Gaps, gaps, gaps - part 2

Part 1 of this report: Gaps, Gaps, Gaps


Next in line is the FRES SV vehicle family. Unfortunately, the NAO report covers a period that ends before the most interesting developments. Following confirmation of the enduring requirement for FRES SV at the completition of the SDSR, and indeed following the army restructuring program (Army 2020), the number of vehicles to be purchased and timings have all changed.
Entry into service will happen at least 9 months later than originally planned. The date is not disclosed, but we are possibly looking at 2018, if not later. I've read that CVR(T) vehicles will not be entirely gone before 2026.

An option that could be given the go ahead in the immediate future would however partly compensate the delay to entry in service by bringing forwards development and demonstration of the RECCE Block 2 group of vehicle variants.
The FRES SV has been broken down into multiple parts, all with their own decision Gates. So far, activity has focused on RECCE Block 1 (Scout vehicle, Armoured Personnel Carrier, Repair, Recovery and Common Base Platform) but the Block 2 could now be added to the ongoing activity, to demonstrate Ambulance, Command Post and Engineer Recce variants.
Part of the Block 2 should also be the Joint Fires direction vehicle, destined to carry a full six-man Fire Support Team of the Royal Artillery, with full equipment for the direction, under-armor or dismounted, of mortar, artillery and air attacks.

A RECCE Block 3 is also envisaged for the future, but budget uncertainty makes me be particularly careful about these future, as yet uncommitted to parts of the program. Bringing forwards demonstration of Block 2, to include the vehicle variants it covers into the Initial Operating Capability would be a very welcome move, as it would greatly increase the chances for the Army to actually get the vehicles it needs.

The Type 45 destroyers are now going strong, and the program has achieved a very positive in year net cost variation of -108 millions, which have been handed back for use elsewhere in the equipment programme. Reportedly, this year we'll see up to four Type 45 fitted with Harpoon missiles, presumably coming from the retired Type 22 frigates, but the NAO does not speak about it. Major improvements in Combat System software and communications (SATURN has been fitted) are reported.

The Typhoon Future Capability Program is, as always, a source of misery. While the Typhoon program registers a positive result, with a cost reduction of 69 millions, the Future Capability Program 1 for introduction of advanced Air-Ground features reports a 22 million cost increase (to 441 million) and, more importantly, a massive 18 months delay, to December 2013, which also affect the Meteor as we have seen before.

A combination of technical complexity, Partner Nation disagreement on a synthetic training solution and delays in agreement of an international support arrangement have caused the delay.

Anyway, the SDSR has pushed to the right the requirement for Typhoon ground-attack capability to 2015.
Future Capability Program 1 introduces Paveway IV, full functionality of the Litening III targeting pods and other improvements.
Future Capability Program 2 will follow, at some point, hopefully including integration of Storm Shadow and Brimstone.

An Active Electronic Scanned Array voice has made its appearance into the Report, with Initial Investment Decision made in July 2011, but no other detail is provided. The budgeted-for date of entry in service is currently classified.

Regarding the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, the NAO reports that the current plan is for the upgrade of 445 vehicles (all variants, including FV514 Artillery Observation Post, but excluding the Battery Command vehicles which appear not to be in use anymore, with a number having been converted in Ambulances by the REME for use in Afghanistan) from an affordable fleet of 565.
The FV514 vehicle is very important to the future of the Royal Artillery. As part of WCSP it is getting mechanical, electric and protection upgrades, but a separate programs will have to be funded at some point to upgrade the fire targeting and direction equipment. I plan to write an article in the near future looking in more detail into the Warrior situation, and more info will be provided there. 

Importantly, the NAO report confirms that the Armored Battlefield Support Vehicle element is not dead, despite having been silent ever since it was made a part of Warrior CSP by the 2005 defence industrial strategy.
The ABSV is described as:

A new variant, replacing obsolescent platforms, that has equal protection and mobility to the core fighting platforms. Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle is currently in the Concept Phase and is subject to future approval.

The ABSV, also known as "turretless Warrior" is meant to replace a number of FV430 tracked vehicles inside armored infantry battlegroups. Also known earlier as Battle Group Support Vehicle (BGSV) and earlier still as M1P1 (tracked vehicle which was accompanied by the also cancelled M2P2, the 8x8 Boxer vehicle), it has had a complex history to say the least.
At least 3 prototypes were ordered to then Alvis Vickers, and at least one was built and demonstrated. The requirement has varied anywhere between 125 and 300-plus vehicles, with Ambulance, Command Post and General Support variants envisaged.

With how things are evolved over the years, now ABSV and FRES SV Recce Block 2 are kind of in conflict for the same roles, replacing FV430 vehicle variants.
Using turretless Warriors for the roles might cost less than build a wholly new FRES SV, and of course having almost all the battalion using Warrior mechanics is good for logistics, but insertion of technology which is so important for Command and Ambulance vehicles in particular suggest that going for a new, modern FRES variant is desirable.

