Type 26: where does the money go?

The MOD has announced the signature of the Type 26 Manufacture Phase 1 contract, covering the first 3 of 8 planned Type 26 frigates. First steel will be cut in the next few weeks, and perhaps we'll hear about names too. 

The latest, and presumably final CGIs released show "fat cheeks" on the superstructure that give long passageways around the bridge, good for situational awareness and for the placement of small weapons for anti-swarm, anti-FIAC defence. The mast design has been further refined, and the Sea Ceptor cells arrangement has been finalized, with the launchers being the same "mushrooms" tubes used on the Type 23s refitted with the missile. The number of cells has not changed, while the export design targeted at Canada (and, with further modifications, at Australia) has been shown replacing the CAMM cells with an additional MK41 module (from 24 to 32 cells).

The latest images show what Type 26 will look like

This model of a Type 26 proposal for Canada shows an extra MK41 module instead of CAMM cells. 

The contract is described as a 3.7 billion pounds deal, but this figure urgently needs to be clarified. Government seems to be playing games by using it: on one side, it is giving the impression that it is committing more money than it actually is; on the other it makes it impossible to figure out how much each of the three vessels is costing. Unfortunately, whatever the exact amount, the answer is: a bloody lot.

The confusion is due to the MOD having already signed contracts worth more than 1.9 billion pounds to get to this point.

The first big Type 26 contract dates back to 2010 and was a 127 million, 4-years contract for designing the new vessel.

In February 2015 this was followed by an 859 million Demonstration Phase deal, which included selection of suppliers and long lead items orders, plus the construction of three shore-based test facilities to de-risk key parts of the vessel. David Brown built a test facility to demonstrate the new cross-connect gearbox developed for the Type 26; General Electric Power Conversion built the Electric Power Generation and Propulsion facility to de-risk the power segment of the ship; and the Combat System Land Based Integration and Test laboratory demonstrated the entire Combat System. This investment should pay dividends later on by ensuring that all works as intended, preventing many of the teething issues associated with new systems in new ships.

In march 2016, contracts for 472 million in long-lead items including side doors, helicopter handling system, bow sonar domes and other parts was announced.

In July, 183 million pounds were added to procure the MK45 gun systems (including automated ammunition handling, gun fire control system and ammunition) for the first three ships; plus another system to be installed ashore as integrated training facility.

In December 2016 another large contract followed, for 380 millions, covering chilled water plants, hangar cranes, hatches and watertight doors, membrane sewage treatment plants, steering gear and stabilizers.

The long list of suppliers and systems already under contract and at work due to earlier Demonstration Phase contracts 

Most, but not all, of these almost 2 billion pounds, which have been converted in a long list of parts already on order / delivered / being delivered for the first three vessels, have effectively been announced a second time, because they are included in the 3.7 billion deal.

A part of what was already expended is counted separately: probably the non-recurring cost of setting up the shore test facilities, the gun training system, and other voices of expenditure.

Whatever the exact division of costs, the pricetag of the Type 26s remains disconcerting, because most of its known systems and capabilities are non-developmental, funded by different budget lines, or straight out recycled.

The ship will have a newly designed gearbox but will use well known MT30 gas turbines already used all around the world; and it will have a CODLOG (Combined Diesel or Gas) which is arguably the simplest configuration involving a gas turbine. A well understood, definitely non innovative propulsion system and, arguably, in some ways a step back from the Type 23’s CODLAG (Combined Diesel and Gas) which allows the ship to exploit all of its installed power for obtaining max speed.

The ship’s main defensive weapon is the CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile, which is developed and acquired under the Complex Weapons budget line and which is already being procured for the Type 23 life extension and capability sustainment project, with three vessels already refitted.

Type 26 will have more Sea Ceptor cells (48 in two well separated silos, fore and aft, of 24 cells each; versus 32 all on the bow for Type 23), but will essentially inherit most of the arsenal from the retiring Type 23s.

The ship’s gun is new to the Royal Navy, but is the latest iteration of a system which is decades old and used in hundreds and hundreds of exemplars on US Navy and other nations’ vessels all around the world. The only developmental addition is the automated ammunition handling system and depot, but similar systems are already operational around the world and hardly break the bank.

The main radar is planned to be the Artisan 3D, already operational on Type 23, from which it will migrate to the new hulls.

The Type 26’s main offensive power will entirely depend from three 8-cell MK41 vertical missile launchers. Again, a new system in Royal Navy use, but well over a thousand such VLS modules are operational in the US Navy and elsewhere. Their cost is far from prohibitive, and they are non developmental and well understood.

What is not well understood is what, if anything, the Royal Navy will put into these VLS. It currently has no weapon, in service or planned, which is ready for MK41. The Tomahawk is an obvious candidate, but the small Royal Navy stock of the missile is all in the encapsulated variant for submerged launch from submarine’s torpedo tubes.

