A few more force structure updates

In the last few days some more force structure plans have been announced. Firstly, RAF Odiham has now officially said that the Chinook OCU Flight will migrate to RAF Benson next year. This is the "minimum" assured measure, with the possibility of further Chinook elements going to Benson during 2016 as the HC6 comes fully online.
There is not yet a formalized plan to form an additional squadron, though. The Chinook OCU Flight could be put into a new OCU squadron comprising the Puma HC2's own OCU Flight. The use of a new standard, or the standard from one of the disbanding RAF Merlin HC3 squadrons are both possibilities. For now, absorbing the Chinook OCU Flight into one of the two Puma squadrons is another possibility.

My hope (and ultimately my belief) is that one of the standards from the disbanding Merlin force will go to a new 2-type OCU squadron. Of course, this, like everything else, also depends on the next SDSR: if the reports of new huge cuts to come are proven right, there's no telling what will be left after the slaughter.

Meanwhile, the last Chinook HC2 has gone into factory for the upgrade to HC4 back in September 2014. The HC3s are to follow, to be upgraded into HC5s to complete the JULIUS fleet-wide upgrade programme.



Elsewhere, we have finally a clue about the future of the Reserve special forces regiments. Rumors have been circulating for a long while, and now it has been officially announced that both 21 and 23 SAS have re-subordinated to the new Intelligence and Surveilllance brigade. The effect of this move on their status as special forces elements is unclear, but the units are being assigned the new specialized role known as HERA, for Human Environment Reconnaissance and Analysis. The reserve special forces patrols will be required to observe and understand the human dimension of the battlefield.

The same role will in part fall on the Honourable Artillery Company as well. The HAC will still be paired to 5 Regiment Royal Artillery and will keep its Ground Based ISTAR role, operating sensors and counter-artillery radars and providing covert observation patrols.
The covert observation patrols, used to reinforce the capability provided by the regulars of 473 Sphinx Battery, 5 Regiment RA, come from 1 (Special OP) Sqn. These patrols will have a HERA focus as well.

2 Squadron and 3 Squadron are in GB ISTAR role, and are paired with P and 93 Batteries in 5 Regiment RA.
The HAC is also getting back the gun role that it lost a few years ago: a Gun Troop has been reformed, with some 35 men and three L118 Light Guns, to provide a reserve capability to 7 Royal Horse Artillery in the air assault role. 7 RHA has lost its reserve gun battery as part of Army 2020, and is now getting back a small depth thanks to a reserve troop coming from the HAC.

29 Commando Royal Artillery is looking to stand up its own Reserve Artillery Troop, as it suffers the same problem.



Meanwhile, in 104 Logistic Brigade, the 2 Operational Support Group has been formed. Based in Prince William of Gloucester Barracks, Grantham, this reserve unit is composed of:

498 Labour Support Unit; which brings specific competencies to manage contractors and locally employed civilians during operations abroad

497 Operational Support Unit; which brings high level logistic planning expertise.

499 Contract Management Unit

Communications Troop; supports deployable field hospitals with a communications capability



Elsewhere in the Reserve, 295 (Hampshire Battery), 106 Regiment RA has formed to operate the Stormer HVM anti-air missile system.
In Germany, as 28 Regiment Royal Engineers is disbanded and the wide wet gap crossing capability moves to the reserves of 75 RE, the 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop is temporarily moving to Minden, in Germany, alongside the german regiment equipped with the same M3 rigs.
Reservists from 75 Regiment will regularly visit the Troop in Germany to train on the M3 on the river Weser, until 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop can move back to the UK, to Halton training camp. The move is planned to take place by November 2016.

Army and Sealift snippets

The Internation Institute for Strategic Studies writes about the British Army structure under the Army 2020 restructuring and helps adding some more clarity on a few points. Their report is to be trusted, because they have been holding several meetings with figures such as general Carter, the architect of Army 2020, general Peter Wall, Chief General Staff, and Major-General Kevin Abraham, Director General, Army Reform. The IISS is among the most well informed about Army 2020. Videos of the meetings with Carter, Wall and Abraham have been made available, and i've linked them inside previous articles on Army 2020.

Their review of Army 2020 is, as a consequence, to be considered extremely reliable. 

The article confirms what has been reported about the brigades mechanism, in which 3 of the 7 "Adaptable" brigades are intended to be 'privileged' and kept up in strenght, readiness and composition, as they are intended to combine to deliver 2 deployable brigades, to achieve the total of 5 (with the 3 Reaction armoured infantry brigades) deployable brigades necessary to support an enduring operation abroad. 
These three brigades will be based one in Scotland, one in the Catterick area and one in and around Cottersmore (now Kendrew Barracks).
The other four adaptable brigades will

[...] will be held at a lower state of readiness. New thinking suggests that the Adaptable Force could be used as a primary tool for UK military assistance and training to other countries. Its units are likely to be aligned to particular regions of the world, such as the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia, to establish closer links and develop broader understanding and language skills. The adaptable force will also be the primary source of support to the UK civil authorities.

There is a passage in the report that does bring up questions, which is the following:

The overall size of the regular army will fall from 142 to 119 units, a reduction of 17%. The number of brigade headquarters will fall from 27 to 18. Four out of 36 infantry battalions are being disbanded. Two armoured regiments will merge and another will be disbanded. The number of regular artillery, engineer and logistics units will fall by 14%, 27% and 33% respectively.

