The UK's F-35 situation

 

The reality of the announcement: it’s not the F-35A, it’s actually TRIDENT

At present, the F-35A announcement by the UK at the NATO Summit is easily translated and summarized:

 

Since F-35A procurement cost is somewhat lower than that of the F-35B and in theory we can more easily maintain it and have it available more of the time, we are procuring 12 of them instead, replacing as many F-35Bs assigned to 207 Squadron (Operational Conversion Unit). We will train our crews on the F-35A as far as possible, and only use F-35B for the unique parts of the syllabus. By releasing aircraft from 207 Sqn and by still procuring 15 new ones, we are still going ahead with standing up a third frontline Squadron.

Since F-35A comes Dual Capable, we are seeking integration into NATO Nuclear Sharing mission planning, carrying dual-key, US owned B61-12 bombs. We will presumably send a few of the F-35A to the relevant exercises a couple of times a year.

We are not spending a penny more than strictly needed as this is literally born as a Saving measure.  Forget about any UK tactical nuclear weapon, forget about storing the bombs in Marham (that would cost a lot in infrastructure) and forget about fixing the air to air refuelling problem.

Maria Eagle, asked during Urgent Question time in the House of Commons specifically on these points, confirmed that as “it is a NATO mission”: any UK F-35A long range mission will depend on allied tanker support. She also confirmed that "this decision is not a stepping stone" towards wider tactical nuclear plans. The UK is "not looking" at “broadening range of nuclear weapons and delivery means".

 

Scratch away the hype, dig to the facts, and while other countries announced new brigades, new SAM batteries, new jets, ships, etc, the UK really took to the stage to say: "we are saving some money off on jets for the OCU Sqn and, so long as you furnish us the bombs and air to air refueling, we can help carry a few of the warheads".

 

B61-12 launch trials. 

The only reason why Starmer wasn't laughed out of room at the NATO Summit while delivering such an announcement is that UK has a Strategic Deterrent of its own, which other double-key B61-carrying european partners don't have. In theory it puts a TRIDENT other than the US one behind the B61s.

As we know, after all, multiple NATO countries have F-35A to carry double-key B61-12s and had them before this UK stunt. They thankfully even have tankers which can actually air to air refuel said F-35A and anti-radar missiles & other weapons that give those F-35A wider capability and meaning.

Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey all have an established role in Nuclear Sharing and all but Turkey are acquiring F-35As for it, carrying American B61-12 bombs. Poland, which has 32 F-35A on order, has already expressed interest in being involved.

And of course, the US own F-35A Squadrons in Europe, and beyond, are available to carry the bombs as well. Most important for the UK perspective are of course the 2 USAF F-35A Squadrons in Lakenheath, which is where B61-12s could be stored on UK soil.

In practical terms, the 12 F-35A in theory added by the UK are almost entirely meaningless. They are few, don’t come with air to air refuelling of their own, and add to a vast fleet of potential carrying aircraft which would have no problems absorbing not only every last B61 stored in Europe but the entire stock of 200+, including the ones stored in Continental US (CONUS).

B61-12 bases. 

Inert B61-12 inside an F-35A's weapon bay. The F-35C's weapon bay has the same size but there was no B61 integration program because the US Navy has been out of the tactical nuke business since the early 2000s. 

More delivery aircraft are the very last thing needed. The one thing the UK adds here is actually TRIDENT. None of the other NATO countries depending on tactical B61-12 has a Strategic Nuclear Deterrent to loom behind the tactical warheads, apart of course from the US one.

Unlike France, the UK already declares its strategic deterrent to NATO, formally offering it to SACEUR, and by integrating in the Nuclear Sharing arrangement it is technically "supplying" a TRIDENT other than the American one to loom behind the B61s.

There is an argument to be made that the government announcement has been deliberately misleading on a political level: it's not so much the UK that is acquiring a new lever of deterrence; it is arguably supplying Trident to Europe. 

 

It’s tenuous, obviously, because the B61-12s are going nowhere without US authorizations and collaboration, and while the warheads on the UK TRIDENT are sovereign, the system as a whole does not stand without cooperation with Washington. But the political message is still valuable.

  

Value in a split fleet?

In pure money terms, the F-35A is effectively cheaper than the more complex F-35B and it’s also pretty realistic to expect its availability will be a bit higher on average.

There will be, as claimed, a short-term saving in terms of aircraft purchase, although the differences between the two aircraft and the need for a separate stock of spares etc will immediately eat away some of the savings.

The cost cutting measure will initially work, we can be reasonably sure of it.

Longer term, I’m pessimistic. Pain will inexorably pop up later whenever type-specific upgrade differences and material differences force duplications with their related costs.

It's also obvious F-35A as training jet can do most, yet not all the training of crews for the B fleet. 

 

When it comes to generating aircraft for operations, the two mini-fleets will generate their own entirely non-compatible pools of Force Elements At Readiness (the aircraft and crews actually ready to fly missions): the F-35A cannot contribute to carrier air at all; the F-35B cannot contribute to the nuclear mission.

 

The value of F-35A beyond the "training role with secondary nuclear mission" is very close to zero, if the number does not grow well above 12 over time and a number of other things aren’t funded and fixed.

 

The optimists are always quick to note that F-35A can fly a bit further on Internal Fuel and has weapon bays that are 14 inches longer than the B’s (no Lift Fan in the way) so can carry larger weapons internally. That makes them perfect for “Deep Strike”, is the usual justification offered.

However, that is only theory. In practice, the F-35A in the RAF will in fact not fly further than the F-35B. Whatever little advantage it brings in internal fuel range is completely drowned out by the RAF's inability to refuel them in flight, which Minister Maria Eagle already confirmed is not being fixed.  

As you should know, the RAF has access to up to 14 excellent A-330 MRTT tankers, the VOYAGERs, but none of them is fitted with Boom, which is what is needed to refuel USAF aircraft, including the F-35A.

The VOYAGER fleet is split in KC2 aircraft which have only the 2 drogues in pods under the wings; and KC3 aircraft which add a centreline drogue which enables the refuelling in flight of A400M.

 

A VOYAGER KC3 refueling an A400M with the centreline drogue 

The F-35A has a receptable on the spine and needs a Boom-equipped tanker to take on fuel in flight. The UK fields no such equipment. 

The centreline drogue is the one used to refuel the big receivers, which would in the past have included NIMROD (MRA4 and R1) and E-3D SENTRY. Unfortunately, over the years things have evolved the way we know and now the only big receiver left is A400M. P-8 replaced NIMROD MRA4 and needs a Boom, RIVET JOINT replaced R1 and needs a Boom (a special arrangement is in place with 100^th Wing USAF at Mildenhall to access their tankers so RIVET JOINT can go places) and E-7 replaced E-3. C-17 could also be air refuelled if the RAF had a Boom tanker.

 

In practice, the RAF literally has more platform types that it CANNOT refuel than ones it can. It's 4-3 right now (E-7, P-8, Rivet Joint, C-17 versus Typhoon, F-35B and A400). 5-3 with the F-35A.

The F-35A problem could also be fixed “laterally” by adding a probe onto it. Space reservation does exist in the fuselage, but it's the second poorest decision just above the current "doing nothing at all": it would make UK F-35As heavier and more expensive and, of course, all the strategic big receivers would remain unable to get fuel in flight.

Although the option exists, nobody took it. Those who have F-35A have Boom equipped tankers, and vice versa. 

Fitting probes rather than acquiring Booms would also mean the UK would continue to be severely limited in providing air to air refuelling support to Allies, which is not great when the 14 VOYAGERs represent a large percentage of the total number of tankers available in Europe and widely known to be insufficient.

 

There are glaringly obvious strategic reasons for acquiring Booms, the most obvious of which is the 143 F-35A in the "Nordic Air Force" (Norway, Finland, Denmark) that sits right between the UK and Russia. That powerful force is short of tanker support, and one of the best joined-up things the UK could possibly do was helping out with that by putting Booms on VOYAGERs to help THEM stay in the air and hit deep into Russia, while helping its own (and allied) P-8s to guard the North Atlantic and E-7s to deliver airborne early warning.