Harpoon is going out of service next year, leaving the Royal Navy bare of any heavy anti-surface missile, and the Type 26’s offensive power is entirely dependent on “Maritime Future Offensive Surface Warfare capability”, a programme which is funded under the Complex Weapons budget (so entirely additional to other Type 26 costs) and which only appeared in the Equipment Plan in the 2016 edition. We know absolutely nothing of its exact aims and of the timeframe associated with it.

Light guns for ship’s self defence will come from retiring Type 23s, as will a good part of the decoy outfit, including the S2170 anti-torpedo system.

The towed array sonar Type 2087 also comes straight from the Type 23s. We don’t yet know about the hull-mounted sonar on the bow. Maybe this, at least, will be new. Or maybe no.

The exact details of how equipment will migrate between Type 23s and Type 26 is not known. The MOD was asked about it in a few occasions, but offered very little in terms of answers. It is obvious that a Type 23 will have to leave service early to be dismantled and robbed of parts to enable the fitting out of a new Type 26 unless a few new sets of equipment are purchased.

According to admiral sir PhilipJones, three such “extra” sets have been procured, for the first three vessels, to ensure that there is no need to shrink the fleet early to fit out the first new Type 26s. After that, the equipment for the following vessels will come from the withdrawn 23s.

Admiral Sir Philip Jones: Yes, that is absolutely true. One of the things that we think will de-risk the Type 26’s entry into service is the fact that much of its equipment will have been tested and proved by operating on the Type 23 frigates, in particular the Sea Ceptor missile system, the Artisan Type 997 air surveillance radar and a number of other things.The Type 23 that we bring in to pay off has to be the donor platform to the next Type 26. We’ve bought new equipment for each of the three first Type 26s, to sort of get the class going, if you like; that is part of the long-lead items we have procured. So we will then have, as it were, a residue of decommissioned Type 23s’ equipment, which we can return and recycle, and deliver to the builder to fit into the Type 26. We won’t have to bring one in and stop it operating before we send it north; we’ve deliberately factored that in. I think that means that we will have much more resilience and already-tested equipment in that ship, which will bring it into service much faster than we’ve seen before.

Exactly what these “extra” sets include is not clear. It seems highly unlikely that there will be extra Type 2087 sonars, for example. Probably we are only looking at the essential pieces.

In theory, the extra sets could afterwards ease the fitting out of the Type 31e frigate if it will ever actually come together and if there will ever be more than 5 of them. In theory, purchasing three extra sets of parts gives the Royal Navy enough kit for 16 frigates instead of 13. Whether this benefit is ever realized is anyone’s guess.

The Type 26 introduces very little in the way or truly new systems to the fleet. There is a hope that the Royal Navy will be able to improve the crucially important self-defence decoy fit by replacing current fixed-tube launchers with something like the CENTURION trainable decoy launcher, which can adjust to fire the decoy in the best possible direction for maximum effect, without the entire ship needing to change course first. This is extremely important in light of the development abroad of faster and faster anti-ship missiles which will not wait for the ship to manoeuvre into a new position. But even this very, very modest development is currently a mere hope: data about Type 26 so far makes no mention of this and earlier attempts by the RN to invest in this area were frustrated by lack of funding.

CENTURION trainable decoy launcher 

It even seems that the Type 26 will not carry ship-launched anti-submarine torpedoes. For years now there has been no mention of migrating the Type 23’s magazine torpedo launchers. In absence of a vertical launch anti-submarine weapon such as the American ASROC, the Type 26 will be entirely dependent on the embarked helicopter for prosecuting the submarines it picks up on the sonar.

While the limitations of the ship-launched light torpedo are well understood (being close enough to a submarine to employ it probably means the submarine has already fired its own much larger torpedoes), it seems rather disconcerting to do away with them entirely. And if they aren't fitted, this is another capability the Type 26’s budget is not funding.

How the ship can be quite so expensive despite all of the above is mysterious. We are light years away from the affordable pricetag that had been the target of the programme, yet many of the big-ticket items are not even contributing to the cost. 

We are left to wonder whether spreading the build on two shipyards (Scotstoun and Govan) is at least partially responsible. Earlier plans included spending serious money on finally building a single, capable “frigate factory” plant, but this would have meant closing one of the current two yards, and this was unpalatable. One look at the two-site Type 26 construction strategy, however, is enough to see how much more complication, risk and waste of time (and, inexorably, cost) it adds.

Above, the single-site shipyard proposal. 

BAE Systems two-shipyards Type 26 assembly strategy. 


