are those which describe
the general structure of the RAF come 2020. One slide in particular, showing
the transition from 2010 to 2020, catches the eye, as the 2020 RAF includes the
photo of a P-8 Poseidon.
The notes accompanying the slide
make no mention of it, noting instead “lose MPA capability”. Yet, it is there,
clearly recognizable. Curious, and hopefully a good signal.
The notes also say the Ground Moving
Target Indicator capability currently provided by Sentinel R1 will be provided
by “SCAVENGER”, the future MALE solution which is supposed to replace Reaper.
Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 remain
assumed to bow out of service in 2018. Reaper itself is currently funded out to
2019 only, and the way ahead seems littered with question marks.
My list of priorities for the SDSR
2015 is very much tied to the sorting out of problems directly and indirectly
connected to ISTAR provision.
The Unmanned Side
One big problem in the assumption
that SCAVENGER will take over the role of Sentinel is the fact that SCAVENGER
is a (semi-?) dead project. The hope had been to develop a new MALE in
collaboration with France, but the resulting Project TELEMOS has never
progressed. It broke down soon after it started, and France moved on instead to
sign a MOU with Germany and Italy for the design of a trinational, European
MALE for the 2020s. The UK’s plans post-TELEMOS are a mystery, and it looks
pretty certain that with all the time lost, in no way can a new uas be ready
for 2019. It looks pretty likely to me that SCAVENGER will be, for the foreseenable
future at least, a mere running on of Reaper.
Moreover, the Fr-It-Ge MALE 2020
project already seem to be encountering its share of issues, with France’s
defence minister saying that it won’t be armed, with negotiations dragging on
without contracts actually being signed and with Airbus already frustrated and saying that it will pull out of
the project if governments continue rising issues.
The road to a new MALE seems to be
effectively blocked.
Unfortunately, even modest efforts
to add capability to Reaper and prepare it for longer-term RAF service seem to
be bogged down, for lack of money and/or lack of decisiveness. A long-term
training solution has not yet been fleshed out; clearance for flying in UK
civilian air space is not on the way and even basing is an issue. Operation
Shader against ISIS in Iraq is practically a blessing for the Reaper squadrons,
which have jumped at the chance of basing and flying the Reaper from the Middle
East . The post-Afghanistan future of the Reaper, otherwise, was planned to be
storage into its shipping container. Waddington is the base that hosts the
Ground Control Stations, but no Reaper is allowed to actually fly from the
base.
This is part of why I find the
recent Prime Minister’s call “for more drones” somewhat irritating. The long
term UAS plan seem in very urgent need of decisions and action, with clarity
needed on several things before more money is splashed out on simply buying more Reapers. The
RAF is heavily using all 10 it has, it is true. A written answer yesterday
detailed that Reapers have fired 155 Hellfire and dropped 4 GBU-12 against
Daesh in Iraq up to 30 June 2015. But before ordering more of them, a plan for
training, basing, sustaining and evolving the UAS capability is needed. Reported discussions with France on a collaborative approach to the Reaper crews
training problem are to be welcomed, hoping that they bring to something.
If Reaper has to make up for the
loss of Sentinel’s GMTI capability, it will be necessary to fit the UAS with a
larger and more capable radar. A Reaper was demonstratively fitted with a SEASPRAY 7500E surveillance
radar already back in 2012, but while other countries now plan to pick this
path, the UK does not seem to have given it further attention.
Trials have also successfully been
carried out with Brimstone fitted to a Reaper, and Paveway IV trials were
considered. But despite successful Brimstone firings back in 2014, even this development
has not seen any significant progress since. For years, the UK has purchased and
employed Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 bombs specifically for the Reaper. It is not efficient to continue with
double stocks. Besides, Paveway IV and Brimstone 2 offer more capability. It
was acceptable to arm Reapers with the same weapons used by American ones as
long as Reaper was a UOR, a time-critical project. But if Reaper becomes a long
term component of the RAF due to the failure in securing development of a new
MALE, it will be fundamental to put british weapons on it, as well as better
sensors to make up for the loss of Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1. A realistic
training, basing and support solution is also needed. It might also be
desirable to buy into the off-the-shelf modifications developed in recent years to expand
range and endurance of the Reaper.
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| The Brimstone has been successfully fired from the Reaper in trials. One of the many advantages it brings is the triple rack, which gives 6 Brimstone against the current load of 4 Hellfire. |
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| Reaper has been demonstrated with Seaspray 7500E radar fitted. This configuration now interests both Italy and Netherlands, while the UK, which was at the forefront in the original demonstration, seems indecisive. |
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| As far back as 2005, the UK also proved in trials with the US that the RAPTOR DB110 reconnaissance camera can be fitted and operated on Predator/Reaper. Again, the trials seem to have ended up as successess without consequences, since no further steps have been moved since. |
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| New landing gear, new, longer wings with greater tanks and external fuel tanks are all modifications available Off The Shelt and already purchased by the USAF. They result in a massive increase in mission endurance. |
It is important that the RAF, the
MOD and the government finally take decisions, instead of going on and on with
half-hearted trials and experiments which seem to never deliver, in the end.
Decide what you want; see what is realistic; and then act to get the best of
the realistic solutions. If getting a new MALE is not realistic, stop being
indecisive and focus on Reaper to bring it up to the long-term task. There are
ample margins to improve it and get more out of it. General Atomics is already
working on adding sense and avoid sensors and safety enhancements that will
allow the certification of Reaper for flying in civilian air space. This should
start becoming available from 2017.