Instead, it is purchasing 12 F-35A that exacerbate the scarcity of tankers while bringing nothing tangible to the table.

 

The optimists assume that more F-35As will follow in the future. I’m not at all sure they will and I’ll explain exactly why, but if they do, expenditure to retrofit Booms on the VOYAGERs must be part of the plan.

 

Why am I so sceptical of the possibility of more F-35A Squadrons following?

Money, timelines, infrastructure, personnel.

 

What has been done right now is taking existing Tranche 2 procurement plans for 27 new F-35, which have been in the works since 2022, and split them into 12 A and 15 B, not adding a single extra jet.

Tranche 2 plans as known to spread the purchase and deliveries all the way to 2033 and at the moment we have been given no indication whatsoever of an acceleration.

In theory, in 2035 GCAP/TEMPEST will be entering service. Even assuming F-35 assembly lines will still be happily going by that date 2035, GCAP will be absolutely bleeding the budget dry.

It is not overly difficult to imagine GCAP not being ready by 2035, but that does not change the picture much: it will still be devouring a huge share of the budget, making it extremely difficult to imagine the RAF being still busy building up F-35 Squadrons by then.

 

Tranche 1 deliveries should conclude this year, in theory. The last of the first batch of 48 F-35Bs for the UK are coming out of Production Lot 17.

In theory, Tranche 2 buys could begin right away with Production Lot 18, the definitive contract for which is expected really soon. Lot 18 and 19, in fact, were due to have a combined contract award announcement this very month, so either it comes on Monday or it has slipped slightly.

 

Long Lead orders covering most of the material (and cost) for production lots 18 and 19 have been signed at various dates from December 2022 onwards.

The US DoD doesn't break down allocation of jets by country when announcing those orders and MoD/UK Gov in their usual mud-like clarity haven't provided info about when Tranche 2 starts.

 

At present we do not know for sure whether Lots 18 and 19 include any UK jet at all or whether there is a gap before new orders are placed. Tranche 1 ends with Lot 17 but it's not clear if T2 starts right away in Lot 18 or gap was/is expected.

We can only go by hints and clues: as funding for Tranche 2 was delegated to the RAF in early 2022 and the very first Long lead Items contract for Lot 18 was eventually awarded in December the same year, the assumption is that the UK is involved.

 

We do not yet know the full composition of the Lot 18 and 19 orders. Lot 18 Long Lead contracts were awarded in 2023 for a total of 147 jets, but the latest contract modification on 20 December 2024 only had 145.

In those 145 there was a single F-35B for “partner nations” and 7 F-35Bs for Foreign Military Sale nations. The 7 FMS ones should belong to Singapore and Japan, but the lone partner B is for the UK or for Italy? Given precedents, the 2 jets partly funded through earlier awards could be Italian ones, to re-emerge as contract modification later (it’s already happened in the past that timelines diverged somewhat), but we do not know.

So 0, 1, 2 jets for the UK...? We will have to see. Even if they were 2, that’s still clearly not a quick procurement pace at all.  

The exact same uncertainty exists for Lot 19 as well.

IF there are UK jets in lot 18 and 19, they are almost certainly going to be F-35Bs.

In fact, some significant Long Lead order has already been placed for Lot 20 as well, and if the UK funded anything in that, it will have been for B aircraft, again.

In practice, there are good chances that the first UK F-35A only happens in Lot 21, which roughly equates to order in 2027 and delivery in 2029.

Maria Eagle, speaking in the House of Commons, says the government is “hopeful” the first F-35A deliveries can happen “before the end of the decade”, which sounds like a confirmation of sorts.

 

It doesn't matter one bit how many times politicians insist on talking about 138 jets. Unless the next lots show a substantial acceleration in procurement rate, it's not going to happen. 

We have already been told, including by Chief Defence Staff himself, not to expect much for circa 2 years. Virtually nothing “new” is coming before 2027 at earliest, simply because no actual new money appears before then.

The only realistic hope of a greater F-35 fleet beyond 74 jets in 3 Sqns plus OCU lays in a drastic acceleration to the purchase rate beginning in FY2027. I don’t see how you can build any other Sqn otherwise.

The known plan of “27 jets by 2033” implies spreading the order across a minimum of 8 Lots, 18 to 25. Lot 25 would be ordered in 2031, and deliveries would wrap up in 2033.

If 2033 was actually the year of last order, we’d be looking at a spread across 10 Lots and last deliveries in 2035, indicatively. That means an average purchase rate of 3.3 jets a year in the best case, 2.7 in the worst.

In the kindest way possible: if the procurement rate stays at those levels, forget any fantasy of more Squadrons. You will be deep into GCAP funding era by then.

 

What if more Squadrons were to happen?

I want to make one thing clear: I have nothing against the F-35A in isolation. I know about the larger bays, I know about the greater range on internal fuel. You don’t need to tell me things that, respectfully, I’m likely to know better than you do.

The problem with a split buy from a UK point of view is that the number of jets and the number of Squadrons are not large enough to make a split buy sensible. The end result is a B fleet too small for what it has to do and an A fleet also too small to make any real difference.

 

3 frontline Squadrons are the complement of a single carrier, and they would only ever all deploy in a major emergency, of course.

3 Sqns are the size the JAGUAR fleet was withdrawn from service at. 2 Sqns is the size the HARRIER GR9 fate was sealed at. It’s not wise to have these numbers at the beginning of a long service life. Those are end of life numbers.

I do not think a split of 3 and 1 Sqns is in any way smart, period. 3 and 2 is also not very good. I’d rather have a single fleet type of 5 Sqns to generate force elements from, frankly. The individual characteristics of the airframe type are little more than a distraction when all other factors are considered.

 

Moreover, we have already seen this movie multiple times in UK defence history, and the end is always sour. Two fleets locked into fratricide battles each time there’s a need for concurrent but fleet-specific upgrades or other expenditure result in disasters. We have seen it again and again and again, most recently with SEA HARRIER and HARRIER GR7 and then with the contrast HARRIER versus TORNADO. To get into that position again for no good reason is absurd.

 

Any “deep strike” advantage F-35A brings is only theory, for the UK. It is only theory because if the Air to Air refuelling situation is not cured, F-35A will actually be far shorter legged in practical terms than F-35B. Nevermind the fact you can sail F-35B thousands of miles closer to whatever you need to hit.

 

The weapon bays advantage is also pure theory. At present there is not a single weapon, in service or planned, which fits the F-35A’s weapon bays but not the B’s. It either fits both, or is too large and fits none.

The F-35B could carry 1,000 lbs stores, but the UK does not have any bomb larger than the 500 lbs Paveway IV at this point.

Does it help anyone that F-35A could potentially carry 2,000 lbs stores?

No, unless new weapons are procured. There is nothing in the UK arsenal or existing plans that can take any benefit.

 

Also, any weapon integration process will be at least partially duplicated, to account for the differences between the two aircraft types. METEOR integration, for example: the UK is leading the F-35B process, with Italy leading for the A.  

There is a very real risk that the UK F-35A will have to partially repeat integration work (and expenditure) just to “port” Paveway IV and ASRAAM across from the B.

I have a suspicion, unconfirmed for now, that as long as the whole buy is 12 aircraft for the OCU, the UK won’t even try to get ASRAAM and Paveway IV cleared on the A.

Also, of course i suspect no ammunition will be procured for the 25 mm gun, considering gunpods for the B fleet have not been procured at all so far. 

 

The external "heavy load", innermost pylons are rathed for the same loads, so the F-35B should be able to carry Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon externally, just like the F-35A. Internally, it won't fit either. AARGM ER, JSM, 2,000 lbs guided bombs could give a sense to the larger bays on the A, but none of these weapons is in the RAF arsenal nor in its plans. 
There might (or might not) be a possibility for the A to carry 6 rather than 4 Meteor internally, but we don't know. 

And there is yet another issue, in terms of infrastructure: RAF Marham has "obvious" room and Hardened Aircraft Shelters sufficient, with modernization work, for taking 4 Sqns. Project ANVIL fixed the South HAS area for the needs of 207 and 617 Sqns; the much delayed Phase 2 to finally go under contract next year is going to focus on the East HAS area to finally give 809 NAS adequate infrastructure and, hopefully, to prepare the space for the 3^rd frontline Sqn, which will also be the fourth Marham sqn (207 OCU, 617, 809 and the as yet unnamed Sqn to come).

