The evolving equipment budget situation: of aircraft carriers and OPVs

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs 
2: Land forces
3: Helicopters


Replacing the Rivers?

The biggest news of the last while is the announcement that military shipbuilding in Portsmouth is closing down and 1775 jobs in the shipbuilding sector are to go, with 940 coming from Portsmouth itself and the balance from Filton, Rosyth and the Clyde's yards. The announcement did not come as a surprise, as it had been in the air for a long while. The surprise came from the fact that, althout the battle to obtain funding for the construction of two new OPVs to be produced in Portsmouth, to both reinforce the navy and keep the shipyard alive, has failed, the MOD intends to actually buy three OPVs.
This could be excellent news, wasn't for the fact that it won't actually do anything to save Portsmouth and for the fact that, at the moment at least, these three new, larger and more capable OPVs, are not presented as reinforcements but as a replacement for the current three River-class OPVs of the fishery protection squadron.

The three new OPVs are going to be larger, coming with a flight deck sized for medium helicopters up to Merlin size, and with "additional operational flexibility through extra storage capacity and accommodation". This seems to suggest that the new OPVs will have more to share with the Amazonas taken up by Brazil than with the current Royal Navy's Rivers. Depending on what exactly is meant with extra storage capacity, the new ships could also act as "prototype of sorts" for the future MHPC ships, but from the little we know the project should essentially be based on the 90m OPV design by BAE. According to BAE, the 90m OPV can embark 6 standard TEU containers 20' without occupying the flight deck.

The expected marginal cost of these three ships is expected to be in the range of 100 million pounds in addition to unavoidable TOBA fees which the MOD would have had to pay to BAE systems anyway in absence of work for the shipyards.

Under the terms of the TOBA, without a shipbuilding order to fill that gap, the MOD would be required to pay BAE Systems for shipyards and workers to stand idle, producing nothing while their skill levels faded. Such a course would add significant risk to the effective delivery of the T26 programme, which assumes a skilled work force and a working shipyard to deliver it.

Ordering ships, therefore, does make plenty of sense and it is exactly what myself and others have been shouting for a long while, asking for just two such vessels as a way to keep Portsmouth going, knowing that in a few years time the shipyards are supposed to experience another phase of major activity, enough to assume that it would be possible to keep all three major yards busy. In particular, observing the MOD plans (even bearing in mind that changes and cuts are a constant...) we have:

- Main Gate for Type 26 frigate at the end of next year with building of the first vessel expected to start in 2016. 13 vessels to be built, with the first entering service in 2021 and the last not before 2036;

- MARS Solid Support Ship: while the MARS Fleet Tanker requirement has been met ordering hulls in South Korea on the ground that tanker hulls are simple and are best built by yards which build commercial tankers all the time, the assumption is (was?) that MARS Solid Support Ship, being more complex and technologically sensitive, would be built in british yards. The Fort class supply vessels are due out of service in 2023 (Fort Austin) and 2024 (Fort Rosalie) and undoubtedly Fort Victoria is also planned to bow out roughly in the same timeframe (2025, possibly?), so the replacement vessels have to enter service in the early 2020s. If they are to be built in Britain, and now doubting of it is licit, they will overlap with the work for the Type 26 frigates.

- MHPC: in late 2012 a DSTL document said that the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability programme should deliver the first new vessel in 2028. MHPC will replace the Hunt and Sandown minesweepers and, possibly, the hydrographic ships HMS Enterprise and HMS Echo. HMS Scott and her oversized equipment are unlikely to be replaceable by the relatively small multipurpose vessel (some 3000 tons, according to most sources) envisaged for MHPC. Delivery of the first vessel in 2028 implies an overlap with the activities on the late Type 26 ships, which will continue to be built into the 2030s.

These three programs, in theory, could have kept all three the major shipyards going, if only the short gap in workload between the aircraft carriers and the Type 26 was bridged. But the decision taken indicates that either the remaining yards can do it all; or someone is anticipating being far less busy than planned; or work on MARS SSS hulls is, like that on MARS FT, heading for foreign shipyards.

The boat building activity in will survive the closure of the major surface warship activity. Of interest in this field we have the Royal Marines requirements for a Fast Landing Craft, which has however been put on hold and won't resurface before 2020, when the slow LCU Mk10 is supposed to finally retire; and the requirement for a Force Protection Craft. The fate of this second Royal Marines requirement is not clear at the moment. During DSEI this year, CTrunk, while unveiling its THOR catamaran solution for riverine, force protection and inshore mission, said that they are in contact with the MOD, which hopes to reveal its final requirements for the boat during next year.
The Force Protection Craft programme, at least until 2011 or early 2012, hoped to deliver 12 crafts, which would partially replace the current fleet of 21 LCVP MK5, from 2016.
Hopefully, the programme is still going ahead.

Waiting for clarity on how the closure of Portsmouth affects the above shipbuilding plan and hoping that closing the yard doesn't turn out to be only the first one of a series of bad news, i want to focus on the building of the three OPVs.
Subject to approval in the coming months, these new vessels will begin being built already next year, with the first due for delivery in 2017. Their biggest merits are that they do good use of money that the MOD couldn't avoid spending (in absence of the order for these ships, BAE would be entitled to around, i believe, a couple hundred millions of payments under the TOBA agreement) and that they keep the workforce going and preserves the shipbuilding skills ahead of the critically important Type 26 project.

The unpleasant bit of news about them is that they are expected, at least for now, to replace the River OPVs. These cheap and effective vessels have only been purchased outright from BAE last year, for 39 million pounds. Initially, in fact, the three ships were not owned by the Royal Navy, but they had instead been built under an arrangement with the shipbuilder, Vosper Thornycroft (VT), under which the Royal Navy leased the vessels from the shipbuilder for a period of ten years. VT were responsible for all maintenance and support for the ships during the charter period. At the end of this, the Navy could then either return the ships, renew the lease or purchase them outright. The first lease period was renewed in 2007, out to 2013. In September 2012 the outright purchase was announced.

The oldest one was only launched in 2002, so in 2017, if replaced, would bow out after a mere 15 years of life and just 14 years of service, having been commissioned in 2003. In my opinion, this is shameful and can't be allowed to happen, especially not in a Royal Navy already struggling to cover its basic, daily committments.
There is no real operational reason why the Rivers need to be urgently replaced by larger OPVs with aviation landing facilities. While additional capability is always welcome, it should not come at the cost of the Rivers. The Rivers are not combat vessels: they patrol the economic zone of the UK and control that fishery respects the rules. They are very busy ships and they are very precious in forming the officers that will then transfer to the large warships. But they have little to no combat use, they are tied to home waters and they do not really need aviation facilities that would be seldom used at best. A flight deck could be handy to operate small rotary wing UAVs, perhaps, but a Camcopter does not take a Merlin flight deck, and i'm pretty sure that enough space could be arranged in the stern of the current Rivers, if that was the idea.

The new OPVs announcement, in other words, as it has been made, smells of back-door capability slashing. The Merlin-capable flight deck immediately made me imagine an horrible scenario in which know-nothing MPs with little understanding of the military are made to think that the ability to refuel a land-based Merlin helicopter away from the shore using the OPVs is a replacement for the missing Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability, for example. Most obviously, for a tons of very good reasons, this wouldn't even rank as mitigation of the gap, and never could it be "a replacement".