However, the FRES Engineer/Bridgelayer vehicle has been cancelled, while a Warrior bridgelayer prototype has been showcased in 2011. Since the requirement is still there (some 35 vehicles were envisaged), to support the FRES Scout, ABSV might end up delivering Bridgelayers instead of ambulances, command posts and APCs.
There is also another requirement that has been ignored this far, which is that for a Mortar Carrier replacing the relevant FV430 variant currently in use. As the Mortar Carrier role should not require a too complex modification to the Warrior hull, and since the requirement would be for a low number of vehicles (between 6 and 9 vehicles for each armoured infantry battalion, so around 54 at most) it might make sense to convert surplus Warrior hulls as a low-cost, big-gain program.

This way, FRES SV RECCE Block 2 would replace APCs (not overly complex, but required in significant numbers that Warrior wouldn't be able to cover) and the complex Command, Ambulance, Communications and Engineer Recce / Joint Fires variants, while surplus Warrior hulls could be used for covering the need for Bridgelayers and Mortar Carriers. The numbers are also compatible with what the NAO says, as 565 - 445 gives 120, a number of hulls more than adequate to meet the two requirements i suggest to tackle.

IOC for Warrior CSP remains defined as one Armoured Company equipped and trained collectively at Level 2. Expected in November 2018.

Among the pre-Main Gate programmes appears MARS, which will of course move up into Post-Main Gate in the 2013 report, since the contract has since been awarded for MARS FT.
The NAO report confirms what i had already reported: the procurement of the MARS Fleet Solid Support Ships currently sits on the White Board, waiting to be given the go ahead later in the decade, post SDSR 2015.
Money is planned to be provided from the core budget for assessment phase of Solid Support in the coming budget cycles.

One major, welcome programs in Pre-Main Gate phase is the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance (NEADS), which is the Army's effort to modernize the obsolete air defence capability currently available.
A very complex program, it is considered of prioritary importance by the Army since future operations are expected to be conducted in far less permissive environments. NEADS is meant to expand the defence capability to give protection from the whole range of threats: aircrafts, helicopters, cruise missiles and, very importantly, against UAVs and Rocket-Artillery-Mortars. 

Three Increments are planned:

Increment 1 will replace Urgent Operational Requirement equipment with an enduring Counter Rocket Artillery & Mortar automated sense and warn capability from 2015.
This capability is being used in Afghanistan to protect UK bases from rocket artillery and mortar attack. This was provided under Treasury Urgent Operation Requirement Funding. Automatic Sense and Warn capabilities will be brought into the core equipment programme.

Increment 2 will deliver an initial Counter-Unmanned Air Vehicle Capability and replace the existing Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar intercept capability from 2017 as well as sustain ground-based air defence in the Falkland Islands beyond 2020.


Increment 3 will improve protection against the remainder of the Difficult Air Targets with Full Operating Capability expected in 2027.

The Difficult Air Targets set includes cruise missiles, Unmanned Air Vehicles, Attack Helicopters and Rockets, Artillery and Mortars.

 

Automatic Sense and Warn UOR is an adaptation of the Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) equipment program for Afghanistan needs. Another element is JAPPLE. In 2011 i wrote this description, which should still be at least partially valid, even though not much info is available on this kind of systems, for obvious reasons.

The Joint Air Picture Provision of the Land Environment is active in Helmand since 2008. A team of eight, split between Camp Bastion and Lashkar Gah, provide the Joint Helicopter Command and to the Combined Forces HQ a 24-hours complete picture of activity going on in the air, to direct air defence efforts and de-conflict the Joint Helicopter Command routes and missions with the concurrent artillery fire or othe potential threats. In addition to this constant presence, the system also deploys small forward teams with troops where necessary. 

JAPPLE builds on the capability provided by the Automated Sense and Warn system: this was procured as UOR for Afghanistan, and is a combination of software and hardware capable to fuse together information coming from a number of sources, including MAMBA artillery locating/battlefield surveillance radars. Mainly, though, it uses two Giraffe ABM radars. The information is fused and transmitted on the LEAPP C2 network, and alarm of incoming attack is launched via the Waves towers installed in based in Afghanistan. Two Giraffe radars are in Bastion, two in Kandhar.

In the system, at some point, is likely to be integrated also the flow of informations coming from B-ISTAR sensors.

The whole system is currently manned by 5^th Regiment RA, with the support of roughly one battery deployed on each Herrick cycle by 16 RA.