Can Marham take more? Possibly, but without HAS (there are only 24 in total, each can take 2 jets once modernized) and with the need for further, substantial and expensive infrastructure work.

The alternative, even more expensive, is to activate another F-35 base.

 

Project ANVIL was heavily focused around the South HAS area. We expect the new contract to be centered on the East HAS area. The potential for squeezing more Sqns into the base to avoid activating another is unclear. 

In short, an expanded F-35A buy, in order to make even just one lick of sense, requires:

 

-         Not only buying more jets, but buying them much faster, to avoid going into "full conflict" with GCAP’s own funding needs just as they reach their peak

-         Adding Boom to VOYAGER

-         Procuring new weapon types, otherwise the larger weapon bays will mean absolutely nothing in practice

-         Infrastructure spending potentially including activation of a second operating base

 

Unless the Defence Investment Plan in Autumn has something serious to offer in regard to these needs, the infamous “138” F-35 number will almost certainly remain fantasy.

 

And in absence of Booms and adequate weapons, the F-35A is in fact of no substantial relevance for any “Deep Strike” mission you might try to imagine.

 

And that is if we completely ignore the wider issue of substantial duplication and inefficiencies that come from running 2 small fleets, and the risk of another fratricide relationship ending in tragedy a few years into the future.

 

None of the problems are impossible to solve. But for the specific UK situation, they are very unlikely to be solved, and that’s unfortunately what matters.

What NATO wants

While the publication of the Strategic Defence Review is some time away still and surprises are the only thing that is always to be expected in British policy for Defence, we actually have a pretty clear idea of what NATO is asking of the UK and what the UK, in broad terms, has committed to. 

Top of the list, for importance and cost both, is the Nuclear Deterrent. 

The traditional UK role in the North Atlantic area and ideally up into the Arctic follows, because regardless of how often this fact is overlooked, the UK’s vital frontline is in the north. That’s where the UK mainland and Russia are virtually “in touch”, across the sea. That’s the direction from which Russian submarine and surface threats and their long range aviation and missiles would be coming from. The UK is expected to have a lead role in controlling this sea front. 

This commitment is multi-faceted and goes from Anti-Submarine Warfare to Carrier Strike to the historic yet so often overlooked commitment to sustain northern Norway from the sea through the UK-Netherlands joint amphibious force. 

Always remember that the world actually looks like this. The UK's geography is an inescapable fact. 

Carrier Strike used to be a key component of the NATO North Flank plans in the Cold War (HMS Ark Royal IV ended her days working with US and French carriers in the Northern Strike Group) and regardless of how hard Army and RAF-inspired lobbies try to deny this, it remains a factor. 

It increasingly means delivering seafloor surveillance and protection of key underwater and surface infrastructure, too, in the North Sea and into the Baltic, where a specific NATO mission has just launched after repeated “incidents” of submarine cables being cut. 

On land, the UK and NATO have agreed, already under the previous government, that the British Army’s main role within the Alliance’s New Force Model is to resource a “multidomain Corps” as SACEUR’s “go-to” Strategic Reserve. Specifically, in the New Force Model, SACEUR is to have two highly-responsive Reserve Corps, one from France and one from the UK. The new Secretary, John Healey, reaffirmed this “multidomain Corps” commitment in his speech at the RUSI Land Warfare conference in July last year, soon after the Election. While the speech itself does not add further detail, it had been reported that during the event he further specified that the “ambition” is for a British Corps of 2 Divisions with 6 brigades”. 

The Corps is of course the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which has started the transition towards the new role as soon as its latest turn leading the NATO Response Force (NRF) concluded (1 Jan 2024 – 1 July 2024). It was indeed an important date for NATO as a whole as the NRF became the new and restructured Allied Reaction Force (ARF), which will be led, for the first 3 years, by the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA). 

The Divisions are obviously 1st Div and 3rd Div. 1st Division has only recently gotten the uplift needed to resume some credibility as a deployable 2-star HQ and has immediately been trusted into a key high-readiness role, covering the transition from the old to the new Reaction Force. 1st Division has been the lead ARF component since 1st July 2024, mainly through 7th Light Mechanised BCT, an aviation task force and an integral operational sustainment brigade supported by elements of 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade. 

The ARRC’s “evolution” towards the new role has in the meanwhile seen the resubordination under its command of key formations including 7th Air Defence Group and 1st Aviation Brigade. De-facto, in order to deliver the Corps as described, all major formations will eventually have to report to the ARRC. 

NATO also wants to see the UK acquire more credible air defence options. This is an increasingly urgent gap to fill and it is historically particularly bad for the UK which, in terms of Ground Based Air Defence, essentially only deals in SHORAD and has for decades, completely avoiding any investment in longer range missiles and any real anti-ballistic capability. 

In theory, the UK is, already since the SDSR 2015, committed to contributing to NATO-wide Missile Defence efforts with a new anti-ballistic radar to be built on British soil. This commitment is known internally as Project LEWIS (possibly from the name of the island, where the radar might be sited) and led to a request filed to the US State Department for acquisition of a Long Range Discrimination Radar. Authorization to procure it arrived in March 2022 but no evident progress has been made since, with Project LEWIS operational capability officially delayed until 2029. 

The UK has been authorized to procure a Long Range Discrimination Radar set for Project LEWIS 

NATO has also made increasingly clear and public that the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible. This is something that has been made clear at the SDR table, along with one simple, albeit perhaps unwelcome reality: there is not an “Indo-Pacific tilt” that can be cut to free up substantial resources, no matter how many times the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary have claimed otherwise during their pre-Election speeches. It would be both strategically illiterate and financially useless to cut what little the UK has committed to the “East of Suez”, and this point at least seems to have been understood by government: Lammy and Healey have both long ceased to attack the “Indo-Pacific tilt”, indeed changing tune entirely. Their most recent speeches invariably underline the indivisibility of the two major regions of concern. 

NATO is also going to increasingly make clear that, as far as it is concerned, “3 (% of GDP) is the new 2”, but it doesn’t look likely the UK will be among the eager proponents of this new target, this time around. We are unfortunately still far from sure that even just the 2.5% target will be reached before this Parliament ends. 

What does it all mean in practice? 

Again, only assumptions can be made because the fact both logic and NATO are asking for some actions do not in any way imply the British government will follow those directions. 

In theory, Carrier Strike is safe and sound. NATO continues to value the commitment to provide Carrier Strike in the North Flank context and beyond, and the carriers are paid for. In general, no matter how some lobbies in the UK continue to campaign for it, NATO is not going to ask for existing capability to be cut in favour of dubious savings and even more dubious investments to follow in something else. The government’s confirmation of the Fleet Solid Support procurement with all 3 vessels confirmed through the new deal with Navantia also logically suggest Carrier Strike remains very much central.

ASW, including submarines (SSN-AUKUS) also remains critical and thus, again in theory “safe”. 

The amphibious role in Norway remains in demand and is part of some of the oldest multi-national commitments the UK has in place (with the Netherlands and with Norway) but this has not been enough to spare the ALBION-class LPDs from early removal from service, again confirming that logic can only ever go so far when it comes to British plans for Defence. 

Again in theory, the expectation is that we will see plans for a second, purpose-built Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship confirmed. This vessel is planned with a very specific role in mind: “Deep Sea Data Gathering”. It will be more complex, more specialized and more expensive than RFA PROTEUS and will replace HMS SCOTT, the critical deep-sea survey vessel that is fundamental to ASW and the Deterrent. Between the subsea surveillance needs, NATO-wide, and the critical relevance of that survey capability to the Deterrent and the ASW mission, the construction of this vessel should be a certainty but, i can never stress this enough, British defence plans are a weird and mysterious world apart. 