The Rivers are very busy in their intended role, besides, and the replacement vessels would be just as busy, meaning that they would actually have very little chance to even try and use their greater capabilities, which in home waters are useful, at best, but not essential.
And having a Merlin-flight deck is of little use when the availability of Merlin helicopters is going to be next to none, with just 30 of them being retained and all of them already overtasked, especially with the AEW role falling on them as well, under CROWSNEST. 

One thing for which the large flight decks could be useful is for landing the S-92 helicopters of the civilian SAR service coming up, to refuel them and enable them to expand their reach out at sea, but even this might be an illusion as it is unclear if the PFI-supplied crews will even have any deck-landing certification.


MP Bob Stewart has, admiradly, thought of the same thing, but still we have no precise answer on whether that would be possible. The helicopter could surely use the deck, but would the crews be qualified for it? That's the real question.

Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con): Most people suggest that our biggest defence capability is not in maritime patrol aircraft. I am no expert—although I can see that there are many naval experts in the Chamber—but could this new River class OPV, with its enhanced length and helicopter deck, also be used to cover the gap between 240 nautical miles, the distance a land-based helicopter can go out from our shores into the Atlantic, and the 1,200 nautical miles for which we are treaty responsible? Could it perhaps play some sort of MPA role in that area?

Mr Hammond: I have not looked at the specification in detail, but I do not envisage that the thing will be able to take off and fly. I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, however, and we are conscious of the gap in maritime patrol aircraft capability. It is one issue that will be addressed in SDSR 2015 and we will manage the gap in the meantime through close collaboration with our allies. We are considering all the options, including, potentially, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in a maritime patrol role in the future.

Also note how, as i feared, irrealistic mentions of MPA capability are made. Back-door capability cutting, camouflaged as new capability being delivered. Disasterous, and tipically suited to politicians. Better to keep one hunded eyes open on this matter. 

In other words, there is no real need to replace the Rivers with these new vessels. Losing the current River vessels would be a waste, and the greater capabilities of the replacements could also end up largely wasted.
In fact, these new vessels would be perfectly suited for interdiction of smuggling, for protection of oversea territories (And the Caribbean standing task springs to mind) and counter-piracy work as well, as noted by Hammond himself in answer to a question by Peter Luff: 

 
Peter Luff (Mid Worcestershire) (Con): I commend the Secretary of State, the Minister for defence equipment—the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne)—the Chief of Defence Matériel and all those involved for making the best of a very difficult situation. Will my right hon. Friend clarify the purpose and capabilities of the three new very welcome offshore patrol vessels?

Mr Hammond: They will be more capable than the existing River class, as they will be able to take a larger helicopter and will be 10 metres longer. They will be able to undertake a full range of duties, including not only fishery protection but the interdiction of smuggling, counter-piracy operations and the protection of our overseas territories.

To do all that, though, the new vessels would have to sail far away from home and, most likely for it to have any sense, they would have to be forward based, like HMS Clyde in the Falklands. While the OPV is suited for ocean navigation, it has a very short logistic endurance in terms of stores and, in part, in terms of fuel, so that sailing it back and forth from the UK would be unworkable.
The new OPV would be a perfect solution for the West Indies committment, if it was forward based there. If the ships end up home-based, and tied to the River's current role, they won't be able to do anything of what they could and should do. 

In my opinion, the Royal Navy can obtain an excellent boost in capability if it manages to retain the Rivers for fishery protection and home waters, using the new vessels in addition, forward-basing them overseas. I can think of three locations:

Caribbean, removing a committment that has been a source of problems and embarrassment for the Royal Navy which has long struggled to find a way to send a warship, having to resort extensively to RFA vessels which would also be very much needed elsewhere, for their actual role.

Gibraltar, because from the base the OPV would be able to engage with allies, with North and West African countries while also providing much needed reassurance to the Gibraltarians, which are loudly calling for a more tangible sign of UK support

Bahrain, because the OPV would be able to provide additional anti-FAC protection to the minesweeper squadron there and/or deploy to piracy-infested waters, restoring more enduring british presence in the wider area and relieving the warships from another role which has been hard to cover with a sheet which is, at the moment, just too short.

The challenge is, of course, in budget and manpower. The Royal Navy is exceptionally lean-manned, following the latest cuts. The insufficient manpower is possibly the biggest problem that must be overcome to bring the second aircraft carrier into service alongside the first, and trying to man three new patrol vessels as well, even with the crews being pretty small, is not going to be straightforward at all.
In terms of cost, the River class costs annually just about 20 millions per year. More correctly, it did in 2010: the current value is probably different. The outright purchase of the vessels has been made in the assumption (hopefully supported by facts) that removing the lease costs would reduce the annual expenditure, while further differences are likely because of inflation and other factors. Anyway, we are talking of a very small amount for three very useful vessels with plenty of life left in them. The new OPVs will also be hopefully quite cost-effective, so the Royal Navy should make every effort to secure all six in the longer term.

The door for such a decision, at least in the words, is left open:

Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con): I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) for her doughty struggle to get a good city deal for her constituents and for the vision for the OPVs that to my knowledge she has been outlining for at least two years. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the OPVs will to some extent provide a force multiplier for our frigate fleet? Some of the roles carried out by frigates do not require full frigate capability, so the OPVs could be a way of partially expanding that capability.

Mr Hammond: At the risk of causing her to blush, I am happy once again to praise my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North. I should say to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) that no decision has yet been taken about whether the old River class vessels will be retired after the new OPVs are brought into service. That decision will have to be made in SDSR 2015 based on the ongoing budget challenges of maintaining additional vessels at sea. That will be a decision for the Royal Navy.

This is somewhat reassuring, as well as the admission that there has not been a decision on where to base the new OPVs. If they were already certainly meant as a replacement for the Rivers, the basing answer would be pretty simple.
Of course, the door is not locked, but this does not make it easy to push it wide open and squeeze the new ships and the old ships through. I can only hope that the Royal Navy realizes how decisive the next SDSR is going to be for its future, and i hope people is hard at work, already now, to make sure to fight the incoming battle with the utmost determination.

Any possible solution should be actively considered. To overcome the manpower issues, it might be attractive to use RFA manpower, but we must not forget that the SDSR took away 400 men from it as well, leaving it far from being overmanned.

Another chance, which has the favor of government, is the use of reserve personnel. This is the only area that is seeing a manpower increase, and it is also low-cost manpower compared to regulars, so it might be very helpful to find ways to fill as many posts as possible on board of the OPVs with reservists, even though it is challenging: normally, a crew member on a River stays onboard for four weeks and then rotates ashore for two weeks, while the ship is at sea for most of the year. Finding a way to make good use of reserves in this cycle could be challenging. 