The Type 26 is also now described as a 157 men ship. Earlier, the “Core Crew” had been given as 118. To be fair, however, 118 probably excluded elements such as the embarked helicopter flight, which are very much an integral part of what makes a warship work. Probably, 157 is not sign of a step away from automation, but merely a more complete and realistic indication of what it takes to make the warship operate. In 2012, the Royal Navy described the 118 core crew as needed for mere “Float, Move and Self Protect” activities, with ASW specialist “packets” coming separately, along with all other teams needed for the mission.  There is space for a further 51 souls (208 bunks in total) to be embarked to operate systems carried in the Mission Bay or as reinforced boarding teams or for other necessities.

The MOD is being very vague about timeframes for entry in service. What once was 2021 had already become 2023 and might now be closer to 2025, with the MOD talking of “around the middle 2020s”. It won’t be earlier than 2023, might be 2025. This is bad news as it means shrinking the fleet or delaying further the exit from service of the aging Type 23s. HMS Argyll was meant to bow out in 2023, followed by the others roughly with a yearly drumbeat. This will have to change unless the fleet is to dramatically shrink.

While we wait for the Shipbuilding Strategy and for a plan for the Type 31e frigate that is supposed to complement Type 26, it is hard to rejoice for Sunday’s announcement. It was a key, much delayed and long expected development, definitely overdue, but it brings forth unpleasant questions. How can this ship cost so much? How can british shipbuilding go on if this is the best price it can offer?

Arming the Royal Navy of the future

During DSEI, Navy Recognition had the chance to speak with Geoff Searle, program director for the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, and one factor emerged: apparently, there is not a clear plan, at the stage, for arming the Type 26 with a surface to surface missile. At least, there is not a plan that BAE knows: it is always possible that, within the MOD and Royal Navy, thinking is actually at a much more advanced phase, since there is a long running program for the definition of Future Maritime Fires capability.

At the moment, however, what can be observed is that the Royal Navy does want at least 16 Strike Length VLS cells fitted to the new frigates at build. There just isn’t a precise plan (at least not out in the open) for fitting a specific weapon system in these cells.

More precisely, a definitive choice hasn’t even been made yet about which cells should be fitted: the europen Sylver A70, or the American MK41 system? A choice could be made next year, or later still.

At the same time, the Royal Navy is preparing to fit the Type 45s with the electronics and wiring needed to support the Harpoon Block 1C missile, with four of the destroyers effectively fitted with launchers and missiles taken from the prematurely withdrawn Type 22 Batch 3 frigates.

In addition, a 2012 graphic in a Royal Navy presentation which provided some insight into what programs are included in the famous 10-year Budget Plan, includes an important voice of expenditure detailed as “GWS60 Harpoon sustainment program”, meaning an upgrade and life-extension for the missile currently in service. There is no detail (yet) about the extent of the upgrade, nor an indication of the extent of the life-extension the missile is going to get, but I believe it is fair to assume that the aim of the Sustainment Program would be to delay the OSD for Harpoon all the way to 20230 – 2036.

The 2036 date is not casual: on the current planning assumptions, 2036 is the year in which the last of the Type 23 frigates, armed with Harpoon, leaves active service.

The graphic, which is the only information we have at the moment, does not provide precise numbers on the amount of money that will be devoted to the various programs, but provides a visual indication of when the most of the expenditure is planned, and that is between the 5^th and 9^th year of the 10-year budget. Since the budget covers the period 2011/2012 to 2021/2022, the Harpoon sustainment program should be in full swing in the second half of the current decade. 

This graphic shows the plans the Royal Navy has made for the allocation of its portion of the Core Budget in the 10 years plan. This expenditure is "uncommitted", as there are not yet contracts signed about these programs, but the work is ongoing and the money is allocated. The expenditure for Type 45, CVF and Type 26 is not shown in this graphic as they all are part of the Committed core budget.

NOTE: for an in-depth analysis of the workings of the 10-year budget and of the above graphic, see my earlier article.

The graphic also shows the Future Maritime Fires System expenditure, roughly starting from the fourth year of the Budget. The main item of FMFS is the new medium gun to be fitted to the Type 26 frigates, and in fact, in compliance with the general indication coming from the graphic, the selection of the new 127 mm gun (either the Oto Melara/Babcock 127/64 Lightweight or the MK45 Mod 4 127/62 from BAE/United Defense) is expected next year. There is no telling, at the moment, if FMFS also includes the purchase of new missiles: while missiles (and even the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition) are all part of the study, there is no evidence suggesting that they are part of the funded program in addition to the new main gun. The relatively small amount of money suggested by the graphic makes me think that, for the moment, the budget just covers the guns.