It is no mystery that, whatever the difficulties RAF and Royal Navy face (which we can summarize primarily with the single word “personnel”), the most uncertainty, risk and trouble is to be found on Land given the absolutely horrible shape the British Army self-mutilated into through the STRIKE Brigade disaster. NATO is understanding and knows it will take time to recover, and understands the “British Corps” will (probably?) never be quite a Corps like the Alliance intends. 

What NATO will invariably demand is that the ARRC and its assigned combat units are properly enabled. This means they need to have credible artillery, air defence, ISR, logistics, engineering, EW, CBRN and medical capability. What NATO expects from the Reserve Corps is clearly a “self-contained” force that, when directed into action by SACEUR, is able to adapt to the situation and the terrain and act “independently”, without needing all sorts of backfill from other Allies to plug capability gaps. 

What the UK is being asked to provide is, indicatively, the 8th largest land component in NATO. It’s a substantial ask, but should not in any way be seen as something beyond the realms of the possible. The brigades, to some extent, already exist. 

In case some of the readers are not familiar with the British Army’s current structures, there are currently 2 armoured infantry brigades (12 and 20), a Light Mechanized brigade (7th) and an Air Assault brigade (16th) which, while not without problems and shortcomings, have a full roster of capabilities including key enablers. One major, major exception is proper artillery for the armoured brigades because at present the British Army has just 14 ARCHER 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, ex-Sweden, after accelerating the withdrawal of AS90 to pass the whole fleet to Ukraine. This is however supposed to be fixed in the coming years procuring BOXER RCH155s (Mobile Fires Platform project). 

The Divisions as they emerged from Future Soldier. Some things have changed since as some units have re-subordinated (most notaly 16 Air Assault has come under 1st Division, while 8th Engineer Bde and 7th Air Defence Group have moved directly under ARRC), but the lack of enablers has remained.

The Army also fields a small Army Special Operations Brigade (ASOB) with 4 Ranger “battalions” (not really battalion-sized at all), which in NATO context will have a stay-behind / deep reconnaissance and target acquisition focus. The UK is to lead NATO’s Special Forces component and the ASOB will be fundamental in providing the lead SOF component in 2026 as part of NATO’s regular rotations. 

4 Brigade at present is a “bag” of regular infantry battalions with dubious access to Reserve-manned enablers (artillery, logistics, engineer). This is not credible and would need fixing by building the missing enabler battalions. It would also need, in time, to be given appropriate vehicles: most realistically, a mixture of FOXHOUND and the future Land Mobility Medium – Troop Carrier Vehicle that is supposed to be procured. 4 and 7 could thus both serve as “Light Mechanized” formations. 

Another brigade that won’t count as a manoeuvre brigade in NATO’s eyes (in everyone’s eyes, really) is 1st Deep Recconnaissance and Strike Brigade (DRS). This is really a glorified, super-sized Divisional Artillery Group with organic recce Cavalry at present, devoid of infantry, engineers and logistics. It has fantastic firepower thanks to 2 regiments of GMLRS (3 Royal Horse Artillery and 26 Royal Artillery) and at least for now also controls the ARCHER / RCH155 regiments (1 RHA and 19 RA) which however are, de facto, there to support 12 and 20 Bdes, but the absence of organic Logistic regiments makes its useability doubtful. The artillery component, particularly the GMLRS launchers, would consume fantastic amounts of ammunition and its not clear, to say it charitably, how the Army believes that ammunition will be moved. 

ARRC has since taken under direct control 7th Air Defence Group, 8th Engineer Bde and 1st Aviation Bde as well 

1st DRS could be turned into an acceptable manoeuvre formation relatively easily. At present it is planned to have 2 Cavalry regiments with AJAX. If 2 BOXER-mounted infantry battalions were moved into the formation, it would assume the structure that had been imagined for the abortive STRIKE brigades. It would need the addition of a Close Support engineering battalion, a dedicate Close Support Logistic regiment and, realistically given the Army’s intention to compensate its other weaknesses through increased reliance on deep strike means such as GMLRS, a dedicate Logistic regiment to move the rocket pods for reloading the M270s. 

Last of the “non-brigades” is currently 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, a formation made up by 4 “non-battalions” (they are less than half the size of a real infantry battalion) specialized in delivering training and mentoring. This is not, by all means, a useless service, but it’s clear that it counts for nothing at all against the main “design driver” of building up a “credible” Corps. 

Unsurprisingly, all rumours agree on the fact that 11 Brigade will change shape and role. I’m insistently hearing whispers of 11 Brigade being transformed into a sort of lightweight counterpart to 1st DRS (which is of course part of 3rd Division, the heavy one) to, presumably, serve as 1st Division’s own “eyes” and “hammer”. 

This is interesting, but raises concerns on what exactly the Army is attempting to do. The hints point to a structure in which 3 Div fields 12, 20 and 1 DRS brigades while 1 Div would have 4, 7 and 11 DRS, with 16 Air Assault presumably leaving 1st Division and resuming her previous “independence” as a high readiness force. Depending on how this was done in detail, it would be either a more ambitious plan (with 7 rather than 6 “credible” brigades) or less ambitious one in which, at beast, 5 brigades would be credible as ground combat formations (12, 20, 4, 7 and 16) with the two DRSs being artillery brigades by any other name. 

With the (unjustifiably late, it was always exceedingly unlikely) realization that the Armed Forces manpower totals will not grow, the Army’s only hope of making its brigades “credible” and finding personnel to man increased numbers of M270 GMLRS and new Air Defence batteries (possibly a 3rd regiment to be added in the role) will come from ruthlessly cutting everything that does not help fill the gaps. Not munching words: in order to create additional artillery, logistics and engineer battalions, infantry battalions numbers will have to decrease. 

The attempt to hold on to 7 "brigades" through reconfiguration of 11 is highly unlikely (euphemism) to include the measures of painful realism needed to redistribute manpower and rebuild the missing enablers. 

The current 32 regular infantry “battalions” (as mentioned earlier, many already are much smaller than true battalions) are unsustainable and (largely) unjustified. The desired 6 brigades force, plus ASOB and standing tasks (2 battalions in Cyprus, 1 committed to Public Duties, 1 in Brunei, 1 experimental unit and 1 UK Special Forces Support Group) require no more than 26. It’s tight, unpleasant, difficult and will require years to build new units and manage the progressive redistribution of manpower, but if the total headcount stays at circa 73K there is simply no alternative. 

NATO will not be fooled into calling brigades formations that have no hope of actually going into the field as one. While the UK government strenuously refuses to release even a “curated” version of the regular NATO Defence Planning Capability Review reports, those will keep coming and will keep pointing out every area in which promises are not being kept. Elsewhere, the Netherlands Defence Planning Capability Review has been released in curated, unclassified form, showing planning assumptions and the areas where NATO identified shortcomings. The Netherlands have since enacted a number of procurement programs to cure those issues. 

Observation of what is happening in the Netherlands and elsewhere leaves us in no doubt at all about NATO being very explicit about the need for Brigades and Divisions and Corps to have their own enablers. Sweden, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy are all busy building or re-building the missing enablers of their brigades and divisions and there are zero reasons to believe the UK is not being given the exact same instructions. 

This, by the way, quietly but surely involves also “details” such as ensuring mechanized infantry battalions have appropriate firepower. The Netherlands, again, have visibly responded by initiating procurement efforts to put turreted BOXERs with 30 mm guns in their formations. Do we believe for one second the UK isn’t being told the same things...? 

As of the Major Projects report 2023/24 (current to last march), the Army’s 2 main AFV programs (AJAX and BOXER) have a combined cost of just short of 14 billion pounds, with a combined total of 1212 vehicles in production. That this veritable treasure doesn’t yet contain any proper “battalion set” of infantry carriers with suitable armament, mortar vehicles and anti-tank solutions is the measure of the failure of the Army to plan a sensible structure for itself. 

It is time to fix both the sclerotic AFV plan and the equally confused Army structure. I understand the Army’s preferred way out of the mess it has created for itself would be adding a tail of ARES infantry carriers, fitted with a suitable crewless, non-hull penetrating turret, to the AJAX production to equip the 4 infantry battalions in 12 and 20 Brigades. This would, ideally, release a substantial number of BOXER hulls for other roles (mortar and recovery modules are supposed to be ordered “soon”) while, ideally, also delivering a couple of BOXER-mounted battalions for 1st DRS. This would be the most “logical” and overall not overly expensive, way out of the mess. Whether the SDR will give the green light to this approach or not, we don’t yet know. 