Perhaps stop snubbing Italy, which
happens to be flying Predators and Reapers routinely in corridors in its air
space, flying them off the Amendola air base and employing them over the
Mediterranean to watch out for immigrants. The Italian air force is seeking
additions and improvements to its Reapers, which include fitting the Seaspray
radar and the Reccelite pod. Italy is also working to stand up the first “UAV
academy” in Europe, having already ordered simulators thought to train Reaper operators. It
might be very advantageous to exploit such academy for the training of UK and
French crews. If not, think about setting up an alternative training centre.
But formulate a long term plan, and then stick to it. You’d be amazed by what
can be achieved when a long term plan is made, and then actually followed.
Recommendations:
-
Join
Italy’s UAV training academy, or set up an alternative one
-
Move
to integrate of Brimstone 2 and Paveway IV
-
Focus
SCAVENGER efforts on developing podded, portable sensors which can first be
added to Reaper and then, eventually, migrated onto a new MALE when this will
be available
Buy MPA, think ISTAR
Overall, the climate seems to be
favorable to the purchase of a number of MPAs, and despite the talk of competition
and competitors, it is widely accepted that the race is almost certainly
restricted to two options: P-8 Poseidon, or nothing at all.
The need for a proper, ASW capable
MPA is clear and I don’t think it needs to be detailed yet once more. One
aspect that deserves to be covered in greater detail, however, is how I see a
P-8 purchase fitting the wider ISTAR picture.
An MPA purchase is very, very likely
to put the final nail in the coffin for Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1, as manpower
for the new MPA will have to come from somewhere, and that somewhere won’t be a
net manpower uplift for the RAF. To a degree, it’ll be a matter of robbing
Peter to pay Paul. However, the capability brought to the table by Sentinel R1
is a real force multiplier, and one that sets the RAF apart from other medium
power air forces. Even assuming Reaper gets equipped with a more capable GMTI
radar, it will still not replace Sentinel in its entirety.
The P-8 Poseidon, however, has great
potential to serve not just as MPA, but in wider sense as an ISTAR (and
possibly Combat ISTAR) platform. The Poseidon comes with ample growth margins
and multi-mission capability, as well as with 11 hardpoints for weaponry, 5 of
which in the weapon bay, 4 under the wings and 2 fuselage stations.
India’s version, the P-8I Neptune,
makes use of some of the growth potential: differently from US Navy Poseidons,
the P-8I is fitted with a second radar, covering the aft sector, and the main
radar has seen the addition of an air-to-air mode. The Indian P-8 is thus not
just an MPA, but also, to a degree, an AWACS platform.
The US Navy itself is working on
adding to the P-8’s arsenal a new, large, capable sensor, the APS-154 Advanced
Airborne Sensor (AAS). This radar is the result of a highly classified
development programme. It is thought to be particularly powerful in achieving
mapping of surface targets in the littoral, and it has a formidable GMTI
capability over land. The APS-154 might be the base of the radar the USAF wants
on its JSTARS replacement aircraft, to be purchased in the next few years, but
this is just a guess since the USAF hasn’t provided details yet.
The AAS is fitted in a canoe fairing
which can be fitted under the front fuselage of the P-8 Poseidon, and the
flight trials began last year, with the aim of putting AAS in service with the
P-8 Capability Increment 3.
As of now, the AAS seems to have one
major defect: looking at photos, it would appear that its carriage makes it
impossible to lower and employ the MX-20HD EO/IR turret. Assuming that I’m
correct in this observation, perhaps the problem will be fixed on the
production line going into Increment 3. Currently, the P-8 is seeing the
introduction of Increment 2 capabilities, while the Increment 3 roll-out is a
2021 affair.
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| This image shows the weapon bay open and the MX-20HD turret deployed. |
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| The MX-20 turret out of its bay |
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| The AAS radar "canoe" seem in conflict with the current positioning of the MX-20 |
From a UK perspective, purchase of
the AAS would enable the Poseidon fleet to fully replace Sentinel R1, and
indeed provide increased capability in all areas, over sea and land. There is a
risk that being a classified, highly advanced development, the AAS might not be
cleared for export so soon, but I’d recommend engaging with the US Navy from
the very start to try and secure the inclusion of such capability in a british
purchase.
If export clearance for the AAS
cannot be obtained, it would be important to still exploit this P-8
possibility, by seeking to integrate another radar in a suitable pod. Even
re-use of the Sentinel’s own radar, if at all possible, could be a good start.
Sentinel R1 proposed upgrades
include tweaks to the radar to enable it to track surface targets at sea, and
possibly the addition of the DB110 (better known as RAPTOR in RAF service)
reconnaissance camera to add a long range optical capability as well. Weight
and space growth margins in the Sentinel R1, however, are limited, and it will
be financially challenging to both purchase a MPA and run on Sentinel. Although
Sentinel is almost certainly considerably cheaper to run per hour, two fleets
means two training and logistic lines to sustain, and more manpower needed.
Moreover, it means there are two aircraft which will compete for investment
going ahead in time, when both will need upgrades but the money won’t be there
for both. I think that, although Sentinel is a good performing system and
indeed better in some ways in its role, a single, larger fleet is a more
realistic proposition for the MOD’s finances. Having a MPA fleet of Poseidons
and keeping the Sentinel at the same time would be better from a capability
point of view, but would quickly become a problem from the financial and
manpower angles.
