The British Combat Aviation Brigade

It has been in the works for quite some time, and will be a building site for several years still, but the UK is finally standing up its own Combat Aviation Brigade to bring some order in the convoluted and overlapping command arrangements of its helicopter forces.

I’ve known about this plan for many months, but couldn’t really talk about it before some sort of official announcement was released. This finally happened yesterday, even if, primarily because of the pandemic, it was an extremely low-key news.

I’ve been and I remain extremely critical of much of what the Army is doing and saying about its future, but for all it’s worth I can certainly say I am a big supporter of this one move. It is arguably long, long overdue and the brigading of the units involved in fielding aviation groups in support of british land forces has long featured in my recommendations for the future structures of the Army. 

The Wings of what once was 24 Air Mobile Brigade have been chosen as the TRF for the new 1 star command, 1^st Aviation Brigade (1st Avn Bde). Fun fact: in my proposals for the future, as far back as 2013, I had seen this coming. It has to be admitted, however, that it was a relatively easy guess: the other likely candidate was the Striking Eagle badge that used to be 16 Air Assault Brigade’s symbol until the return of Pegasus In 2018 and which has stuck around since as badge of the Attack Helicopter Force.

Back to serious matters, 1^st Aviation Brigade is the main component of a wider restructuring of Army aviation (known as Project COLINDALE) which has been very, very slowly progressing ever since 2015.

Primary drivers for change are the need to generate efficiencies; the need to build a C2 construct capable to brigade aviation elements in support of a Divisional deployment, rather than penny-packet groups only suited to brigade or sub-brigade deployments; and the ongoing review of the infrastructure footprint of the Army Air Corps.

Notoriously, all three Services have had to craft a plan to divest a lot of bases, barracks and land in an effort to achieve savings and enable the modernization of the remaining infrastructure. Army Aviation is supposed to do its bit in this project, but decisions on the future footprint remain elusive. Essentially, the biggest dilemma is whether to close down Middle Wallop or Wattisham, since Yeovilton is going nowhere and there isn’t a real alternative to keeping Aldergrove for operations in Northern Ireland.

Operations in Arctic conditions have been intense between 2019 and 2020, with the debut of british Apaches in Norway and their first arctic use of Hellfire missiles. This is part of the as yet unpublished "UK Defence in the High North" strategy in which the UK committs to a much increased role on the Norway flank of NATO for the next decade. 

From what can be observed from the outside, the closure of Wattisham with the migration soutwards of the Apache squadrons is the desired outcome, but clearly the complexity and cost of the move are very much preventing the sealing of a definitive plan. It is clear that the time for such a move is now, if not yesterday, since the transition between the current AH1 standard and the new Block III standard is soon to begin on the flightline, with the first remanufactured helicopters arriving this year. The Army would like to co-locate all Apache training phases, currently split between Conversion To Type carried out by 673 AAC at Middle Wallop and Conversion To Role  done by 653 AAC, Wattisham, with the ultimate objective of also merging the 2 squadrons into a single one (653 AAC).

3 and 4 Regiments will remain otherwise relatively unchanged, each with its two frontline squadrons and with an uplift to manpower in the ground element to sustain an higher operational tempo for high intensity operations.

In terms of Command and Control, aviation groups have so far deployed under the control of HQs pieced together from disparate Joint Helicopter Command resources, assigned to the commander of one of the constituent forces. The Commander of the Attack Helicopter Force has been the core for one such “makeshift” Aviation Task Force (ATF-1); Commando Helicopter Force provides another (ATF-2) and Support Helicopter Force (RAF Chinook and Puma 2 squadrons) provide the basis for a third.

The use of Force Commanders and augmentees from JHC is no longer judged sufficient as it lacks the command capacity and battle staff power needed to plan, refine and execute multiple tasks at the necessary speed, concurrency and endurance.

The formation of a permanent 1-star command with associated staff also offers the benefit of providing a “plug-in point” that better enables integration with international forces and, primarily, with the US Army’s own Combat Aviation Brigades. Most countries the UK will be working with, have long had a 1-star Aviation HQ directing employment of Aviation Battlegroups, and others, like France, have in recent times gone in the same direction.

1^st Aviation Brigade, based in Middle Wallop, will be born out of the progressive merging of the current Attack Helicopter Force (AHF) command element (the overarching command sitting above 3 and 4 Regiments AAC) with the Aviation Reconnaissance Force (ARF, essentially the overarching command element overseeing 1 and 5 Regiments AAC) and later of the Watchkeeper Force (WKF) as well.

Instead of having separate AHF and ARF forces, the Avn Bde will instead be a deputy commader in chief for the ATTACK and one for the FIND functions.

In preparation for the more ambitious role of Aviation in future Divisional operations, several large scale operations have seen whole AAC Apache squadrons flying long range strikes across the UK and even deep into France. The teaming of Wildcat and Apache, including the use of the first to laser-mark targets in favor of the Hellfire missiles of the latter, has also been tested and validated 

Watchkeeper will continue to be operated by 47 Regiment Royal Artillery, which continues to work on equipping and training 4 equipment batteries. The change of command won’t be particularly dramatic since 47 RA has been under Joint Helicopter Command control already since 31 august 2016, when it resubordinated from 1^st ISR Brigade as part of efforts to overcome the problems that have tormented this UAV capability in its work up to full service readiness.

Under the 31 (HQ) Bty, 10 (Assaye) Bty and 43 (Lloyd’s Company) Bty were the first subunits to become operational with Watchkeeper, and have since been joined by 74 (The battleaxe Company) Bty and finally by 57 (Bhurtpore) Bty, which resubordinated from 32 RA during 2019.

