The sad farcical pre-Integrated Review: amphibious without ships

One area of massive concern ahead of the Integrated Review is the UK’s amphibious capability. Despite the attempts to put up smiles and talk of “exciting” times ahead for the “Future Commando Force”, it is impossible not to notice the horrendous persistence of a question mark on the fate of the amphibious ships that give the Royal Marines their meaning. Worse still, there are some very, very goofy attempts constantly going on at laying justifications for the loss of amphibious ships, mainly the LPDs of the ALBION class, using wildly inaccurate comparisons with the “USMC giving up its MBTs” or even statements as absurd as “the days of storming a beach are over".

Let me be absolutely clear from the very beginning: “the days of storming a beach are over" is another one of those typical british nonsensical claims generated purely by fear that budget cuts in an incoming SDSR are going to strip the capability to do so away. It is simply not in any way true and it is ludicrous to see people arguing otherwise.

It shouldn’t be necessary to say this, but sadly it appears many need to hear it:

Nobody “storms the beach” because it is a pleasant or easy thing to do. It is done because it is sometimes beneficial and sometimes simply non discretionary to cross a significant body of water to access strategically relevant territory.

Amphibious maneuver might simply be indispensable to dislodge an enemy from a position; in order to access a theatre of operations; in order to force the enemy to spread out its forces along its coast, weakening its defences in other areas as a result; or even to turn the flank of an enemy front too solid to be dealt purely with through “frontal” assault on land.

Seas, islands and shores are not going anywhere and so isn’t the need to be able to move significant force over water, onto the shore and beyond. There will be occasions in which littoral maneuver is simply non discretionary because geography, both physical and political, dictates it.

And why beaches? Simple: because the enemy is not stupid enough to directly give up a port. If getting directly into a port is an option, obviously everyone is very happy to go for the port as unloading ships in port is countless times faster and safer and easier. But the enemy will make sure the ports are well guarded and / or timely sabotaged. Having the ability to land substantial force over an undeveloped beach and maneuver from there enormously complicates the enemy’s defensive needs and plans.

There are legitimate concerns about the ability to assault “defended beaches”, but first of all we should better define what a "defended beach" is. Many seem to automatically revert to images out of Omaha beach and imagine infantry charging in shallow waters at Atlantic Wall bunkers.

But nobody today would be able to defend in that way. Not even China has enough army to do that, and if you forced them to do it, it would be a victory in itself with how many troops and resources it ties down along countless kilometers of shore. Not to mention that precision weaponry of today means that the fortifications of a new Atlantic Wall would quickly turn into large graves.

A defended beach today is more likely to be a stretch of coast which can only be approached from directions which are covered by reconnaissance assets, perhaps with ground-launched anti-ship missiles in range and with the threat of enemy air assets as well as ground-based air defence such as long range Surface to Air Missiles. Enemy ground forces over and in the immediate vicinity of the beach are unlikely to be substantial, but mechanized units will be ready to move along the coast to timely meet an invasion force. For example, Italy during the Cold War developed the 8x8 tank-destroyer CENTAURO specifically to create wheeled, medium-weight formations which could race along the coastal roads to contain a soviet amphibious force landing (presumably) on the Adriatic coast. Now the TYPE 16 tank-destroyer being fielded by Japan is a continuation of that general idea.

These overlapping layers of defence are commonly identified as Anti Access; Area Denial (A2AD) “bubbles”, although this arguably tries to attribute to these threats a degree of novelty which they do not really have. A major feature of war has always been the need to prevent the enemy from accessing / taking over an area. What was a fort, a coastal battery, is not A2AD of its time?

What is “new” to A2AD is that, potentially, offensive weapons are currently seen as having better chances than the defences. In the endless struggle between “sword” and “shield”, we currently feel that the “sword” has the advantage. In other words, in the West, we no longer trust our warships to be able to cope with enemy missile and air attacks. We fear that modern technology has made it so much easier to detect, track and attack ships out at sea that getting past the “coastal batteries” might no longer be possible.

As I’ve written already while talking of the other commonly heard trope that “aircraft carriers are obsolete”, it is not the carrier that has grown more vulnerable than it was in the past, but it is our escort ships and embarked air wing that we no longer trust. If we feel we can’t operate the carrier / amphibious ships safely, the actual implication is that we do not expect the escort ships and embarked fighter jets to be able to defend them.

The answer to this fear cannot be “let’s do without carriers and amphibs”, because that would weaken the fleet even further (no air wing to fight the air battle with) and remove much of the purpose of the whole fleet. If the carrier cannot be defended, what can we defend? If warships cannot defend each other in a group, they won’t be able to prevent the enemy from cutting off the sea lanes either.

Basically it would mean we have lost not just control of the sea, but the ability to make any use of it, tactically and strategically. If we believe this, very urgent action is required to improve the “shield”.

But in truth, much of the argument against carriers and amphibs is born more out of interservice rivalry over insufficient budgets than by actual strategic and tactical thinking. If the latter was driving the policy, we would be talking of how to improve escort ships and their missiles as well as the capabilities of the embarked air wing. To be fair, it must be noted that some in the US are actually calling for an Air Wing rethink, but unfortunately they are an exception in a discourse which is otherwise a completely partisan battle for the budget, not for the sea.

But the USMC…

In this sad debate, largely devoid of actual technical content, many will happily mention the USMC reforms and their offer of their MBTs in sacrifice to free up funds for other capabilities as a sign that “storming the beach” is a thing of the past.

Some claim that the future is “raiding” to be conducted with small boats, stealthy infiltrations of small groups of Marines and helicopters for the rest, with little to no space for surface maneuver. They want this to be the future of the Royal Marines and they even claim this is what the USMC is doing.

Thing is, the USMC is definitely not giving up on surface maneuver. The moment an amphibious force does that, it ceases to exist, or at least it ceases to matter.

Using raids, stealthy infiltration of small and agile combat elements and carrying out “Commando” work, sabotage, reconnaissance and target acquisition in favor of the fleet is of course important and it is right to pour more effort into improving tactics and equipment for achieving greater effect. It is also rational to reduce the vulnerability of the force by coming in smaller groups from multiple directions at once: dispersion is an effective way to reduce vulnerability to the mass of long range fires some enemies are able to deploy.

Ultimately, however, raids and long range insertions of small bodies of troops to push the enemy back from the shore are pre-landing force work. The multiple pinpricks they directly deliver, and the much greater damage they can cause by calling upon and coordinating Joint Fires are meant to weaken the enemy defences and ideally drive them back from the shore to allow the fleet more freedom of movement, eventually all the way up to the landing of a mechanized force. All these activities (call them Commando work, if you must) are not new, and while we might evolve them and make them deadlier, they cannot, in isolation, in any way be the future of amphibious capability.

If you can raid but not land, you are essentially arguing to become a master of foreplay but with no actual capability to continue with the main act.