The P-8 has a lower service ceiling than
Sentinel (41.000 feet versus 49.000), which is unfortunate as height allows
radar sensors to look further away; but it comes with some SIGINT / ELINT
capability, an MX-20HD EO/IR sensor, a powerful multi-mode radar (AN/APY-10)
and a powerful communications suite, plus air to air refueling capability
(although via receptacle only). Its unrefueled endurance all in all might not
be quite as good as that of Sentinel, however.
Over time, the P-8 could become a
Combat ISTAR platform thanks to its significant payload. The integration of
weapons such as SPEAR 3, for example, would enable a P-8 AAS to survey a
massive area, track moving and fixed targets from a great distance and even
engage them directly as necessary. France, in recent times, has been using its
Atlantic 2 MPAs in a Combat ISTAR role, integrating GBUs on them for use in
operations in Africa and over Iraq. Something similar was envisaged as a Nimrod
MRA4 capability, as well. The MRA4 was also seen as a potential Storm Shadow
carrier, and the P-8 could one day carry cruise missiles as well.
Under a purely MPA point of view,
the P-8 Poseidon purchase is desirable due to it including the very latest
Multi-static Active Coherent sonobuoys, which are to massively increase
wide-area ASW capability. Moreover, the P-8 means close partnership with the US
Navy on development and integration of future updates. A support and upgrade
arrangement similar to that adopted with Rivet Joint, which sees british
aircraft integrated in the USAF rolling programme of bi-annual maintenance and
upgrade, is highly desirable. This is a crucial factor: it is no use to
purchase a cheaper MPA, if there is no clear path and reliable partner for future
upgrades and support. The MOD no longer has the financial power to keep bespoke
systems up to date without partners to share the cost with: we do not want, in
a few years time, to see the new MPA start declining in capability because it
is a unique, bespoke solution which no one else is interested in investing in.
For that, there’s already the Challenger 2’s rifled gun.
In my opinion this is one major
point in favor of the Poseidon: none of the other competitors can promise the
same assured future as the main MPA platform of the US Navy. The USN is the
partner you want, if you seek economies of scale and a plan that ensures the
system stays up to date.
Notorious “issues” with the Poseidon
include the fact that, to depart as little as possible from the USN’s own
variant, the UK will have to adopt the High Altitude ASW approach. This means
having to not only integrate Stingray Mod 1 torpedoes, but having to fit these
with the same wing kit that will be added to the USN’s MK54 torpedo for launch
from high altitude. This will add some to the cost.
High Altitude ASW also means no use
for MAD: the MAD is not a silver bullet and its usefulness is kind of limited,
but nonetheless its complete absence is not entirely desirable. The US Navy is
considering adopting MAD sensors built into expendable drones which can be
dropped at altitude from Poseidon. If purchased, these will add some to cost,
as well. The promise is that such drones will be very cheap, of course, but the
reality more often than not is not quite as rosy as the original targets.
It is true, however, that the MAD
drone’s cost would be compensated, at least in part, by not having to fit a MAD
to the aircraft itself. Moreover, High Altitude ASW is less stressing on the
airframe, and this should give a longer operational life, and reduce
maintenance needs.
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| Stingray Mod 1 will need a wing kit, to work as a part of the High Altitude ASW construct |
High Altitude ASW also improves
survivability of the MPA and its efficiency in the hunt: it is much harder, if
not impossible, for the submarine to hear the incoming aircraft (turboprop,
low-altitude MPAs are tipically picked up easy on passive sonar) and the high
altitude puts the aircraft out of the range of the submarine-launch SAMs which
are beginning to appear and that might become a factor to consider, in the
future.
Recommendations:
-
Purchase
P-8 Poseidon, with the mindset of it being an ISTAR / Combat ISTAR platform,
not just a MPA
-
Secure
the addition of a side-scan, surface search, GMTI-capable radar, ideally the
same AAS being integrated by the US Navy. AN/APY-10 offers good capability as
it is, but the addition of a dedicate radar would make the withdrawal of
Sentinel pretty much painless in capability terms.
-
Phase
out of service Shadow and Sentinel progressively as P-8 enters service.
-
Adopt
the High Altitude ASW method, and in general stick as much as possible to the
USN’s own configuration, to ensure efficiencies in long-term maintenance and
upgrades
-
Look
at integrating weaponry beyond Stingray: anti-ship capability and ground
attack.
-
Secure
the higher possible number of aircraft. Rumors talk of an initial purchase of
6, with 6 options. At least 8 / 9 would be needed, especially considering the
wider ISTAR role.
A Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
In early 2002, the RAF ended the
practice of having dedicate reconnaissance squadrons of fast jets, each with
its own Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (RIC), to merge these together into
the Tactical Imagery Wing, which today provides deployable teams specialized in
exploitation of Full Motion Video (Crossbow Flight, Tactical Imagery Wing) and
others specializing in evaluation of imagery collected by RAPTOR and Litening
III pods flown on Tornado and Typhoon (Orion Flight).
With the plan for the future being
the dissolution of the Sentinel R1 fleet and the spreading of wide-area GMTI
across multiple platforms (SCAVENGER, P-8 [?] and the AESA radars of F-35s and
Typhoons], it is probably wise to expect the formation of a third flight within
the Tactical Imagery Wing, this specializing in exploitation of GMTI
information. The concentration of GMTI specialists in the same unit should help
preserve the maximum level of experience and efficiency, while building on the
successful methods of the TIW. With the focus expanding beyond “imagery”, the
Wing should be known for Reconnaissance, or for Tactical ISTAR. As the Sentinel
goes out of service, its bespoke Ground Station should be replaced by a
“General Purpose” ground station to allow real-time exploitation of GMTI coming
from whatever platform is available, be it Reaper or F-35.