A note on the aircraft carriers as well: as part of the announcement, Hammond confirmed that the cost of the enterprise has grown further, to 6.2 billion, an increase of 800 million from the last announced figure. If we believe to the secretary, however, this has had no impact on projects other than the carriers themselves, as the increase has been absorbed using the programme's own built-in financial margins. This, we are told, has avoided the use of any of the 4 billion pounds contingency reserve built into the 10-year budget:

In 2012, I instructed my Department to begin negotiations to restructure the contract better to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure the delivery of the carriers to a clear time schedule and at a realistic and deliverable cost. Following 18 months of complex negotiations with industry, I am pleased to inform the House that we have now reached heads of terms with the alliance that will address directly the concerns articulated by the PAC and others. Under the revised agreement, the total capital cost to Defence of procuring the carriers will be £6.2 billion, a figure arrived at after detailed analysis of costs already incurred and future costs and risks over the remaining seven years to the end of the project. Crucially, under the new agreement, any variation above or below that price will be shared on a 50:50 basis between Government and industry, until all the contractor’s profit is lost, meaning that interests are now properly aligned, driving the behaviour change needed to see this contract effectively delivered.The increase in the cost of this project does not come as a surprise. When I announced in May last year that I had balanced the defence budget, I did so having already made prudent provision in the equipment plan for a cost increase in the carrier programme above the £5.46 billion cost reported in the major projects review 2012 and I did that in recognition of the inevitability of cost-drift in a contract that was so lop-sided and poorly constructed.
I also made provision for the cost of nugatory design work on the “cats and traps” system for the carrier variant operation and for reinstating the ski-jump needed for short take-off and vertical landing operations. At the time of the reversion announcement, I said that these costs could be as much as £100 million; I am pleased to tell the House today that they currently stand at £62 million, with the expectation that the final figure will be lower still.
Given the commercially sensitive nature of the negotiations with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance, I was not able publicly to reveal these additional provisions in our budget, since to do so would have undermined our negotiating position with industry. However, the MOD did inform the National Audit Office of these provisions, and it is on that basis that it reviewed and reported on our 10-year equipment plan in January this year.

I am therefore able to confirm to the House that the revised cost of the carriers remains within the additional provision made in May 2012 in the equipment plan; that as a result of this prudent approach, the defence budget remains in balance, with the full cost of the carriers provided for; and that the centrally held contingency of more than £4 billion in the equipment plan that I announced remains unused and intact, 18 months after it was announced.
In addition to renegotiating the target price and the terms of the contract, we have agreed with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance to make changes to the governance of the project better to reflect the collaborative approach to project management that the new cost-sharing arrangements will induce and to improve the delivery of the programme. The project remains on schedule for sea trials of HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2017 and flying trials with the F35B commencing in 2018.

Hoping that this is true, because any penny matters, these days, and the two major army programmes, the FRES SV and Warrior CSP, are both dealing with some trouble and delays which might cause cost increases, and i'll talk of armour in the coming days in a new post.

Multi Role Brigades and Army 2020

Some more information has been coming to the light regarding Army 2020, thanks to a speech delivered by general Nick Carter to the International Institute for Strategic Studies that was clearer and more honest than any announcement, speech or description delivered so far to the british public.



I also found the video of another IISS conference during which part of the Army 2020 approach was explained by Mayor General K. D. Abraham, and this confirmed the identity of the brigades contained in the Force Troops command:

1st Artillery Brigade
8th Engineer Brigade
1st and 11th Signals Brigades
1st Intelligence & Surveillance Brigade
2nd Medical Brigade
104th Logistic Support Brigade
Security Assistance Group

The Reaction Division will be supported by 101 Logistic Brigade, and the Adaptable Division will have the support of 102 Logistic Brigade.

Some additional indications (not much in terms of new info, actually) came from the hearing of the Chief General Staff, general Peter Wall, with the Parliamentary Defence Committee, of which is already available the uncorrected transcription. It is also possible to watch the hearing in video here.

Moving on to the solid information that these sources provided, i'll start by saying that, in part to provide a figleaf to politicians, the Multi Role Brigade is not entirely dead.
As we know, the October 2010 SDSR promised a 95.000-strong regular army formed in five 6500-strong Multi Role Brigades, one of which would be based in Scotland, each with:

1x Tank Regiment (size unspecified, possibly as small as 38 tanks per regiment)
1x Recce Regiment (during the planning it emerged that each would have 2x FRES Scout squadrons and 1x Jackal-mounted squadron) 
1x Armoured Infantry Battalion (mounted on Warrior)(6 Battalions would have been mounted on Warrior, with the sixth having a Training and Demonstration role, filled on rotation)
1x Mechanized Infantry Battalion (mounted on Bulldog, then on FRES UV)
2x Light Role Infantry battalions 
1x Artillery Regiment (it was intended that each regiment would have 2x AS90 batteries and 1x L118 Light Gun battery)  
Full Embedded Logistic Tail

Accordingly, there were big promises of army manpower increases in Scotland, and, with heavy armor headed up north, there even were talks to open a large training area in Scotland, a "Salisbury Plain" north of the border.
Big promises that are all going to be broken, entirely or almost entirely, with Army 2020 and the Basing Plan announcement that will come early next year.

The infamous supplementary "3 months Exercise" (effectively a second, emergency Review) in July 2011 eventually ended with the Army ordered to plan for a regular force of just 82.000 men, and a much smaller budget, and that spelled the end of the Multi Role Brigades as originally intended. A team guided by general Nick Carter put together the Army 2020 plan to accommodate the savage cut to manpower and deliver a force structure still able to (somehow) meet the (unchanged) Defence Planning Assumptions that had been written for a 95.000-strong regular army of 5 Multi Role Brigades.

The key planning assumptions are:

- The Army must be able to deploy, at the same time, a 6500-strong brigade on an enduring operation, a 2000-strong battlegroup on a complex but not enduring intervention and a 1000-strong force in support of a non-complex, non-enduring operation such as a Non-Combatant Evacuation.

- The Army must be able to deploy, with suitable warning, a Division of 3 brigades, roughly 30.000 strong for a non-enduring operation. 

The Multi Role Brigade, complete with its own artillery and logistics and with the full spectrum of capabilities (from heavy armor down to light infantry) was ideally suited to ensure that the Army was realistically capable to meet the needs of a complex, enduring operation, even if this required deploying tanks and heavy artillery.
The number of 5 is not casual: the Army works with harmony guidelines that expect personnel to deploy in the warzone for a 6 month tour, followed by 24 months at home to rest, reset, train for a new tour. This means that out of 5 men, one is deployed and 4 are back in the UK. The five brigades, supported by services also organised to the "Rule of the Five", would have be able to support an enduring operation with minimal disruptions and changes to their structure, ending a long practice of "patchworking", pulling battalions and units from multiple brigades to put together a deployable force package containing all of the various capabilities needed.
A new concept that the Army had been planning out since 2008.

The 3 month review has brought the Army back, effectively, a concept of operation that is, in good measure, a return to its pre-2004 structure. Back then, the army took its force from the 3-year rotation (Low Readiness year, Collective Training year, High Readiness year) of 3 Armored and 3 Mechanized brigades: under Army 2020 it will use the same concept, but will have 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades (Reaction Force) and 3 Adaptable Infantry Brigades on the same 3 year readiness cycle, supported by a further 4 Adaptable brigades.

And here comes the figleaf: for the Army and for the Government, the 3 Reaction and 3 of the 7 Adaptable brigades are "basis for Multi Role Brigades".