As we know, a fifth battalion of infantry is not being disbanded (on paper) but will effectively cease to matter as a fighting unit as the 5th SCOTS are being reduced to a public duty company only.
The IISS, conversely, considers one of the two merges in the Royal Armoured Corps not as a merge but as the disbanding of one regiment. Presumably, they are thinking of 1st Royal Tank Regiment, which is formally to merge with 2nd Royal Tank, but is more than likely to pretty much vanish, as only A sqn has tanks, while the others have been left without a clear role when the Fuchs CBRN recce vehicle was retired and the CBRN role was given wholly to the RAF Regiment.

The truly controversial point in the passage is the "27 to 18" brigade HQs part. This figure is in conflict with the stated targets of Army 2020: the brochure released by the MOD is very clear about the number of 1-star (brigade level) HQs.

3 Armoured Infantry Brigades
1 Air Assault Brigade
7 Adaptable Infantry brigades
2 Logistic brigades (101 and 102)
1 Logistic Support brigade (104)
1 Artillery brigade
1 Intelligence and Surveillance brigade
2 Signal brigades
1 Medical brigade
1 Engineer brigade

In addition, the Military Police is commanded by a Brigadier and is indicated as grouped under a  1-star HQ. That gives a total of 21 brigade-level HQs.

There are 21 1-star HQs according to the MOD

As i said, the IISS has been speaking with very high level figures in the Army, so we have to assume they know what they are writing. But the difference here is very evident: there's three 1-star HQs missing from the IISS number, with no clarity on how this comes into being. In the article, they confirm the number of frontline brigades, mention the 2 deployable logistic brigades and most of the elements of the Force Troops, so it's hard to even guess which HQs are missing. Unless they are counting only 1 Signal Brigade, they effectively mention 19 of the HQs while putting that 18 figure that just doesn't fit.
This one point is tricky.  

Moving on, an important passage seems to prove me right on the composition of the Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade:

Previously disparate surveillance, drone and intelligence units will be grouped into a single new intelligence and surveillance brigade. 

This would suggest that 5th Regiment Royal Artillery and the UAV regiments 32 and 47 will transfer under the command of the "new" brigade (which actually is an evolution and replacement of the current non-deployable 1st Military Intelligence brigade HQ).  

On the Royal Signals front, the IISS reports:

Signals units will be redesigned to deliver network and broadband access to battlefield units in new ways through deployed 'points of presence'.

As i had already explained in detail, the Signals will restructure to provide 5 "theatre" regiments, each capable to support a brigade-sized deployment providing network, close support communications and information services. The NAO Major Projects report provides an indirect confirmation of this, as it specifies how the Army has decided that the FALCON system will now be distributed to the various regiments, instead of being centralized in just two formations (30 and 22 regiments).

On the two specialist, high readiness brigades, 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando, the IISS reports:

[...] 16 Air Assault Brigade, which will retain a unique mixture of parachute battalions and Apache attack helicopters, although its ground element is set to get smaller, as will the army's contribution to the Royal Navy's amphibious force, 3 Commando Brigade.

16 Air Assault Brigade seems destined to see its ground element reduced to the two regular PARA battalions plus 4 PARA, the reserve battalion. Unfortunately, the number of Apache squadrons is also at risk, it has been reported, with the possibility of dropping from 6 to 4 deployable sqns.
As for 3rd Commando, reductions include the reversion of 24 Engineer Regiment to the sole 59 Independent Commando Sqn and reductions still not clearly set out to 29 Commando Royal Artillery. I also expect 1st RIFLES battalion to move out of the Commando brigade. 

IISS also confirms that the infantry battalions (and the cavalry regiments too, i'll add) in the Adaptable Force will be deliberately undersized:

For example, strengths of regular infantry battalions in the Adaptable Force are being reduced on the assumption that they would be joined by reinforcements from their partnered TA battalion when mobilised for operations.

The IISS does not expand on the extent of the reduction, but reportedly we are talking of one platoon removed from each of the three Rifle Companies. The official figures for the total establishment of the army formations by type are as follows:

Armoured Infantry Battalions (6x): 729 men
Heavy Protected Mobility - Mechanized Infantry (3x): 709 men
Light Protected Mobility (6x): 581 men
Light Role Infantry (14x): 561 men
Gurkha (2x): 567
PARA (2x plus 1 PARA which however is likely to be a completely different matter): 660 men

Type 56 tank regiment (x3): 587
FRES SV-mounted Recce regiment: 528
Jackal-mounted Light Cavalry regiment: 404
Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment: 341

For the Royal Engineers, the relevant passage says:

The army's hard-won expertise in countering improvised explosive devices is to be merged into a single group of engineer search teams, bomb-disposal operators and search dogs.

Four High Assurance Search squadrons are to be part of the Reserves' contribution to the Royal Engineers, it has been revealed, but exactly how the already existing 29 EOD & Search Group will change has not yet been disclosed in detail.

On the Royal Artillery front, the IISS reports:

The Afghan war saw British troops making extensive use of close air support. So numbers of tactical air-control parties, which act as the essential interface between ground troops and attack aircraft, were increased accordingly. These are set to be retained at their current level. Army air-defence units are to fall under the operational command of the Royal Air Force.