LEAPP in itself (Land Environment Air Picture Provision) is a little known but invaluable programme which is going on from a few years, and that allowed the advanced JAPPLE to happen. LEAPP provides near real time correlated air picture for the land environment. It is a combination of control nodes and organic sensors, and a vital software, Bowman data radio-compatible, capable to link and connect all Royal Artillery assets (artillery batteries receive info and feed back into the system the data of their own firing trajectories, so that all things moving in the air can be mapped). LEAPP is deployed at formations Hqs, and provides its air picture to all users via NATO data link 16 and 11.

The report says that the C-RAM interception capability will be replaced in 2017, but please note that the British Army currently has not an in-service C-RAM interception capability. ASW is a detection and warning system only.
In Iraq, the Army deployed, as UOR, a number of american-made Centurion C-RAM trailers, fitted with suitably modified Phalanx CIWS guns taken from the Royal Navy's stock. However, for what i understand that was a temporary solution: Centurion was not deployed to Afghanistan, the trailers have been handed back to the US and the Phalanx guns returned to the Royal Navy.
The "existing" C-RAM capability is virtual, but a C-RAM protection system was promised in SDSR documents. Nice to see that they are sticking to that promise. 

We can assume that  connected to NEADS will also be the replacement for the now retired COBRA counter-artillery radar and for the active MAMBA: the Common Weapon Locating Radar, which should be the ARTHUR Mod C from Saab.
Entry in service should be in 2014 but an order has not yet been finalized.

Some 34 US-made Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar are in use after being procured as UOR. Most of them are in Afghanistan, but a number was also used to provide protection to the Olympic games in London. It's near certain that these precious radars are part of the solutions being brought into Core Budget.

The NAO does not go into such detail in its report, but includes this information:

Approval for the Assessment Phase 1 was given by the MOD Investment Approvals Board in February 2010, and ratified in June 2010 as part of the review by the new coalition Government.
The objective of the Assessment Phase 1 is to establish the most cost effective solution to the Increment 1 requirement and early de-risking activities for Increment 2.
The current approval covers Assessment Phase work required to reach Main Gate 1, which leads to the Demonstration and Manufacture phase for Increment 1 and effectively Increment 2 Initial Gate. The Assessment Phase has been structured into three workstreams as follows:

a. Workstream 0. Initial de-risking activities will identify and address any changes and further lessons learnt as a result of the evolving Land Environment Air Picture Provision and Urgent Operational Requirement projects and current operations. Further work will develop the architecture required to allow the incremental insertion of capability over the project lifecycle. This will also drive coherence into future Urgent Operational Requirement activity and address any scaling issues as a result of the Defence Review.

b. Workstream 1. The work stream will result in the down selection to a single affordable option to be presented at Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance Main Gate 1 to deliver the Automated Sense and Warn capability. A full option analysis will be undertaken to investigate retaining extant Urgent Operational Requirement and Core Programme components as well as alternative off the shelf solutions.

c. Workstream 2. This work stream will result in the development of a detailed system architecture and associated systems and technical requirements and initial evaluation of potential equipment options. It is planned to de-risk the overall Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance architecture, by integrating Future Local Area Air Defence Systems (Land) and High Velocity Missile models/ equipments into a representative Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance system and also undertake an initial assessment of Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortars effectors.

In 2010, associated with the Strategic Defence and Security Review a number of options were raised to maintain alignment with wider Defence priorities. These were primarily associated with scaling and delivery timings.

An Industry Day was held in November 2010, at which a number of companies were briefed on the programme. Since then industry have been kept informed of developments via a series of newsletters. A series of one to one discussions with industry on Increment 1 is currently being conducted, following the Request for Information for Increment 1.

The NAO notes that, as of March 2012, NEADS activities were on track and making good progress towards the first Main Gate point. The Main Gate expected date, however, is classified and obscured in the report.
Surprisingly, the NAO shows FLAADS(L) as expected to hit IOC or even In-Service date in November 2016: i'm not sure how we should read this passage, however. While FLAADS(M) has long been expected to start replacing Sea Wolf on the Type 23s from 2016, Rapier replacement was expected not to be funded before 2018 at the earliest. I'd be surprised if it had been brought forwards.
Not because it is not needed, but because of budget considerations.

Another program of interest is the already mentioned upgrade to the Spearfish torpedo.

Spearfish is the sole heavyweight torpedo in the UK arsenal and is carried aboard Trafalgar and Vanguard Class submarines. The weapon was introduced into service in 1994 and is the only submarine launched weapon for offensive and defensive operations against ships and other submarines. Spearfish will be deployed in the Astute Class from 2013 and an upgraded Spearfish weapon is the planning assumption for equipping the future Deterrent.

The Spearfish Upgrade project is required to deliver a mid-life upgrade to sustain a credible and safe weapon for future submarine operations. The scope of the project includes digitisation of the weapon, the provision of a new insensitive munition warhead to replace the current ageing warhead, changes to the fuel system and the introduction of a new communications link. The upgrade will address obsolescence and also enable future reductions in through life costs.