On the composition of the Army 2020 brigades, we have some detail:

the 3 Armoured Infantry brigades will have each a tank regiment (Type 56, so with 56 Challenger 2s), a Cavalry/RECCE regiment, with Scimitar first and then, in the 2020s, with the FRES Scout (CVR(T) vehicles will not be fully replaced before 2026...!) in 3 large squadrons with 16 vehicles each. 9 Squadrons of 16 vehicles means more vehicles needed than with 5 regiments each with two squadrons of 12, even if, of course, there would have been also 2 more tank regiments needing their own embedded Recce component with 8 Scouts (unless the recce element in the tank regiments is removed, at this point nothing would surprise me anymore...).
Each brigade will have 2 Battalions of infantry on upgraded Warrior vehicles (6 armoured infantry battalions, as for earlier MRB plan, and indeed with all six in full frontline role, instead of 5 + training unit).
A third infantry battalion will be present, mounted on Mastiff when the vehicles are brought back from Afghanistan and, in the future, on FRES UV if it'll ever arrive for real.

The composition of the 7 Adaptable brigades is far less clear. Nonetheless, we know the regular army will have 14 Light Role infantry battalions and 6 Light Protected Infantry battalions (infantry mounted in Foxhound vehicles) to distribute in them.
The Army 2020 brochure indirectly suggested that, in the end, only 3 of the 7 Adaptable brigades would really be relevant and base for deployable maneuver formations.
The brochure provided a graphic illustration of the 3-year Readiness Cycle, and showed an indicative adaptable brigade output comprising one Light Cavalry regiment (on Jackal), one battalion of infantry on Foxhounds and one Light Role battalion, each with a paired Reserve formation.
An internal Army briefing document, initially not released to the public, shows the 3 brigades formed by:

- Cavalry regiment - with paired reserve formation
- 2x Light Protected Infantry battalions - with paired reserve formations
- 3x Light Role Infantry battalions - with paired reserve formations    

The Adaptable brigade output; general overview from the Army 2020 brochure

The Adaptable brigades as shown in the internal Army briefing package

Both general Wall and general Carter report that the 3 "main" Adaptable brigades are intended as the basis for the generation of "Multi Role Brigades" to be used to sustain a future enduring operation, and they would be responsible for the Fourth and Fifth tour in theatre.
A future enduring operation, in fact, would be met with a rotation of this kind:

Reaction Brigade, Reaction Brigade, Reaction Brigade, Adaptable Brigade, Adaptable Brigade, Reaction Brigade... 

and so along.
The 3 main brigades in the Adaptable Force are described by the two generals as "light-ish brigades", which is frankly more than a bit pathetic as they will in fact be light brigades with the addition of some Foxhounds.
It is to be expected that the 6 Protected Mobility Infantry battalions and a good number of the regular light battalions will be concentrated in these 3 brigades that, and here comes into play the figleaf again, will be based in Scotland (i can already hear the secretary of state saying "we promised a Multi Role Brigade, and here it is!"), in Edimburgh area (with units in Leuchars too, it seems, but until the Basing Plan is announced we can't be really sure), one in Catterick and one on the ex-RAF Cottersmore base, now Kendrew Barracks, already selected as home to the 2nd battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment and 7 Theatre Logistic regiment RLC.  

The generals also confirmed that the regular infantry battalions in the Adaptable Force will be smaller, but did not venture into details. As i've reported for a long time now, this means, apparently, that each infantry battalion will lose one platoon from each of its 3 rifle companies.
It is not casual, therefore, that the generals described the "formed unit" to be provided by the Reserves as company-sized elements: general Carter in his speech says that the regular battalions, reduced to a total establishment of 561 men (Light Role) and 581 (Light Protected Mobility) will be paired to Reserve battalions that he expects will be 400 to 450 strong.
Only working together, the regular and reserve battalions will be able to put in the field a complete battalion which, Carter hopes, will actually be larger than before, assuming the reserve element can really generate deployable formations.

The new look of the Territorial Army, or Army Reserve as it will almost certainly be renamed, is not known in detail yet, but the outline of roles for the existing reserve force has been announced: one battalion will be in the Air Assault role and will be part of 16 Air Assault brigade, in the Reaction Force. That will be 4 PARA, which has indeed been recently assigned to the brigade command.

That will leave 13 infantry battalions (The TA counts 14 infantry battalions in total), of which 6 would (in theory, since all documents show the Foxhound battalions paired with TA formations) support the Foxhound-mounted regular infantry, leaving only 7 other battalions.
This is a controversial point: the internal briefing graphic on the Adaptable brigades output alone shows 15 TA battalions, 9 Light plus 6 Light Protected.
Again, we are told that the regulars will have 14 Light Infantry battalions, and even if the 2 Gurkha battalions get no paired TA formation (despite seeing their establishment reduced to 567), up to 12 other reasonably should.
Will some TA battalions support more than one Regular formation at once? Are the Foxhound-mounted battalions really going to get a paired formation from the reserve? Will some more battalions be raised in the Reserve component? At the moment, it is impossible to say.

The generals then explain that the remaining four brigades in the Adaptable Force will be very much like the current regional brigades: non-deployable HQs tasked with administration of a variety of units (mostly Reserves, but also 1/2 regular units) based in their area. General Wall provides the example of the Welsh brigade, which he says will contain "one regular battalion, one reserve battalion, a big training area and a lot of other TA units". More interesting than this pretty vague description, is the point he makes: the brigade will mostly be about UK resilience tasks (support in the event of floodings etcetera) and upstream defence engagement abroad, with the possibility of using the brigade to build enduring relationships with a particular region of the world, as the americans hope to do by "regionally align" some of their Brigade Combat Teams.
If the graphic from the internal army briefing is correct and not just an example, 9 of the 14 regular Light Infantry battalions will be in the 3 "main" adaptable brigades, leaving 5 for the other 4 brigades. Even if not exactly 100% correct, it should be quite close to a ratio of this kind.

Gone the Multi Role Brigades, it seems that supports like Artillery, Engineers and Logistics will be removed from the single brigades, and all reunited in the Force Troops formations. But this, even if it happens, is kind of an illusion that the Army 2020 document itself destroys: we know, for example, that there will be 5 Artillery regiments, 3 of which will line AS90 and GMLRS batteries, while 2 more will only have L118 Light Guns.
Similarly, there is going to be 3 fully-regular manned engineer regiments and 2 "integrated" regiments with a strong embedded reserve component.
There are even 3 Armoured Medical Regiments and 3 Armoured Close Support REME battalions! Even if they are formally removed from the maneuver brigades and managed centrally, it is pretty clear which regiments will support who.

Indeed, the supporting elements arrangement gives away the trick, showing that the Army is indeed still planning to the rule of the five: even though the "Deployable" Adaptable brigades are 3, for them there is only going to be 2 Engineer Regiments, only 2 Artillery regiments ("paired" to two Reserve artillery regiments also on L118 Light Guns), only 2 regular Close Support Battalions REME, only 2 regular Medical Regiments... In short, there is only going to be the elements needed to support the Fourth and Fifth roulements within an enduring operation.