The retention of JTACs (indeed, of the whole Fire Support Teams, able to direct any supporting fire from that of mortars up to air attacks) is important and welcome. For what has emerged so far, the idea is to have a battery of FSTs into each artillery regiment.
Hard to say how exactly the Ground Based Air Defence HQ, which is already a Joint structure bringing together Army and RAF, will change as the RAF takes operational command. 12 Regiment Royal Artillery, which used to be outside the control of JGBAD and under the direct command of 1st Division will now join 16 Regiment RA and the supporting 106 (Volunteer) Regiment inside the air defence formation.


On the Artillery front, and returning for a moment to the problem of the number of brigade HQs, i want to express my thought that the need for a separate Artillery brigade has in my opinion ceased to exist with Army 2020. If, as it seems, 5th Regiment and the UAV force are moving to the Surveillance brigade and considering that the only depth fire regiment in the Army (39 RA) is being disbanded, i don't see why a separate 1-star HQ would have to continue existing.
The IISS notes:

Close support communications, engineers and artillery were previously part of the armoured and mechanised brigades. But, driven by the need to partner both regular and reserve units, and to make the most cost-effective use of equipment, the majority of support units are to be centralised in specialist brigades.

 [...]

And the centralisation of most combat support may make it more difficult to bring all combat and supporting arms together for all-arms training, an activity that has been essential preparation for fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We are going towards a Royal Artillery which lines 5 regular regiments (excluding those assigned to PARA and Commandos, which are a different subject) of which 3 are going to each have:

1 GMLRS Battery (coming from the disbanded 39 Regiment.)
2 AS90 Battery
1 TAC Gp Battery (Fire Support Teams)

The composition gives away the fact that these regiments are destined to the 3 Reaction, armoured brigades. It is evident beyond any possibility of error. It has also already been made clear that these three regiments (1 RHA, 19 RA and 26 RA) will be based in the Salisbury Plain area (indeed, with the exception of 26 RA which is currently in Germany, the other two are already based in Tidworth). 

The other two regular regiments are just as clearly destined to be the artillery element of the two deployable brigades to be formed from the three main Adaptable Brigades.
They are going to have:

2 L118 Light Gun batteries
1 TAC Gp Battery (Fire Support Teams)

In terms of basing, 4th Regiment should not move from its current home at Topcliff, which is right in the Catterick area, home to one of the famous 3 brigades.
The second regiment, 3 RHA, on return from Germany has been rumored to be heading for Albemarle Barracks, Newcastle, current home to the disbanding 39 RA. This is an acceptable basing solution for the regiment to be close enough to the Scotland-based brigade.
In alternative, 3 RHA could inherit St George's Barracks in North Luffenham [current home to 16 Regiment: the rumor is that 47 Regiment will move out of Thorney Island to reach 32 Regiment in Larkhill, to centralize the UAV force. 16 Regiment RA would then move to Thorney Island, where it would join 12 Regiment, centralizing Air Defence.] and be well positioned to be part of the Cottersmore-centered brigade. 

In short, i don't see why the Artillery regiments have to be pulled out of brigades and "centralised" (in terms of command, but not physically) when they can be based exactly in the right areas to be part of the relevant brigades. It's simpler to just assign the regiments to the relevant brigades and, in future, was it to be necessary, deploy a regiment under a different brigade HQ. It has been done for years, and it can continue.  
Much the same reasoning could be made regarding regular Engineer regiments, as well, with two of the intended "Heavy" regiments already well placed to support the Reaction Brigades in the Salisbury area, with the ambition to move a third in. 
21 Royal Engineers, which is one of two regiments due to become "Adaptable" (read: reduce to just 2 squadrons, get light) is already well placed (Ripon) to be part of the Catterick-centered Adaptable brigade.  

Anyway, if the basing review of the government gets delayed again, i might be in time to write about my own personal basing review proposal in greater detail, so i'll stop here for the moment.





Strategic Sealift downsized 

A written answer from Mr Dunne on Friday 25 January 2013 seems to reveal that the UK has no longer assured access to the full fleet of 6 invaluable Point class RoRo transports.

Procured with a PFI approach, the Point RoRo were delivered 18 months early and on budget, just in time for the first four vessels to be used to ship heavy equipment for Operation Telic in 2003. Alone, four Point ships carried 11% of the equipment employed by the UK for the war.

4 Point class ships are permanently available to the MOD and crewed by british personnel, while two more used to be employed on the civil market, while being at 20 days notice (the first) and 30 days notice (the second) to move to serve the UK's military needs.
Dunne's answer suggests that the 2 "on call" Point ships have been dropped out of the contract, following a (demented) decision made in 2011:

The review of the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) strategic sealift requirement, conducted in 2011, concluded that for the movement of cargo by sea, strategic support is primarily provided through the private finance initiative (PFI) strategic sealift service, and that better value for money would be achieved if the number of vessels contracted as part of this PFI was reduced from six to four. The PFI strategic sealift service now comprises four British flagged roll-on/roll-off vessels used for MOD business, manned by British mercantile marine officers and crews. If required, additional sealift capacity is chartered by means of competitive tenders.

The better one system works, the more likely is that the MOD will cut it, it seems at times.