From 2019, Watchkeeper is finally cleared to fly from Boscombe Down. Intense operations are ongoing also from Akrotiri, Cyprus.

1 Regiment AAC has had to abandon all ambitions of eventually re-activating 669 AAC and 672 AAC squadrons on AW-159 WILDCAT, as had once been planned. These ex Lynx units have now disbanded, leaving the Regiment composed of 661 and 659 Squadrons, plus 652 as training unit delivering both Conversion to Type and to Role. The regiment will have the ability to force generate as an Aviation Battlegroup for deployment.

4 Regiment AAC has under command 656 and 664 Squadrons on Apaches. The first is the specialist in Apache shipboard operations and the primary supplier of Attack Helicopter support to 3 Commando Brigade. 664 is primarily aligned to 16 Air Assault Brigade. The regiment will increasingly contributed to the max output required by Division scale operations, however. It should eventually take responsibility also for the combined CTT and CTR training unit, 653 Sqn.

3 Regiment AAC has the Apache squadrons 662 and 663. Both Attack Helicopter regiments will have the ability to force generate as Aviation Battlegroups for deployment.

5 Regiment AAC will oversee internal security operations (essentially, Northern Ireland and Special Forces support) and will also oversee aviation support to training overseas (7 Flight in Brunei and 29 Flight in BATUS). The regiment is otherwise made up by 2 squadrons; 665 AAC operates Gazelle helicopters from Aldergrove, while 651 AAC operates fixed wing ISLANDER and DEFENDER aircraft from the same base. Since 1 April 2019, however, 651 Sqn has been transferred to the RAF and once the new arrangements eventually reach Full Operational Capability, 651 will be removed from the Army’s order of battle. 665 AAC is instead intended to re-equip with a new helicopter replacing Gazelle. The expectation is that a small number of H-145 helicopters will be acquired for the role. Some could also replace the Gazelles of 29 Flight in BATUS, Canada.

658 Squadron, which operates in support of the SAS with Dauphin helicopters, will sit under the regiment but clearly its actual line of command is somewhere else.

The Brigade also commands 6 Regiment AAC with its 4 squadrons of reservists (675. 677, 678 and 679) who backfill ground support roles positions and provide war establishment uplift to the manpower of regular squadrons.

The training regiments (2, 7 and 9) of the Army Air Corps will not be included in the brigade. With WILDCAT training delivered directly by 1 Regiment AAC via 652 Sqn and with the same approach eventually planned for adoption by 3 and 4 Regiments with 653 AAC taking over all phases of APACHE training, it is expected that 7 Regiment AAC will fold its remaining functions into 5 Regiment AAC (training for the successor to Gazelle and oversight of overseas flights) and then disband. There are no firm official dates yet for this to happen; the main obstacle being the enduring inability to agree on whether to vacate Wattisham.

2 Regiment will carry on delivering the early phases of AAC personnel training in 668 and 676 Squadrons.

9 Regiment has been recently stood up at RAF Shawbury as part of the Defence Helicopter Flying School and has taken under command 670 AAC and 60 RAF Squadrons. It works alongside 2 Maritime Air Wing which delivers training through 660 AAC and 705 NAS squadrons. This arrangement will carry on.  

The aviation brigade will deploy under 3(UK) Division for major divisional operations and will deploy scalable C2 elements and associated Aviation Battlegroups or Units of Action for smaller scale contingencies. The Brigade will be resourced to operate with “at least” 4 Avg BGs and will be able to take under command non-british formations.

In particular, it is assumed than in any “max effort” scenario requiring 3(UK) Division to be fielded, 1^st Aviation Brigade would have to deploy the vast majority of all frontline helicopter fleets, as it is expected than the Littoral Manoeuvre helicopter force (the Commando Helicopter Force with the MERLINs of 845 and 846 NAS plus the WILDCATs of 847 NAS, reinforced by 656 AAC with APACHEs and some CHINOOKs for heavy lift) would be required to operate as the same time as the main ground-based force.

Air mobility up to Company level is also assumed as requirement for Rear Area security: during a Divisional deployment, a Light Brigade formed out of units from 1^st (UK) Division would deploy with Rear Area security roles.

It is assumed that 2 Squadrons of CHINOOKs, for up to 26 helicopters in total, would be deployed for such a large scale operation. If massed together for a primary operation, these helicopters could easily airlift a whole air assault battalion in one wave. If realized, this ambition would mean deploying more Chinooks than are found normally in American CABs.

24 Apache would also be the target, same number as are found in an attack battalion within an American CAB.

The main weakness of british aviation is naturally Medium Lift. Wildcat has extremely limited lift capability, while the small number of Puma HC2s is expected to be, for the most part, busy with Special Forces requests. The Americans, conversely, employ large numbers of Black Hawks, including several permanently tasked with CASEVAC / MEDEVAC role. French, Italians, Germans and others count on large numbers of NH-90 for the medium lift, but, with the sole exception of Germany, are in turn much weaker in terms of heavy lift.

Apart from the new and enhanced capabilities of command and execution of multiple concurrent operations, the Brigade will benefit from a substantial restructuring of 7 Battalion REME, which also includes 132 Squadron, Royal Logistic Corps, combining Equipment Support and repair with logistic sustainment of the deployed force.

Regimental REME workshops within 1, 3 and 4 Regiments will be restructured and strengthened with their own Equipment Support platoons and vehicle platoon for sustaining increased tempo of operations in the field.