With a difference: compared to the original Multi Role Brigades plan, the Army loses the capability to deploy formed regiments of tanks, heavy cavalry, armoured engineers and heavy artillery enduringly. It will be realistically able to sustain such elements in the field for around 18 months only. After that, only sub-units will be sustainable in the long term if the men within the affected regiments have to see their break between tours protected.
It is not casual that both Carter and Wall have observed that the "6 months deployed, 24 months at home" rule "might not be the right solution". It is "about right", and "a good benchmark", and but not set in stone.
I have the benefit of not having to justify the cuts imposed by government, so i can say that the above expression are weak diplomacy: the reality is that the generals are entirely aware that, in the future, regular soldiers in many roles and trades will possibly be deploying for 6 months, but won't have 24 months to spend at home before going again if the operation becomes an enduring effort. The rule of the 5 is no longer sustained by the new army structure: in many trades, there are going to be only 3 men in the role.

Even in terms of infantry, light artillery and other "simpler jobs", the dependency on reserves is going to be great. The adaptable battalions will have 3 companies, but that will be "virtual": if 3 platoons are removed for real, it will be like having only 2 companies. The battalions will depend on reserves to achieve their intended trinary structure, and there is no telling if the "war time" establishment on 4 companies (1 for Maneuver, 1 for Support, 1 as Reserve and 1 Echelon) will ever be obtainable again.

A slide from an Army briefing helps in better understanding the impact of the changes:

The expected minimum amount of reserves deployed is 14.4% in a Reaction Brigade deployment, rising to a 39.2% of reservists in the 5th tour.
In support of the Reaction Brigade tours, most of the reservists will be Individual Augmentees, with some formed sub-unit or unit at logistic and medical level. But when the 4th tour comes around and the first Adaptable Brigade deploys, the number of formed Reserve units required to support the operation grows dramatically.

It is also evident, that Army 2020 maximized the use of "patchworking" to form deployable force packages by picking units up from all over the army: a concept that is not wrong in itself, but that will impact the lives of serving personnel and the efficiency of basing, training and of the brigades themselves, which will end up missing pieces more often than not. 

In addition, it must be kept in mind that reservists are intended to be at readiness for a year in five, which means six months of deployment followed by five years at home. Eventually, the harmony guidelines will collapse: the british army is now severely limiting the meaning of "enduring", because the manpower will simply be insufficient to sustain operations abroad beyond a certain amount of time.

The generals also noted that, to deliver the "Best Effort" and deploy a 30.000-strong division in the field, the new army will need 12 months of notice. The Army's feeling is that, given less warning, it will only be able to deploy a couple of brigades.

Earlier figures released tell us that the composition of the Reaction Force will be 20.000 regulars and 2000 reserves, while the Adaptable Force will have 12.500 regulars and 8000 reserves, with the rest of the personnel part of the other units and of Force Troops.


Another interesting change is the committment to develop a collaboration with industry, to exploit the training period of the Reaction Brigades to test and innovate: the armoured infantry brigade in its training year will spend part of the time working in an experimentation role, to define new tactics, approaches and, of course, requirements that industry can work upon.

The generals provide evidence that Gurkha battalions will continue to rotate in and out of Brunei, and the Falklands will continue to be garrisoned. Two infantry battalions will continue to be based in Cyprus, as well, and here comes the big surprise, when general Carter drops in the mention of one of the two battalions being expanded into a battlegroup. How and why, this is not at all clear at the moment.


Equipment

General Carter also interestingly notes that, in the long term, the Royal Artillery is likely to adopt one single calibre for its guns, kind of confirming that the long delayed program to replace the 105 mm L118 Light Gun will look at acquiring a 155mm weapon. The M777 lightweight howitzer has always been considered the perfect solution, and this is unlikely to have changed, but there won't be a budget to replace the Light Gun until well into the 2020s, so for now this is philosophy.

39 Regiment Royal Artillery will disband, as we know. It has been expanded to 5 batteries to support the constant deployment of one in support of operations in Afghanistan (well over 800 rockets have been fired, with great success) and it is also supporting the entry in service of the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition, but it will nonetheless be lost in the cuts in coming years.
3 Batteries of GMLRS will move into the 3 "heavy" artillery regiments: these will have 2 batteries of AS90 guns and 1 battery of GMLRS each. A further battery contains the Fire Support Teams.
A Reserve GMLRS regiment will also be maintained: currently, 2 batteries are found in the 101 (Volunteers) regiment of the TA: it is not clear if there will be changes to this arrangement or if it will stay exactly the same. 

89 AS90 self-propelled guns will be retained (down from an earlier figure of 95), while 48 will be stripped of all valuable parts and scrapped. The six batteries planned, i hope, will at least grow back to an 8-gun establishment.

The "Heavy" artillery regiments are expected to be 1 Royal Horse Artillery, 19 Royal Artillery and 26 Royal Artillery.
3 Royal Horse Artillery and 4 Royal Artillery will be "adaptable" artillery regiments, with just two batteries of L118 Light Guns and a battery of Fire Support Teams.
There will be 2 reserve regiments using the Light Gun in support.

There are also been no known developments regarding the promise of a "force protection system to protect against indirect fire such as artillery and mortars". Some C-RAM artillery would surely be a welcome capability. 

Carter also says that the Army has considered improving and expanding communications and data-sharing (C4ISR) down to Company level if not further down the scale, but that the Army is now looking at expanding communications capability at battlegroup level: the budget won't allow much more than that. On the issue of communications in the Army, i had already written, noting this very problem and very urgent requirement, here and here.
Talking about communications, the changes in the Royal Signals have been explained in great detail and can be read here. 
In terms of communications, efforts have also been announced in trying to make brigade and even more so division HQs better able to "talk" to HQs from other NATO nations, with which the UK obviously expects to work frequently.

In terms of Engineer support, as we said, there will be 3 regiments fully manned by regulars. These will probably be heavy, armored engineer units which will have the majority (or very possibly all) of the Trojan and Titan vehicles.
The other two regiments will be "integrated", sporting a smaller regular component supplemented by embedded reserve sub-units. My guess is that there will be only 2 regular squadrons in each of these two regiments, supplemented by 2 reserve squadrons.
Encouraging my guess is the recently released breakdown of roles planned for reserve units, where 4 Close Support Engineer squadrons appear. Details here.

There will also be 3 Reserve regiments in the Force Support role, helping 36 and 39 Regiments delivering the wide range of engineer capabilities needed to enable land and air operations. In this field, apparently it is not yet fully decided how the wide river crossing capability will fit in the force structure: currently, the M3 rigs are based in Germany with 23 Amphibious Squadron, 28 Engineer Regiment, but 28 Regiment is to be disbanded, and the unique capability of the amphibious squadron will have to be retained somehow.
I suspect 36 Regiment will, in good time, inherit the M3 rigs and have a Squadron in the amphibious role, assuming that 39 Regiment maintains its airfield and air support focus. I think it is less likely that the M3s will be made a wholly-Reserve managed capability, although it must be noted that, already now, one of the 3 Troops composing 23 Squadron is 412(V), the only unit of reservists based outside the UK. 

It is also not clear what will happen to TALISMAN, the family of systems and vehicles procured to give the Royal Engineers an invaluable Route Clearance capability, for which an impressive training simulator solution has been just acquired. My hope is that at least a Squadron in the Force Support engineer regiments will have a Route Clearance role and will continue using this precious kit: too many times in the past the British Army has developed this kind of capability only to throw it away at the end of the operation at hand, regreting it just a few years later. 