The USMC is definitely not giving up on its ability to go ashore with a significant force. It is not giving up on beaches and it is not aiming for “helicopters and boats”. If you actually read the papers about the USMC restructuring you will see that they actually intend to sacrifice several helicopter and even some tilt-rotor squadrons in order to free up funds. Specifically, Heavy Lift helicopter squadrons are due to drop from 8 to 5; attack helicopter squadrons from 7 to 5 or less; Tilt Rotor squadrons from 17 to 14.

Some of the funds will go towards one of the greatest priorities so far identified, which is the purchase of 30 more amphibious ships. Much smaller, simpler and “attritable” than current large amphibs, but, interestingly, actually able to beach themselves like the LSTs of old, and thus able to disgorge a significant load of vehicles or stores, all the way up to MBT size.  

Why would they want that?

Because their new concept of operation definitely still requires the landing over the beach of significant amounts of heavy equipment. While they recognize they must put the enemy in front of a much greater number of individually less attractive targets (30 ships means almost doubling the current amphibious fleet) to begin to change the dynamics, they know they can’t do that by turning amphibious capability into 8 or 12 Marines in an Offshore Raiding Craft with little or nothing behind them.

While the exact shape of the new amphibious ships for the USMC's future concepts has yet to be decided, the concepts make clear that landing heavy stuff on a beach is far from a dead requirement. 

The USMC wants to create multiple dispersed forward operating bases ashore, some of which equipped as forward arming and refueling points for aircraft up to F-35B or even F-35C (the latter is more complex, for obvious reasons, but the USMC has the capability to lay longer AM-2 strips and install deployable arresting wire sets). The Forward Bases will effectively become their own A2AD bubbles, armed with long range rockets and missiles, including anti-ship weapons. Indeed, the USMC plans to greatly reduce its holding of howitzers (from 21 to 5 batteries) but to treble the number of HIMARS rocket launchers and missile batteries equipped with even smaller launchers (from 7 to 21). Notably, the USMC is investing in an unmanned vehicle, the ROGUE, which is a JLTV without crew and topped by a launcher for GMLRS rockets or other munitions, including the Naval Strike Missile anti-ship weapon. The ROGUE is smaller and more easily deployable than even HIMARS and, obviously, is more remorselessly sacrificed. The USMC has also requested in the 2021 budget a first purchase of 48 TOMAHAWK missiles for launch from the ground, with the expectation that they will go for the new TLAM MK 5A Maritime Strike variant, aka the one fitted with an active seeker for use against warships at sea as well as moving targets on land. While it might be feasible to move ROGUE by helicopter (the USMC will have the massive CH-53K King Stallion heavy lift machines, after all), it is clear that in order to actually beef up and sustain the forward bases there will be an enduring need for surface manoeuvre. Only landing craft, or the new beaching amphibious vessel, will be able to deliver the quantity of stores, ammunition and combat vehicles required.

Test firings of a NSM anti-ship missile from a ROGUE prototype are expected soon. This new launcher has the firepower of a HIMARS in a smaller, attritable package. 

The new USMC Marine Littoral Regiment is still experimenting to find its final shape, but it is centered on a slightly smaller but “more powerful” infantry battalion mixed with long-range Fires, including anti-ship missiles. The Regiment obviously has its own dedicated logistic battalion. And, very significantly, there is a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, which will be absolutely central to the success of the plan. Let the full implication sink in: a battalion of infantry, a battalion of air defence assets. That’s one special ratio of infantry to air defences.

For now there has been very little discussion about what exactly a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion will end up looking like, but personally I expect the USMC will move to field ground based anti-air capabilities with ranges and lethality going far beyond the remit of the current Low-Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalions. Investment currently is focused on providing a modernized SHORAD and Counter-UAV capability with weapons and sensors on JLTV vehicle bases, but it is reasonable to expect that much longer ranged SAMs will follow. It is only logical: the USMC “A2AD” bubbles will need to not only threaten ships but to help the fleet at sea in the fight against enemy long range missile and air attacks. The USMC is already working to ensure its ground-based radars can seamlessly share tracking and targeting data with the Navy’s and with the Army’s own air defence networks, but they will need to be able to put ashore their own long range SAMs, so I fully expect substantial investment in this direction.

The USMC forward bases, some of which will be decoys and some of which will be used rotationally, with frequent moves from one to another, are clearly meant to be “sponges” for enemy long range fires. Imagine forward airfields that can enhance the striking range of F-35Bs as well as fire Naval Strike Missiles, TOMAHAWK and other long range guided weapons: they constitute a threat that no enemy can ignore. Dispersion, movement in and out of bases and use of small and expendable weapon systems such as ROGUE, with a great number of small, cheap vessels shuttling the force around mean that suddenly, the target is much harder to eradicate and it starts absorbing more and more long range fires and more missiles. Especially so if it comes with its own anti-missile defences and can shoot down some of the incoming weapons, as well as “taking the others on the chin” without becoming combat-ineffective.

Imagine a few of these deployable A2AD bubbles forming a loose chain around a stretch of shore. Suddenly, the defender is the one struggling to get troops into the area to hold it against a force coming ashore.

You can see how the new USMC approach starts to change the picture.

The USMC having no MBTs of its own is more detail than substance when you realize that they will have the same, or indeed a much greater ability to put MBTs ashore if they so need. The USMC commander, General David Berger, has been very clear about what his thinking actually is: “We need an Army with lots of tanks. We don't need a Marine Corps with tanks.”

That phrase, alone, is enough to shoot down any wildly inaccurate claim that the USMC thinks the tank is obsolete, or that “storming the beach” is no longer a thing. It makes sense for the USMC to accept some sacrifices and a greater dependence on the Army’s own formations, if it can lead to a better overall result by enabling investment elsewhere. Not to mention that this is the United States of America that we are talking about: Congress might still decide to provide additional money and prevent some of the proposed cuts from even happening.

Even if all cuts do take place, please note that the USMC will no longer have tanks but it will have a very significant number of 8x8 vehicles, both for reconnaissance and screening (a LAV-25 replacement is in prototype phase) and for the infantry fighting.

The new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) destined to replace the AAV-7 will have far better on-land combat value than its predecessor, and the USMC is acquiring not just the APC variant but an IFV / Combat variant with turret and 30 mm cannon. This is an enormous capability uplift from the .50 HMG plus 40 mm Grenade Launcher in the tiny turret of the gigantic and vulnerable AAV-7.

While it is notionally planned that the number of Amphibious Assault Companies will drop from 6 to 4, this still means the USMC will have the ability to move 4 full battalions of infantry on 8x8s (note: each Amphibian Company of AAV-7s, and in the future of ACVs, is able to lift a whole battalion of Marines. The Amphibian companies are grouped in 2 battalions), maybe more considering that the individual battalion strength is expected to go down around 200 elements from the current 850. Overall, the number of infantry battalions itself is expected to go down from 24 to 21, so the reduction in vehicles is proportional to the overall force restructuring. 

The Reconnaissance Companies (currently mounted on the lightweight LAV-25 8x8) are at the moment penciled for an increase from 9 to 12, meaning that significant “cavalry” support will also be available.

In short: the USMC is certainly not giving up its ability to land a substantial force and maneuver aggressively inland. They will sacrifice their remaining 7 companies of MBTs, yes, but they will gain more capability elsewhere and will still be more than able to put ashore tanks. They will be army tanks, but that is secondary.