Assessment Phase began with a contract assigned to BAE in April 2010, and will be completed in April 2014 with in-water trials. So far, the effort is progressing satisfactorily and on time. The new Insensitive Munition compliant warhead achieved the required level of technological maturity in January 2012 completing successful land based and underwater scale test firings undertaken in Germany and in the UK respectively.

The fibre optic dispensing system evaluation trials in April 2011 proved that the fibre in use was too weak and required replacement with a more ruggerized one. There are no delays to report anyway.

Initial design work to define and develop the interface between the upgraded weapon and the submarine combat system was completed in February 2012. Work is ongoing.

Regarding CEC, the NAO unfortunately confirms that:

Planning Round 2012 has announced United Kingdom Cooperative Engagement Capability Project Delete Option E12AW006S has been taken and is not part of the funded Core Programme. Delete Option also identified £1m to conduct project close down activities in Financial Year12/13.

It is a big loss of capability, in particular for the Type 45 destroyers. It is not clear how this PR12 decision affects the possibility, for the Navy, to resurrect the CEC effort in the coming years.

Particularly unwelcome is this passage:

Once the Sea King leaves service there will be some consequent capability gaps until upgraded Merlin helicopters can take on the tasks of providing helicopter lift from naval vessels to the shore (a two-year gap until April 2018) and providing airborne surveillance and control capabilities for the future aircraft carriers (a potential four‑year gap until 2020). The Department is examining alternative means of closing these capability gaps.

Regarding Crowsnest, the intended replacement for the Sea King MK7 ASaC, we will know more this year, if plans do not change: assessment phase will finally be launched. Avoiding this particular gap is extremely important.
Just as unwelcome is the gap in amphibious support helicopter capability. It is not clear how this must be read: the plan so far has been that in 2016 the Commando Helicopter Force will take over the Merlin HC3/3A, but properly "navalized" HC4-standard airframes were not going to arrived before 2017.
In the disaster, we have to hope that the April 2018 is the new date for conversion to HC4 standard of the Merlins: if the delay is to be intended as total lack of helicopters for CHF for two years due to postponed Merlin transfer, the only sane option is keeping the Sea King going for a little longer. It would be totally irresponsible to do otherwise.



Finally, they have nothing to do with the NAO report, but they are relevant news:

- The british armed forces have selected their new sidearm: it's the 9mm Glock 17 Gen 4 pistol, fitted with Picatinny rail under the barrel. It is lighter than the Browning, the clip holds 17 rounds (vs 13) and it allows much shorter reaction times from draw to firing of a full sequence of 5 rounds.

25.000 pistols have been ordered, at a cost of 9 million. Afghanistan-deployed troops, of course, will get the weapon first. Firearms distributor Viking Arms Limited, of Harrogate, will deliver guns and holsters.

- An UOR has also been financed to procure a number of LSD500 laser surveillance and sniper detection systems from France's CILAS. The systems are for use in base protection in Afghanistan.
I don't question the wisdom of the purchase which i'm sure is made for good reasons, but bases have already the Boomerang III system, while soldiers have seen the UOR for a body-worn or rifle-mounted sniper detection system cancelled last year. I would have preferred to fill the capability gap in terms of wearable/rifle mounted shooter detection system first, to extend the capability to foot patrols away from FOBs and vehicles (a number of vehicles in theatre are fitted with Boomerang III). 

The ballistic anti-ship missile panic

The reports about China's development of a ballistic anti-ship missile have given new (questionable) arguments for air force fans to attack the aircraft carriers. Too vulnerable, they say, forgetting that ballistic missiles have been a threat for land airfields for many years. At one point, Vertical Take-Off and Landing was the answer to what was expected to be "the end of all airfields", which would be devastated by barrages of missiles and bombs. 
Days ago I wrote a quick comment piece that proved, sadly, a prophecy: while people obsessed about "too vulnerable" aircraft carriers, an attack on Camp Bastion took place, and 6 US Harriers were destroyed on the ground. 
Although it does not appear that this time indirect fire was the main threat, the attack on Bastion proves me right on both the need for improved Base-ISTAR and also the need for an effective C-RAM capability. 

Today I want to return on the subject of the ballistic carrier killer and look at the matter in greater detail to make a few considerations. 