Towards SDSR 2015: ISTAR

It is never too early to start and discuss about what the future should ideally bring. Possibly, without losing sight of reality talking about enormous budget uplifts and acquisition of countless new weapon systems and medium bombers and other kit that is clearly destined to remain only a dream, barring a dramatic change in the world's situation and, moreover, in the priorities and policy of the british government.

In this article i'm going to explain what i'd do in the next SDSR if i was in charge. The objective is to give a coherent and sustainable mix of air assets to the Armed Forces, to face the uncertainties of the future.

ISTAR 

There is no overstating the importance of knowing what is happening on the battlefield, at all times. Knowledge is key to the victory, and situational awareness is key to successful employment of the resources available.

The most welcome news of the Army 2020 announcement to me was the creation of the Surveillance Brigade HQ, even if we still haven't got much detail about its composition. Even with incomplete information available, the creation of an HQ element with the stated mission of overseeing Surveillance and Intelligence on the battlefield is something to be cheered. It'll be even more of a welcome development if this new 1-star HQ is structured as a joint organ of control bringing together UAVs, Intelligence, battlefield surveillance and Electronic Warfare (the latter being a certainty, as the HQ Royal Signals has confirmed that 14 Regiment (EW) is being transferred to the Surveillance Brigade).   

The new HQ (in itself non-deployable) will provide a central oversight and a central direction to a wide variety of efforts, controlling, more or less directly, a number of different formations and systems. I expect the brigade to include the 3 Military Intelligence battalions of the Army (plus Reserves), with the current Military Intelligence brigade HQ "folding" into the new 1-star command (and in support to this vision, the Military Intelligence brigade is not listed as part of Army 2020). Ideally, the RAF, RN and Army experts of Imagery Intelligence should also refer to the new brigade.

Then i would expect 32 and 47 regiment Royal Artillery (the UAV regiments) to transfer from 1st Artillery Brigade to the new formation.

And, while not part of the brigade, the newborn "Aviation Reconnaissance Force" of the Army Air Corps, to comprise the 1st Regiment AAC (on 4 squadrons of Wildcat recce helicopters) and the 5th Regiment AAC (2 squadrons of Defender and Islander fixed wing surveillance airplanes) would work under the new HQ's direction.

Again, during operations the HQ would control the 5th and 14th RAF Squadrons (Army Cooperation), flying respectively the Sentinel R1 and the Shadow R1. 51 RAF Squadron, with its Rivet Joint ELINT/SIGINT airplanes would also feed data to the new HQ. The RAF's UAVs would do the same.

At times, the AEW platforms of the Navy would also work for this command, in situations such as the Olympics, or such as the continued use of Sea King MK7 ASaC in Afghanistan. 

And here we come down to one of the most insensate announcements of the SDSR 2010, the retirement of Sentinel R1 at the end of operations in Afghanistan. This was an unexpected and very stupid announcement, that was met with incredulity by most, if not all, expert and commentators. The Sentinel R1 has been proving itself again and again on operations, with constant use in Afghanistan and with very successful participation in operations over Libya last year. Retiring this still-new, expensive system in 2014 makes absolutely no sense, and thankfully, most people at the MOD, starting from the RAF itself, seem to have finally understood it. It is now planned that the eventual retirement of Sentinel will be decided by the SDSR 2015, and it is widely expected that the system will get a reprieve.

In my own SDSR, Sentinel is definitely confirmed, as is Shadow. Sentinel's wide area surveillance and ground target tracking capability are simply unmatched by any other system in service or visible on the horizon of the immediate future. The loss of Sentinel would represent a massive reduction in situational awareness and battlefield surveillance capability. A loss that is unjustified, and that would openly contradict the lessons of operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Sentinel is good for COIN ops and for more conventional warfare, representing a perfect example of the flexibility required by the uncertainties of the future: in any kind of scenario, Sentinel is going to prove invaluable.

In future, the Scavenger MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) unmanned airplane might be able to provide enough surveillance to make Sentinel R1 redundant, but Scavenger won't be available before 2020 at best, and it is highly likely that it won't have a radar anywhere near as powerful, and it will lack the level of C3 (Command, Control and Communications) that the manned Sentinel, with its mission specialists aboard, can offer.

At least until 2020, the Sentinel R1 has no realistic competitor, and no realistic alternative, so it has to stay.

UAVs have also proven invaluable on operations, so that while Reaper is a UOR funded by the Treasury out to 2015, bringing it into core is considered a probable RAF move as part of the 10 Years budget. Soon there will be 10 Reaper drones in service, in two squadrons (39 and 13), both based in Waddington (as 39 re-locates from the US from where it has been operating for all this time), and this force is an obvious stop-gap on the way to Scavenger.

If not, and it is possible, the base for Scavenger itself, since the selection of Reaper as base platform for the new drone is far from having been ruled out, especially now that France hesitates, thinks again about its plans and takes time, putting the joint BAE-Dassault Telemos MALE at risk of never really happening.    

In any case, with a gap of at least 5 years in sight before Scavenger delivers, bringing Reaper into Core Budget is a priority in my SDSR.

For the Army, i hope in a confirmation for the Desert Hawk III mini-UAV for use at Company/Squadron level. The Desert Hawk III would be an interim solution on the way to, ideally, a back-packable VTOL mini-UAV more adequate to operations that, as for Army doctrine, are more and more likely to happen in urban environment.