International Armoured Vehicles conference will be this week, but I’m not optimistic we’ll get an answer (yet). 

NATO would be equally fine with putting a turret on BOXER itself, but one solution or another will be needed. In one way or the other, AJAX and BOXER will have to coexist and, however sub-optimal that is, the Army needs to make this combo work. 

And regardless of how unpleasant it is, the Army also needs to re-balance its headcount to put manpower and resources towards much needed enablers. Make-believe plans are not going to get a pass from NATO, and the quiet and polite “displeasure” of the Alliance might eventually materialize with the British Army finding its role within the Alliance changed to properly reflect what it is and not what it would like to be. 

In a non-distant future we might well see the UK quietly pushed out of high prestige roles, most notably Deputy SACEUR, if the UK output quality keeps collapsing. 

What NATO wants is mostly clear. What the British Army and British government are able and willing to do is not.

An entry ahead of the new SDSR

For the first post in literally years, I'm sharing the submission I've filed in the public consultation for the SDSR. The format of the consultation involved a long list of fixed questions that could be answered with up to 500 words each. 

This has, of course, determined the format of my entries. 

Describe the strategic context for UK Defence

Strategic context begins with geography. Always remember that the world actually looks like this, and the UK's front in any Russia scenario is to the North. 

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the main factor polarizing attention, the threats to UK interests go well beyond Russia. It is in the Red Sea and Middle East that UK assets have actually needed to open fire to protect allied installations and critical shipping routes, and it is towards Asia that the economic and political center of the world is shifting. While Russia represents the most obvious threat, it is not in a position to start a direct land conflict against NATO and it would be a mistake to allow Russia to tether UK foreign and Defence policy to a narrow European focus.

The priority for UK defence remains maintaining a capable, useful mix of capabilities measured against high end, state on state warfare scenarios, that can be projected where needed, across Europe and beyond.

Geography dictate that any threat against the UK originates quite some distance away, and that any operation mounted by UK forces will be expeditionary by nature and will imply thousands of kilometres of distance to be negotiated. UK forces must be able to project over those distances and be credible once in theatre. While the UK won’t be able to achieve Mass on its own, it should maintain armed forces which are as much as possible capable of “independent” action within an alliance framework. In other words, the UK force should be able to deploy with its own means (SEA-lift, AIR-lift, LAND mobility) and, as much as possible, able to take responsibility for a section of a front / part of an operation without Allies having to fill critical capability gaps. The UK contingent should come with adequate Enablers and be able to serve as core for Allies to attach to (for example in a Joint Expeditionary Force context).This would enable the UK to retain a leading role in any scenario and in any theatre. UK forces could act as an aggregator that smaller partners can join forces with, helping to generate mass, enabled by UK strategic capabilities they might otherwise not have access to. When working with greater partners with more mass and resources, UK forces should still be able to provide a complete, reliable military component that can look as autonomously as possible over a sector of the front / portion of the operation.

There can be little doubt that UK forces which best compare on the world stage with that of other nations are Navy and Air Force.The Army does not compare as well, nor is likely to be able to catch up anytime soon. While the Army conditions must be improved, this must not come to the detriment of the other Services, especially since, even in a “narrow” European scenario, the front of most immediate interest to the UK is the Scandinavian peninsula – North and Arctic Sea and Iceland area (in Cold War parlance, the GIUK gap). This is the only front where Russia and UK are virtually in direct contact, through Sea and Air.

In general, UK is fortunate in that forces which are well attuned to their NATO role will generally be valid elsewhere too.

 

Propose, in order of priority, the roles UK Defence must be capable of fulfilling 2024-2040.

If the UK will maintain its ability to secure the North Sea / High North by forward deploying in NATO context a powerful Air Force component while also putting to sea a capable fleet centered on SSNs and the Carrier Strike Group, plus the Littoral Response Groups, it will meet its vital, direct defence interest.

On Land, the UK should maintain its High North commitment through the Littoral Response Group North and, ideally, a greater Army component aligned to the task (at least initially it would come from within 1^st Division) while working to deliver the full promise to NATO of a Strategic Reserve Corps of "2 Divisions with 6 brigades" under the ARRC. Obviously it will be a relatively small Corps, made of relatively small brigades, but there is no reason why it shouldn't be capable.

The need to be rapidly deployable wherever SACEUR needs them across Europe will in turn ensure the British Divisions maintain capabilities and logistical readiness that will ensure the British Army can be relevant outside of Europe too when necessary.

To achieve this result, the British Army structures will need to evolve and, in absence of a net growth to the overall manpower ceiling, some infantry battalions will need to go, not because they are unneeded, but because forming the necessary Artillery, Air Defence, Drone, Logistics and Engineering units will be far more critical. The current structure is dramatically short of these key enablers and this will need fixing.

The wider context of a major NATO clash with Russia has not changed much. 

In Europe, the UK's priority is dictated by geography and will always come down to reinforcing the Northern flank of NATO, working in close cooperation with the Joint Expeditionary Force partners and bringing naval and air elements"up threat"in Iceland, Scandinavia and at Sea to contain Russian navaland air elements which are a direct threat to the UK mainland. Through the JEF, and the Littoral Response Group (North), which also hinges on the long standing cooperation with the Netherlands' own Marines, the UK is also committed to reinforcing the Allies ashore.

The UK is also committed to putting a British Corps (ARRC) of eventually 2Divisions at the call of SACEUR as a strategic reserve that can be rapidly deployed "along the entire NATO front in Europe".

This will require a well stocked, well trained force that can move quickly and that has the necessary strategic lift in place to get where SACEUR needs it.

UK reach and commitments to the Northern NATO flank require amphibious capability to be sustained and ideally enhanced.

The need to protect key infrastructure at sea and the Deterrent requite dedicate Deep Sea Data Gathering and thus put urgency on the need to procure the planned and very much necessary purpose-designed vessel for this (planned as the second Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance hull).

The Reserve should be reorganized to provide a more realistic seedcorn for expansion in time of crisis. Probably the Army Reserve would benefit from being organized in a couple of "shadow brigades", one dedicate to supporting the Heavy armour (and thus 3^rd Division) and one (or more) dedicate to lighter,more easily regenerated light role / light mechanized capability in support of 1st Division.

Describe how existing UK Defence capability and the current 10-year programme match the demands of the roles and capabilities identified for 2024-2040, highlighting and prioritising critical gaps.

Existing equipment plans are mostly coherent with UK tasks in Europe and beyond. Some areas that require additional attention include:

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence: the introduction of SPEAR 3, SPEAR EW and ECRS2 radar with jamming capability (this on Typhoon Tranche 3) are helpful, but the absence of an anti-radar missile since the withdrawal of ALARM in 2013 is a concern. Adoption of the AARGM ER missile for both F-35 and Typhoon (Germany and Italy are already planning to adopt and integrate it) would greatly increase capability. Retrofitting the ECR Mk2 radar to Typhoon Tranche 2 should also be a priority.

Air to Air refuelling: the "nordic air force" (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark) is THE obvious and critical partner for the RAF in an European fight, while US and Australia are other obvious main partners the UK will collaborate with. All these partners, and others (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan etc) will use F-35As that can only be refuelled through the Boom method. The VOYAGER tankers of the RAF at present are not fitted with boom and cannot contribute in any way (and can also NOT refuel the RAF's own C-17, P-8, E-7 and Rivet Joint fleets). Fitting Boom to at least a portion of the fleet would enable the RAF to offer invaluable support to Nordic partners in Europe, and to Allies everywhere.

Ground based air defence must be enhanced at a brisker pace and with greater ambition. Existing SKY SABRE batteries can be quickly enhanced adopting the Extended Range variant of the CAMM missile, while development of the even longer ranged CAMM MR with Poland should be properly supported.