The DF-21D

The new bogey man, I call it, because it is causing all sort of bold assertions and an unjustified amount of panic. The Dong Feng (Eastern Wind, in Chinese) DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod. 4 in NATO nomenclature) is, reportedly, a ship-killing variant of a well known two-stage, solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) land-based medium range ballistic missile in service in China for several years in nuclear (DF-21A) and conventionally armed variants (DF-21C). The DF-21 itself is a derivation, engineered in the 90s', of the Ju-Lang JL-1 missile originally developed to be launched by the submarines of the Xia class.
The DF-21A is road-mobile, mounted on a trailer towed by a large truck, while the DF-21C is mounted on a WS-2400 Tractor, Erector, Launcher (TEL) 10x10 high-mobility vehicle, which is also used by the DF-21D, to enhance survivability by allowing the system to move offroad, making it harder to locate.
The DF-21C has a payload of 2000 kg, and the DF-21D has probably the same space and weight envelopes. Differently from the C variant, however, the D needs a propulsion system and a complex guidance system fitted in that same space and weight. 

DF-21C missiles on parade. The DF-21D is supposed to look very much like its conventional brother, and share the same TEL vehicle.

Much of what we know about the DF-21D is a mix of speculation, Taiwanese-intelligence and US Intelligence analysis. 
We believed the range of the DF-21D is 2000 km but 3000 have also been suggested, and we assume that it is armed with a single, large maneuverable warhead (MARV) capable to pierce the armored decks of a Nimitz aircraft carrier, even if there is who talks of submunitions meant to destroy sensors and airplanes parked on the deck. 

The warhead is possibly equipped with a hybrid propulsion system, with liquid or solid fuel, in order to be able to maneuver and avoid interception in its exo-atmospheric flight phase. 
Unofficial Chinese sources say that the warhead is fitted with a Synthetic Aperture Radar in order to look down over the target area and locate the ships it is supposed to hit, and for terminal guidance would be provided by a multi-mode seeker combining millimeter-wave radar, electro-optic seeker and possibly passive radar homing. 

According to Taiwanese intelligence reports, the DF-21D should have entered service at the end of the 11th 5-years Plan of China, so around 2010, with a first production block of 15 to 20 missiles. Production is estimated at 10 to 15 units per year, allowing a force, by 2020, that in theory could number 150 launchers. 
For what we know, so far the DF-21D has never been tested against targets at sea, but only against land objectives.

In the words of China itself, the DF-21D is a long term capability that was first announced in 2003 and that plans to deliver: 

- By 2010, a ballistic anti-ship missile capability with a range of 1800 to 2000 Km. 
- Improve range and targeting by 2015
- Extend engagement capability at intercontinental level by 2020 (14.000 km or more) 

This is part of a larger plan of strengthening for the Strategic Missile forces that includes development of hypersonic missiles with global attack capability by 2025. 

A graphic demonstration of the Ballistic Missile capabilities available to China. In red, the indicative range of the DF-21 family.

In the Chinese forces, ballistic missiles are assigned to the 2nd Artillery Corps, which controls the nuclear and conventional missile resources as well as organic Electronic Warfare elements, force protection and support. 
The assumption is that China has so far been giving the DF-21 to two Missile Brigades based in front of Taiwan, each expected to be organized on 6 battalions with 17 launchers each in 2 batteries. This organization is that of the land attack DF-15 missile brigades, that, we assume, will be maintained. 
Within these two brigades, the anti-ship variant of the DF-21 missile is supposed to have been trialed and brought to IOC in 2010. 
Up to 40 anti-ship systems might be in service as we speak. 

And by this time, the number of "assumptions" is already very high. 

The doctrine

The DF-21D employment is part of an operational concept adopted by the Chinese forces to confront an enemy (the US Navy) that they cannot face directly with hopes of victory. 
The use of long-range bombers with anti-ship missiles is nothing new, as it is the approach the old URSS used before China. 
And ballistic anti-ship missiles were probably imagined by the Russians, as well. The idea is that the ballistic missile gives the US navy a difficult enemy to deal with, without China needing to risk any asset near the carrier battlegroups of the Americans. 

Obviously, the long range anti-ship ballistic missile is meant to neutralize aircraft carriers sailing towards China, but it is also meant to cut communications line across the Pacific and isolate hostile powers in the area (Taiwan first of all, obviously, but Japan a close second). 
The ballistic anti-ship missile is meant to keep the US away from the area, in a perfect example of Anti-Access strategy. 
To do so, the conventional DF-21 missiles meant for land attack could be used first, to force the US Navy (incapable to determine the kind of warhead fitted to the missile) to employ its SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles before the actual anti-ship Dong Feng is launched. 
The old tactic of saturation, nothing more, nothing less. 

The US are not helped in countering this tactic by the fact that the SM3 intercepts enemy missiles in their exo-atmospheric phase, so that during a saturation attack done with normal ballistic missiles there would be no real possibility to wait and track the trajectories of the warheads re-entering the atmosphere to hit only those on a dangerous trajectory. 
The US Navy would have to run the risk and hold fire, or potentially waste a huge number of precious interceptors against missiles with nearly zero effective chances of hitting the ships at sea. After that, the actual anti-ship guided warheads would follow, and find the defences of the carrier battlegroup severely short of ammunition. 
To make things worse, currently there is pretty much no way to reload vertical launch cells at sea with new missile canisters, making saturation a real issue, even for ships such as the Burkes and Ticonderoga, which carry dozen of interceptors. 