With the Desert Hawk III needing a clear area of 100x100 meters to be launched and recovered safely, and with its other limits well known, for the future the right solution in my opinion resembles the Selex Galileo ASIO, in itself a more advanced evolution of the american T-HAWK idea. The T-HAWK has the main defect of being very noisy, so that it is easily detected, meaning that in urban warfare it would probably be destroyed very soon.

The ASIO combines the advantages of vertical take off and landing (very useful in urban operations) with silent running and with the ability to "perch and stare", landing on top of a building and working as an unattended sensor for extended period of times, in alternative to hovering in the air (which obviously reduces the duration of the mission, in comparison).

Another important sector is that of Base-ISTAR, the provision of surveillance and situational awareness around main bases and FOBs. In Afghanistan, this role has grown dramatically in importance, and it is one of those needs that are here for staying. The Army and RAF Regiment, that already collaborate on Base-ISTAR, have launched the joint Project Outpost, which is about selecting the systems currently in use that are most effective and promising, and bring them into Core Budget. In Afghanistan, a number of Radar sensors, EO/IR cameras and aerostats are in use, integrated in a B-ISTAR system known as Cortez. According to the RAF Regiment, the aerostat has performed so well that it will be part of the future solution under Project Outpost. Currently in Afghanistan the British Army reportedly deploys 7 (initially 5 were ordered) american-made PGSS (Persistent Ground Surveillance System) aerostats, which aren't exactly small: 70 feet long and 25 in diameter when up in the air, and are filled with 25.000 cubic feet of helium. Once filled, it'll stay in the air at 2000 or more feet of altitude with a 150 pounds payload, normally made up by a Wescan M/X-15 Eo/IR camera, plus other kit including acoustic gunfire-locating systems or other payloads. With the M/X-15, the PGSS can detect a man standing at 12 km, and allow identification at 4 km.  

They are tethered to purposefully-designed trailers weighting 16.000 lbs and can be launched in presence of a 20 knots wind, staying in the air even with a 60 knots wind. 

In the US, efforts to make these aerostats better deployable (mainly by reducing size and weight of the mooring station-trailer) are ongoing.

There are lighter, more deployable alternatives worth exploring, which also have the advantage of being british-designed and british-built. Allsopp Helikites offers the helikite solution, which reportedly is indeed already in use in Afghanistan with both British and US forces.

Helikites are semi-rigid and exploit powerful wind lift as well as helium, so a Helikites of only 11 cubic metres can fly thousands of feet high in no wind, or in in gale force winds, and can stay at high altitude unattended for weeks.

They combine aerostat and kite, with great advantages in term of sizes and handling in windy conditions. Allsopp offers the impressive Cased Helikite Aerostat Maintainable Platform (CHAMP) as a fully-self contained system that, folded up for transport, fits in a 190 kg, 4 ft x 4ft x 4ft pallet. It is a 10 cubic meters balloon with a payload of only 5 kg, but it is enough to place an all-weather, radio-downlinked surveillance camera several thousand feet into the air to gain weeks of unblinking view, even in winds of 50 mph or more. 1 sole operator can deploy the system, which comes with an helium reserve good for "months" of operations.

There are also larger formats of aerostat, with increasing payload capacity, still much smaller than the PGSS. A number of helikites have been trialed, and several seem to have gone in service already. They make for an incredibly effective and cheap solution to a range of issues: another use they have is as means to lift a linear radio antenna high into the sky, massively expanding the range of Line Of Sight communication systems.

This is an area in which relatively tiny investments can bring huge benefit to operations, so i'd expect Project Outpost to take a very good look into the range of uses of these systems.

Also, the usefulness of Helikites as communication relay systems is massive: erecting radio antennas pretty much anywhere, with minimum cost and complexity and in literally minutes is a capability that could well prove invaluable in future warfare, enabling long range and on-the-move connectivity. In Afghanistan, the province of Helmand is covered with a wireless internet system working from huge fixed antennas built into bases, but Afghanistan is a relatively static front, and a relatively permissive one. With a return to contingency operations, that include the possibility of fighting an high-end war of maneuver, Helikites represent a portable, cheap and deployable solution to recreate battlefield internet, following the progress of the maneuver.

Last, but not least, the Royal Navy is finally moving onwards with its Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Air System (VTUAS) [also known as rotary-wing unmanned air system (RWUAS)], an unmanned helicopter for at-sea ISTAR and surveillance. With a nominal entry in service date of 2020, this new helicopter could provide a wide number of useful services.  

This VTUAS could potentially weight up to 3000 kg at takeoff, and offer long endurance and sizeable payload. It is not yet clear how ambitious the Royal Navy will be with the VTUAS, but Qinetiq has offered a 1900 kg Gazelle conversion, and the US market shows some very interesting products, the most impressive of which is probably the Boeing A-160T Hummingbird.

The Hummingbird is still in development, but it is intended to fly for 4640 km or 24 hours, with an ISTAR payload of 136 kg or more. It has so far demonstrated an already impressive 18,07 hours endurance.

Alternatively, the Hummingbird can fly as an unmanned cargo carrier on shorter distances, carrying up to 1135 kg underslung from the cargo hook.