The Royal Marines have given up way too early on trying to secure an amphibious 8x8 future for themselves. The UK could use that kind of capability in many ways and scenarios, including on the continent. The complete absence of any amphibious armour in the UK's inventory (beyond the modest VIKING) is twice as surprising considering how much experience the British Army has collected in the Second World War on the usefulness of amphibious armour in getting acrosss rivers, littorals and flooded areas. 

The Future Commando Force

It is very worrying instead to observe the Future Commando Force work through a series of botched interviews and news releases and endless rumors which all reinforce the unpleasant feeling that we are staring at nothing more than a capability cut.

It is widely speculated that the ALBION-class LPDs will be lost at the Review table, and probably without any kind of replacement.

Not even the infamous Littoral Strike Ships.

In the last article on the Telegraph, the Littoral Strike Groups (one in the North Atlantic / Arctic area and one East of Suez) are described as nothing more than a Company-group held afloat on a single BAY-class LSD each. The possibility of the LPDs going and the LSS never happening is spelled out without much hesitation, and yet the annoyingly false pretense of “evolution” is pushed forth in what would be, with those premises, nothing but an insult to any thinking brain. 

Single company groups deployments on lone BAY class LSDs, but also on the LPD at times, have been happening for years under the heading “Special Purpose Task Group”. A SPTG based on HMS Albion operated into the Pacific in 2018, for example, while one on Lyme Bay operated in the Mediterranean. Eventually, the groups reconnected for an operation at more meaningful scale during SAIF SAREEA 3 in Oman.

Reorganize the Company-group all you like, add some UAVs and cameras on the helmets and a new uniform and C8 rifles in exchange for L85A3s, but what are you actually going to achieve?

Not much, frankly. It will still be an SPTG, in the end. With the same limitations due to operating from the very same ship it has been using for years. 

What would be new if the loss of the LPDs was confirmed would be the inability to do anything more than SPTGs. No ability anymore to do something at battlegroup scale. No ability to put ashore a mechanized force of any relevance.

That is not an “exciting future force”. That is a disastrous death for the UK’s amphibious capability.

“Dealing with new threats” has clearly nothing to do with the structure of such a force. A BAY is in no way more survivable than the LPD. In fact it is built to more relaxed standards, which make it even less of a hit-taker, in pure survivability terms.

It is not any better armed than the LPD. It does not come with new generation ship to shore connectors that enable the Royal Marines to get ashore faster, from further away, or just more stealthily. A forward deployed, one-ship Littoral Strike Group, or Littoral Response Group, depending on who you listen to, is in no way more useable or useful, than what could be done with the current amphibious ships.

I can trust the Royal Marines’ judgement on what they are trying to do with tactics for 12-man groups operating more dispersed, more “Special Forces-like” once ashore. But, dramatically, I see little to no attention paid to how to put troops ashore in the first place. Going back to what I wrote at the beginning of the article, it feels like we are debating all sorts of details about pre-landing force work, but completely ignoring the landing bit.

What we really need to see is ships, ship to shore connectors and vehicles talk. It’s impossible to take seriously the hype about “future force” without the actual fundamentals being secured. Until there is such a huge question mark over the fate of the ships and craft needed to lift and insert and sustain the force, everything else is secondary at best.

In all seriousness, if an amphibious force isn't even sure it will be able to hang on to its defining capability for lack of shipping, throwing money at new uniforms and C8 rifles is more infuriating than exciting. Is this expenditure truly necessary, considering that the amphibious capability as a whole is hanging by a weak thread…?

What if the LPDs go but Littoral Strike Ships come in?

Much would depend on what capability the Littoral Strike Ships would come with. However, for what we have seen and heard so far, the LSS was definitely heading into MV Ocean Trader territory. That is, pretty much, a POINT-class RoRo with a flight deck and hangar bolted on top, as well as an enlarged accommodation block added to the superstructure.

If this is the LSS, losing the LPDs to purchase them would be madness.

Let us be clear on one thing, once and for all: the LSS concept was born as a (very) poor man's LPH replacement because the current amphibious fleet's greatest weakness is the lack of aviation facilities.

The combination of ALBION and BAY classes was originally conceived with the expectation that there would be 2 LPH covering the aviation side. Of course, 2 LPH quickly became 1 (HMS Ocean) and then 0 today.

In absence of the QE-class carrier at readiness, the LSS was (is?) going to provide a forward deployed group with some hangar space, a big flight deck and extra lift to compensate, again, the loss of the substantial capacity that Ocean ensured.  

You might remember that the Commando Helicopter Force was thinking in terms of “Units of Action”, aka modular sub-squadron groupings of helicopters, indicatively described as 4 MERLIN plus some WILDCAT for the reconnaissance, escort and light attack roles. An air group similar to the one we can observe on RFA Argus right now in the Caribbean.

The PREVAIL concept is the best visualization we have been given of what an LSS could be. It would be a fantastic low cost floating base for forward presence, but makes very little sense as LPD replacement. 

A Littoral Strike Group of “2-3 ships”, centered on an LSS and comprising a BAY and eventually an LPD, would have been a significant forward-deployed force, especially with an helicopter “unit of action” on the LSS.

When the idea was proposed in these terms, it all made sense.

But if you start to picture the LSS as an LPD replacement, you are much better served by doing nothing and keeping the LPDs you have.

The LSS as imagined so far has nothing particularly magic about it and while it might carry several boats / Offshore Raiding Crafts it is highly unlikely to have any real ability to land heavy stores and vehicles unless she can use a port or go real close to shore to make do with Mexeflotes. It is no better than a normal POINT sealift vessel, in this particular regard. 

Which means that, whatever kind of fantastic insertion concept you want to imagine with RHIBs, "boats and helicopters", the only thing the LSS has that other ships in the amphibious flotilla don’t, is the hangar for maintenance on the helicopters.

Even if there was anything truly smart to "using boats and helicopters only” and withdrawing the LCU MK10 from service losing your heavy lift capability in the process, and there is not, you could do that extremely well from the existing LPD. You can fit plenty of boats in the well dock and vehicle deck; the davits have already been tested with CB90 combat boats in place of LCVPs, the flight deck can operate 2 CHINOOKs at once.

Which also means, again, that the LPD can do better than the BAYs as well. Whatever you can imagine doing from a BAY with "boats and helicopters", you can do better from the LPD. More boats and more helicopters, literally.

Capability-wise there is exactly ZERO reasons to lose those ships early, whatever concept of operation you want to fantasize about.

If the LSS is to be a replacement and not an addition, again there is ZERO reason to bother.

Beyond small boats, what defines amphibious capability is the possibility of inserting ashore a mechanized force with meaningful combat power. A force almost as agile as an airborne one in terms of deployability at range, but at the same time one which comes with armor, with mobility, firepower and sustainability that air insertion cannot give you.