The British Army is retaining 227 Challenger 2 tanks, plus 16 more than will be converted in Driver Training Vehicles. The army already had 22 Driver Training Vehicles: the 16 new ones might replace some of the old ones, or be a partial compensation for the loss of A Squadron, 1st Royal Tank Regiment, which used to have 12 to 16 Challengers for training and demonstration role.
102 Challenger 2s will be harvested for spares and then sold for scrap. As we said, there will be 3 regular Type 56 tank regiments, established for 587 men, all ranks, all trades, and a Reserve regiment tasked with providing replacement crews.

Challenger 2 Driver Training Vehicle

The Army hopes to upgrade "at least" 381 Warrior vehicles. The Capability Sustainment Programme is progressing, and 11 prototypes will be prepared: 6 in the Infantry Section Vehicle configuration, 2 in the Infantry Command variant and one each in the Recovery, Repair and Artillery Observation.
It must be noted that the Artillery Observation variant will need a separate upgrade, which the Royal Artillery is trying to determine and secure at least since 2010, to modernize its artillery-specific sensors and electronics.
The Battery Command Post variant of the Warrior is probably destined to vanish: it used to be a command post for AS90 gun batteries, but some or perhaps all of them had been turned into ambulances by the REME. So far, i've heard nothing about the future of these Warriors.
In 2005 it was also decided that many Warriors, removed from disbanded Armoured Infantry battalions, would be converted into Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicles, with an APC, Ambulance and Mortar variants planned: it was to be part of the wider Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme, but i never heard anything about it ever since, unfortunately.
Lastly, in 2011 a Warrior Bridgelayer was showcased, fitted with a multipurpose front mount point which allowed swapping the bridgelaying arm for other engineering devices including mine ploughs: such a bridgelayer Warrior could at some time be chosen as solution for a requirement for up to 35 medium weight engineer support vehicles for the FRES-equipped Cavalry regiments.
Prototypes should be demonstrated from 2014 onwards, with production starting in 2016 and with dDeliveries of the first upgraded Warriors for service in 2018. The first armored infantry company on the upgraded Warriors should be ready in 2020 and full capability should be reached by 2022.
Armored infantry battalions will number 729 men. 

The new Scout vehicles will replace Scimitar and will be fielded in 3 Heavy Cavalry regiments, each with 3 squadrons of 16 vehicles. The regiments are established for 528 men.

The 3 main Adaptable Brigades will each have a Light Cavalry regiment, on 3 squadrons of 16 Jackal vehicles each. Establishment is for 404 men, and each Light Cavalry regiment will be paired to a reserve cavalry regiment.  

The Army Air Corps will suffer a significant downsizing with the retirement of the Lynx AH7 by 2015, but will retain the 22 AH9A helicopters out to 2018. The number of Wildcat helicopters to be delivered to the Army are unclear: everywhere you can read of a plan for 34 machines (6 of which will actually go to the Royal Marines in 847 Naval Air Squadron, however), but in Planning Round 2011 a decision was made to convert 4 Wildcats into "Light Assault Helicopter", and procure a further 4 new LAH, bringing the total to 38 machines in two variants instead of 34 in one.
The 8 Light Assault Helicopters were expected to go to 657 AAC Squadron, supporting the Special Forces, but there has been no update on this plan ever since, and i'm waiting for the NAO Major Projects report 2012 to discover what happened.
The Army is planning to have 4 Squadrons equipped with Wildcat helicopters within 1st Regiment AAC: this is down from 5 Lynx squadrons today (2 in 1st Regiment and 3 in 9th Regiment) and includes the announced merging which will see 9th Regiment vanish.

1st Regiment AAC will return from Germany and find home at Yeovilton, where the Navy's own Wildcats will be based. This is likely to mean closure for Dishfort, current home of 9th Regiment AAC. 

The Army Air Corps is also fearing reductions in its Apache force, despite SDSR promises to retain the whole Attack Helicopter fleet. From a six squadrons force plus Conversion to Type training squadron, the apache force could go down to just four squadrons plus training formation. Details here.
In the meanwhile, one airframe was written off after a very hard landing in Afghanistan in 2008, reducing the fleet to 66 from 67.

In terms of base-ISTAR, the RAF Regiment and the Army are collaborating under Project Outpost to determine the best way to retain in the long term the valuable network of sensors built up under Project Cortez to protect bases in Afghanistan.
Watchkeeper's future is certain, while more of a question mark hovers on the Desert Hawk III: for all the talk of focusing on ISTAR and on providing the soldiers with enhanced surveillance, there is at the moment no certainty about this UOR's future. The Treasury will stop funding it when operations in Afghanistan end, and the Army will need to bring it into the core budget somehow, if it has to stay.
The RAF will have to make the same kind of decision for the Reaper fleet itself. 

I believe that the two Royal Artillery regiments using drones will be moved into the Military Intelligence & Surveillance Brigade although i have no evidence for it at the moment, while it has already been officially announced that 14 (Electronic Warfare) Signal Regiment is definitely moving in. Unfortunately, a (highly questionable at best) decision was made to size the EW regiment at 4 Field plus Support Sqn. Even this vital capability, when Afghanistan operations end, won't meet the Rule of the 5.

5 Regiment Royal Artillery will probably remain in 1st Artillery Brigade, and i can only hope that at least this regiment, which has been keeping at least a battery on the field for over 10 years, constantly, is allowed to retain the five deployable batteries that have been raised in these years: in 2003, 5th Regiment had the 4/73 Sphinx special ops observation battery, K and P batteries and Q (HQ and Support) Battery.
53 Battery was added in 2004, Z battery followed in 2009 and 93 Battery was added over the course of last year. In a decade, this rarely celebrated regiment provided constant Surveillance and Target Acquisition to over 100 different battlegroups and introduced into service more than 30 different UORs. 4/73 Bty provided a 'behind enemy lines' observation patrol which kept the men totally isolated in hostile territory for 56 days, the longest patrol since World War II.
This regiment now needs to receive new Battlefield Surveillance and Artillery Locating radars, since the COBRA has been prematurely dismissed, and i hope the formation is properly resourced and supported in its current form, to be ready for the next operations. 
  
  
Training Areas

A review into the future training areas for the new Army is ongoing, but decisions might not be taken before 2014 or 2015.
Salisbury Plain is the only true certainty, with the 3 Reaction brigades headed there. BATUS, in Canada, should also be retained, while the british army base in Kenya is being expanded to accommodate greater use.
The "Salisbury of Scotland" is, i think, definitely a dead idea. 

There is also an option for retaining a presence in Germany, and the army is, in particular, evaluating the possibility of using much more frequently the US training areas in Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr in South-Eastern Germany, which make up the largest US training area outside of the USA and have received huge investment in the last years. These two areas offer a much more complex environment, more challenging than that offered by BATUS, and thanks to american investment the targetry and infrastructure is top class. There is also another advantage, which is the possibility to train alongside very relevant contingents from the US and from other european allies, while in the BATUS area the US and Canadian presence is not constant and normally numbers in tens or a hundred men at most.
However, the areas are much, much smaller than BATUS, possibly too much to accommodate all of the heavy armor maneuvering training.
Anyway, the 5th Rifles battlegroup will train there next year, instead of going to BATUS and last October the 3rd Mercian also trained there, participating in the massive Saber Junction NATO exercise. And the soldiers liked it.
Are we in for a major surprise regarding BATUS in the coming years...?