-
Preserve
GMTI exploitation experience by forming a dedicate Flight within the current
Tactical Imagery Wing. Specialist teams from the new Flight will deploy in
support of the various platforms over which GMTI capability will be spread,
including F-35 and, in the future, Typhoon Tranche 3A with AESA radar. The new
Flight should operate in close liaison with the Royal Artillery, since
Watchkeeper also introduces its own GMTI capability, although of course on a
smaller search area.
Restoring strategic air refueling sense
In a plan that puts such importance
on P-8, the continued lack of boom air refueling capability is unacceptable.
The lack of boom is one of the most disappointing facts about Voyager (aka:
take the best tanker in the world and dumb it down to a civilian passenger
aircraft with drogues). Airbus can fix booms to Voyager within six months, and
the cost, while significant, is unlikely to be prohibitive. Any spare money the
RAF might have, in my opinion, should go towards this particular requirement.
Fitting the boom is more desirable
than trying to fit a probe to P-8: the boom already exists, while a probe for P-8 doesn’t;
moreover, the boom makes Voyager capable to also refuel C-17, Rivet Joint and
allied aircraft.
It would solve the ridiculous,
absurd situation of being unable to refuel some of the most precious, strategic
platforms in the whole air force.
A good start would be to fit the two
“fitted for but not with” centrepoint tankers in the fleet. The RAF’s core
fleet of 9 Voyagers includes a civilian registered transport-only aircraft and
8 tankers, 7 of which are KC3 with centerline station as well as the underwing
ones. However, only 5 of the 7 are actually fitted with the centerline drogue.
These two should be the easier to fit with boom.
It is unfortunate, and a failure of
the wider policy of engagement with allies, that despite a recognized shortage
of tanker capability in Europe, up to 5 Voyagers are going to be stripped of
tanking equipment and chartered out to serve as civilian passenger aircraft.
Currently, only one of the 5 “surge” aircraft is already contracted by a
civilian air line, but four more are seeking a similar arrangement.
Meanwhile, Poland is leading a
multinational effort to purchase a common fleet of new A-330 MRTT tankers. It
is quite amazing that an arrangement hasn’t been fleshed out to cooperatively
run the Voyager surge fleet in its intended tanker role, to help counter the
shortage. The UK should engage with its NATO partners to seek an agreement in
this sense, adding the boom to as many aircraft as possible.
Recommendations:
-
Fit
boom to Voyager, beginning with the 2 “fitted for but not with” KC3s in the
Core Fleet. Unfortunately, Sentry can be refueled both by drogue and by boom,
but A400M only by centerline drogue. So, part of the fleet will have to retain
the centerline drogue instead of moving over to a boom, to avoid moving from
one problem to another. A400M can in theory be fitted with the receptacle for
boom refueling, but this would add yet more cost.
Common Weapon Launcher and reduced number of weapon types
The announcement of a contract for
the development of a Common Weapon Launcher for Typhoon is to be welcome.
However, the news releases suggest that this is an early demonstration
contract, and the plan seems, as way too often happens, somewhat vague and
indecisive. The aim of the Common Weapon Launcher is to introduce a rack which,
while preserving the same aerodynamic shape and weight, so to ease integration
on fast jets, can carry different loads, including 2 Paveway IV bombs, or 3
Brimstone 2, or (possibly) 3 SPEAR 3. The Common Weapon Launcher concept, shown
in computer graphics and in mock-up form at some recent air shows, is clearly a
derivative of the Brimstone triple rack. Since integration of Brimstone 2 on
Typhoon has been funded (finally!), the choice is particularly wise, as the
launcher will be aerodynamically cleared for carriage as part of this activity,
allowing for considerable savings.
The Common Weapon Launcher should
definitely be developed for carrying all three the main weapon systems: PW IV,
Brimstone 2 and Spear 3. It should not be a Typhoon-only affair, either, but be
exploited on the F-35 external hardpoints, as well.
On the weapons front, considerable
uncertainty, unfortunately, persists regarding SPEAR 3: the considerable
expense needed to develop the wholly new MBDA weapon has lead to the “US
Option” of going Small Diameter Bomb II growing in strength.
A final decision is now not expected
until 2018. SPEAR 3 and SDB 2 are externally and conceptually very similar, but
SPEAR 3 has a key difference: it embodies a small turbojet engine which gives
it a greater range and the ability to be launched in a far greater acceptable
zone, irrespective of altitude, wind conditions etcetera. SDB 2 is currently an
unpowered, gliding weapon.
The greater range and launch
flexibility of SPEAR 3 would make it far more capable against highly defended
targets, and indeed make it into a DEAD (Destruction of Enemy Air Defence)
asset, much needed since the RAF has given up its main SEAD (Suppression)
weapon, the ALARM anti-radar missile, to budget cuts.
Raytheon, aware of this key factor,
has started promising the development of a powered Small Diameter Bomb 2: if this was to materialize, the
MBDA SPEAR would lose its key advantage, and it might become just too
financially attractive to go with the US weapon, which in its base form can
count on tens of thousands of planned American purchases. SDB 2 is also already
planned for F-35 integration, which would also save money.