The Hummingbird is 10,66 meters long, and has a four-blade rotor with a diameter of 10,97 meters. It sits in the 3000 kg class. It is not exactly small, but luckily, its fuselage is not wide, and with a folding rotor it would not be a problem to embark it on a Type 45 alongside with a Wildcat (with the Merlin it might be harder). Even easier it would be on the Type 26 future frigate, while the Type 23's hangar might not be large enough to take it and a manned helicopter at the same time.

The Hummingbird currently is not a naval system, but Boeing is likely to be able to develop a navalized variant quite easily, and has indeed offered the helicopter UAV to the US Navy already: the problem is that, as of June 2012, the US Army has lost confidence in this impressive machine following several technical problems, and has issued a stop-work order. The Hummingbird is, literally, a step away from being terminated, and the loss of US government funding might cause Boeing to abandon the Hummingbird entirely.

The US Navy is currently pursuing its own VTUAS requirement by purchasing 28 MQ-8C Fire Scout, not to be mistaken for the original Fire Scout, the small MQ-8B already in use.

The new C uses the same software suite, but installed in a larger, more capable commercial Bell 407 helicopter airframe. Weighting 2724 kg at takeoff, the MQ-8C can operate for 8 hours at 556 km from the launching ship, carrying an ISTAR payload of up to 400 kg. The maximum endurance is 12 hours. As a cargo carrier, it can carry 227 kg internally or 1203 kg under slung.

It is 10,6 meters long and 2,4 meters wide once folded up for fitting in the hangar, and has a rotor diameter of 11,2 meters once unfolded. This means that, folded, the helicopter is smaller than a folded Lynx 8. The Type 45 could easily carry a Wildcat and a MQ-8C, and possibly it could carry a Merlin and a MQ-8C. 

A folded Lynx 8 is at least 3 meters wide and well over 10,8 meters long.

A Type 45 would have no difficulties in carrying a mixed Ship Flight comprising a Lynx/Wildcat and an MQ-8C or similar

AgustaWestland, on the lines of the MQ-8C, is offering to convert into a UAS the poland-produced light helicopter SW-4.

The Type 23 remains an issue, and quite an important one since the Dukes will be part of the fleet all the way into the 2030s, but their own Ship's Flight can be reinforced in other ways, with systems such as ScanEagle or the newer, more capable Integrator selected by US Navy and US Marines. And indeed the Royal Navy is about to purchase a number of such systems, to gain one, and then two task-lines, each capable of 300 hours of operational ISR data collection at sea per month from RFA and Type 23 platforms so that, in theory, the problem is easily solved. 

ScanEagle in british colors on a Type 23 frigate during successful trials at sea in 2007. Now the ScanEagle has a more capable brother, the Integrator. 

My belief is that the Army could benefit from a VTUAS just as much as the Navy. The ability to act as a light cargo hauler would greatly ease the strain on crews and machines tasked with delivery of multiple, relatively-small loads to troops in FOBs or at the edge of the battlefield, as proven by the US Marines experience with the K-Max unmanned helicopter in Afghanistan. This would free up a lot of precious flying hours of manned utility helicopters, that could then focus on troop-transport and other roles. The availability of an unmanned cargo-hauler would also reduce the need for the resource-intensive Combat Logistic Patrol convoys used in Afghanistan to bring supplies to FOBs on roads made dangerous by the IEDs and ambushes. Anything that can cut back the need for such convoys while also keeping the utility helos free, is to be welcomed.
If i was in charge, i'd be very keen to see the Army collaborate with the Navy to put into service each a squadron of such VTUAS, based in Yeovilton, where Army Air Corps personnel and Wildcat helicopters will be jointly based from around 2015.

I would of course go ahead with Scavenger, and specifically i'd try to prosecute the development of a national, or bi-national product along with France. Telemos is going to be fundamental for the future of the aerospace sector in the UK, after all.

I'd want the new drone to make ample use of mission pods, so to be easily reconfigurable for multiple kinds of missions, and i'd stick with the indicative number of 20 (in two squadrons) that was circulated some time ago, with no immediate purchase of attritional airframes, in the hope of procuring further drones only later, when they are needed.

I've covered the Scavenger extensively here: the article provides an update on the current situation and expands on the subject of mission pods.

Last, but not least, as part of SOLOMON the RAF should invest into the development of the Common Ground Control Station software and installation, developing a single, common model of GCS able to interact with both Scavenger and Watchkeeper and at least dialogue with the Sentinel R1 ground element.

On land, with the COBRA artillery-locating radar having been prematurely required and with MAMBA being quite limited in its performances, priority must be accorded to purchase of the Common Weapon Locating Radar, in number of 12, by 2014 at the latest, as planned. The new radar (the very effective ARTHUR C from Saab) will replace fully the already-lost COBRA and the MAMBA.

The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, procured as UOR, should be confirmed in service in the longer period due to its effectiveness.

In summary, in the ISTAR domain, my SDSR would include the following indications:

- Continue development of Scavenger, with the aim of acquiring 20 systems from 2020 [Planned]

- Put into service the Common Ground Control Station

- Go ahead full strength with the Rivet Joint plan [Planned]

- Retain Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 and Reaper at least until Scavenger enters service and provides a real alternative to their peculiar capabilities. Reaper is easily replaced, the Shadow should be replaceable if an adequate SIGINT payload is developed for the Scavenger, while the wide-area surveillance offered by the Sentinel's radar might remain unmatched for a long time still. Retaining Sentinel even after Scavenger arrives is probably going to be the best approach. [planned?]