Additional SKY SABRE batteries are needed, and the Army's air defence regiments should probably be reorganized into hybrid regiments that, a bit like the PILICA+ batteries in Poland, combine CAMM with SHORAD. Adding a gun in anti-drone function should be a priority, with the PALADIN system having already been tested providing a good, UK-made candidate for rapid adoption. Directed energy weapons such as laser and RF (projects DRAGONFIRE, SWINTON, EALING) promise great capability which however might not be fully reliable for quite some time, making a gun-based solution a precious complement and stopgap.

Additional SHORAD Batteries should become an organic part of manoeuvre brigades: in other countries, a SHORAD battery is commonly found within the Brigade's artillery regiment, for example.

BOXER vehicles fitted with SKYRANGER gun turrets and missiles represent a good, readily available solution to succeed to STORMER and bring(thanks to the 30/35mmgun) increased anti-drone capability.

The Navy's Type45s should be equipped with new-production ASTER 30 Block1 NT missiles as soon as practicable. Low-volume production of these new and improved missiles would help realize the much needed "always on" model for key weapons production in the UK.

Logistic lift is known to be insufficient. The number of MAN SV EPLS trucks capable of carrying containers, for example, even if recently uplifted, remains more than 700 short of the endorsed Land requirement. This should be addressed, including by standing up new regiments to fill known gaps (for the support of 1 DRS BCT and 4 Light BCT, for example).

Propose how UK Defence's contribution to NATO should be enhanced as a driving requirement of capability and activity, including through prioritising defence export potential.

The UK contribution to NATO should be centred on the two Key roles:

 

-              The protection of the Northern Flank, with a focus on Carrier Strike Group operations, ASW, maritime urveillance, air defence and amphibious reinforcement of Scandinavia (Littoral Response Group North, in cooperation with the Netherlands's own amphibious force)

-              The provision of a credible British Corps to SACEUR for the Strategic Reserve role.

 

It might seem counter-intuitive and politically unpalatable, but to improve its contribution to NATO the British Army needs to offload the commitment to Estonia to other partners. The British Army is simply not large enough to deliver, at the same time, an armour-centric Battlegroup in the Forward Land Force (with commitment to uplift to a full brigade in time of crisis) and the Strategic Reserve role.

This is not debatable but rather fact: 3rd Division is the only heavy division the UK has, and only comprises 2 armoured brigades. If one of them is committed to Estonia, it cannot at the same time be available as a strategic reserve for SACEUR. Double-hatting is not serious and is not workable.

Partners should be approached in a mature way and the Forward Land Force role in Estonia should fall on another Army within the new NATO Force Model. Other countries are due to take Regional defence roles, and this should include replacing the british element in Estonia so the British Army can, in turn, ensure SACEUR's critical reserve is truly available and ready to deploy when and where needed.

2 Army programs in particular stand out for export potential in a NATO context and possibly beyond: the Technology Demonstrator 5 project to integrated advanced lethal and ISR payloads into GMLRS rockets and PrSM missiles would result in a massive capability growth and most likely in substantial export orders.

The other project with great potential is the Mounted Close Combat Overwatch project centered on ground-launched Brimstone for long-range anti-armour capability. This has in some ways already obtained an export win of sorts with Poland having selected Brimstone for its own long range ATGW need.

There is obvious potential in several of the UK's drone projects as well: uncrewed adjunct aircraft, the HYDRA armed drone, one-way strike solutions and the PROTEUS uncrewed helicopter for the Navy could all prove successful in securing export deals.

DSTL’s work on an uncrewed, highly mobile ultra-lightweight 127mm gun on the LAMP mobility platform should also continue as it would answer the need of Marine, Para/Airmobile and Mountain troops in particular and could secure interest in multiple countries.

 

 

Describe how the current support to Ukraine is integrated into UK Defence programmes and activities and propose measures in priority order to sustain and enhance this support to at least 2027.

The UK could provide aid to Ukraine while improving its own defences in multiple ways, as the decision to restart manufacture of large calibre barrels in the UK proves.

With GMLRS rockets being a key asset for the British Army as well as one of the most successful weapons employed by Ukraine, the UK should look at establishing production at home. Lockheed Martin reportedly was willing to bring GMLRS work to Ampthill and this should be a priority.

Again on GMLRS, the already mentioned Techical Demonstrator 5 could be a game changer: Ukraine could probably benefit from early access to some prototype systems, which in turn would support spiral development for the UK's own needs.

There is great scope for even more cooperation on drones, lethal and not, and on electronic warfare, including C-UAS jammers.

Ukraine is also continuously in need of anti-air missiles. France and Italy have supplied SAMP-T batteries firing Aster 30 B1 missiles, and MBDA UK will soon be remanufacturing existing Aster 30 missiles of the Royal Navy into B1s. There might be potential to increase production capability in the UK and help keep Ukraine's batteries armed.

Similarly, CAMM/CAMM ER, much needed to increase the British Army's GBAD capability, could be key to help meet Ukraine's needs as well.

The recent work to increase the ability to produce ammunition in the UK and manufacture artillery barrels is welcome, but one critical weakness remains unaddressed: the production within the UK of energetics and propellants. A core capability in country would be fundamental for resilience in times of crisis when supply from abroad might dry up.

 

Describe and recommend how the UK Defence homebase is made secure and resilient in confrontation, crisis and conflict, including in enabling full mobilisation and campaign endurance when needed.

Ther esilience of the UK realistically depends on factors other than military. Increased capacity to produce energy domestically, reduced reliance on imports would be the most decisive factors.

The military specifically, and the UK’s ability to mobilise for a major war are afflicted by excessive centralisation as a result of decades of efficiencies. A successful long-range missile strike that managed to hit a few critical installations (for example Lossiemouth, critical to QRA, maritime patrol aircraft and AEW), Waddington, Ashchurch (most of the Army’s vehicle fleet is to be found stored there), Donnington (general stores) and Kineton (ammunition) would be enough to have an absolutely crippling effect on the ability to properly mobilise in the first place.

Strengthening Ground based air defence can help, but there are not enough resources to attempt a complete coverage. For sure, a resident SKY SABRE battery at least in Lossiemouth and other key locations on the eastern coast would not be a bad investment. Longer range air defences would help, but would require massive investment.

Project LEWIS for a new anti-ballistic radar would provide early warning to the UK and to the benefit of the whole of NATO, assuming the Government remains committed to it.

Project LEWIS has seen the UK secure US authorization for the procurement a Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) (for construction on the island that gives the project its name...?), but it is one of those background programs no one ever talks much about. It's also a promise to NATO formulated years ago. 

The best defence against such an attack, which at present can come only from Russia, will always be to deploy the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force, “up threat” to intercept Russian ships, submarines and long range aviation over Scandinavia and the North Sea. Forward deployment of the carrier strike group and of RAF jets to Iceland and Norway would no doubt be an early measure taken at the first sign of serious crisis.

In general, the worst threats to the UK will manifest not so much directly against the UK mainland but abroad. The Red Sea shipping crisis is an eloquent example. Even in a “Russia” scenario, the UK will be defended first of all at range up in the High North, not so much directly from its shores. Geography dictates this.

As a consequence, it is non-discretionary to maintain military force that is expeditionary and has the logistic “legs” to deploy where needed.

 

Propose measures in priority order that establish how UK Defence transitions to the optimum balance of regular, reserve, civil servant, and industry people across all standing tasks and commitments and on mobilisation. Recommend the recruitment, education, training and retention measures required to achieve this.

The topic of Reserves for the UK is complex, again because of the geo-political truth that dictates that state threats to the UK will manifest away from the homeland. The frequent mention of Finland’s reserves, or Poland’s territorial units is of limited relevance to the UK: light infantry formations for local defence have little to no relevance for the UK, unlike for those countries who would be fighting on and for the very home turf. Units equal to Poland’s territorials could be formed, but in any war scenario they would have to be lifted across Europe to the point of need, unlike Poland’s own.

The old Territorial Army used to have a demonstrable ability to deploy to the Continent in support of regulars during the Cold War, but it’s undoubtedly harder to do that now, and it is proving difficult to deploy formed bodies of Reservists during “peacetime”. There are a few cases, but all pretty small scale and relatively sparse over the years.