The MBDA SPEAR, on the other hand,
is meant to keep the national weapon industrial capability alive and in good
health.
As long as the MBDA SPEAR is the
only one powered, long-range choice, I think the RAF should stick with it, even
if it costs more. But if a powered SBD 2 becomes reality, the MOD will be faced
with a much more difficult choice.
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| Common Weapon Launcher mock-up, seen carrying two Paveway IV bombs |
Another key programme is SPEAR
Capability 1, which is actually the spiral development of Paveway IV
capability. Apart from better, more jamming-resistant GPS module, the Paveway
IV should soon gain a new warhead option, with bunker-busting capability. The
smart aspect of Paveway IV developments is that the external shape and the
general mass remain the same, so that there is no need to repeat the
aerodynamics part of the integration process over and over again.
The Paveway IV anti-bunker seem
destined to replace the older, 2000 lbs Paveway III, which will go out of
service alongside Tornado GR4.
Other Paveway IV developments
include a low collateral damage warhead option; the addition of a seeker (IR
Imaging, it is thought) for greater capability against moving targets; and
eventually the addition of a wing-kit for much improved stand-off range.
A recent briefing given by US
officers about the F-35 Block 4 software seem to suggest that the RAF has
decided that the first two Paveway IV developments entering service will be the
anti-bunker and the seeker.
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| MBDA's SPEAR 3, without its quadruple rack, seen on a Typhoon ahead of the flying testing campaign |
The same briefing also suggests that
the RAF wants to soon get moving about a “new build” ASRAAM. We might be close
to the launch of a Capability Sustainment Programme for the short range
missile, which should build on what has been done with the CAMM / Sea Ceptor.
The integration of a two-way datalink is highly likely, if the programme
actually secures funding. The data-link would massively enhance the
capabilities of ASRAAM to acquire its target after launch and achieve high
off-boresight kills.
Recommendations:
-
Proceed
with Paveway IV developments, in particular with the anti-bunker variant to
avoid a gap in capability when the combination Tornado/Paveway III bows out.
-
Whatever
weapon is selected for SPEAR 3 should be
powered, long-range, and have a wide acceptable launch region, to make it a
viable DEAD solution
-
The
Common Weapon Launcher should be developed fully, and used to full effect with
both Typhoon and F-35
-
The
ASRAAM CSP is not as high a priority, but adding a two-way datalink is
important to give it true High Off-Boresight capability, which is needed to
make best use of the F-35’s DAS “bubble” and HMD.
F-35 plans and babbling
Much noise has followed the blog
post of David Axe of War is Boring about the leaked test report about the basic
combat maneuvering trials begun last January between an F-35A and an F-16. The
usual crowd has started self-quoting itself and shouting from the rooftops
about how the F-35 had lost the dogfight and, indeed, how it could never win
one. The answer provided by the JPO was to eager to dismiss the issue
altogether, and actually ended up being a own-goal, adding to the noise (you
need better media relationship experts, JPO: that answer really does suck).
Much of what has been said since is
garbage. My general sentiments about the whole thing are very similar to the
thoughts expressed here, so I recommend following the link and reading
what the experienced C.W. Lemoine, an F-16 and F-18 pilot, has to say about
it.
In more detail, although I do not
want to spend too much time on this, also because my own understanding of the
highly complex art of air combat is limited and I don’t want to pontificate
past my pay grade, the dogfight wasn’t even a dogfight.
Axe has since graced us all with the
report itself. And reading it, as was to be expected, has allowed thinking
heads to arrive to different conclusions to those that Axe, a notorious F-35
hater, drew. The first thing to notice in the report is the title itself: it
was a test to experiment F-35 combat manoeuvres at high angles of attack.
The F-35 has excellent
controllability at very high angle of attack. At entry in service it is
expected to be certified for + 50° and – 10°, values much higher than most other
fighter. F-16 does + 25°, Typhoon a little bit less, Rafale +29°.
What the test tried to determine was
whether this capability has a value in dogfighting. The F-35 deliberately tried
to manoeuvre at high angle of attack to see if it can “nose-point” like a Super
Hornet. The result of the test, reading the report, say that in most
situations, no, staying controllable won’t bring advantages. High Angle of
Attack means losing energy very, very quickly, and the F-35 has a too high drag
factor to keep its energy high enough to nose-point in a meaningful way without
losing all its energy.
The test pilot said he found only
one kind of manoeuvre which offers a repeatable firing chance: this one can be
expected to end up in the tactics manual of the F-35, while the rest will be in
the “don’t do this” list.
Outside of a test event, you are not
forced to seek high AoA in combat: if it is not
advantageous, simply, you do not do it. And the air combat manual for the F-35,
once written, will say this (obviously, in a much better and more detailed
way).
For the rest, the report notes that
the F-35 fights best around the 26° AoA angle, which is not surprising as it is
a common value and particularly is the F-16’s area. The F-35 has been developed
trying to obtain F-16 comparable maneuverability, after all.
In this area of flight, the test
pilot expresses his frustration at the Flight Control Laws interfering with his
commands: basically, the computer has limited the F-35’s agility to prevent a
loss of control which was actually very far away. The test pilot at one point
specifically mentions “fantastic yaw rate”, truncated by the unnecessary,
unwanted, early intrusion of the computer.
The pilot’s recommendations, in the
end, are to relax the control laws in the software, to let the aircraft pitch,
yaw and roll faster.