The 3 british Chinooks deployed in Mali give much needed Heavy Lift support to the french forces in the region. In their first year of deployment they flew for 1192 hours, lifting 7,052 soldiers and 475 tonnes of freight 

On top of those organic resources, 7 REME will provide a 2^nd line of Aviation Close Support in the field, with two Aviation Companies (71 and 72) and a Field Company specializing in Recovery (70 Fd Coy). 73 Aviation Coy relocated to Yeovilton in the last few years and will merge with 1 AAC regiment’s workshop elements to provide organic support.

1^st Aviation Brigade is very much inspired by the US Army’s own CABs, but, for the moment at least, will continue to suffer of some of the typically british over-convoluted and overlapping layers of command and inter-service arrangements. 

Somewhat counter-intuitively, for example, the brigade does not seem destined to include 244 Signal Squadron, the designate aviation support comms units, which remains more loosely at JHC level, despite the unquestioned need for Communication and Information Support. I fully expect experience in the field to eventually lead to the resubordination of said squadron into the brigade, regardless of what the assumptions are right now.

More significantly, while 1^st Avn Bde will have very significant organic FIND and ATTACK capabilities thanks to WILDCAT, WATCHKEEPER and APACHE, it won’t have direct day to day control over Manoeuvre helicopters as the CHINOOK and PUMA Squadrons are part of the RAF.

Connection with these crucial elements will be maintained through the higher level of command (Joint Helicopter Command), and deployed support helicopters will fall under 1^st Avn Bde control during operations. Even then, it is acknowledged that “support helicopter squadrons have less organic life support than attack and recce formations and are not expected to manoeuvre in the same way”.

Similarly, the brigade won’t have direct control of the Tactical Supply Wing and Joint Helicopter Support Squadron.

This once again brings into focus the unhelpful awkwardness of having the troop carrying helicopters, quite frankly, sitting under the “wrong” Service. I don’t intend to denigrate the RAF’s commitment to the Support Helicopter Force, much as I will be inexorably accused of doing exactly that. I believe I’m simply stating a fact of life.

I will also immediately acknowledge that it is, at the moment and in the foreseeable future at the very least, almost unthinkable to prospect a transfer of CHINOOK and PUMA in Army hands. The effects on manpower could admittedly be disastrous if a well established RAF “family” was broken up, dramatically changing the career prospects of those who serve into it. Moreover, the Army is the Service that is most severely struggling with recruitment and retention, as well as grappling with decades of accumulated obsolescence across its structures and vehicle fleets, leading to a budget which is already broken as it is. As a consequence, I am NOT recommending a transfer at this time, although I will forever remark that it should be an objective for the future, perhaps to be incrementally implemented alongside the purchase of new build CHINOOKs to replace the oldest airframes in the coming years (assuming that the ongoing CHINOOK Capability Sustainment Programme does survive the new Integrated Review, of course). 

Transferring capabilities is difficult, but not impossible: the already mentioned case of 651 AAC is an example, and the transfer of MERLIN HC3 to the Navy is another.

What I am unashamedly urging is the immediate consideration of alternative joint solutions to bring the Support Helicopter Force into the Aviation Brigade and to restructure CHINOOK and PUMA 2 ground support / life support elements to deliver a more homogeneous capability for manoeuvre and flexible basing. As of now, APACHE and WILDCAT units are aiming for an increased ability to deploy forward and switch between Forward Operating Bases and multiple FARPs to operate in bitterly contested scenarios, while CHINOOK and PUMA 2 remain more decisively tied to availability of a better established Main Operating Base.

In addition, I believe that any honest appraisal of the resources available would conclude that creating a coherent Aviation Sustainment Battalion by combining Tactical Supply Wing, JHSS and 132 RLC Sqn is the sound thing to do. 7 REME could then focus entirely on Equipment Support.

Finally, proper planning should go into an integrated plan for adjusting / expanding the warfighting establishment as required, with Reserve support coming both from 6 AAC Regiment and from Royal Auxiliary Air Force formations. 1^st Aviation Brigade will indeed include 6 AAC Regiment in its structure exactly for that purpose, and RauxAF elements connected to the Support Helicopter Force will, in a way or another, end up involved in any case.

Better to properly develop the arrangements in peacetime than scramble later when deployment time comes.

Tales from a hundred years of Royal Air Force - The Centenary Collection

The Royal Air Force turned 100 on 1st April this year, and carries its age in great fashion. It was the first air service to become independent of the other two, and was born out of the hard-won experience built up over the battlefields of the Great War by the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service. The achievements of those two corps and of the air force that emerged from their unification are certainly worthy of celebration, and Penguin is doing so by publishing a collection of books that tell some of the countless great stories of the RAF.

The Centenary Collection is a series of six paperback books, united by same style of cover and by the same agile format, which bring together a good selection of tales of that human courage that has seen the RAF through the great challenges of its century.

Naturally, the skies of the Second World War get most of the attention, but of the many stories out there, Penguin has selected an interesting few:

The Last Enemy by Richard Hillary is not only the story of a Spitfire pilot in the terrible hours of the Battle of Britain, but also the extraordinary tale of a man who was shot down and survived through months in the hospital, becoming a member of the “Guinea Pig Club” that Archibald McIndoe created by pioneering plastic surgery.

Every so often, Richard writes the name of a comrade, of a friend, noting “from that flight, he did not return”. It hits home hard, every time. Not much else needs to be added.