- Go ahead with the urgent purchase of mini-drones for the Royal Navy [planned]

- Bring the Army into the Royal Navy VTUAS effort, buy a squadron of machines for the AAC as ISTAR and cargo-hauler platforms, with a weapons capability possibly following. The VTUAS must at least match the MQ-8C capabilities to truly benefit the forces.  

-  Maintain the Desert Hawk III mini UAS in service as an interim solution; develop/select a VTOL mini UAS for long-term use in Infantry companies and Cavalry/Armor squadrons.  

- Create a capable, integrated, joint HQ, directed by the Army, in the form of the Surveillance and Intelligence brigade, to direct the collection of ISTAR and to process and redistribute the data to the forces. [planned?]

- Retain a credible B-ISTAR package of systems and experience, jointly operated by the Army and RAF Regiment, to include aerostats and/or Helikites, on which i urge more investment due to the extremely cost-effective benefits they offer.

- Go ahead with the purchase and fielding of the Common Weapon Locating Radar; bring into Core Budget the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars.

I do not call for a revolution in this field: many of my proposals are already part of the strategy and, crucially, of the 10 Years budget. But i do deem indispensable to pour some more specific effort into things such as the VTUAS and lower-echelon ISTAR, at Battalion and, better still, at Company level. These improvements would, in my mind, absolutely be worth the use of money from the famous 8 unallocated billions in the 10 years budget.

I did not mention Watchkeeper and Sentry AWACS because i do not advocate any change in the current fleets and plans for these two machines. On at-sea AEW, i'll expand in a future article, but i'll anticipate that i deem a Merlin-based solution sufficient to meet the realistic UK's needs, so long as the AEW role is given to the 8 currently non-upgraded HM1 airframes. Loading the AEW role on the small fleet of HM2 currently envisaged would be too much of a compromise: there is no room for another demanding and rather unique role in a fleet of airframes and men that are already very hard worked.

My solution to Crowsnest is to remove the ASW kit from the 8 HM1 airframes, while exercising the option for their upgrade to HM2 standard (barring the ASW-specific updates), instead fitting these Merlins with the AEW suite that will prove most effective: either the proven, already-in-service Cerberus/Searchwater AEW or the new Lockheed Martin Vigilance podded solution.  

For a detailed review of Crowsnest current status, i suggest reading here. 

As for maritime patrol aircraft, i'm going to talk of this vital requirement in a future article. 

Royal Signals and Army 2020

A rather detailed overview of the Army 2020 impact on the Royal Signals has appeared on the August issue of their magazine "The Wire", courtesy of Col G Norton, Corps Colonel, so that now we know the general ORBAT of the Corps.
In detail:

The new Royal Signals ORBAT as part of Army 2020. 11 Signal Brigade is set to become the largest formation in the Corps by far. It'll also include, as shown, the Central Volunteer HQ (CVHQ) which looks after the TA specialists and after the Full Time Reserve Service. It also is responsible for organizing mobilisation efforts. 1 Signal Brigade is to be the top level Strategic Communications enabling formation, closely related to ARRC and JRRF. Very interesting to see the 14 Regiment (EW) assigned to the Surveillance and Intelligence brigade.

2nd (National Communications) Signal Brigade is, as we know, disbanding after the end of the Olympics, and 7th Regiment is to disband as well. There won't be other regiment-level losses.


11 Signal Brigade is to become a massive formation. Its new ORBAT includes:

7 Signal Group; Reaction Forces

Under 7 Gp, there will be 5 "Multi-Role" Theatre Support Regiments, evolution of the "Campaign Regiments" formed to support operations in Afghanistan. These regiments will provide signals support to deployed brigades and divisional HQs, with the loss of all but 16 Air Assault Brigade's Signal Squadrons.

Each Multi-Role regiment will have four squadrons (1 Support Squadron and 3 Field Squadrons). The Multi Role regiments are:

1st Signal Regiment (ex 1st UK Division signal regiment)
2nd Signal Regiment (To maintain a Queen's Gurkha Signals (QGS) squadron in its force)
3rd Signal Regiment (ex 3rd UK Division signal regiment)
16th Signal Regiment
21 Signal Regiment (ex Air Support signal regiment)

Each of the above regiments will come with some TA contingent components posts to facilitate regular/reserve integration. The exact detail of which squadrons will make up the Regiments, and the transition and implementation plans will follow on later this year.
The only ones who seem to already know their future are the men in the Queen's Gurkha Signals: their 3 squadrons all seem set to survive, and stay where they already are. 

2 Signal Group; UK Resilience and Adaptable Forces

Under 2 Gp will be grouped the Territorial Army signal formations, which are being reorganized under the Reserves plan, hopefully to be announced by year's end.

In addition, there will be the 10 Signal Regiment (regulars), in ECM(Force Protection) role and Information Communication Systems (ICS) infrastructure support. The Regiment will have the Squadrons 225, 241, 243, 251 and 81 (Volunteers), the latter being a TA formation.

Again, 2 Gp will have 15 Regiment (Information Support). The regiment provides Level 3 support, deploying elements abroad and providing "reachback" support. The Regiment was born only recently, on 30 September 2011, by re-titling the Unified System Support Organisation, which had steadily been growing in size and relevance over the years. The regiment will also include the Land Information and Communications Services Group (Volunteers), LICSG(V).