There is a reason why the F-35
hasn’t had its full flying envelope opened up yet: the software control laws
are still being tweaked and developed. The full flying envelope (Mach 1.6,
50.000 feet altitude, 50° AoA, max G) will only become available with Block 3F.
Block 2B, with which the USMC is
about to hit IOC, is limited at Mach 1.2, 40.000 feet and 5.5 G, for example.
While the F-35 will never be a
fighter defined by super-maneuverability, it will not be as limited as AF-2 was
in the test. And it will not fight in the same way either, once the tactics
will have been written down.
Read the report: the dogfight was a
control laws test, at high AoA, with none of the aircraft involved being armed;
none carrying a weapon simulation pod (needed for an actual dogfight) and with
the F-35’s HMD having only a fixed reticle, absolutely not representative of
the operational HMD.
There has been some rather wild
jumping to conclusions going on.
I will close the “babbling” part
with one question only: even assuming energy management in a dogfight is not on
the F-35’s side, if you were a pilot given a choice, would you want to be on
the jet which has to rush through the F-35’s BVR area to force a dogfight, or
would you rather be in the F-35?
I will be in the F-35, thank you
very much.
Back to the plans. The SDSR 2015 is,
I fear, unlikely to provide the information we’d all like to have about how
many aircraft the UK will ultimately buy. Main Gate 5, the decision point for
the bulk order, has been set for 2017, and I think the government will be too
tempted to leave the final decision for then. The SDSR will most likely carry
on just with the plan for 48 aircraft for OEU, OCU and for the first two squadrons.
The plan is as follows:
17 Sqn (Operational Evaluation Unit) – Edwards AFB, USA
BK-1
BK-2
BK-4 (not yet delivered)
BK-1, 2 and 4 are instrumented
aircraft, which will be used for development and trials and evaluation. BK-1
and 2 were among the first to undergo a retrofit, which might have brought them
all the way up to Block 2B standard. 1 and 2 came in the LRIP 3, so were very
early jets indeed, with quite a few limitations to overcome.
Training Unit
– Embedded in the USMC 501 Sqn, Beaufort, USA, until July 2019.
BK-3
BK-5 (ordered)
BK-6 (ordered)
BK-7 (ordered)
BK-8 (ordered)
Currently, only BK-3 is available,
but the training fleet will grow to 5 over the coming months and years. BK-3
was produced in LRIP 4, and will receive a retrofit later on.
The next aircraft assigned to
training will be BK-5, 6, 7, 8, all coming out of LRIP 8. The LRIP 8 is much
closer to the final, block 3F standard. It will be delivered with the TR2
computer processors and Block 3I software. The TR2 processor, introduced from
LRIP6 onwards, means that passage to 3F will be a software change only.
The third generation HMD, which
solves the well known issues of the Gen II helmet, should also come along.
Come July 2019, training of british
crews in the US is expected to end, with the OCU moving into RAF Marham, where
an Integrated Training Centre will have been built. It seems likely that the UK
will seek to attract other European users of the F-35, beginning with Norway,
hoping to get them to train their personnel in Marham.
617 Squadron – Stand up in Beaufort next year, transfers to the UK in April 2018,
Deployable Land IOC by 31 December 2018
BK-9
BK-10
BK-11
BK-12
BK-13
BK-14
BK-9 to BK-14 will come from LRIP 9.
A production contract will come soon, with Long Lead contracts having been
already signed. LRIP 9 is expected to introduce the redesigned bulkhead 496 on
the assembly line, which is the one which cracked during durability tests. The
jets from the earlier lots will be retrofitted at the first Major Maintenance
occasion.
If the current schedule is
respected, the first frontline F-35s should thus be delivered already in their
final shape, more or less, reducing to the minimum the number of retrofits which will be needed later.
The following 4 aircraft:
BK-15
BK-16
BK-17
BK-18
are included in LRIP 10, for which
the first Long Lead contracts have been signed. All should be in british hands
by the end of 2018. Further aircraft will be needed to bring 617 up to strength
and to stand up 809.
The following batches however
haven’t been detailed yet, and the stand-up date for 809 is also not yet known.
Both squadrons should be fully operational by the end of 2023, however. The OCU
will probably initially be a Flight within 617 Squadron, but might be given its
own identity later on.
 |
| Expected F-35 global fleet in 2018 |
Trials at sea on HMS Queen Elizabeth
are expected to begin around the end of 2018 and last to May 2019. They will
take place in US waters, and will see the involvement of 17 Sqn and, most
likely, USMC units. The trials should allow for Carrier IOC in 2020.
The UK is engaged in talks promoted
by the US to place a “Block Buy” big order covering the years 2018 to 2020 (Lot 11, 12 and 13, with the first being the last of the "Low Rate" LRIP blocks, and the first two being the start of the full rate production).
Placing a bulk order is expected to result in significant savings. Without even considering the partners and foreign customers, the US orders alone in these lots are expected to go from 126 (in Lot 11) to 176 (Lot 13). The quantities will be truly significant, in other words.
Regarding final number of F-35s to be procured by the UK, it is a
shot in the dark still. It has been reported that, back in 2010, the RAF fought a
bitter campaign to ensure recognition that the needed force level is some 9
squadrons, which could mean 4 F-35 units. However, 9 would mean one more
squadron than the RAF has now, and 3 more than it will have in 2020 if the
Tornado GR4 OSD isn’t pushed to the right again. Extending the service life of
Tornado might become desirable not just because of its combat capability, but
because keeping up the number of squadrons would help a lot in securing greater
purchases of F-35S. If the number of squadrons is allowed to fall all the way
down to 6, rebuild it up to 9 becomes a rather unlikely proposition.