There is no attempt on Richard’s part to reconstruct how he was shot down: just falling into darkness and pain, with hands and face burned, eyesight lost. Weeks of suffering, followed by the return of eyesight and a long struggle to get back in control of his hands and have his face rebuilt. It is a tale of courage and also a story of evolving medical practice. The strength of character that emerges from the pages is hard to describe: Richard is direct, sincere and concise in his memories: the intensity comes from what he sees and goes through, there is no need for tinsels.  

Richard decided to write his story, and that of his lost comrades, when he was in the hospital, slowly recovering. He said he wrote for humanity whole, to let at least some of the stories of those men be known, to show what they were ready to do for their ideals.

Richard Hillary was not tamed by what he went through. He helped rescue a mother and her children from a bombed house, and that ensured that he would never rest. He managed to get back to a flying unit.

The Last Enemy was first published in 1941. It is an open ended book, because Richard died 7 months later in a second crash.

Few stories could better underline the value of the men who made the RAF what it is.

Tumult in the Clouds by James Goodson is another inspired choice. Anglo-American, James survived the sinking of the SS Athenia off the Hebrides and distinguished himself by helping other survivors. He decided to become a fighter pilot in the RAF and served in 43 Squadron and for a stint in 416 Squadron, Canadian, before being posted to fly Spitfires with 133 Squadron, one of three Eagle Squadrons set up for American volunteers.  

Eventually, those Squadrons would become the core of Fourth Fighter Group, Eight Air Force when the United States declared war, and the Spitfires were hesitantly handed over to be replaced by P-47s. Including this particular story is a tribute to the long lasting and key relationship between the UK and the US, between the RAF and what wasn’t yet, at the time, the USAF, but the USAAF, with the extra A for “Army”. It is amusing to read of how an impudent Texan joyously asked King George VI permission to wear Texan boots with the RAF uniform, and touching that the original Eagle squadrons asked to continue wearing RAF wings on their uniforms after becoming USAAF units.

The book is rich of action, and recalls combat actions and rivalry with the great Luftwaffe units, and even the meetings with the Me-262, the first combat jet. One of the best stories to experience what it was like to fly fighters in the Second World War, and a great story of long range bomber escort flights and daring strafing through hellish barrages of Flak.

Going Solo by Roald Dahl brings us to Africa, where Roald is caught by the war. He trains in Nairobi, on Tiger Moths, then out to the huge base at Habbaniya, before joining 80 Squadron with its Gloster Gladiators. But Roald crashes in the desert and has to go through a slow and painful recovery in Alexandria, before ferrying a Hurricane out to Greece and staying there to fight alongside the remaining few, and they were really few at that point, trying to carry through a doomed campaign.

The book is full of photos that appear on many of the pages, and original letters sent at the time are also reproduced inside. It is another deserving story: the battles over Greece are not the most famous, so it is great to include them in this collection.

First Light by Geoffrey Wellum contains one of the most impressive recollections of training to become a fighter pilot. The pages transmit all the burning desire and all the fears and hesitations. The night flying, with its challenges. The difficulties in mastering navigation. The entry, with very little in terms of flying hours, in newly formed 92 Squadron. There is everything, and Geoffrey really transmits his emotions from the page. His account of his first flight in a Spitfire is particularly delightful.

The pages that follow are intense: the Battle of Britain, then fighter sweeps and escort missions over occupied France. All of them gripping, and culminating with Geoffrey taking part in Operation Pedestal, the desperate bid to resupply Malta.

Tornado Down by John Nicol and John Peters brings us to the RAF of our times. RAF Flight lieutenants John Peters and John Nichol were captured in the desert of Iraq in 1991 when their Tornado was hit by Saddam’s air defences. They were prisoners for seven terrible weeks of torture, abuse and interrogations.

The narration alternates between one protagonist and the other, telling the story of those days in vivid detail. The book contains multiple good photos and a cutaway of the Tornado, and gives us the chance to discover what it was like to go through that infernal experience and return to normality after it, which is a formidable feat in itself.

Immediate Response by Mark Hammond is the last book of the collection but, I will admit, the first one I began reading. Its great merit is to bring Kandahar and Bastion to life on the page and tell the story of operations that are very close in time, yet already distant. The key turning point in the Afghan campaign was in 2006 and the book shoves the reader into a Chinook flying in support of British troops holed up in the infamous platoon houses.

Major Mark Hammond is a Royal Marine, a bootneck with experience on Lynx and on USMC Cobra attack helicopters that refused to “fly a desk” and went on to serve in the Chinook force. In his story there is the joinery of modern day operations, and the intricacy of dealing with rules of engagement, political implications, media considerations that are a cornerstone of modern operations.

The most vibrant pages of the book are about a casualty extraction from an incandescent landing zone in Musa Qala, which required a major combined effort to be carried out and which resulted in the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. This personal, direct, bootneck-speak story – truly hoofing, if you know what I mean – gives an insight of what Afghanistan was truly like, and shows the hard work of the MERT teams as well.

I want to include this extract from the book, which introduces another powerful part of the book, when Chinooks are instrumental to the first large scale Relief in Place between PARAs and Royal Marines, because it shows the complexity of modern operations and the variety of considerations involved.

Immediate Response Extract - Chapter 27 by Liger30 on Scribd

The book is rich with images from the campaign and is opened by a cutaway of the Chinook.