It is anyway in the FMFS voice that the long-running requirement for a Future Surface to Surface Guided Weapon has been likely folded into. The british requirement is indicated under the very generic acronym SSGW (surface to Surface Guided Weapon) and has been around, in a shape or another, from the early 90s. An SSGW system was part of the Type 45 planned mission fit, but was notoriously written off from the list of requirements for the AAW destroyers for the time being. The detailed requirements are not known, but according to some sources, the ambition included developing a rocket boosted-weapon for long range anti-submarine attack as well as providing an anti-ship and land-strike missile. The anti-submarine rocket would restore a capability the Royal Navy has missed for decades, ever since the old IKARA system was retired from service without a replacement. Comparable weapons of this kind in the world include the American ASROC and the Italian MILAS: these rocket-propelled torpedoes enable a frigate to immediately attack a submarine contact at ranges of over 30 kilometers, even if the helicopter is unavailable. They are a good solution for the need to hit time-critical targets at range without having to send the helicopter in the air all the time, and they are good at filling the many gaps in helicopter coverage that come up in a rolling 24 hours period. The Type 23 and 26, which will relay on the big Merlin helicopter for ASW work, and that carry a single such machine, would appear to badly need such a gap-filler, since a single helo can’t be in the air all the time, and obviously can’t be expected to be always in the right place at the right moment. Despite this consideration, it is fair to assume that it will be really tough for the royal navy to develop or even just adopt this kind of very single-role, highly-specialized weapon.

Certain is, instead, the requirement for a genuinely multi-role missile capable to hit enemy warships but also able to strike targets well inland. The new missile will be vertically launched, and it is behind the selection of Strike Length cells on the Type 26. 
The idea seem to be that the old MK8 Mod 1 gun and the old Harpoon missile will be around as long as the Type 23 is in service, which under current plans means 2036. At that point (or by that point) the new Medium Gun can be expected to be retrofitted to the Type 45 to standardize the fleet back on a single main gun type, and the 45s could finally receive their own Strike Lenght cells, losing Harpoon in exchange for new capability. 
There is also the chance that MK41 cells make their debut on Type 45 much earlier than 2030, if the ongoing assessment of the T45s as anti-ballistic missile platforms evolves into a program for the acquisition of kinetic ABM capability.  

With the RAF and with France

The only new anti-ship missile there is currently talk of, is the UK-France Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FC ASW). And to say the truth, it is not like there is much talking going on about it in the open. This new weapon was conceived under the framework of the UK/French joint Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation agreed at Lancaster House in November 2010, but only came to the light in early 2012, when the governments of France and United Kingdom disclosed its existence and announced that a two-year seed contract had been awarded to MBDA in December 2011. The contract was signed by the French Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) with MBDA UK and MBDA France, on behalf of both countries.

Currently, we are at a very early stage: the contract covers initial studies over the concepts, technologies and system options that could be employed to bring to life the new weapon, or family of weapons, which is destined to replace cruise land attack and anti-ship missiles currently in service.

In practice, Storm Shadow, Harpoon and Exocet would all be replaced with the weapon(s) that come out of this joint development. Perhaps even Tomahawk would be replaced by this new missile.

In the first quarter of this year, a first selection was made between the concepts emerged so far, with around six being brought forwards for further study and development. The approaches being considered to make this new weapon survivable and lethal against ever improving air defence systems (mostly of Russian design) essentially come down to stealthness and to very high speeds, with Mach 3 having been mentioned more than once in recent MBDA concept works, such as PERSEUS and, more recently HOPLITE.

The aim of the joint project is to prepare the new weapon (or family of weapons) in service sometime between 2030 and 2035. 

Among the requirements that this new weapon will have to satisfy, there’s clearly the capability to be launched from vertical cells on warships, from airplanes and almost certainly from submarine’s torpedo tubes as well.

Being intended also as a Storm Shadow replacement, the FC ASW project is part of the Selective Precision Effect At Range programme of the RAF, as Capability 5.

SPEAR Capability 4 is about the mid-life upgrade and life extension of Storm Shadow. This project, which once again is jointly sustained with France, should start soon enough and aims to keep the missile relevant and effective out to the 2030s. France confirmed in its own White Paper, released earlier this year, that the joint work on Storm Shadow (Scalp, in French service) will be funded.

Together with the Harpoon sustainment programme, this seem to be intended to “hold the ground” before the new system developed under the Capability 5 headline does arrive.

Sylver or MK41?

I first of all invite you to give a look at the following presentation about MK41, which will give you a much better idea of what a VLS system is and how it works: presentation by Mark Zimmerman. 

With the Type 26 frigate, we are back to a debate which never really ended ever since it was opened by the attempts of the Royal Navy to get MK41 VLS systems for the Type 45, attempts that were frustrated by European political considerations and by the worries connected to the possible costs and technical challenges of integrating the European Aster missile in a VLS cell made in America.

The problem is now back on the table for the Type 26, and a decision has not yet been taken.