A four squadron force with 70 to 90
F-35B is a good target to pursue, but in no way a given.
In terms of evolution and capability
growth, the F-35B will enter service capable to employ up to 4 internal AMRAAM,
2 external ASRAAM and up to 6 Paveway IV (2+4). It will also have the gunpod
(operational as part of Block 3F).
The next big thing in the history of
the F-35 is Block 4. This new software load will be delivered in four
increments between 2019 and 2025. The list of things to add is being
formalized, and should become definitive by the end of the year.
Improvements to the EOTS, video downlink and a new
"big SAR" radar mode are pretty much certain additions. In terms of weapons, the UK is
looking at integrating, in the order, Paveway IV bunker-buster, Paveway IV with
seeker, ASRAAM CSP, Meteor and SPEAR 3. However, only by year end we will know
(hopefully) what will be actually funded and included.
 |
| The non-definitive list of weapons to be integrated in Block IV, as shown earlier this year by US officials |
Pratt & Whitney is considering a
plan of upgrades and improvements to
the engine, with
Block 1 in 2018 and a Block 2 with advanced adaptive technology “in the early
2020s”. Targets include substantial reduction of fuel burn rate, improved
cooling (with benefits extending to engine service life), possibly thrust
increase by up to 10%, and range improvements between 20 and 35%.
The engine is obviously a key part
of any aircraft, so the evolution of the F-135 is something to watch very
closely indeed. The P&W Block update plan is currently not part of the F-35
plan proper, but it would be important for the UK to join the initiative if it
progresses. General Electric is also shaping its own plan for improvements,
with both companies building on the work done as part of the US Adaptive
Engine Technology Development (AETD) research and development programme.
Typhoon
Apart from the AESA radar, which
hopefully will start serving on Tranche 3A aircraft in the early 2020s, the RAF
might want to consider the integration of a reconnaissance pod, especially if
Tornado GR4 OSD is confirmed for 2019, and RAPTOR is left without a platform.
Much lower priority goes to the Conformal Fuel Tanks, which however remain interesting, since the carriage of Storm Shadow means no underwing tanks, and the targeting pod is only integrated for carriage on the central, wet pylon under the fuselage.
Conformal fuel tanks would keep the available fuel up, while leaving the pylons available for weapons and pods.
The Conformal Fuel Tanks however require also an aerodynamic modification kit, it seems, which makes their addition more challenging in terms of expense and downtime. The aerodynamic modification kit has just completed flying trials on IPA7 in Germany, and brings significant agility improvements as well, including bringing Angle of Attack value up to 36°.
 |
| Conformal Fuel Tanks wind gallery tests |
It would be nice to put Conformals on Tranche 3A at some point, but it definitely is the last voice on the list of priorities. Money is still tight, and it must be used on the urgent things first.
Sentry
Budget shortages have left the RAF’s
Sentry fleet lagging badly behind the rest of NATO. While the other AWACS
across the alliance are getting significant upgrades based on the Block 40/45
(E-3G Sentry) entering service with the USAF, the RAF is literally out of the
picture. This situation badly needs to be corrected as soon as possible,
otherwise the interoperability will suffer, and the operational value of the
british Sentry will continue to decline.
Airlift
Several improvements are on the way,
and others could be made. The C-17 is receiving satellite communications, for
example. On the other hand, the RAF continues to make no use at all of the
tactical capability of the C-17, which is only used as a strategic cargo flying
from A to B. This is, in my opinion, an unjustifiable waste, and opening up
some of the latent capability is something I will keep recommending.
A Boeing C-17 International Training
Centre is standing
up in Farnborough, with a full flight simulator and engine ground running
courses. Parachuting and aidrop training could follow, if the capability is
finally pursued.
The non-exploitation of the C-17’s
airdrop capability is made worse by the fact that the C-130J itself is
currently partially handicapped in this role: the withdrawal of the old C-130K
has left the RAF with no capability to employ Medium Stressed Platforms for the
airdropping of vehicles, L118 Light Guns and other key, large equipment for the
air assault task force.
A replacement platform will be put
in service for use on the A400M, but we are talking of a gap that will stay
open for a few more years, as it’ll be 2017 or 2018 before the Atlas is ready
for the task.
The RAF seem to have attempted to close the gap by putting out a request for a
modified Medium Stressed Platform compatible with the C-130J’s cargo floor
system. Delivery was planned for June 2015, but it is not clear what the status
of the programme is.
The new airdrop platform should come
with greater capability. The American Type V platform is one option. A clear requirement
includes the ability to airdrop a Jackal, which is now part of the Air Assault
Task Force’s equipment.
Investment in airdrop is to be
supported. Modern precision airdrop equipment can ease immensely the resupply
of troops from the air, and large kits allow the dropping of bulky, heavy
loads, reducing the need for a small, tactical cargo capable of intra-theatre
lift.
The RAF, for this role, is only
going to have the 2 BAe 146 QC MK3 procured under UOR. So it’ll be Atlas, or
146 MK3. Expanding airdrop capability will compensate.
Another gap left by the withdrawal
of C-130K is the Special Forces support. Unfortunately, the internationally
developed software upgrades needed as base of Project HERMES, the fitting of SF
equipment to the J, have suffered monstrous delays. Block 7.0 has run so late
that it has been actually incorporated into Block 8.1, causing a much longer
gap than once anticipated.