For this fantastic, unique attribute to be true, however, you need LIFT. You need the right ships to carry that force, and the right Ship to Shore connectors to send that force ashore. Lose the LPDs and you've lost much of the LIFT (especially so if you get nothing at all in exchange, obviously) and the very vast majority of ship to shore capability. A single LPD operates 4 LCU MK10 and 4 LCVPs. The smaller well dock on a BAY can handle a single LCU MK10. The whole fleet of 3 BAYs combined is still one LCU short of what a single LPD gives you.
It's really simple math.

And since the carries thankfully exist, i'd rather take the lack of aviation facilities in the forward deployed element, knowing the carrier can at least be used when really needed, than go for the lack of ship to shore, which nothing else in the fleet gives you.

Talk money, if you have to. But whoever thinks the LPDs are a problem capability-wise is clearly not in touch with reality. Don't even try to spin it in capability terms, it destroys your credibility. 

Whoever thinks that using the BAYs alone has anything to do with “new scenarios” and “A2AD making it impossible to storm the beach like before” is equally living in fantasy.

What is the aim, at the end of the day?
What is the actual aim of the Future Commando Force work carried out by the Royal Marines? What is the desired end state, the actual thinking for the future?

Obviously the Royal Marines are not in the financial position for pursuing their own anti-air formations and follow the USMC lead, but what is being done, or at least thought of, to improve the capability at least a bit?

What does all the talk about “working more closely with the Navy” actually entail? For what we are reading right now, not much. Beyond the role change of 42 Commando, which has already happened, I don’t see much. The forward presence through BAY ships is more of a Navy realignment with the Royal Marines than the opposite, simply because the BAY class has been increasingly called away from the amphibious role in order to cover all sorts of other requirements, from disaster relief in the Caribbean to the enduring requirement for a mothership in support of the MCM force in the Gulf.

With 3 BAY ships in total, one of which tied down in support of the MCM force, keeping up a constant routine of forward deployments in the High North and East of Suez would exhaust the entire fleet. It is a concept of operations which will entail unavoidable presence gaps for lack of shipping whenever a BAY hits refit time.

The loss of amphibious shipping will also mutilate the role of 3 Commando Brigade in Norway and the High North, just after the UK has committed itself to a 10 year plan of support to its ally. Without the ships to lift a sizeable force and insert and move it with agility along the Norwegian coast, 3 Commando brigade is just another Light Infantry brigade with a problem of how to get to Norway in the first place and how to move quickly around the country once there. Its actual usefulness in the area drops down to minimum terms.

I hope there is a bit more to this Future Commando Force than cosmetics, but so far it looks like shuffling of chairs on the deck of a sinking ship. None of the work we’ve heard about is tackling any real requirement connected to actual amphibious work. The last time there was an attempt at something genuinely helpful was almost 10 years ago when the PACSCAT fast landing craft and the CB90 combat boats were extensively tested. Those could have been engines of change. Adding this or that UAV is helpful, and changing uniform might make a lot of difference to the individual soldier's comfort, but none of these small bits does a future force make.

Ultimately, is there is going to be no actual amphibious lift and capability left, the logical consequence must be the immediate disbandment of 3 Commando brigade, with the transfer of 29 Royal Artillery, 24 Royal Engineers and the Logistic Regiment and the VIKINGs to an army brigade in 1st Division, so that at least one brigade can be rescued from the current state of insignificance. If there is no capability to insert it from the sea, there is no reason for it continuing and being a drain on the Navy’s budget. Thanks to the VIKINGs, an Army brigade can take up the mountain / arctic role (if at least that is to be retained in some form, at this point there is no telling what the UK is even trying to do anymore), while 40 and 45 Commando should just be disbanded. They would be reduced to the status of infantry as expensive as Special Forces but not equally free of political caveats on their employment.

42 Cdo would remain to cover the “actual” maritime roles, as it already does; 43 Cdo will stay as long as the nuclear deterrent stays, in order to ensure its security; and 47 Cdo might still become something useful if, out of the massacre, they can at least buy actual combat boats for littoral / riverine support to the Navy.

Imagine what an actual maritime force multiplier a battalion more similar to the Swedish amphibious force, or the US Navy riverine squadrons, could be: if 47 Commando was equipped with well armed combat boats with decent range, something like CB90 or larger, it could actually complement other warships.

Imagine a BAY used as mothership for a substantial number of combat boats, deployed to somewhere like the Gulf, in a scenario of protection to commercial shipping, like we saw very recently. Fast, highly mobile combat boats cannot beat back a major Iranian offensive on their own, but they can virtually “multiply” HMS Montrose. In the vast majority of realistic scenarios, the presence of a suitable Royal Marines combat boat would be enough to dissuade attempts to seize the merchant vessel, even if the nearest frigate was a long distance away.

An expensive hollow force without a clear role is not needed: the British Army already maintains a whole Division of loosely put together infantry without supports, always on the lookout for a reason to continue existing. 3 Commando brigade should not join the count of the “fake” brigades.

But if it does because the disastrous decision to cut the amphibious ships is made, then I’m left to hope that there is the dignity and courage to at least be honest about the implications and follow through with reductions which can at least generate some actual savings in terms of manpower and money to devote to other priorities. 

The worst possible outcome is to mutilate amphibious capability to save the few dozen millions spent yearly for the LPDs, but continue sinking money on a brigade no longer able to carry out its mission.

If you really need to save money, at least do that decently. If you kill a capability to save pennies and gain no real personnel / budget headroom to do anything else anyway, you are shafting yourself twice.

Ultimately, the UK needs to decide what it wants to be. This is the one decision that constantly gets skirted around.

If the worst case scenario for the Integrated Review, which has been leaked to the Times today, ever comes to pass, the UK must be honest with itself and spell out the consequence: it is finished as a military power of any relevance. Not global, not even regional. It will be a small player with some absurdly good capabilities still in the arsenal merely because they are the ruins of what existed before. The whole structure, however, is losing so much coherence and stability that the comparison with other countries is increasingly humiliating. 

What we absolutely not need is the UK pretending to still be relevant and capable while mutilating itself.

Exactly like we don’t need the Royal Marines pretending to be an amphibious force for the future while amphibious capability actually vanishes.

Sort out what you want to be, with honesty.

A look at the Equipment Programme and an ear for the Secretary of State's speech

Equipment Programme 2017: Category A and B projects

The MOD has published a FOI answer in which it details the names of the projects of category A (value exceeding 400 million pounds) and B (from 100 million to 400). The list does not provide any additional detail, but even so it is simply invaluable to better understand the 10 Years Equipment Programme.

The fact that the MOD is fine with revealing this list if specifically asked to do so, but does not include anything comparable in the EP document itself, is extremely irritating, and it proves once again that there is no security reason whatsoever for publishing such a vague EP document. As I’ve fully embraced the cause of greater accountability and transparence by the MOD in the handling of the defence budget, I will remark that in the future it should no longer be necessary to use FOIs to get this level of information. It would be very helpful to include it in the EP document itself.

Getting to the document, in addition to the really big programmes that are well known and expected to figure, the list does contain a number of voices worth touching upon. 