It is clear that, if the Royal Navy has no real hopes to get a missile into the Strike Length cells before SPEAR Capability 5 comes of age, going Sylver A70 might make sense: since the FC ASW missile is developed jointly with France, compatibility with the Sylver VLS system will be a requirement from the very first moment. The French have adopted the Sylver A70 on their new FREMM frigates, and the same launcher will be expected, in the future, to welcome the new missile. It is to be seen, though, if this is enough of a justification for going again with the Sylver line of VLS systems.

In the short term, in fact, Sylver A70’s only weapon is the Scalp Navale cruise missile, ordered in 250 pieces by the French armed forces. This “European Tomahawk” seems not as capable as the Tomahawk itself, especially the most recent TLAM Block IV, while it is much more expensive, as is to be expected for a new weapon, which has not been (and perhaps never will be) produced in the same huge numbers as the Tomahawk. France is planning to purchase some 250 missiles in four separate orders. 50 missiles will be encapsulated for torpedo firing from the new nuclear attack submarines of the French fleet, with entry in service in 2017, while the rest will be for vertical launch from the A70 VLS cells on the FREMM frigates. The expected cost is 910 million euro, and done the math, the Tomahawk is a much, much cheaper option for the Royal Navy.

Of course, the A70 cells can also be used to embark Aster missiles, but it is a bit of a waste since these only need five meters deep cells (the A50 module) and not the full seven meters of the A70 VLS module.

Until SPEAR 5 eventually happens, the only use of A70 cells eventually fitted to Type 26 would be as launchers for the Scalp Naval: but there is no reason at all to justify the purchase of a more expensive, less capable “clone” of Tomahawk, establishing two separate logistic lines.

Adopting the MK41 Strike Lenght VLS used by the US Navy, instead, opens the door to the possible integration in the Type 26 combat system of a huge variety of weapons, including the full range of surface to air missiles employed by the Americans, plus Tomahawk, ASROC and, in a not distant future, the new LRASM anti-ship and strike missile.

Adopting the MK41 would, in my opinion, offer the greatest insurances for the future. As it is destined to remain the launcher of choice of the US Navy for many more decades, the MK41 won’t be short of support and will be the launcher for which the greatest number of weapon systems will be certified. The sole fact of being fully ready to employ the Tomahawk Block IV is an important consideration, as the TLAM has effectively become the weapon of choice in all military operations. The Royal Navy tried to secure funding for the addition of MK41 cells and vertical launch Tomahawks on the Type 45s already in the early 2000s: the attempt was unsuccessful back then, but there are good chances that it would be successful in a new try.

Gaining the capability to fire Tomahawks from surface ships as well as from submarines would mean having more platforms fully capable to influence events ashore, well inland. It would simplify planning, as it would be much easier to bring a launcher platform in the area of a crisis, and it would not tie a precious nuclear submarine into a “launch box”, a small area of sea where the SSN stations and waits for the order of launching a missile against targets ashore. In the future, the small, precious fleet of SSNs could be needed to cover many other tasks, so avoiding the limbo of the “launch box” would help meeting the other commitments.

There is also an important financial factor at play: an SSN is an expensive launch platform, which is not always necessary. Against an enemy with capabilities as limited as Libya’s, there was no real need to covertly deliver strike missiles from an undetectable submarine: a cheaper surface ship could have done the job almost as safely.

Again, the Tomahawk capsule for torpedo tube firing adds several hundred thousand dollars to the price of every single missile, compared to the Vertical launch variant used on ships from MK41 cells.

Strike Lenght cells aren't an easy fit: they go down into the ship for 7 to 9 meters, so they can't be fitted everywhere.

Lockheed Martin has introduced the very smart idea of the ExLS insert, which is an "adaptor" which can be slid into MK41 cells, with the electronics and canisters made for missiles not initially thought for MK41. An ExLS with quadpack is being validated for use with CAMM. The ExLS can also be used, in some cases, as a stand-along launching system. An ExLS Standalone with three CAMM cells is being jointly developed by LM and MBDA.

The first test ejection of a CAMM missile from a MK41 cell fitted with ExLS module.

Ultimately, Tomahawk has proven to be a highly useful, highly requested and highly useable conventional strike weapon. When TLAM was first purchased, specifically for use on submarines, the british armed forces didn’t think they would end up using it so much, so often. TLAM was almost conceived as a conventional arm of the policy of submarine-based deterrence, but operational experience has proven that it is far more than just that, as Dr. Lee Willett wrote in his essay “TLAM and british strategic thought”. The introduction of the Tactical Tomahawk, the Block IV, has only made the TLAM even more useable, and further improvements are being jointly developed by the US and the UK, including the Joint Multi-Effect Warhead System, which couples fragmentation effect with enhanced bunker-busting capability, making the missile capable to engage pretty much any kind of target. Importantly, TLAM is evolving to be able to engage even relocatable and moving targets, with Third Party In-Flight Retargeting capability already demonstrated, also during HMS Astute’s TLAM firing trials in the US.