Immediate Reaction is certainly recommended reading for everyone who wants to better understand operations in Afghanistan. A multitude of good books have been published, and I haven’t read them all so any list I can offer you wouldn’t be complete, but I can certainly recommend Ed Macy’s Apache and Hellfire for the Attack Helicopter side; Aviation Assault Battle Group – The 2009 Afghanistan tour of the Black Watch (3^rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland) might be less known, and is a chronicle more than a novel, but is highly recommended. Rich of photos, maps, data contributed by multiple members of the battle group, this is a great summary of one of the most interesting roles covered by British troops in Helmand, written directly by those who were there. I also suggest picking up Company Commander by Major Russell Lewis and Joint Force Harrier by commander Ade Orchard with James Barrington. For me, Immediate Response was another step in a travel that began with those books and which is by no means finished.

The Centenary Collection is a perfect way to celebrate the RAF’s birthday in this special occasion. The stories that have been chosen show in full the kind of human values and of characters that have made the RAF what it is today. It sheds light to lesser known battles; it shows modern day joint force approaches and shows how the special relationship with the US truly went in force.

It is a collection of tales that I think anyone with an interest in the RAF’s story should possess. I’m certainly glad to add them to my own collection, right by my many aircraft models, because Spitfires and Hurricanes and Typhoons will make a good contour for these books.

These days I often stand accused of being a navy type, while my interest is the health of the UK’s military capabilities as a whole. Those that accuse me of an anti-RAF bias clearly do not know me, and misinterpret my comments. They can’t know, and some might not believe even if told, that it was the Spitfire that started my interest in the military. They can’t imagine that I was reading The Great Circus, the memories of Pierre Henri Clostermann, when I was just a boy; nor that the Dambusters Raid and the “thousand bombers” attacks were arguments of my readings and studies at an age when they probably should not have been. I grew up with pilots such as Guy Gibson as an ideal hero and with a great interest in the Pathfinders and in the agile, fast “wooden wonder” Mosquito which managed to improve the picture for Bomber Command while it was paying such a bloody price to get past German defences. The friends who have lived up with me ranting on about the RAF’s exploits could definitely shoot down any accusation of me having anything other than love for the Light Blue.

That doesn’t mean that I always have to agree with its decisions and their impacts on wider Defence, but that’s a story for another time.

The Centenary Collection is an ideal addition to my vast library, and a source of new inspiration. While I’m writing, though, let me also again recommend that you get your hands on The Great Circus (or The Big Show, in other editions) as well, if you get a chance to do so. Clostermann, Free French ace in the RAF, first on Spitfire and then on his beloved Tempest nicknamed “Grand Charles”, has another great story to tell.

It might have also been responsible, at least in part, for my special, (not) secret love for the Hawker Tempest and Fury... 

Building on strengths - Amphibious Force and the Royal Marines cut

1 - Introduction and Air Manoeuver 
2 - Amphibious Force and the Royal Marines cut 


This second chapter of the "building on strengths" series has been urged on and changed in shape by the emergence on national news of a problem that has been brewing in the background for a while. Amid enduring tightness of budgets, the Navy Command is very seriously considering cutting back on the Royal Marines in the desperate attempt of saving money.

The idea of permanently removing 42 Commando from frontline work has been lurking in the background for months. The fact that it has now appeared on the press means that it is very close to turning to reality. This leak to The Times might well be the last ditch effort to prevent it from going ahead, but it could very well not suffice.

Delegation of budget responsibilities to the frontline Commands is generally a very good thing, but when it comes to funding crises of this kind, it can turn into a monstrosity. Fallon has already clearly shrugged off the blame and appointed it like a medal on the chest of the 1^st Sea Lord, and this might serve to make the cut all but unavoidable, simply because, from a Royal Navy-only point of view, the alternatives are probably even worse as they probably involve the loss of ships.

It is a fact, however, that removing 42 Commando from frontline duty will dramatically weaken the amphibious force, even in its routine battlegroup strength. The three Commandos alternate yearly into high readiness to serve as the core of the up to 1800-strong amphibious battlegroup, which includes an engineer squadron from 24 Regiment, an artillery battery from 29 Royal Artillery, logistic group from the Commando Logistic Regiment and reconnaissance, command support, police and air defence from 30 Commando IX.

It is a fact that 16 Air Assault brigade delivers the Air Assault battlegroup at readiness mostly from just 2 units (2 and 3 PARA). But it is equally a fact that they have been reinforced with the Royal Gurkha Rifles when it became clear that two battalions on their own struggled. It is also a fact that the Royal Marines have an additional task to take care of, which is provision of “Green” boarding teams to the fleet, for the more dangerous operations. This task used to be the remit of a squadron within 43 Commando, but that squadron was disbanded and the responsibility given to the Commando group in its “Other Tasks” year.

The idea for 42 Commando, I guess, might be to turn it into the permanent provider of Green teams and other supporting capabilities at lower-than-full-Commando scale. Recently, 3 Commando Brigade developed a Personnel Recovery capability for saving downed pilots in enemy territory and negate sensitive material to the enemy. A C-SAR capability that has long been needed and that the return of Carrier Strike, as well as the sensitive nature of F-35 technology and the value of its pilots, have made more urgent than ever.

The Royal Marines are also following the USMC lead on Special Purpose Task Groups, smaller forces (roughly company-group sized, in what has been seen so far on Mounts Bay in her solo deployment in the Mediterranean) adequate for raids, quasi-SF operations and rapid reaction. It might be that 42 Commando would be permanently tasked with delivery of a number of these groups. 
At a minimum, a SPTG with 4 Merlin HC4 is expected to always feature on board of the active aircraft carrier in the future, as well. 

However, even this "soft cut" would still deprive 3 Commando Brigade of mass, something it cannot afford to lose. In his end of year letter to the Royal Marines association, Major General Rob Magowan, commander general Royal Marines, wrote that the Corps was not in the condition of losing mass. At the time, the rumors about the push towards cuts to the RM were already alive and had already reached my ears and, no doubt, those of many others. The letter does not mention it directly, but the hints are clear: the fight was already on.