Complex Weapons

There are several voices here that are of enormous interest. One is the Category A project unimaginatively named “Battlefield Weapon”. It is hard to guess what this is, exactly. With the JAVELIN anti-tank missile having a notional OSD of 2025, the development of a new, more multi-role missile for the infantry might well be what’s hiding under this name. The British Army also has (or had?) a requirement for a “Reusable Multi-Role Medium Range Shoulder Launcher (MRSLs)” to introduce into the platoon to increase anti-structure and anti-infantry firepower and, effectively, replace the outgoing 60mm mortar. The expected date for contract award has however passed months ago without a selection being announced. The contenders were (are?) the Carl Gustav, which is enjoying a major renaissance being selected by both US Army and USMC as new Squad weapon; and the C90 Reusable.

MRSL might be hiding behind “Battlefield Weapon” as well, in theory, but it is not likely, also because even an Army-wide purchase of Carl Gustav would still not get anywhere near the 400 million mark.

There is also a “Tactical Guided Munition – Indirect”, which appears as a voice both under Procurement and under Support. This could hide the decade-old requirement for a guided 155mm shell solution for the Royal Artillery’s AS90 howitzers.

We also have, however, “Land Precision Strike”, which, if I had to guess, would be related to the GMLRS rockets. Again, there is no way to tell for sure. These are both Category A procurement programmes, so we are talking about sizeable projects for new capability. It would be hugely beneficial for the Army to procure the new GMLRS “Alternative Warhead” which restores area-effects lost with the demise of traditional sub-munitions, but I’m not sure an area-effect weapon would fit very well within the project name.

Finally, we have the “Deep Fire Rocket System”, again a Category A project. To comment on this one we have to note that for well over a decade the Royal Artillery has wanted a long range weapon, namely the ATACMS large rocket for the M270B1 launchers. 
We must also go back to the end of last year, when 16 RA Bty went into suspended animation, but with a most unusual promise of a relatively swift return to active service to operate a new Deep Fires capability. In the occasion it was said:

 “There is a plan in the middle of the 2020s around 2024 when we develop a new capability for the British Army and enhance some of our deep fire capabilities as part of a divisional fires regiment.”

While there is no way to confirm it, it seems very likely that the British Army intends to procure the new missile that the US Army is developing to replace ATACMS, the Long Range Precision Strike munition for GMLRS launchers. The standing up of a new battery for it, however, suggests that the launcher vehicle might also be new, and it is relatively easy to imagine that the army might be thinking of the wheeled HIMARS launcher, which would complement the tracked, heavier (but with more rockets ready for launch) M270. This solution would deliver wheeled GMLRS capability for the Strike Brigades and introduce a 500 km precision strike capability (or maybe even more than that if the INF treaty collapses for good. The LRPF is a prime candidate for quick range extension in that case).

HIMARS and LRPF for the Royal Artillery in the early 2020s? 

Curiously, the integration of Meteor on the F-35 also appears in the “Complex Weapons” budget rather than in the “Combat Air” one, as happens instead for weapons integration on the Typhoon. This might be due to the fact that the missile is to receive a new set of “clipped” wings as part of the integration. It might also have to do with its further development (GaN AESA radar seeker) under the name “Joint New Air to Air Missile”, a bi-national programme with Japan. JNAAM does not appear in the FOI: it is either part of “LII (Lightning II) Meteor integration” or is too small a budget to enter in category A and B.

There is a “Next Generation SPEAR” voice as well, which is not readily identified. Brimstone 2 Capability Sustainment Progamme (also known as Brimstone 3), SPEAR Cap 3 and Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon are all listed separately, so this might revolve around the Paveway IV spiral development, or represent a whole new system.

In the Category B list it is worth noting two large purchases of Paveway IV bombs for arsenal replenishment: 1200 and 3500 bombs respectively.

There are also a “Javelin follow-on buy” voice, which might or might not include the purchase of the latest, multi-role Javelin F with improved blast-fragmentation effect for roles other than anti-tank.

The 4^th Tranche of High Velocity Missiles (Starstreak) is also listed as Category B.

There is a Category A “Future Systems” which is as vague as it could be but no doubt covers all sort of studies.

The Storm Shadow Mid Life Refit is a Category A equipment support project. There is a “Future Ground Based Air Defence contingency” voice which is probably connected to FLAADS Land Ceptor (now Sky Sabre).

Complex Weapons budget includes also a “Medium Range Radar” voice which is probably ARTISAN. The inclusion of this and most of the Sea Ceptor costs in the Weapons budget explain why the Type 23 CSP appears so cheap.

Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon is quoted as two programmes: FLRDFC is (probably) the replacement for Storm Shadow, but the exact meaning of the horrible acronym is uncertain. FC/ASW FOSUW should be the Future Offensive anti-Surface Weapon, the replacement for Harpoon on ships.

Brimstone 2 CSP is worth a mention as this programme should deliver a "Brimstone 3" round which is expected to replace Hellfire on the British Army's Apache Block III helicopters in the 2020s. By then the US Army will be transitioning to JAGM, and while Hellfire will remain a plenty big player for many more years, it will become progressively harder to support as the main customer moves on to the new system. Brimstone, on the british side, is the obvious solution. Brimstone 3 is also offered to France for the TIGER attack helicopter modernisation, but it is pretty easy to imagine that Paris will go with a MMP development or some other non-british solution, especially since a british purchase of VBCI has well and truly gone with the wind. 

It would be very interesting if Brimstone 3 added a launch mode that sees the missile dropped before the rocket ignites: this modification would enable integration of the 3 inside the F-35's bays. Currently, Brimstone is rail launched so is not compatible with confined spaces... 

LAND

In the Land Sector the big disappointment is the disappearance of the Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle which brings the issue of replacing FV432 in armoured formations back to square one. It had been present up to the 2016 edition. Not for the first time I’m left wondering how the “Armoured Infantry 2026” overarching programme is supposed to ever deliver full operational capability if the Warrior CSP is not supported by a replacement for FV432. If they are looking at having MIV covering the role, I can only repeat my suggestion: bin WCSP and put the new turret on MIV. It would be absurd to have, say, the mortar team in support to a battalion of Warriors traveling on a wheeled AFV larger and heavier than the IFV itself… 

MITER and NAV-P are both present, however. MITER is a large Category A programme which aims to unify, in the 2020s, the provisions of the current C Fleet, Protected Plant fleet and Mechanical Handling Fleet.

The C Fleet comprises of engineering, construction and plant equipment to enable manoeuvre, construction, logistics, force protection engineering and life support. It is currently provided under a Private Finance Initiative contract which will end in 2021. The current small protected construction plant fleet is owned by the MOD and is mainly the result of UORs. It is now supported by industry under a contract also ending in 2021. The Defence Mechanical Handling Equipment is currently almost entirely provided under the DMHE contract, ending in 2020. The equipment fleet, composed of pure Commercial Off The Shelf kit, is owned by the contractor and provided to MOD on a period lease basis. Under MITER, the future contractor will manage and sustain the combined construction and mechanical handling equipment fleet in the United Kingdom, on deployed operations and overseas environments.