There is every reason to consider an expansion in the number of Tomahawks available to the MOD (thought to remain at a total of around 60 to 65 rounds) and, critically, in the number of launch platforms. 

A Tomahawk is launched from a MK41 cell on a US Navy warship. Notice the blast of the rocket venting upwards and wooshing out of the opening in the middle of the launch module. CAMM removes this complexity by adopting the ingenious Cold Launch feature: a piston powered by compressed air ejects the missile and shoots it around 100 feet into the air before the Sea Ceptor's rocket ignites. CAMM, however, is an exception, not the rule: the other missiles need a VLS system, complete with the exhaust system.

The adoption of MK41 cells on Type 26 would be the solution. It would also be a reliable parachute for the Royal Navy, was something to happen with the development or procurement of SPEAR Capability 5: with the weapon potentially more than two decades away from entering service, I don’t think the RN can shape the new ships to be only focused on the hope of getting this particular European product. Was the program to die in future budget cuts, and the Royal Navy had fitted Sylver cells, the alternatives would be very few: the Navy would most likely end up having to fork out new money to try and adapt an American missile to the Sylver system.

Since MBDA and Lochkeed Martin are now collaborating to integrate European weapons in the MK41 launcher, starting with the Sea Ceptor missile, also known as CAMM, I believe there is every reason to go with the proven MK41. After signing an agreement last May, the two companies have very rapidly made tangible progress, and demonstrated in early September a first ejection sequence from an ExLS quadpack inserted in a MK41 cell.

Considering that the Type 26 design is still to be completed, and keeping in mind that SPEAR Cap 5 is many years away, there is all the time to make sure that the missile can fit into the MK41 cells when the day comes. This would ensure the best capability for the new frigate, both in the near term and in the long term.

Anti-ship capability: timeframes do not match

Tomahawk is a ready-to-go solution available to give the Type 26 a punch against land targets, from day one at entry in service, if the MOD will want and find the money for it. There is also the option of adapting the Fire Shadow loitering munition for vertical launch, MBDA says. Fire Shadow only has a range of some 150 km, but it can loiter over a target area for six to ten hours, sending imagery intelligence back to the ship and denying an area to the enemy by being ready to strike as soon as one shows up. It would be a great capability to have, although completely different in nature from the long-range reach offered by the cruise missile.

What about anti-ship capability in the fleet, though?

A new vertical-launch missile, especially if large enough to require strike length cells (which means tubes with a depth under deck that ranges between 7 and 9 meters, meaning some three deck levels) could never be fitted to the Type 23 frigates, which just do not have the space for such a VLS system.

If the missile is longer than around 5 meters, it won’t fit the Sylver A50 cells employed on the Type 45 destroyers, either, but the Type 45’s VLS silo has been built to a design and size values that make it possible to add a further 16 cells to the current 48, and all the cells (newly-fitted and existing ones) could be Strike Length if the need was identified.

The Harpoon currently in use is not a Vertical Launch missile. It can only be fired by the well known stacks of tube launchers employed on the Type 23s. The Royal Navy uses quadruple launchers, but the canister-launchers can also be stacked in couples, or even used singularly. The Type 45 destroyer has been built with space and fittings arrangements for mounting a couple of quadruple Harpoon launchers behind the Aster missile silos, and four of the six vessels will receive their fit of Harpoons in the next future, the MOD has confirmed.

Observation of the current Type 26 design, however, suggests that it is not possible to install the conventional stacks of canister launchers (used not just by Harpoon, but by the likes of Exocet, Otomat TESEO, PRBS-15 and Naval Strike Missile). Observing the images and the models showcased so far, there does not seem to be any adequate allocation of space for the installation of the launchers. On the Type 26, the typical locations in which such an installation normally happens (amidship between radar mast and funnel, or, in british style, behind the main gun/ VL missile silo) do not appear to be properly dimensioned and kept clear of obstacles. In particular, the space between the sensors mast and funnel does appear to be really too restricted. And effectively, the conventional launcher for anti-ship missiles was last seen in the very first concept pictures for Type 26: as the design progressed, they vanished.

The twin quadruple launchers commonly used by current-generation western anti-ship missiles were clearly shown on the very first Type 26 design. Soon, they vanished.

Today's Type 26 has changed a lot, and improved a lot.

The current arrangements of the ship's spaces and armament suggest that the Royal Navy wants to make the big step with the new frigate, moving entirely to vertical launch weaponry.

While the decision to move fully to vertical launch makes perfect sense, the Royal Navy is going to find itself in trouble because of timeframes that do not match.

The Type 26 frigate will, under current plans, begin to entry into service from around 2021, and will then replace, one for one, the Type 23s at a rhythm of roughly one per year all the way out to 2036.