Unfortunately, the Royal Marines appear to be losing it, and going public now is probably the last bullet left to fire. If it misses, it is probably over. 3 Commando Brigade has been under constant assault since 2010: the Army, faced with its own great share of cuts, wanted to take manpower and pieces out of green Commando units. Initially, it looked like 24 Commando Engineer regiment would vanish, as well as 148 Battery Meiktila. In the end, both those cuts were successfully fought back and cancelled. 24 Commando Engineer has since had some actual success, growing 54 Squadron into a deployable engineer unit supporting the historic 59 Sqn. 131 (Reserve) Squadron has also been formally absorbed, with the regiment effectively mirroring the efforts and general organization of 23 Parachute Engineer regiment, with two deployable squadrons alternating into readiness.

7 Battery, 29 Commando Royal Artillery has had more of a struggle, between starts and stops: move south from Arbroath; stay in Arbroath; lose the guns and become Tac Gp only; keep the guns; wait for more announcements; repeat. Since 2010, the Arbroath-based battery, in theory support for 45 Commando in RM Condor, has faced a very uncertain future made of orders and counter-orders. 

Tthe last info I had suggested that its future was more than ever hanging by a thread as the loss of the Citadel and the need to relocate most of the brigade’s units as part of the “Better Defence Estate” project added to the shortage of guns, tight manpower margins and insufficient REME support. "Wait for further communications" seemed to be the thing. The artillery regiment is down to 12 guns in 3 tiny fires batteries, and could well end up having only two batteries, like 7 Royal Horse Artillery in the Air Assault role. In other words: the bare minimum needed to support a single battlegroup at readiness. The loss of 42 Commando as frontline unit is pretty much assured to come together with the loss of 7 Bty as well: no Commando to support, no artillery battery required. 

3 Commando brigade is one of just 6 brigades in the whole of the British Forces which will have any Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. In simpler terms, it is one of only 6 brigades that are actually deployable (in full or in part), in connection with the effects of Army 2020 Refine. To further damage this already pitifully small force is a crime, and is not a decision that should fall on the shoulders of the 1^st Sea Lord alone. The whole british armed forces would come out weaker from the ordeal, even before considering the precious specialized nature of Marines units (from amphibiosity to Cold Weather and Mountain specialization) and the fact that they traditionally are a privileged recruiting ground for the Special Forces.

42 Commando is in line for the shrinking and change of role 

Dismantling this area of excellence makes zero sense when observed from a whole force point of view. The Navy budget might well be the one in most immediate trouble, but this “fix” is worse than the illness. There are other areas that could be hit with cuts without the damage being anywhere near as serious, and the primary one is the “Adaptable Force” of six “infantry brigades” in Army 2020 Refine. This container of Light Role infantry battalions will have zero CS and CSS elements at its disposal as the few it had as part of Army 2020 get either dismantled or moved to 3^rd Division as part of Refine, meaning that its brigades are not deployable at all. The government needs to drop its absurd and horrendously damaging diktat that “no more than 5 infantry battalions should be lost, in order to preserve all capbadges”. This requirement, dropped on the Army’s top brass in 2010, has warped the army out of shape in an horrendous way, and now will be partially responsible of the cuts to 3 Commando Brigade as well.

The Royal Marines capability needs to be nurtured, not dismantled. They deliver unique capabilities within defence and, together with Royal Navy amphibious shipping and RFA strategic sealift (themselves already very unwisely run down dramatically beginning in 2010), they represent a huge share of the amphibious capability within NATO. The UK does itself no favor at all by depriving itself of this capability, and NATO as a whole. It is not the right way to approach Brexit negotiations either: threatening to retreat from Europe’s defence is not a very serious proposition if the forces get dismantled either way, and one of the unique or semi-unique contributions get lost before the debate even starts.

Army and Royal Marines must be looked at from the same table. 3 Commando Brigade is both a precious deployable brigade (one of far too few) and the custodian of the ability to maneuver on the sea flank and in the littoral. I cannot emphasize enough how urgent it is to fix the ridiculous imbalance of “Light Role infantry” to “everything else”. The manpower and money that go into those six undeployable, unfinished, paper-tiger infantry brigades is a treasure that the Forces cannot possibly do without in this climate. Manpower and money that should go into rebuilding lost supports, and with them lost deployable brigades. Some capbadges will be lost, but this is far, far better than the current path of self-destruction that is dismantling CS, CSS and now even the amphibious force in order to preserve more infantry regiments than the army can possibly support. That Army 2020 Refine dismantles yet another set of brigade-level supports (artillery, engineer, logistic, medical) is a act of self-harm absolutely unjustifiable, and this Royal Marines cut will add to that disaster.

Going back to my original plan for a moment, I intended to write that the UK should invest on its amphibious force. The news of the incoming cut only add urgency to the statement. The UK possesses a very large share of all of Europe’s amphibious shipping, as well as a very capable permanent strategic sealift component (the Point class RoRo vessels). It has a capable, proven, respected amphibious brigade that only needs a small investment in supports to rebuild muscle.

Moreover, the UK will have a capable carrier strike force to support and protect amphibious maneuver with. To sacrifice one to fund the other is an act of strategic blindness hard to even describe with words. The two things go hand in hand, and the 1^st Sea Lord repeatedly tried to make the point clear and understood; in several speeches he explained that the Royal Navy must be defined by three macro areas being: Nuclear Deterrent (and we should also add, the all-important SSNs), Carrier Air (not strike. Air, in general, because a key contribution of the air wing is protection of the task force in a heavily contested environment) and Amphibious capability.