The doubts

There are many reasons to doubt of the effectiveness of the ballistic anti-ship missile. In our estimates, we are likely giving the new system capabilities it actually does not have. 
The reports about hybrid propulsion, SAR radar and multi-mode seeker bring forth several questions, from the size of the warhead to the feasibility of putting any kind of radar and electro-optic sensor inside such an atmospheric re-entry vehicle. 
The space for the actual warhead is likely to be tiny, if there really is a propulsion system and multiple targeting sensors fitted to the re-entry vehicle. 

Even assuming the tremendous speed of the re-entry into Atmosphere gives the warhead sufficient kinetic energy to be lethal on impact, we come straight to the next issue: developing a seeker window that allows the radar and electro-optic sensors to look out towards the target while resisting to the heat and stress of re-entry into atmosphere. 
The temperatures involved, the speed, the violence of the impact with the atmosphere, are tremendous. A tiny vulnerability in the heat shield means catastrophe, as the shuttle Columbia demonstrated not so long ago with tragic consequences for its crew. 

The actual feasibility of a maneuvering warhead that, during the re-entry phase, can significantly alter its course to detect, track and pursue moving ships that will have changed their position by a good bit since the DF-21D has been launched is also questionable. 
Hitting a ship at sea is not like delivering a large warhead on a static land target with an acceptable CEP. Delivering a nuke or a conventional warhead over a static target of which we know the position is one thing. Hitting a moving ship in the middle of the sea is a whole different story. 
There is too much stuff that must be crammed into the re-entry vehicle. Technology might be moving fast, but it is hard to believe that the Chinese have solved all the issues involved. 

Crucially, the biggest vulnerability of the DF-21D is in the "Find" phase. Even assuming the missile can do what it promises on the tin, the Chinese first need to detect and track the position of the ships to be hit. And this is a task far more complex than most people realize. 
The crucial capability here is that provided by satellites. The Chinese are in fact putting satellites into orbit to provide coverage to the South China Sea, with a number already deployed and 8 more planned. The satellites are of the HJ-1 type, fitted with SAR radar and/or electro-optic sensors, and of the Yaogan type, fitted for ELINT tasks. 

Realistic...?

 
It'll be around satellites that the opening phases of any conflict between the two superpowers will revolve. The "player" that shoots down the most enemy satellites while preserving more of its own, gains a fundamental upper hand. 
Blind the satellites, destroying them or using electronic warfare or just hiding from them (you can actually hide from most satellites, guiding your ships into a different area of sea at the right time, and it is a simple geometrical issue, with times and routes easily calculated upon observation of the orbits of the enemy satellites) and you have seriously reduced the chances of the DF-21D to achieve anything. 

Iran's own missile 

Iran also claims to have developed a ballistic anti-ship missile, but its claim is even less substantial and raises even more doubts than China's own. 
Iran showed images on its state television of a barge in the water being hit and sunk by what was presented as the warhead of a ballistic missile, but hitting a motionless barge for the state television's camera is hardly demonstration of any realistic capability.

The countermeasures 

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Navy carrier wing has massively reduced its long range air defence effort, focusing more on land attack. It cut back on dedicate CAP patrols, and removed the "air defence" fighter from the Wing with the F14, along with the long range anti-air missile, the Phoenix. 
One countermeasure to the Chinese threat will be reversing these decisions, strengthening the carrier wing against air threats. In this sense, the interest for increasing the number of missiles carried by the F35 and the interest in the Meteor long-range missile are both indicative. 
Improved air defence will be indispensable to keep bombers, missiles and, crucially, reconnaissance airplanes and UAVs away from the battlegroup. 

Improved anti-ballistic capability, on land and at sea, is already a necessity, with the proliferation of ballistic threats, from the SCUD to the Iskander, up to the Dong Feng. It is very much likely that the UK itself will have to take note of the ballistic threat at some point (currently, it has nearly zero capability of its own to counter ballistic missiles) and the MOD has indeed studies open, and a partnership with BAE to keep the Type 45 and its Sampson radar up to date and readily available to take on a ABM role. The Type 45 also has space for 16 new missile cells, while Raytheon has developed a data link that would quickly enable the destroyer to employ the SM3 missile in ABM role.