With the Harpoon apparently incapable to move from the Type 23 retiring to the Type 26 entering in service in replacement, the number of royal navy ships fitted with an anti-surface capability will shrink dramatically from the third T23 onwards (assuming that the Harpoons removed from the first two Type 23s would move on to the last two Type 45 destroyers).

With the risk of having to wait until 2030 or 2035/36 before a new missile is inducted, the Type 26 could be without an anti-surface weapon for over a decade, and the Royal Navy could go down to as few as six or seven vessels fitted with such a capability, before a replacement comes with SPEAR Cap 5.

Alternatives?

In theory, there are alternatives to a Type 26 without anti-ship capability for a decade. Going MK41 with the VLS cells would keep the door open for adoption of the LRASM, for example, which the US Navy is developing and trialing right now as a solution to its own Harpoon problem. The US Navy is, in many ways, are already in trouble for an acute shortage of anti-ship capability on its surface vessels. The old Harpoon is seen as increasingly outdated and ineffective against modern decoys and missile defences, and the number of ships fitted with it in the American fleet is much lower than one would think: attempts to develop a vertical launch Harpoon never went ahead, and the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers have not been fitted with Harpoon launchers ever since the Flight IIA production lot started.

The US Navy is, in many ways, in the situation that the Royal Navy seems doomed to experience in the 2020s, and is trying to take swift action with LRASM to remove this dangerous gap in capability.

The alarming fact is that the US Navy at least still has submarine-launched and air-launched Harpoon. The Royal Navy lost the first capability in 2003, and the second in 2009/10, when the Nimrod, last british air platform with a heavy anti-ship missile, was withdrawn from service.

Unfortunately, even the adoption of MK41 cells does not automatically remove the anti-ship missile problem: it is hard to imagine the Royal Navy having the money for a substantial investment in an interim anti-ship missile, while simultaneously having to keep spending on Harpoon and on the development of SPEAR Cap 5.

A large ship-launched anti-ship missile is an important capability, but a bit of a niche one, which hasn’t seen much use in the operations the RN has been a part of. Seeing how complex it is to get funding even for an expanded Tomahawk arsenal, despite it being used all the time, arguing for more investment for the anti-ship niche is likely to be a desperate, hopeless struggle.

One solution could come, once more, via Tomahawk. The solution could be the Maritime Interdiction Multimission capability proposal, also known as Multi Mission Tomahawk. The MMT would introduce a moving-target seeker and an upgraded data link to the Tomahawk Block IV, turning it into an hunter-killer weapon capable to locate and pursue moving targets including warships out at sea.

The MMT idea has been around since 2009, and has been briefly brought back in the spotlight in August 2012, when the US Navy and Raytheon were reported as “close” to going ahead with the development of an anti-ship capability package for the TLAM Block IV.

Early data for the “Maritime Interdiction” missile, released by the US Navy, assumed that the modified Block IV would be able to search for targets in an area of 30 square nautical miles, accounting for possible errors in the position of the target supplied by third-party directors and, of course, for the movement of the target at speeds of up to 30 knots. The range of the missile for such a complex anti-ship engagement would be around 500 nautical miles. The navigation system, the data link and seeker would have to be reinforced to ensure the missile can find its target even through jamming and decoys.  

The Multi-Mission Tomahawk was intended to be US Navy Interim Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare solution, but as of April 2013 the US Navy seems to have abandoned the Tomahawk Block IV conversion, while DARPA-funded work on the Lockheed Martin LRASM A (a weapon derived from the JASSM cruise missile) is ongoing, with a successful test on August 27 that involved launch from a B-1 bomber against a barge loaded with empty containers acting as target. The missile hit the containers as expected. Preliminary work to demonstrate launch from MK41 vertical cells was completed on September 4, and next year, LRASM should be fired twice from MK41 VLS cells, demonstrating its ship-launch capability. A submarine-launch variant could follow.

For the Royal Navy, a Tomahawk solution would have been easier to acquire, because it wouldn’t have been a total departure from established logistics and knowledge basis, and it would have fitted in the idea of expanding TLAM attack capability, as the missile retains full utility as a long range land strike weapon, indeed adding greater capabilities against complex, mobile targets.

The Tomahawk solution could still happen, though: the US Navy is still working on choosing its next move. LRASM could be chosen without a competition, but Raytheon and Boeing are ready with their own proposals if the pentagon decides to give a chance to other systems.

Sea Ceptor for everyone?

If the anti-ship segment of the RN capability is close to extinction, there is at least some relief in the Anti-Air missile arena. With an order placed for the production of CAMM Sea Ceptor missiles, the Royal Navy can now work to get it on all relevant platforms.