General Carter mentions expanding the presence in Cyprus by transforming one of the two resident infantry battalions in a full battlegroup, and i suspect this is connected to training plans.
And lastly, Brunei is willing to engage more widely with the british forces on its territory.

For an army that is shrinking rather dramatically, there sure seems to be abundance of training areas. 



Earlier Articles explaining Army 2020 

Strenght of the Army after the cuts http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/09/the-force-of-army-2020.html 

An in depth analysis of the british infantry's weapons and capabilities http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/07/the-infantry-of-army-2020.html

Beyond the announcement: an in depth analysis of Army 2020 http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/07/army-2020-in-detail.html

Aiming for the Whole Force - UPDATE

The Ministry of Defence has launched yesterday the Consultation on the future of the armed forces reserves, aiming to collect the information needed to prepare a Report for publishing in Spring 2013. The target is to deliver the Whole Force concept, integrating Regulars and Reserves in a responsive, modern force. It is not an easy target. Much could go wrong. But i was pleased to see clarity of thought in the consultation paper, which is, at least, promising.

The Reserves are to be significantly grown in number and, even more complex, in trained strenght. The figures provided are particularly interesting and telling:


Maritime Reserves (Navy and Marines)

From 2526 All-Ranks now, the reserve is meant to expand to 4150 by 2020, with a trained strenght of 3100.

Royal Auxiliary Air Force

From 1335 All-Ranks now, to 2300 by 2020, 1800 of which trained.

Territorial Army

From 25.430 now, to 38.000 by 2020, with a Phase 2 Trained Strenght of 30.000.


The expansion of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force includes the standing up of 5 new Squadrons:

No 502(Ulster) Squadron at JHC Station Aldergrove;
611(West Lancashire) Squadron in Liverpool
614(West Glamorgan) Squadron in South Wales, most likely at RAF St Athan.

These squadrons will be general service support squadrons representing various trades and branches from within the RAF.
At RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire, 2624(County of Oxford) Squadron will re-form in the force protection role and 622 Squadron will stand-up as the Reserve unit for aircrew augmenting the RAF’s air mobility force.

It must be noted, however, that the RAF anticipates the disbandment of a couple of Field Squadrons from the RAF Regiment (from 8 to 6) after Afghanistan operations will be over, and this change might be accompanied by a reorganization of the Reserve Force Protection squadrons as well.

The most crucial and challenging development is that of the Territorial Army, which will see a lot of changes. It is indeed proposed that even its name will change, to Army Reserve, as "Territorial" is seen as a limiting, unfair description for a force destined to much more frequently train and operate abroad.

It is expected that the force structure and basing of the Reserves will change, as much as possible within a budget that remains tight, to enable the desidered "pairing" of regular and reserve formations, which will be crucial to the future of the Army.
In this sense, Philip Hammond said he hopes to deliver to the House the report on the full plan for the basing of the Regulars (a chapter of Army 2020 that has been left quite up into the air in the previous announcements) before Christmas, so that work can then start on the plan for the Reserves, with the hope of concluding the process in time for the Reserves Report publication in Spring 2013.

The Basing Plan, if delivered in one single go, will not be just about the Army, either, as there are still question marks over the future of RAF aircraft fleets and related bases. We might see confirmed the selection of Marham as future Main Operating Base for the F35 fleet, for example, and there have been rumors of a possible rethink about the transfer of Typhoon from Leuchars to Lossiemouth, especially if the Typhoon Tranche 1 fleet is retained and a 7-squadron force is adopted.

As part of the modernization of the Army reserves, the TA is being given more up-to-date equipment to train and operate with. Since last October (and out to December 2013), the Yeomanry regiments are being given a first tranche of 80 Land Rover RWIMIK. In fact, as you will remember from the Army 2020 plan, 3 of four Yeomanry regiments of the reserve are to become Light Cavalry formations, with the 4th regiment in Tank Crew Replacement role, supporting the Challenger II fleet.

Some 800 Land Rover Wolf and 900 MAN SV trucks of all types are being passed to the Reserves, with deliveries completed by December 2012 and March 2013 respectively.

By March 2013 the Reserves will be fully issued with the new MTP clothing and uniforms, and they will also be assigned stocks of Dismounted Close Combat equipment, including FIST STA weapon sights, night vision googles, body armour and other kit.

This is part of a 1.2 billion investment, including a first allocation of four million pounds for improving a selected net of Army Reserve Centres by April 2013.
Crucially, Oversea Training Exercises (OTX) have returned, with several having already taken place, such as Ex Roman Star, in Italy.  

The Reserves Consultation Paper says that mandated training periods for the reserves will change for the TA, with an additional 5 days per year (from 35 to 40), following completition of initial training. 16 of these 40 days are delivered as a continuous period of training, while the others are delivered through weekend and evening training sessions, to minimise the burden on employers.

The Royal Navy Reserves are expected to continue with their 25 days training requirement, with 35 days for Marines Reserves and for Royal Auxiliary Air Force personnel.
Naval Reserves are quite frequently called into action as of now. The Maritime Reserve is, indeed, highlighted as example of integration, being considerably ahead of its counterparts.

Indicatively, Maritime Reservists can expect a minimum notice of 28 days when called out for a contingency operation, and a 60 days notice when they are called up for routine deployments.
Indicatively, they will be expected to have one 6-month long deployment every 5 years.

RAuxAF personnel could be called into action for up to six months every 3 years, but normally they are employed for much shorter periods, the report says.

The Army Reserves's deployment cycle will be particularly crucial, as it will be indispensable to use large numbers of Reserves to sustain future enduring operations. The report acknowledges that from a 10 to 15% share of Reservists in a brigade-sized deployment abroad, the Army will move to a 40% share of Reserves by the time of the 4th and 5th Brigade tournations in theatre.

To sustain this, it is envisaged that, one year every five, an Army reservist will be at a minimum readiness level of 3 months notice. Of these three months, up to 8 weeks could be taken up by pre-deployment training, so the effective notice might be as little as a month. A 6-month deployment would follow.
In practice, an Army reservist could expect to be mobilised for up to 1 year every five, with the 12 months including the pre-deployment training, the tour itself and a period of rest and recovery afterwards.

This 5-year availability cycle will cohexist with the Army's three year training and readiness cycle, as described in the Consultation Paper.

In Year 1 of this training cycle, a Reserve battalion will conduct a basic level of training, to get its soldiers used to working as a team under pressure. The training will culminate in a 16-day exercise held in the UK, where the soldiers will practice their individual skills and their ability to work together. This is mandated training and must be attended by the reservists. It will be planned well in advance and every effort will be made to stage it outside normal working hours to help reservists and employers absorb the impact.
Year 2, Platoon-level training will take place during weekend field exercises, some of which will involve working with regular soldiers. The year will see a large 16-days long oversea training exercise, possibly to Kenya, certainly along with the Paired Regular formation accompanying.
In Year 3, the reserve battalion might be asked to deploy on operations, possibly fielding formed
sub-units alongside the regular counterparts.