The big pieces are in place, and the United Kingdom, in a rare moment of sanity and awareness of its potentiality, had actually taken leadership of a NATO “Smart Defence” initiative to develop a strategic Port Opening capability to enable theatre entry. Unfortunately, nothing has been heard since, even though this is a capability that would be simply invaluable both in war (Think Defence wrote an excellent report about the efforts, back in 2003, to reopen the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq)  and peace (think about disaster relief, such as after the Haiti earthquake, when establishing a point of easy access from the sea is vital).

One bit of good news…

… related to the previous chapter of this series.

Interestingly, images coming in from Joint Warrior 17_1 suggest that someone in the army either reads me (just kidding) or has ideas similar to mine for investment on Air Assault and Air Manoeuver. The 2^nd Battalion, Royal Gurkha Rifles seems to be playing with Foxhounds air-landed at Keevil with C-17. 

Other deliveries have included artillery and Pinzgauers towing the guns and even Apache, with rotors folded and all bits in place for rapid entry into action. 

The brigadier commanding 16 Air Assault brigade has added a photo in tweet, showing a Tactical HQ element mounted in Foxhounds for mobility, part of an “airmobile armour” experiment.

I was not aware of it coming when I wrote my recent article, I can assure you all of it. But obviously it is pretty pleasing to see some positive development, and one that goes in the very same direction I argued for.

The Tac HQ in the Airmobile Armour experiment 

Elements of Joint Helicopter Command deployed on Salisbury Plain with Joint Helicopter Force - 1 (HQ element coming from the Attack Helicopter Force. JHF-2 is amphibious-focused and comes from the Commando Helicopter Force) along with 4 Chinook, 3 Puma and 5 Apache from 664 Sqn in its new permanent attachment to the Air Assault task force. The exercise has included refuelings from fuel bladders carried inside Chinooks adding as relocatable Forward Refueling Points.

Meanwhile, in Exercise Una Triangle, the RAF A4 force and Royal Engineer's 529 Specialist Team RE (STRE) from Wittering deployed to Cottersmore to turn the ex-airfied (now the Army's Kendrew Barracks) back into an active air hub. Tents, catering, logistics, bulk fuel installation were all exercised to create a small deployed air base. Hopefully this will be further exercised and developed in the future, to include austere basing for the F-35B in good time. According to Scott Williams, RAF pilot within the F-35 programme, Royal Engineers will renew their stock of matting panels for runway repair and construction in order to support F-35 austere operations. 

Coming to a future Joint Warrior in a non too distant future, hopefully. 

Meanwhile, you can see photos and video reports from Una Triangle on RAF Wittering's facebook page. It is nice to see that some things are still moving. 

Building on strengths

 In this series of short posts I pursue two key objectives:

-          Argue that the British Armed Forces, in times of severe budget difficulties, should not pursue “ham tomorrow” at all costs, but focus instead on a number of areas in which they still have the seeds of excellence.

-          Provide a more detailed background to my “Alternative Army 2020” proposal, showing the reasoning behind certain approaches.

The approach behind my reasoning is simple: building on what is available, to secure and improve a number of key capabilities that make the UK a major player in defence within NATO.

Rather than dismantling mass and capability even further to pursue new “Strike Brigades”, or seek savings by cutting back on the more “exotic” specialties, I argue that it makes more sense to move back a step and watch the picture from a slightly different angle.

It is by now constantly repeated that the British Armed forces will always operate in Coalition and that this or that gap are not worrisome because allies will help plug the hole. However, unless the “ally” is invariably Uncle Sam, certain decisions make no sense as they are not at all aligned to what the European allies could effectively provide in a joint operation. The result is that certain cuts and proposals only exacerbate weaknesses that already exist within NATO and sacrifice precious specialism.

Does it make sense to cut back on Heavy Armour when, even with all the well known obsolescence issues of Challenger 2, the british heavy contingents are the only ones with true, recent wartime mileage in Europe?

Does it make sense to cut back on the ability to project power from the sea through amphibious operations when 3^rd Commando Brigade and the shipping available for it remain a very large percentage of Europe’s capability in this specialist area?

Does it make sense to weaken the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and pretend that there is no manpower problem, when the RFA represents the vast majority of complex logistic shipping in Europe, making it a truly invaluable component not just for the UK, but for its allies as well?

Does it make sense to cut back on air-ground manoeuvre when there are 60 Chinooks, 50 Apache and 8 C-17 in service, giving the UK the best mix of tools for air manoeuvre in all of Europe?

Does it make sense to still tinker with the idea of cutting Sentinel, when the air ISTAR elements the UK can field are without rival in Europe?

Certain suggestions and, worse still, certain MOD moves appear to me to be absolutely misguided. Dismantling capability in areas in which the UK is the major European player is not going to make any favor to Her Majesty’s Government political weight. Being leaders in a number of specialist areas is more valuable than being able to field half-formed, half-tracked “Strike Brigades” able to respond “quickly” to… no one really knows what.

Not to mention that if the specialist capabilities are retained and nurtured, the potential for independent action, albeit on a small scale, remains more realistic. And the ability to take action independently is a key differentiator in the weight of a country at the table. An independent nuclear deterrent on its own will lose value if the rest of the armed forces turn into handicapped forces, plagued by capability gaps, pursuing political clout by being always the first to deploy in any new crisis. The UK still has a budget large enough and capabilities good enough to be a leader within NATO, a framework nation to which smaller players can contribute reinforcements. The UK should be, first of all, a Strategic Enabler: a military power lacking in mass, for obvious reason, but with the most complete range of capabilities possible. Even more so because it already possesses much of what it takes to do so. It is actually cheaper, or at least more cost-effective, to build upon what there already is.