The US is planning to expand progressively the capability of the SM3 missile, and plans to have more ships ABM capable, and more interceptor missiles at the ready. 
There are also studies to fit AMRAAMs with Infra-Red seekers, adapting them as ballistic missile killers, and this could be a cost-effective measure capable to massively increase the resilience of deployed forces against the ballistic threat, even if this project is intended to kill a ballistic missile in its boost phase, thus requiring the launching airplanes to enter enemy airspace. It would arguably be better to have more possibilities of hitting the enemy missiles in the re-entry phase, to counter the Dong Feng. 
The US Navy is also due to enhance air defence for its ships with the SM6, a Standard missile fitted with the radar seeker of the AMRAAM to finally give the Aegis system a fire-and-forget weapon, in place of the current semi-active missiles. This will greatly help in reducing the risk of saturation in front of massive air attacks. The UK in this area leads the way thanks to the formidable performances of the Aster/Sampson combination. 

The age of the UAV can help, too. The US Navy is investing to bring, by 2018 or 2020, the first UCAV into the carrier air wings, as a platform capable to collect intelligence and strike enemy targets at greater distance from the enemy.  This too can be an effective defence: the further away you are from the enemy shore, the harder you are to find and target.


Conclusions 

It is way too early to be frightened by a weapon system of dubious effectiveness, known mostly through stories, suggestions and guesses. There are many good reasons why we should doubt of the effective capabilities of the DF-21D, and there are, in general, good countermeasures already on the way. 
While it would be stupid to ignore the Dong Feng appearance, it would be even worse to fall into panic and start with unsustainable programs for weapons adequate to counter this specific mooted threat. This would only make China happy. It is a trick that NATO itself used against URSS in the Cold War. To fall for the same trick would be rather embarrassing. 

Even more unjustifiable to my eyes is the position of those who say that the aircraft carrier is now "too vulnerable" and destined to lose importance and quickly become obsolete. Its effective vulnerability is questionable, and arguably inferior, in many ways, to the vulnerability of land airbases, no matter how well defended. 
Ballistic missiles have been and are a threat for airfields from many years. It is possible that, in the future, they will be a threat to aircraft carriers as well. But this should not lead to bold and dumb claims.

Ultimately, the "obsolescence" of the aircraft carrier is denied by the simple fact that airplanes, manned or not, still need bases in order to operate. And airplanes are, today more than ever before, fundamental in any kind of operation. 
In my opinion, it is more "likely" that we will see a submarine aircraft carrier one day, more than is likely that we will see the obsolescence of floating bases for aircrafts. 
Just as we depend on runways on land, we depend on runways on the sea. Both kinds of runways are vulnerable in their own ways. 
But until the airplane becomes obsolete, or somehow ceases to need a base from which to operate, there is no alternative to the aircraft carrier just as there is no alternative to the use of airports. 

Has anyone tried to think of the vulnerability of any kind of fleet at sea without the air cover and air support provided by a carrier air wing...?  
Also, has anyone tried to think of the vulnerability of air bases in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, when on the opposing coast, in China, literally thousands of ballistic missiles are based, ready to be launched for a massive opening strike...? 
Has anyone noticed the events in Camp Bastion...? 

Try and think about it. You're probably going to change opinion about the "vulnerability" of the aircraft carrier.  

Priorities...?

A new rocket attack launched by the Taliban has hit Bagram airfield, with five rockets hitting inside the perimeter, causing three dead and the destruction of one parked american Chinook helicopter.
Mortar and rocket attacks are still very common on FOBs, and the british forces have experimented rocket attacks on airfields, with Kandahar being hit in 2005 with the loss of an Harrier and the damaging of a second, temporarily removing 20% of the air support available, at the time represented by 6 Harriers.
Attacks on airfields, with mortars and rockets, are a daily thing around the world, and they are a plague that has not yet been defeated. Attacks as successful as this last one on Bagram or the 2005's attack on Kandahar are relatively rare, but we should not forget that there are other effects to the RAM (Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) offensive: mainly, the enormous number of precious "boots on the ground" that become tied in to the protection of the airfield.

Kandahar airfield, crucial for the prosecution of operations in Afghanistan, is protected by a multinational force of over 700 men, the force of an Armoured Infantry Battalion in the british army.
This always includes a RAF Regiment field squadron for force protection.
The rationale of this is that patrols and defensive operations happen outside the wire, expanding the safe perimeter around the base to a distance that makes mortar and rocket attack virtually impossible.
This is an effective method, but a resource-intensive one. 

The inner layer of defence is provided by artillery locating radars and sensors (the UK urgently procured 34 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars LCMR from the US for operations in Afghanistan) that provide a warning for the troops to get to cover before the shells hit. The radars are also meant to cue the fire of C-RAM defense systems, but the UK has not deployed any to Afghanistan, while a number of Centurion systems (naval Phalanx 1B modified and mounted on trailers) were leased from the americans and employed in Afghanistan by joint-services batteries made up of Royal Artillery and Navy personnel.