The pairing of Regular and Reserve battalions presents geographic challenges, hopefully to be tackled by the Basing reviews, but it might also mean that additional Reserve formations will be created, depending on how exactly the pairing will work. An interesting point was made in Parliament about the possibility of tapping into the large number of willing Gurkhas that would gladly join: Hammond said that he's not currently aware of a plan for a Reserve Gurkha battalion.
I, however, think it is actually a good idea, at least because Gurkhas willing to join are numerous, and it would be a good way to help with reaching the challenging manning targets. 

Hammond however hints that Logistic, REME and Engineer reserve formations will get the most attention, saying that the army took a "deliberate decision has been taken to reduce manpower disproportionately in logistics, engineers and REME, which will require a disproportionate growth in the reserve strength in those three areas."
A previous Reserves paper also highlighted Light Gun artillery as a field good for increased use of Reservists.
There has also been talk about a new Army Air Corps reserve squadron, 666 Sqn, to stand up as a Wildcat reserve formation at Yeovilton as part of 6 Regiment. 

We will see how the plan will or will not follow these indications.

UPDATE:

the autumn issue of ARQ, the british army reserves magazine, includes a page spelling out the roles currently envisaged for the Reserve units in the new, integrated force.
It is not clear how "definitive" this is, but it is interesting to see it nonetheless. Contrarily to earlier indications, the number of Light Gun artillery regiments is seen decreasing (from 3 to 2), while the GMLRS and STA components are seen growing, from 2 batteries of each specialty in the same regiments (101(V) Regt) to two separate regiments, one with GMLRS and one in the Surveillance and Target Acquisition role.

Anyway, here is the graphic as appeared on ARQ: 

The ARQ page

The Infantry is not seen changing, and i am a bit surprised by this, as in my opinion there is not enough battalions at the moment to enable proper "pairing". One battalion is seen in Air Assault role, and i think it will be 4 PARA, which has already been assigned to the Joint Helicopter Command.
2nd Royal Irish regiment was also moved under JHC control, but probably this second move is going to be reversed and the Royal Irish involvment in 16AA brigade will end. 
The remaining 13 infantry battalions will have to be paired with, according to the Army 2020 document, up to 20 regular battalions (14 Light Role plus 6 Light Mechanized formations on Foxhound vehicles). Even if the 2 Gurkha battalions will have no reserve counterpart, the Reserve battalions look too few at the moment.

The Armour component also presents no surprises, sticking to what was announced by Army 2020: 3 Light Cavalry/RECCE regiments and one Tank Crew replacement regiment. 

The Army Air Corps reserve component is also seen staying formed by one Regiment, the 6th, and there is no way for now to know if the additional Squadron will be there or not.

The Royal Artillery component, as noted earlier, is going to change.

The single Close Air Defence regiment (106(V) Regt, i don't think it'll change) will remain, but for what i've heard it will lose the Rapier component and only work with Starstreak.

The current 3 Light Gun regiments (100, 103, 105) will become only 2 despite earlier indications suggesting a growth.

101(V) Regiment will have one of its two roles assigned to another formation. It currently has 2x STA batteries and 2x MLRS battery, while under Army 2020 there will be 1x MLRS Regiment and 1x STA regiment. Probably the second regiment will be the missing Light Gun formation, re-roled.

The UAV regiment is staying. Even if ARQ doesn't say it, i'd assume there will be no change, and it'll be 104(V), as now. 

In support of my expectations, i can report that 101, 104 and 106 regiments were moved under Theatre Troops in the past months.

The Royal Engineers reserves will provide 4 Close Support Squadrons, 3 Force Support Regiments, 4 Search Squadrons, 1 Works Group, 1 Geographic Squadron and 3 Specialist Team Royal Engineers.

The identity of two of the Force Support regiments is already pretty much certain: 71 and 73 Regiment have been moved in recent times under Theatre Troops.

The 4 Search Squadrons shoud be part of the "integrated" 101 and 33 EOD Regiments. I think there are only 3 reserve squadrons in the two regiments as of now, so there will be a growth here.

The 4 Close Support Squadrons should include 131 Indipendent Commando Squadron, perhaps 591 Indipendent Squadron, which is the only RE unit left in Northern Ireland, and 299 Squadron (Parachute). The other squadron will probably be the remaining part of a Regiment that will be lost, as the royal engineers reserve currently also lines the regiments 72, 75 and Royal Monmoutshire. For what we can understand from ARQ's presentation, it is likely that only one of these three regiments will survive, as the third Force Support regiment. There is no mention of other regiments, so that would imply the disbandment of two remaining formations. The Royal Monmoutshire identity is likely to be protected somehow, basing my reasoning on seniority.
The situation here is a bit murky still. It seems, however, that even in times of growth for the Reserves, there will be formations lost. 

The Royal Signals will apparently lose a regiment as well, from 5 down to 4. I suppose, but cannot be sure for now, that the 3 squadrons remaining will be the same as now, with 43 Sqn specialized in aviation support, 81 Sqn in telecommunications support and 63 Sqn in support to SAS operations.

The Royal Logistic Corps are listed with 5x Transport Regiments (down from 9, a loss of 4!), 2x Supply Regiments (same),  1x Postal and Courier and Movement Regiment (apparently the result of merging the roles of the current 88 (P&C) and 162 (Movement Control) Regiments), 1x Fuel Support Regiment (a new creation which will probably include the current 383 Commando Petroleum Troop), 1x Port and Maritime Regiment (same) and 1x Catering Support Regiment (same).

Judging from the ARQ overview, the RLC reserve component is due to take a tremendous blow, regardless of the manning increase for the reserve. There is also no mention in ARQ of the single Pioneer Regiment, and since the only regular unit in the same role has been closed with the specialty no longer deemed necessary, i suspect its reserve will follow and be disbanded.

A loss of 5 regiments, it would appear.

In the medical field, ARQ reports: 1x Air Assault Medical Squadron (same), 4 Medical Squadrons in the Adaptive Force (1 should be new, while 3 squadrons are already part of the regular Medical Regiments), 10 Field Hospitals (same), 1 Hospital Support Regiment (same), 3 Medical Regiments (same) and 1 MEDEVAC Group (currently is a regiment, how will the change work?).

The REME component shows a total of 6 Force Support battalions (a growth of 2, but inclusive of 101 Battalion which is to lose its current regular component and pass wholly to the reserve).

The Royal Military Police component seems set to lose a Company: from 4 plus the Special Investigations company to 3 plus special.

Two Reserve Military Working Dog Squadrons are to be formed (unless it is two of the five regular squadrons that get transfered to the reserves...). 

And the Military Intelligence battalions are to grow from 2 to 4, with a Specialist Military Intelligence Company in addition.

In general, it is not so much of an exciting plan. Looking at it and at the current force structure, you wouldn't exactly tell that the force is expanding.
Coupled with the fact that the ambitions in terms of trained strenght are very high, i'm more than a bit worried in front of this plan. I'll be looking forwards to the release of more details. And honestly, i expect some changes to the above scenario, personally.




It will be crucial to get this ample program of changes to the Reserves right. I will continue to follow with attention the developments.