In March this year, a study should have been concluded, on the costs connected with eventual installation of Sea Ceptor on the new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. There is no open-source evidence of the results of the study, nor can we realistically expect to see an investment made any time soon to fit the missile system, but it remains an option. The carriers are fitted with the Long Range Radar and with the Artisan 3D radar (Type 997 in RN service), both of which could feed targeting information to the missiles, which are, differently from Sea Wolf, fire-and-forget and would pursue their targets autonomously after being launched, with the aid of information relayed from the ship via secure Data Link.

The first platform that will get the Sea Ceptor in current planning is the Type 23 frigate. The first vessel should swap Sea Wolf for the new CAMM during a refit in 2016. The ship has not yet been identified. The work to be carried out will involve the removal of some five tons of Sea Wolf cabinets and old electronics, plus the two guidance radars, in exchange for a far more modern, smaller and lighter data link system.

The missile silo on the bow will be modified with the removal of the 32 Sea Wolf tubes and the installation of CAMM electronics. The Sea Ceptor missiles will be fitted in quadpacks into 12 sealed wells to protect the canisters from the sea water washing over the deck. The number of missiles carried will be boosted to a maximum of 48.  

On Type 23, the CAMM will be feed data on the targets by the Type 997 radar, which is due to replace the earlier Type 996 over the coming years, with HMS Iron Duke having received the first-of-class fit already.

The Sea Ceptor fit will then be physically moved out of the Type 23s as they are withdrawn from service, and installed on the new Type 26. The images and models shown so far about the new frigate show that the 48 air-defence missiles will be distributed in rows of 6 canister-launchers each, with four such rows arranged in the bow missile silo and a further four rows aft of the funnel mast.

The canister-launchers are weather-proof as they have been developed to be used (from around 2020) by the Army as replacement for the elderly Rapier, so they do not appear to have additional protection: on the Type 26, they are installed high enough in the superstructure to be protected by the sea spray without having to be sealed into enclosed wells like on the Type 23.

The Type 997 radar will also move on from T23 to T26.

Around 2016 there will also be the chance to transform a potential problem in an opportunity. The Royal Navy has decided that it will withdraw from service the Goalkeeper CIWS system, to standardize instead on the Phalanx (36 mounts + 5 new on order). This is due to the fact that the number of Goalkeeper mounts in the fleet by then will have fallen dramatically in number, due to HMS Illustrious bowing out in 2014 with her three mounts, leaving the sole Albion and Bulwark with a total of four mounts (although Albion’s ones have already been removed as she was put into reserve and mothballed).

In 2016 it is planned that the two LPDs will trade places in the fleet, with HMS Albion being refitted and regenerated to return into active service, while HMS Bulwark enters her own period of mothball (unless the SDSR, as I personally hope, allocates the 20 or so million a year needed to operate the second LPD as well).

The LPDs should both receive their Type 997 radar during the next refits, and they can be expected to be fitted with a couple of Phalanx CIWS in replacement of Goalkeeper.

The opportunity I see, however, is that of fitting the bow CIWS on top of the deckhouse, instead of on top of the small superstructure used by Goalkeeper. There might be some problem since the two manned GAM-BO1 20mm light guns for surface close defence are located up there as well, but it should not be an insurmountable issue. The GAM-BO1 are arguably well in need of being replaced by the DS30M remotely operated 30mm gun mounts being adopted throughout the fleet, as well.

Phalanx has no under-deck penetration, while the much larger Goalkeeper turret takes one deck of space. By removing Goalkeeper and relocating the frontal CIWS, the LPDs would have a little bit of precious free space on the bow for the fitting of CAMM missile cells.

This would of course have a cost, but it would massively increase the survivability of the LPDs against all kind of threats: the Royal Navy is fully aware of how vulnerable these large ships can be, especially when docked down for landing craft operations. Air attacks, swarm attacks with FIACs and missiles are all very serious threats, and CAMM would counter them all (the missile has a secondary anti-surface attack capability, good against fast and suicide attack boats).  

The LPD problem that could be an opportunity: replacing Goalkeeper

The small superstructure on the bow, currently occupied by Goalkeeper's under deck segment, offers precious space that could be used to fit CAMM cells.

 

Moving Phalanx on top of the deckhouse could be a problem because of the old GAM-BO1 gun mounts. Imagine doing this with a Phalanx mounts a few meters away, buzzing and taking aim and perhaps opening fire. The GAM-BO1 could and should really be replaced by the unmanned 30mm mounts as on the rest of the fleet

On the export front, there is some initial sign of interest from Italy. The Italian army will need to replace its Skyguard batteries in the near future, and CAMM is seen as an attractive option. MBDA Italy and MBDA UK could end up collaborating on the land variant of CAMM, with MBDA Italy looking at the command and targeting system, introducing elements of the SPADA 2000 air defence batteries. For sure, CAMM is a very interesting missile system, with a great potential and very good chances of gaining international success.