The matter of Reserves is tricky and not easily solved. It’s true reserve infantry battalions cost a lot less than regular ones, but that is of little relevance if their output is not only much smaller but also relatively unpredictable due to uncertain availability of people. Any expansion of their combat role, in addition, would require equipment and vehicle fleets that at the moment simply do not exist.

A serious assessment is needed to determine what the Reserve can actually do in “peacetime”(it would be fairer to say in times of competition/confrontation short of all out war) and what they can be expected to do during major mobilisation.

If all-out war ever happened, there is every reason to believe the Reserve would show up in decent force, but at present it is at best questionable whether it could be equipped and actually employed as anything other than individual / small sub-units replacements and some degree of augmentation. There is an obvious shortage of combat vehicle fleets, for example. Formed reserve units would only be of the lightest kind.

There will probably need to be a more neatly “separated” plan for those Reserve individuals and units which are available, willing and indeed needed in “peacetime” and those formed bodies which would only realistically come together for occasional major exercise and ultimately in case of a real major crisis.

The latter formations, which should probably be organized as coherent brigades for best effect, would need to have a well defined, realistic role attuned with what equipment will be actually available in the depots or in a realistic emergency procurement/production plan to outfit them.

It would probably be beneficial to organize a “shadow” heavy brigade of Reservists, recognizing however that as things stand the armour to make them deployable as a formed unit simply does not exist in the inventory. They would deploy essentially as augmentees / casualty replacements.

Light brigades could be organized to be “deployable” in a specific format which will not be equal to that of regular formations and should thus develop its own Concepts, much like Poland’s territorial formations but with the difference, again, that UK Reserves would be deployed to fight far away from home.

It might yet prove to be the case that a larger Reserve is not in fact the right answer if larger doesn’t work out to more available/capable. More capable will require dedicate vehicle fleets and equipment holdings which will rapidly make the Reserve far less financially attractive overall.

Roles and expectations must be defined first.

 

 

Propose how the maritime (including littoral) domain is developed to contribute to an Integrated Force, recommending measures that accelerate modernisation and transformation and identifying existing capabilities and programmes that do not support this.

The development of uncrewed assets such as PROTEUS (rotary wing), VIXEN (fixed wing) and SEA PROTECTOR (MQ-9B modified with the wing-king for short take off and landing on the carriers) would massively enhance the carrier strike group's ability to deploy and fight up-threat. SEA PROTECTOR could be ready within a few years and, equipped with suitable podded radars and sonobuoy launchers, could bring extremely long endurance airborne early warning cover against missile attacks and long range, persistent anti-submarine patrol.

PROTEUS will help make up for the insufficient numbers of manned MERLIN helicopters.

Carrierborne F-35B (the expansion of the fleet to atleast 74 jets in 3– ideally at least4 – Squadrons should remain an absolute priority) and drones ensure the UK can confidently deploy far from home with the indispensable air cover.

 

The Littoral Response Groups give the UK a persistent forward deployed force around which larger operations can take shape. In a NATO context, the Littoral Response Group North represent the continuation of cooperation with the Netherlands and assistance for the Nordic Allies. The future Multi Role Support Ship will need to be more survivable than current amphibious ships while preserving the ability to lift and send ashore even the heaviest Army vehicles. The new vessels will need to combine both aviation capability and heavy surface lift capability, with a well dock sized for LCUs and mexeflotes operations. Room for containers, including on the weather deck, will give flexibility to embark modular weapons (a modular CAMM missile system should be a priority) and capabilities (Role 2+ and 3 medical facilities) for deployment.

 

Frigates, destroyers and submarines with land strike weapons will contribute to the suppression of enemy air defence and will strike high value targets. They have a great deterrent value as well. General purpose frigates and pureOPVs are no longer particularly useful in a new context of state on state warfare risks: the new generation vessels should have space and services reserved for embarking drones and modular mission payloads / containerized weapon systems that make them more useful combat platforms by expanding their base fit.

 

The MCM component is currently based on small ships which are not very deployable nor very useful beyond their specialized role, but the transition is already underway. Drone-based systems for MCM are more capable and more flexible but the necessary motherships to project those drones at range have not yet been built. If they were, the transition could be accelerated further. Swift procurement of a first mothership would allow the return of the currently employed BAY-class vessel in the Gulf to the amphibious role.

Modular capability, such as CAMM missiles in containers (NavyPODs) and portable lasers can help ensure the new Multi Role Support Ships and MCM motherships can deploy with the necessary defences on board, while saving on build costs. Such modular capability could also follow the Marines ashore, delivering further effect very efficiently.

The Littoral Response Group will need long range strike weapons that can be inserted from the sea and then used from land, against the land and against the sea. GMLRS and PrSM missiles, common with the Army, would achieve this but would ideally require a lighter, more deployable launcher like the defunct LIMAWS(R) on Supacat platform, or the uncrewed ROGUE of the US Marines.

If the Marines can go ashore with GMLRS and CAMM, they can create safe havens for the fleet and prove a real strategic concern to the enemy.

  

  

Propose how the land domain is developed to contribute to an Integrated Force, recommending measures that accelerate modernisation and transformation and identifying existing capabilities and programmes that do not support this.

Land will contribute through growt of Long Range Fires, primarily through the Land Deep Fires programme to grow the number of M270 launchers and their ammunition.

-              GMLRS ER, which should include Alternative Warhead to restore area-attack capability, 150 km reach

-              PrSM missile 500+ km

-              Land Precision Strike will deliver extended overwatch

-              Technology Demonstrator 5, a UK effort, to integrate advanced payloads into GMLRS and perhaps PrSM, including reconnaissance drones and intelligent sub-munitions, mines, ISR sensors, EW devices and jammers. If realized, these capabilities would be transformational and are sure to gain export orders.

Further long range strike options will come through drones. Lethal drones are needed at all tactical levels:

small ones such as D40 would restore infantry’s ability to deliver HE on indirect trajectory.

Fires have to make up for lack of mass. The PHALANX model for Platoons and Companies, which pushes JAVELIN and 81 mm mortar down to Coy level, should be adopted.

At battlegroup level, adoption of 120 mm mortars and Mounted Close Combat Overwatch is key.

 

A battery of M270 should become organic to each Heavy brigade, alongside RCH155, primarily for Land Precision Strike overwatch. This seems the correct tactical level where to employ this new capability.

GMLRS ER and PrSM would primarily be used by the GMLRS Regiments held within Deep Recce Strike BCT if not even aligned directly to Corps level.

Another GMLRS regiment should be added, equipped with a lightweight launcher (like USMC’s ROGUE or resurrected LIMAWS-R) to ensure 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigades have access to this strategic system and can more easily move it (including under slung by CHINOOK).

GBAD will need to grow. CAMM ER should be added to SKY SABRE urgently; more batteries should be formed.

Each Brigade should grow an organic, mobile SHORAD battery, on BOXER Skyranger in the Heavy formations. 30 / 35 mm gun adds cost-effective counter-drone capability.

Directed energy weapons work should continue towards a useable capability to be fielded as soon as practicable.

12 and 16 RA regiments probably need to evolve mixing SKY SABRE with SHORAD, both for their own survivability and for improved effect. Guns (such as PALADIN from British company MSI, which has already been tested) would add resilience against drones.

In order to deliver the “British Corps”, 4 Brigade will need to be rebuilt, with Combat Support and Combat Service Support regiments it currently lacks.

4 and 7 Brigades should both be made medium mechanized with FOXHOUND and a circa-20 tons Troop Carrier as planned within the Land Mobility Programme.

Ideally, 1st Division should have its own lightweight Deep Recce Strike formation. Resources are highly unlikely to be sufficient, so 16 Air Assault Brigade could be adapted to deliver this role where applicable while preserving its more unique deployability aspects.

3rd Division’s armoured brigades would benefit from putting a remotely operated turret on ARES and adapting the internal fit of these new vehicles to restore a degree of IFV capability.

BOXER would then deliver supporting roles by adapting the current plan for Mission Modules. A 120 mm turreted mortar and SHORAD should be priorities.