The Non Articulated Vehicle Programme is the replacement of DROPS. In July 2018 the MOD ordered the conversion of 382 of its MAN SV HX-77 trucks to be converted into Enhanced Pallized Load Systems EPLS, including 33 winterised/waterproofed for Royal Marines operations. 40 deliveries are planned early this year with final deliveries by the end of march 2021. Around 180 had been procured earlier on. NAVP will build on this interim solution to hopefully finally complete the DROPS replacement.

One notable absence, not easily explained, is the Multi Role Vehicle - Protected voice. The Foreign Military Sale authorization for up to 2,747 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles is dated 10 July 2017, so the programme was definitely ongoing already. But, up to that point it might, for internal accounting reasons, have been reported as a smaller-budget project? After all, no MRV-P candidate, not even the JLTV, is still fully and definitively selected. 
JLTV should cover the Group 1 requirement, while Bushmaster and Eagle 6x6 are still battling it out for the Group 2 requirement for a larger vehicle (selection might take place this year). Group 3 should cover the Light Recovery Vehicle. 
The absence of MRVP from the list is curious, but not necessarily concerning. However, MRVP does seem a remarkably vulnerable programme which might well be delayed once again in the near future as far too many priorities battle over a far too tight budget. 

Worth a mention is the Category B project TYRO for the upgrade or replacement of BR90 equipment, both Close Support (Titan-launched scissor bridges) and General Support (the ABLE system.

The latest variant of contract notice published for TYRO – Close Support adds a new vehicle requirement: a Wheeled Close Support Launch Vehicle that must be able to launch the same bridges as operated by Titan.

As of today, the Close Support bridge does not have anything like this: the supporting vehicle is a Unipower trucks that carries spare bridges but is not meant to launch them.

Up to 36 Wheeled Close Support Launch Vehicles are requested, and the inclusion of “Close Support” is significant because, keeping pace with army doctrine and definitions, it requires a vehicle that can operate in the Direct Fire zone. In other words, something offering a decent level of protection, because it is expected that there will be a fight going on while launching the bridge.

Not just Tank Bridge Transporters anymore. Under TYRO, a wheeled close support launch vehicle is now requested. The number of ABLE General Support bridges, on the other hand, shrinks to compensate. 

It is pretty evident that such a vehicle would deliver greatly enhanced bridging support to the Strike Brigades when compared to the Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS) which spans a smaller gap, is launched by a lightly protected MAN SV EPLS and has a Military Load Class limited to 50.

TYRO requests that all bridge elements are certified at least for MLC 100 (Tracked), which means that pretty much everything has to be able to cross.

There is no Project TRITON in sight yet, but it might just be because of timelines. The TRITON project for the procurement by 2027 of a replacement for the M3 rigs for Wide Wet Gap Crossing has been unveiled in late 2018 in the new Army’s newsletter. It probably hadn’t been firmed up yet in the 2017 plan.

ISTAR

ISTAR big projects are dominated by communications, and in particular Future Beyond Line of Sight, or SKYNET 6, the successor to the current constellation of comms satellites. As is know, a first “transitional” satellite, SKYNET 6A, has been ordered in summer 2017.

Many of the other voices are part of the Land Environment Tactical Communication Information Systems mega-programme for the renewal of comms at pretty much all levels. FALCON 2 EXPLOIT and EVOLVE both figure in the Category A programmes, and it is meant to expand on the capabilities of the current FALCON, which is the deployable High Bandwidth Backbone Network for the joint force, and primarily for the army.

Importantly, Dismounted Situational Awareness appears as a Cat A programme. It is part of the MORPHEUS communication system (data and voice radios and display for situational awareness) meant to progressively replace BOWMAN.

PICASSO also figures, and in this case we are talking of the national capability for strategic Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and GEOInt, which provides commanders with information obtained from the analysis of date coming from national and multi-national collectors.

The Increment 1 and 2 of the Aliied Systems for GEOINT (AGS) are also included.

Combat Air

The elephant in the room, due to the current uncertainty surrounding it, is the UK-France Future Combat Air System, aka the UCAV for the 2030s. If we believe the press reports, France was ready to progress into a funded Demonstration phase and proceed with the building of prototypes, but the UK has refused to commit funding to that. Whether the programme survives, and in which form, is currently hard to say.

Then we have, of course, the national FCAS, better known in public as Project TEMPEST. Connected to it is also project PYRAMID, which is meant to develop the solutions for the MOD’s Mission System Reference Architecture for future Air Systems.

Worth of mention is Typhoon RADAR 1, a category A project meant to deliver a workable AESA radar for Typhoon Tranche 3 (and hopefully Tranche 2 too). The radar 1, or R1, is the baseline AESA in development for the consortium, but the UK’s intention is to eventually use a more ambitious R2 standard, with Electronic Warfare capability. R2 does not appear in the list, but this might simply be because the additional investment so far authorized over and above R1 funding does not yet qualify into Cat B. Some 60 millions were given to BAE Systems. A more recent version of the list might or might not display R2 since the Secretary of State for defence, speaking at RUSI on February 11, mentioned that the Transformation Fund includes another 60 million for the Typhoon radar. The 100 million mark, in other words, might now have been passed.

One notable Cat A project is the Watchkeeper Mid Life Update. Given the pricetag, it should include some serious improvements and additions. The Army has finally declared Full Operational Capability for Watchkeeper, but it is actually still struggling to secure the certifications needed to operate it from Boscombe Down as intended. Training on Salisbury Plain, in non-segregated air space, was the big promise of Watchkeeper and on this one point there isn't yet a happy ending. 

Air Support 

One surprising absence is ASDOT, which should more than qualify as Category A. It might, however, have been included into the rather incomprehensible “DCS+S - DOTC-A- Core System + Services”, which stands for Defence Operational Training Capability – Air. Its core component is the development of a Common Synthetic Environment that enables the connectivity between different simulators, in different locations, to enable articulate, large-scale simulations.

Another byzantine acronym is MSHATF PFI, but this is the well known 40-years Private Financing Initiative with CAE for the delivery of the Medium Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility in RAF Benson.

The Sentry CSP makes an appearance, but as we know the MOD’s preferred approach is not so much a Capability Sustainment Programme anymore, but rather replacement with new build E-7 Wedgetail.

Sentinel R1 capability and its “project team” are both Cat A programmes. Its mid-life update, with the addition of maritime radar mode and other upgrades, might be the explanation.

The Secretary of State for defence’s speech at RUSI

While it is clear that the uncertainty around the budget has not gone away, the Secretary’s speech should be welcomed as it signals that the armed forces have finally found a champion who truly has a vision for the UK’s role in the world.

For one, I was particularly pleased with it because it attempts to change a narrative of decline into a rather happier one in which the armed forces return to the center of the UK’s visibility in the world. I was of course particularly happy also because, in the last few months, defence policy has been heading in a direction which I had identified years ago and for which I’ve been campaigning as relentlessly as I could, while admittedly having a lot less time for blogging than in the past.