Finally, there will be 299 Signal Squadron (Special Communications).

New info has been provided with the January 2013 issue of "The Wire", magazine of the Royal Signals. The above graphic shows the current structure of the brigade. 1st and 3rd Regiments haven't yet moved in, 14 (EW) Regiment hasn't yet moved out and the two Groups (7 and 2) haven't formed yet. TA regiments from the disbanded 2nd Signal Brigade have moved in.

For a while, the brigade will also include the Land Information Assurance Group (Volunteers), which is however expected to move under the newborn Joint Forces Command at some point in the future.

11 Signal Brigade will also have the Central Volunteer HQ, which looks after the TA specialists and after the Full Time Reserve Service and is responsible for organizing mobilisation efforts.

Lastly, the brigade is due to assume the function of regional 1-star HQ over the West region, and will do so thanks to the Regional Point of Contact RPOC(West). This suggests that the current Regional Brigade (West), 143 Bde, is sadly going to vanish as part of the restructuring.

The future plan (Army 2020) on the left, and the current Regional Brigades structure on the Right. The 11 Signal Brigade is to take over the West Area. 143 Regional Brigade HQ seems set to go, and the direct comparison of the maps helps in guessing which other regional brigades are likely to vanish.

1 Signal Brigade will have the role of supporting deployed strategic communications for the ARRC and for the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. It will meet its requirements by lining the following regiments: 

22 Signal Regiment; on 1 Support and 4 Field Squadrons, with one being Queen's Gurkha Signal (QGS). 

30 Signal Regiment; on 1 Support and 4 Field Squadron, again with one being QGS. 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corp Support Battalion  


In addition there will be several more formations under other Commands, namely:

11 Signal Regiment (Training), to remain part of the Defence College of Communications and Information Systems (DCCIS) under 22 Group (Training) RAF.
The regiment provides training, and is based in Blandford Camp along with the DCCIS HQ.
DCCIS also includes the No 1 Radio School in Cosford and the Royal Navy CIS training unit at HMS Collingwood.

18 (UKSF) Special Forces Support Regiment; undergoing no changes from current structure and strenght and staying under control of the Director Special Forces.

216 (PARA) Squadron; the communications element of 16 Air Assault brigade.

628 Signal Troop; british contribution to the 1st NATO Signal Battalion. There are also another 74 or so posts for Royal Signals personnel within NATO. 

660 (EOD) Signal Troop; assigned to direct support of the EOD force

Joint Service Signal Organisation; around 200 Royal Signals posts within the JSSO. This organization, part of Joint Forces Command, has its headquarters in RAF Digby and is commanded by a RAF Operations Support Branche group captain.
The JSSO delivers support to deployed operations and contribute to innovation by researching new CI systems and techniques.

JSSO is divided in three Joint Service Signal Units, one in Cyprus JSSU(Cyp), one in Digby and one in Cheltenham.

A further 154 or so Royal Signal posts will be kept to provide support to Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) in several locations. 

Finally, and very importantly, 14 Regiment (Electronic Warfare), on 1 Support and 4 Field Squadrons, is being assigned to the newly formed Surveillance and Intelligence brigade. 
This reinforces in me the belief that this particular 1-star command is going to become one of the most important components of the Army, bringing together a wide array of enablers. 

My guess is that 32 and 47 Regiments Royal Artillery, with their UAVs including Watchkeeper, will be part of this new brigade, along with the Military Intelligence battalions. Possibly, even 5 Regiment Royal Artillery (Surveillance and Target Acquisition) could move under this new command. 
Currently, 5 Regt is part of 1st Artillery Brigade along with 39 Regiment (GMLRS) and the UAVs regiments. 

I'm expecting the UAVs and possibly 5 Regt to move into the Surveillance Brigade, and as we know 39 Regiment is to disband. 1st Artillery Brigade will however receive, in my opinion, the 5 "Fires" regular regiments, with the exception of 7 Royal Horse Artillery and 29 Commando which will stay with 16 Air Assault and 3rd Commando brigades. 

In any case, 14 Regiment (EW) has received a good news in these last few days, with the announcement that the ROKE Resolve manpackable EW system has been accepted into Core budget and will live on after Afghanistan, where it has been introduced as UOR under Project SEER. 
The RESOLVE system can be used on the march, in the backpack of a soldier, or on the move when installed on a vehicle, or, of course, it can be used from a base or any stationary position, with the option of erecting it on top of a mast to gain better coverage. 
While the press releases do not talk of it, the selection of Resolve is almost certainly part of the LANDSEEKER programme for the renewal of the Electronic Warfare equipment of the Army and Royal Marines. 

Resolve will provide the Light, man-portable EW solution to the Royal Signals of 14 Regiment and to the Royal Marines of Y Squadron (EW), 30 Commando. 

Interestingly, the ROKE Resolve is being installed on the Marshal TRAKKAR Unmanned Ground Vehicle, which is being evaluated by the British Army as an Assisted Load Carriage platform for the Infantry. While the Army's priority is to procure a platform capable to carry north of 25 kg of load from each soldier in a Section, to keep the men light and agile and comfortable, a longer term aim is to have the UGV provide ISTAR and possibly even Fire Support. 
Good news for once, and lots of potential for future improvements to the armed forces.