The investment in C-RAM systems is relatively little, even in the US. In the UK, with the end of the deployment in Iraq is also ended the brief but important story of C-RAM for the deployed army. Germany is the only european country seriously addressing the C-RAM requirement, with the MANTIS system, probably the best one available at the moment. Italy's Oto Melara is working on the Porcupine system, with an italian army order anticipated, but budget issues are slowing down the process and adding uncertainty.
The RAM threat, however, has not gone away, nor it has been defeated. It continues to eat up resources and it continues to cause losses.

But the attention of most is not conquered by relatively little, dumb rockets hitting land airfields, which could well be civilian ones soon or later, causing far worse bloodshed. No. Most press, most "experts" and many commenters like it more to try and sell the argument that the aircraft carrier, the floating airfield which featured in all conflicts after the end of the Second World War, is "vulnerable" when not even "obsolete", using the infamous chinese ballistic anti-ship missile as the new big bogeyman. An untested system of which we know little, but that is apparently proving almost as successful a deterrent in the mind of some as a nuclear arsenal.
This made even more ridiculous by the fact that, for years, we have been told by the same experts of the superior technology of the Western alliance, first against the (fearsome, but nonetheless downplayed) russian anti-ship missiles and then against China's own technology.

This new fear of the anti-ship missile reminds me of the UK Defence White Paper which, as early as 1957, talked of a future in which combat airplanes would cease to exist, replaced by Surface to Air missiles, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. 55 years later, that forecast sounds like a drunkard vision, and for the foreseeable future there will still be manned and unmanned airplanes flying.
Or the never-ending talk of end of the tank age, with the MBT "obsolete" and "useless" due to the menace of anti-tank missiles: reality shows that the battle tank is still going strong, with thousands of MBTs in production and with new models coming online, with Russia due to put in service a new type by 2015 and with the Asian countries putting their own new tanks in service.

The new movement of thought saying that the aircraft carrier is obsolete is even more ridiculous than those others, because it focuses on the carrier, but does not expand to the other surface vessels. How come, those are not vulnerable to anti-ship missiles? If they aren't because they can shot down the missiles, then the carrier isn't vulnerable either, when escorted, and no one would send one on a solo mission during war.
So, what is the explanation? Also, if we removed the "vulnerable" carrier from the equation, wouldn't the other surface warships be even more vulnerable because left without air cover?
If the carrier is doomed, then surely even more so is the Amphibious ship? What should we do, buy navies of sole submarines?

The aircraft carrier is actually less vulnerable than most other platforms. A succesful attack against an aircraft carrier hasn't been seen since the war in Korea. The UK itself failed to find and sink the argentinian carrier ARA 25 de Mayo in the Falklands in 1982, when the submarines failed to locate her.
As we know, the carrier had located the british surface fleet instead, and only the weather prevented the launch of the heavily loaded Skyraiders from her deck.

How many countries in the world have a realistic chance of finding, targeting and striking an aircraft carrier at sea? Excluding allied countries, the list comes down to China and Russia. But in such a conflict, against one or both of these two major powers, there is nothing that would not be "vulnerable". Still, i know i'd prefer to be on an aircraft carrier than in an airport exposed to artillery, direct land attack, ballistic missile attack (we should not forget that Russia and China and Iran and other countries deploy a formidable array of tactical ballistic missiles, with Russia having used its Iskander as a tool of aggressive diplomacy against Poland already more than once), air attack and so along.

In most realistic war operations against minor countries, terrorist organizations and so along, the aircraft carrier would be nearly untouchable.

The aircraft carrier is "vulnerable" in the sense that, while it is much harder to hit in the first place, it can take less damage than a land airfield. An airbase can't sink, and a cratered runway can (normally) be restored quite quickly. A carrier can sink, or more realistically she can be forced out of action since repairing damage to the floating airport is undoubtedly more challenging (but not impossible, as the second world war showed more than once).


However, the vulnerability of an aircraft carrier is most likely to be tested in a major conflict between major powers. In such a conflict, you can't expect many things to stay out of trouble, and a land airfield wouldn't at all have an easier life. It would not sink, no, but it most likely would be devastated nonetheless.

In more realistic scenarios, most enemies worldwide do not have the capability to harm the aircraft carrier at sea.
While in the meanwhile, the list of successful attacks on land airfields is long and growing constantly. And i'm not speaking just of assaults on Pakistani bases, but of attacks on airfields held and fortified for years by british and american forces.

Lastly, there is no real alternative to the aircraft carrier just as there isn't much alternative to using land airfields. We will need both until the airplane, manned or not, remains indispensable for the war effort, and the airplane is here to stay, i think we can all agree on this.

I think someone has gotten its priorities wrong. If i have to point the finger to indicate which airfield is the most vulnerable, the one i'll point to is not the floating one.
Before throwing money into anti-ballistic missiles for Type 45s (which are anyway desirable for the future), i'd much prefer to see investment in an effective C-RAM system, thanks.