Ideally, 12 and 20 brigades should be “square” and composed of Combined Arms Regiments of CR3 and ARES. At an absolute minimum, the current 3 regular MBT regiments should be preserved by cancelling plans to convert King’s Royal Hussars from MBT to Armoured Recce.

Security Force Assistance Brigade should be sacrificed to free resources. In general, rebuilding needed CS and CSS formations is priority and in absence of manpower growth, accessory missions should be scaled back to recoup posts for more urgent priorities.

  

 

Propose how the air and space domains are developed to contribute to an Integrated Force, recommending measures that accelerate modernisation and transformation and identifying existing capabilities and programmes that do not support this.

The Air Force contribution to the Integrated Force is fundamental, but its ability to intervene in the face of powerful enemy anti-air defences must be increased if this is to continue to be the case even in high intensity warfare. EW, uncrewed aircraft companion for crewed jets, SPEAR 3 and SPEAR EW are going to be fundamental, and it would be extremely important to retrofit the ECR Mk2 radar with jamming capability on the Tranche 2 Typhoons too, since they make up most of the RAF’s numbers.

The procurement of AARGM ER anti-radar missiles, as already pursued by allies, should be the next step.

 

MQ-9B PROTECTOR’s potential overland is threatened by its vulnerability to enemy action. As it stands, PROTECTOR is virtually helpless against any enemy attack: procurement of a Self Defence pod should be a priority.

PROTECTOR should then be developed with suitable radar and podded sonobuoy dispensers to become an adjunct maritime patrol solution supporting P-8 Poseidon, especially in the High North.

PROTECTOR should also be equipped with the Short Take Off and Landing wing-kit to enable it to deploy directly on the aircraft carriers. The addition of suitable radars in pods would enable SEA PROTECTOR to deliver high altitude, long endurance Airborne Early Warning; in Maritime Patrol configuration it would deliver long duration anti-submarine patrols. In both cases, this would ease the burden on the insufficient number of MERLIN HM2 helicopters, which could then go back to focusing on ASW. In AEW, PROTECTOR would deliver greater capability than CROWSNEST and could in part supplement the insufficient number of E-7 WEDGETAIL too.

 

It would be highly beneficial to pursue a capability similar to the USAF’s RAPID DRAGON: pallets that can be air-dropped from cargo aircraft to launch multiple cruise missiles. A single A400 could be made to launch as many Storm Shadows as 4 or perhaps even 8 Typhoon, at far greater ranges from the UK, with next to no need for air to air refuelling. For a modest investment, this would bring quasi-strategic bomber capability back to the RAF’s roster.

 

Probably the most transformational capability that can be pursued, however, is the ISTARI multi-ISR constellation of Low Earth Orbit satellites. The OBERON-type satellites, with their radar sensor, will be particularly important to gather intelligence and targeting in all weathers. The use of laser to securely transmit huge amounts of data (TITANIA demonstrator) could also be game-changing.

In general, while LEO satellites are small and individually less capable than larger satellites so far favoured by most nations, they present advantages:

-          The UK industry is one of the main LEO small satellites producers worldwide

-          The use of multiple small satellites makes the constellation more survivable

-          It is conceivable that additional LEO sats could be “rapidly” deployed into orbit in time of need

-          The maturation of launch options directly from UK soil open up an opportunity to have UK satellites, launched from the UK, delivering sovereign intelligence capability

 

It would be highly beneficial to procure a number of air to air refuelling pods for A400M, to open up the ability to refuel MERLIN HC4 (Littoral Response Group) and CHINOOK (Army, Special Forces) in flight as well as have extra AAR capability for jets in times of need.

As mentioned elsewhere, adding Boom to at least some VOYAGER tankers would be a massive force multiplier by opening up options to extend E-7, P-8, RIVET JOINT and even C-17 in Flight, as well as making the RAF capable of supporting its main partners, including the F-35A of the “Nordic Air Force” in Scandinavia.

 

 

Propose how UK Special Forces are developed as part of an Integrated Force and in support of UK National Security and resilience.

In a high intensity warfare context, the role of Special Forces is likely to primarily revolve around deep reconnaissance and target acquisition in favour of the integrated force. The Army Special Operations Brigade, in particular, should have this as a key role for its Rangers, which should thus be organized and equipped with the necessary mobility, sensors and communications to scout deep beyond the Forward Edge of Battle Area.

Special Forces will of course retain their shock action and direct assault capability as well.

 

 

Propose how to improve financial management and administration across Defence, meeting HMG standards of accountability and identifying how more rapid adoption of digital technology will modernise culture, organisation and ways of working.

The one reform that would have the greatest effect on the handling of Defence budget would be one that favoured flexibility over rigid annuality parameters and that created a planning mechanism more akin to the Defence Planning Law in France. Government and Opposition alike need to have more visibility and more say on how long-term defence plans are set out and should vote regularly on those plans to ensure neither side can offer big promises while in Opposition only to deliver the opposite if Elected.

 

A more credible, long-term commitment to capabilities, programs and structures would give the Services and Industry the confidence needed to approach programs in annual increments. Currently, UK defence spends years and years trying to plan every financial detail of enormous, decade-long programs, generating famine periods followed by gigantic monolithic contracts which later invariably encounter problems due to inflation, unforeseen events, changed requirements and the delays that end up regularly being inflicted upon programmes to fit within annuality requirements. Enormous amounts of equipment are purchased in big contracts because Industry doesn't trust the government to come back if a project is split in tranches, and the Services are terrified of losing their chance (and budget) is they don't commit it. This needs to change. Industry and Services alike must be put in a situation in which they are more comfortable ordering 100 or so vehicles a year within a framework, rather than order 523 BOXERs in one go, to make an example. This would make it easier to control expenditure year on year on big projects without the need for shock cancellations.

 

Requirements must be set, endorsed, voted upon by both sides of the House, and then delivered incrementally year on year with industry and armed forces reasonably confident that the entire thing won't collapse the moment there is a new General Election and yet another SDSR looking for cuts.

 

 

Propose how UK Defence can build relationships with allies, partners and alliances as a strategic strength for the UK

AUKUS is the most impressive example of mutually beneficial relationship, and GCAP will do much in turn to keep Japan and Italy close to the UK.

 

There is obvious scope for more cooperation. BOXER with Germany, Australia and the Netherlands, for example. With Germany, synergies have been found in the TRITON program to jointly procure a replacement for the M3 rig; in the joint development of ammunition for Challenger 3; in the RCH155 artillery program, in FOST naval training, and hopefully in the future this can continue through the UK procuring the Skyranger turret for BOXER, like Germany already is doing, to enhance anti-air and anti-drone defence.

 

Type 26, if selected by Norway, could represent a formidable area of cooperation in the context of ASW on the Northern flank of NATO. There is potential for cooperation over P-8 POSEIDON too, and on MQ-9B PROTECTOR, particularly once it is fitted to also deliver maritime patrol / ASW. Norway has a known interest. Both countries employ the Sting Ray torpedo and this might continue in the future should Norway decide to follow the Mod 2 development now started in the UK.

 

Poland ties are strong thanks to CAMM / SKY SABRE and the joint development of the new CAMM MR munition. Poland has also acquired BRIMSTONE. Further synergies can be built upon these capabilities. Poland is about to become the second user of APACHE helicopters worldwide and the British Army Air Corps could do much to assist them along the way. The two nations would benefit from joint armament purchases for the APACHE fleets and from joint development of conceps and capabilities relating to the AH-64E.

Poland has also acquired AW-149s which the UK is considering as New Medium Helicopter solution.

I again stress the importance of TD5 and the advanced payloads for GMLRS rockets: this project could be a real winner in the field and on the market, and more GMLRS users should be involved as soon as possible to help build momentum.

 

These are some of the main examples. Those equipment points of contact bring mutual advantages, ease interoperability and create a wider user community to share the costs of modernisation with, while deepening mutual understanding and favouring common solutions.

 

The UK should consider more direct purchases from partners in return for defence sales. For example, cooperation with Norway on the VANGUARD concept for large motherships would deliver a good solution for the Royal Navy requirement while probably representing a welcome return for Norway's eventual selection of the Type 26 as its new frigate.