I was incredibly pleased to see the removal from service of the River Batch 1s being pushed to the right. My readers will known that ever since the River Batch 2s were ordered earlier than necessary, I’ve been saying that the only way to make them into a genuinely good story was to also keep in service the earlier ships. While at the moment it is a short-term promise only (a couple of years), the Royal Navy has confirmed that it will try to man them with the help of the Reserve, and if the scheme can be made to work successfully it will prove to be a massive force-multiplier. I believe that there are good chances that the three vessels will stay into service well beyond the next two years if the experiment is successful. In turn, this will allow some of the newer Batch 2 to be employed in constabulary tasks far away from home. You might have noticed that, following the experimental deployments of two River Batch 1s in the Caribbean in the last couple of years, the North Atlantic Patrol tasking is regularly quoted as part of the Batch 2’s missions. This is all the more likely to become routine if the Secretary’s “ambition” of restoring a more permanent and sizeable presence (or a “base”, even) in the Caribbean is realized.

The other massively welcome development, which I’ve also auspicated for a very long time, is the announcement of two “Littoral Strike Ships”. The image released on Twitter by the 1^st Sea Lord is virtually identical to the American MV Ocean Trader, and so very, very similar to my proposal for aconverted Point-class RoRo vessel. However, at this stage the programme is still in concept phase and the exact look of the ship, as well as the decision for whether it will be newly built or perhaps converted from an existing vessel, is still up in the air.

While the announcement came a little “out of the blue” after months of gloomy reports of cuts, it was actually in the air from a while. Back in 2017, Jane’s reported that a concept study for a Multi Role Support Ship had been launched, to firm up options for a vessel with utility for amphibious, forward repair, and medical capability work.

More recently, during a hearing in front of the Defence Committee, the MOD’s deputy chief of staff for Military Capability, Lieutenant General Sir Mark William Poffley, said that a new programme for “support ships” was being considered for launch ahead of the Solid Support Ships, something i discussed in depth here.

Finally, reports emerged of two “hospital ships” to be jointly funded with DFID.

The Secretary’s speech, most evidently, is just the culmination of a quiet but determined campaign which has been progressing within the MOD for at least a couple of years.

It is pretty likely that these new vessels will cost the Navy the “optional” third Fleet Solid Support ship, but this is not a bad trade-off. Two supply vessels are enough to support the single large task group that the Royal Navy is able to generate, while these two new vessels will greatly help in a number of areas which would otherwise be very problematic. The loss of RFA Diligence without replacement, the lack of a realistic plan for replacing RFA Argus in 2024 and the fact that up to two thirds of the Landing Ship Dock hulls are actually unavailable for amphibious operations at any one time are 3 major concerns which I’ve been highlighting constantly over the years.

The Littoral Strike Ship's first concept art as posted by the 1st Sea Lord on Twitter. The MV Ocean Trader vibes are evident. 

 

All the way back in 2016 i made my very own "mad" suggestion for something similar to the MV Ocean Trader, but a bit more ambitious and even more flexible. If the Littoral Strike Ship was newly built rather than a conversion of an existing ship, it would not be impossible to incorporate all of these changes. 

The name “Littoral Strike Ships” is kind of misleading, as we are most likely looking at something which will be done on the cheap and will thus not be quite adequate for the more “fighty” operations that “strike” suggests. Multi Role Support Ship, while far less pyrotechnic, is probably still the best definition for these units.

The “new” Littoral Strike Groups announced by the Secretary, in fact, might not be based on the new ships, but rather on the existing Bay-class LSDs that these new hulls might end up releasing from the Caribbean and the Gulf respectively.

The Littoral Strike Groups will, realistically, be the continuation of the semi-experimental “Special Purpose Task Groups” that the Royal Marines have been sending out at sea in the last couple of years. These formations, normally of Company-group size and embarked on a single amphibious vessel, have been sent all the way to Pacific (HMS Albion’s tour of last year) and have repeatedly traveled in and out of Mediterranean and Indian Ocean (RFA Lyme Bay, most recently). The Littoral Strike Group should be a more capable evolution of the SPTG, hopefully enabled by the availability of extra supports, including escort vessels.

The new Littoral Strike Group will probably embark significant amounts of Marines and is likely to beat the Bay-class in aviation facilities (the MV Ocean Trader used as example has a two-bays hangar for medium helicopters and a two-spot flight deck that can take anything up to the gigantic CH-53), but is unlikely to have a dock in the stern. It will still be plenty useful, however, and if a RoRo / container ship hull is used, it will have enormous utility as additional strategic sealift.

With the right people and modular facilities on board it could also do decently as a Forward Repair and Support vessel, and it could be able to replace Argus in the medical role if able to embark a modular Role 3 hospital, for which the Navy could work alongside the Army for maximum efficiency.

The MV Ocean Trader, ex MV Cragside, after being modified for use by the US forces 

MV Cragside undergoing her transformation in Mobile, Alabama

The announcement of a RAF Squadron equipped with Swarming Drones is also a welcome development. The mention of this by the Secretary fueled a lot of comments, especially since he made it sound like the whole system would be ready by the end of the year. The MOD has subsequently clarified that it Is more a three years effort, and at the moment we can only speculate on the final form that this capability will take. The “end of 2019” mentioned by the Secretary might actually be for the formation of the squadron, which I figure could well start out as an experimental unit, much like the Fleet Air Arm’s own 700X NAS.

At the moment it is impossible to say if the LANCA (Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft) low-cost UCAV, which was sought last year in a call for proposals to industry, is part of this effort or a parallel development.

The UK, however, was already experimenting with unmanned loyal wingmen back in 2008, when a modified Tornado took control, in flight, of a BAC 1-11 modified to serve as UAV; plus 3 other simulated unmanned aircraft. There clearly has been an interest in the capability for many years, and this fits into the wider campaign of experimentation ran by UK industry, which includes of course TARANIS, but also the very interesting BAE MAGMA which replaces flaps, ailerons and other moving surfaces with blown air taken from the engine. In other words, there are the capabilities to put together some good capability.

The result might be something like the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie intended to be used as part of the Low-Cost, Attritable Strike Unmanned Air System Demonstration for the USAF.

It will also be a step forwards on the way to unmanned companions for FCAS / TEMPEST. Replying to a House of Lords written question by Lord West on 14 february, Earl Howe wrote that “the combat air acquisition programme is looking at the replacement of Typhoon's capabilities and any new combat air system will need to be interoperable with the Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) programme. The concept phase of the acquisition programme will consider QEC basing for any unmanned force multipliers which may form part of the future combat air system.”

This reads as if the TEMPEST will not be carrier-capable (sadly, not a surprise and one of the reasons why the lack of catapults on the QE class remains regrettable) but the unmanned part of the future combat air system might be. This is very interesting, but it’s very early days and I’m somewhat skeptical still.

Williamson also mentioned a non-specified “VENOM kinetic strike capability” which is meant to give an attack capability to “ISTAR platforms”. UK Defence Journal says that, according to MOD sources, the platforms in question are the C-130J and the SHADOW R1 (soon to be R2 after the ongoing mid-life update programme).

The C-130J is not properly an ISTAR platform, but like the SHADOW R1 is commonly used in support to the Special Forces and there are several good options readily available for its armament.