Block 7.0 is the biggest upgrade to
the C-130J since entry in service, introducing tactical data capability, a new
flight management system, new processors and 26 other changes, and it has
proven challenging, to say the least. While not much has been said about it,
Block 7 work has kept ZH866 in the US for over two years, returning
only in December 2014 to then begin flight
testing at Boscombe Down, ahead of further modification into Block 8.1.
It seems
that Block 7.0 (and later) aircraft are to be known as C6, such is the extent
of the changes.
In the meanwhile, at least, 9 of the
C-130Js have been fitted with external fuel tanks giving a significant increase
in range.
The now
combined Block 7.0 / Block 8.1 modification deliver software upgrades; new Communications, Navigation,
and Identification System Processor (CNI-SP); Link-16; new control wheel; new
Civil Global Positioning System (GPS); new mission computer; upgraded Data
Transfer and Diagnostic System (DTADS); new Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
Transponder Mode 5; Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B);
enhanced internal-communication system (ICS); Communications, Navigation, and
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Data Link; improved public
address (PA) system; and covert light aft of the cargo ramp.
However, flight testing of Block 8.1
is expected to wrap up in 2019, quite a while away still, and the risk is that
the Special Forces support gap will only be closed right before the C-130J
leaves service, in 2022!
 |
| The welcome addition of external fuel tanks on a C-130J C4 (long fuselage) |
The rumors suggest that there is a
strong current within the Special Forces and the RAF calling for the running-on
of 7 to 9 long-fuselage C-130Js beyond 2022 (the ones fitted with external
tanks?), specifically for the Special Forces mission.
The A400M is expected to equip 70
Sqn and 30 Sqn (the first for sure, the second sqn has yet to stand up), while
47 Sqn, unless C-130Js are indeed kept for SF work, will be disbanded.
The A400M has had its IOC delayed
from March to September this year. 7 aircraft are required for IOC, and so far
the RAF has received 3 (ZM400, ZM402, ZM403). A fourth A400 has flown to Brize (the
future ZM401) but is still marked with an Airbus code while it undergoes work
for the integration of the DAS defensive system. At least 3 more A400M are
approaching their delivery date, and will fly to Brize over the next weeks.
Recommendations:
-
Procure
modified airdrop platforms for the C-130J in order to close the gap. The lack
of Medium Stressed Platform is a major problem for the air assault task force,
and makes it a lot less credible.
-
Invest
in platforms for heavy airdrops in the longer term, with payloads including
Jackal in mind, and in precision airdrop kits. Some have been procured as UOR
for Afghanistan, but they should become a more common capability.
-
Ideally,
run on 47 squadron on C-130Js for the Special Forces operations beyond 2022
-
Gradually
bring online tactical capabilities for the C-17
Training
Contract signatures for the purchase
of the new fleets of fixed wing training aircraft are expected soon. The Grob G115,
the Tucano and the Beechcraft King Air 200, used respectively for Elementary,
Basic and Multi-Engine training are due to be replaced by G120TP, T-6C and
Phenom 100.
If the recent NAO report on the
Military Flying Training System has the right figures, the renewal will be
accompanied by rather dramatic reductions in the number of aircraft and
instructors, and by a growth of synthetic training on simulators. The NAO
expects that the Elementary Flying Training fleet will go down from 40 to 23
aircraft, with military instructors falling from 44 to 35, but with civilian
instructors growing from 17 to 23.
Simulators will grow sharply in
relevance, with synthetic training hours growing from 0 to 35% of the training
programme.
The most evident reduction, however,
is expected in Basic Training, where the NAO expects only 10 aircraft, down
from 40, with military instructors going from 48 to 15 and civilians from 1 to
5. Simulation will grown from 33 to 46% of the training programme.
The Basic Flying Training will leave
RAF Linton-on-Ouse (which I guess is then very likely to close down) and move
into RAF Valley, probably at the same time as 208 Sqn, on Hawk T1, disbands.
More on this later.
Multi-engine training will see the
fleet reduced from 7 to 5 aircraft and from 25 to 16 military instructors, with
civilians going from 0 to 6.
There will be little to no excess
capacity to train foreign students. This dramatic reduction ties in with the planned
sundown of the Hawk T1’s role in training: the plan is that flying training
of british personnel on the T1 of 208 Sqn will end in early 2016. 208 Sqn will
continue to train foreign students until December 2017.
208 Sqn was once planned to disband
in 2012. It was saved by the signature of contracts to train crews coming from
the Middle East. But it seems that its time in the sun is limited, and that by
end 2017, early 2018, disbandment will again be on the cards.
The guess is that the “naval 8”, as
208 Sqn is known, might become the new Basic Flying Training squadron, taking
up the role from 72 Sqn as the Tucano goes out of service and training moves to
Valley.
A major question mark remains on
what will happen to the Hawk T1s used in “aggressor” role in support of
training by 100 Sqn RAF and 736 NAS. A replacement for the Hawk T1 has not yet
been identified.
Simulation will continue to grow in
importance. Recently, the RAF has acquired simulators even of the gliders of
the Air Experience Flights and University Air Squadrons. An Immersive Close Air
Support Simulator has been
purchased to contribute to the formation of JTACs.
The renewal of the rotary wing
training fleet is expected to follow in 2018.