It has now been confirmed that at least one C5 short-fuselage C-130 is being retained as part of the 14 that the RAF is going to keep in the long term. This is important because the tanking kit has only ever been installed on short-fuselage C-130s and might not be adaptable to the stretched ones. The HARVEST HAWK kit has been developed to equip short C-130s in tanker configuration (KC-130J). 

HARVEST HAWK originally swapped out one Air Refueling pod and replaced it with a quadruple launcher for Hellfire missiles. In addition, a palletized console is embarked into the cargo bay and a 10-cell launcher for GRIFFIN lightweight missiles was installed on the ramp. A TSS EO/IR turret is provided thanks to a modified external fuel tank. 

HARVEST HAWK evolution is continuing, however, and the USMC is replacing the TSS with a MX-20 EO/IR turret mounted under the nose, to restore the full fuel load. Moreover, with the Outer Wing Station 430 modification (OWS430), by 2020 they will have added two additional underwing pylons, doubling the capacity for externally-carried missiles while allowing the return of the Air Refueling pod. The new and improved HARVEST HAWK will restore 100% of its tanking potential while doubling its fire power at the same time. 

The missile launcher on the cargo ramp has been replaced by an enclosed launcher in a modified side door ("Derringer Door") which enables the launch of the missiles without requiring decompression and ramp opening. That also ensures that cargo capability is retained and requires less preparations before a mission. 

The USMC is also integrating the INTREPID TIGER II Electronic Warfare pod, while Hellfire will be replaced by JAGM. 

The RAF has only activated two pylons on its C-130J-30s so far, adding external fuel tanks to them in the last few years. 

In an ideal world, at least a second C5 should be retained and HARVEST HAWK kits, including AAR capability, should be procured for the pair. That would deliver a great firepower boost while also introducing in service a couple of tankers able to refuel helicopters. The Merlin HC4 is AAR capable and the Commando Helicopter Force wants to tap into that latent capability since extra range would obviously help a lot in all missions, including Joint Personnel Recovery.

Harvest Hawk in its original configuration. The 30mm gun pallet is on hold. 

The Special Forces are also known to want the capability, ideally on CHINOOK, and the SDSR 2015, in theory, promised them “longer range helicopters”.

Putting a couple of pylons and lightweight munitions such as MBDA’s VIPER-E on SHADOW R1 wouldn’t be difficult, either. But if I was in a position to make the choice, my priority would definitely be converting two C5 into KC-130Js and getting a pair of HARVEST HAWK kits for them at the same time.

PROTECTOR deserves a mention too, because we have recently been given the first official indication that maritime patrol capability could feature in the intended second batch (16 are on order, but there are 10 options as well and the stated intention remains to get to “at least 20”). Leonardo has showcased its SEASPRAY radar, which is ready for adoption on the centerline pylon (PROTECTOR will have 9 pylons overall, up from 5 on REAPER, or 7 counting the low-payload external ones, which in practice have never been used so far but would be good for, say, Sidewinder / ASRAAM). ULTRA is continuing work on its ASW sonobuoy-dispensing pods.

It is now contractually confirmed that PROTECTOR will be armed with Brimstone and Paveway IV and fitted with the Due Regard Radar, which was initially only going to be Fitted For But Not With. On the other hand, deliveries will happen later, and entry in service will arrive in 2023 rather than 2021, while the RAF is in the process of “decommissioning” one of its 10 Reapers. A curious development, might be because the UAV has suffered damage that is deemed not worthy to try and repair.

In his speech, Williamson briefly touched on the issue of Warrior upgrades, indirectly confirming that WCSP is going ahead. 2017 and 2018 have been tough and unpleasant years for the programme, which was called into serious question over the big delays accumulated (entry in service now to start in 2023 when it had once been 2018, then 2020…), but the ongoing trials at Bovington seem to have been positive enough that cancellation is no longer a possibility.  

A remotely operated, unmanned TERRIER was used to breach anti-tank obstacles during a demonstration ran by the US Army which also included unmanned M113s laying smoke to cover the action. The US Army is already seeking an Optionally Manned IFV for replacing Bradley. 

Also for the army, the Secretary remarked that he supports the fielding not just of unmanned logistic support vehicles, which have so far gotten most of the attention, but unmanned combat vehicles too.

At the latest AWE event, a WarriorIFV was converted into a remotely operated combat vehicle and I thinkt the demonstration opens up interesting possibilities. If I had to put my money on something in this area, it would be on surplus CRV(T) Scimitar to be converted in unmanned combat vehicles. Their insufficient protection would no longer be quite as concerning, while their awesome strategic and all-terrain mobility, as well as air mobility, would make them incredibly flexible in support of manned AFVs and infantry alike. The RARDEN is not a good weapon for an unmanned vehicle due to manual reloading and lack of stabilization, but there a few good options out there for replacing the turret and introduce an autocannon+missile combination that would be enormously capable.

Jordan's KADDB's proposal for upgunning CRV(T). Add remote control. The first British Army unmanned companion for much larger and less deployable manned AFVs? 

The Secretary also announced that funding will go towards equipping all infantry (including Royal Marines and RAF Regiment) with advanced night vision equipment which so far was reserved to Special Forces. This follows on similar decisions in the US and will go a long way in ensuring the Army can truly own the night. It could be argued that night vision is a major asymmetrical advantage over non-peer enemies, but that so far it hasn’t been exploited as much as it should have been. 

Some growth

In the coming months, 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop, in Germany, will be growing into a Squadron. Mothballed M3 rigs are being reactivated and the new ORBAT is being defined. With its M3 rigs, it will remain forward based in Germany, alongside its german counterpart and well positioned to continue training on the river Weser.

M3 rigs, british and german, in action during NATO exercises

This is also the year of the return of 28 Royal Engineer Regiment as a joint C-CBRN regiment is reformed after the idiotic SDSR 2010 cut. 28 RE Regt will take under command 77 Field Squadron, ex armoured squadron, which was part of 35 RE Regt until this converted into an EOD unit.

FALCON Sqn Royal Tank Regiment, with its FUCHS reconnaissance vehicles, will join the regiment in July.

27 Squadron RAF Regiment, the current CBRN specialist, will also join the new unit; 64 Headquarters & Support Squadron will form up this year and 42 Field Squadron will be re-established in 2020. There are also tentative plans for a reserve squadron to follow in 2022.

The Brigade of Gurkhas in particular is growing quickly to fill some gaps and help with the manpower deficit. This too is a U-turn on disastrous 2010 and 2011 choices. The Gurkhas now man Gurkha Company (Tavoleto) in its role of Training Support Company, part of the Specialist Weapons School at the Land Warfare Centre in Warminster.

Moreover, the Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment is growing and two additional Gurkha sqns are appearing, one within 9 RLC Regt and one within 4 RLC Regt.

The Queen’s Gurkha Signals are growing by two squadrons as well, with 247 Sqn within 16 Signal Regt and 249 Sqn within 3 Divisional Signal Regiment.

The Queen’s Gurkha Engineers could also see growth in the near future. They have taken up significant roles within the ARRC support battalion, beginning in 2014 with the Close Support Troop and Engineer element.