Air Manoeuvre

While large-scale airborne operations are of questionable, at best, likelihood and of uncertain wisdom in this day and age, and anyway outside of the UK’s material possibilities; smaller scale parachute operations and, above all, manoeuvre by the air at battlegroup level, remain absolutely valid and useful. Air manoeuvre has been extremely effective and very widely used in Afghanistan and in Mali. In Mali, the French had some success with company-group parachute assaults as well, showing that there is still merit to having this kind of rapid insertion capability.

It is my belief that the British Army absolutely needs to maintain parachute assault as a capability, albeit at relatively small scale. Even more important is maintaining a significant ability to manoeuvre significant forces by air, both for securing key points ahead of the ground forces and for flank operations.

This is a complex, demanding and expensive proposition but, among the good reasons for insisting on this capability, is the fact that the UK is actually relatively well positioned to maintain and expand its know-how in this area. It is not my intention to produce here an history of the various SDSRs and of the procurement decisions they have generated, because it would take several pages at best, but the important thing is that the various decisions taken in the past have generated:

-          A fleet of 8 C-17 strategic cargo aircrafts, which provide a lift capability with no match elsewhere in NATO

-          A fleet of 22 A400M Atlas; not as numerous as desirable but certainly significant

-          A fleet of 14 C-130J to be retained in the long term thanks to a sudden dawn of wisdom in the SDSR 2015

-          A large and very capable helicopter fleet, composed of, crucially, 60 Chinooks providing a lift capacity that only Germany, having the CH-53, could hope to match.

Add the 50 Apache E with their proven firepower and sensors; 23 Puma HC2 and the Wildcats, and the resulting pool of resources is actually very considerable. It is easy to lose heart in front of the constant downpour of cuts and capability gaps, but there are actually still areas of excellence which could and should be better exploited.  

Arguably, the UK has better resources in this area than anyone else (always excluding the US, obviously) within NATO, yet 16 Air Assault brigade hasn’t fared too well in the last decade. Its organic supports (Artillery, Logistic, Signal…) have been eroded down to such a degree that the brigade today cannot be considered a “true” brigade. It has three regular infantry battalions thanks to the recent addition of the Gurkha rifles, but for lack of supports it would not be able to convert all three into battlegroups and deploy en masse. It has also lost the little bit of semi-organic cavalry support it had, and the Patrols platoons within the PARA battalions cannot be considered an adequate replacement.

In my opinion, this amounts to wasting a fine unit and a great opportunity. Those who have read my alternative proposal for Army 2020 Refine know that I called for a reinforcement of 16 Air Assault Brigade in its supporting parts as well as, if at all possible, the expansion to a four-battalions structure. What is needed is an “air-mechanized” brigade composed of two air mobile battalions and two light mechanized battalions (on Foxhound and Jackal). The whole brigade remains relatively light and easily deployed, but comes with everything it needs to be a true Strike force, tactically as well as strategically agile and able, from within its constituent units, to replicate the kind of combined air and ground manoeuvre that the army has most recently carried out during operation Herrick.

It is worth mentioning Operation Panther’s Claw (Panchai Palang) in the summer of 2009: 3^rd SCOTS, then deployed as Aviation Assault Battlegroup, saw 350 soldiers of A and B companies (the Aviation Strike Coys in the group) airlifted in a single large wave to secure key crossing points in the Luy Mandeh wadi, north of Babaji. The reinforcements came in the form of a 64-vehicles convoy, with Mastiff, Jackal, Vikings and trucks from Camp Bastion, led by Task Force Thor, an American C-IED route clearance unit. The single-wave assault was made with 12 Chinooks, both british and American, supported by 4 Apache and 2 US Black Hawks.

2 weeks later, after holding the ground, B company carried out another aviation assault to secure another key passage ahead of the advancing Light Dragoons battlegroup. In July, during the third phase of the operation, Alpha coy was inserted using 5 Chinook and the support of 2 Apache. This operation included link-up with an armoured thrust by Charlie Company, 2 Royal Welsh in Warriors. The Fire Support Group operated on the ground, mounted in Jackals.

Air manoeuvre remains an essential capability, and the Army and RAF own the most expensive pieces already: there is no reason not to expand on them to put meat on the bones of 16 Air Assault Brigade.

As 3^rd SCOTS example proves, in addition, air mobility is not necessarily a job for PARA troops, provided that the necessary expertise and procedures are well rehersed and understood within the army. In my alternative Army 2020 proposal, 51 Brigade has the same structure: 2 Light Role Battalions replace 2 and 3 PARA, and are meant to provide the air mobile element, while two light mechanized infantry battalions provide the ground mobility element. Each brigade also has a Light Cavalry regiment on Jackal.  

Several equipment problems are immediately evident:

-          The army currently lacks the capability to parachute Jackal into battle, and this means that the first Fire Support elements are forced to enter the fight as dismounts.

-          The Jackal is a good vehicle, but it was not engineered to be a rapid air landing assault platform. As amazing as it might sound, the Jackal cannot charge out, combat-ready, from a C-130 since the machine gun on top has to be removed in order to fit. So, even as an air-landed follow on reinforcement, it needs some time to make ready before it can move into the fight.

The latter problem is possibly going to go away thanks to the A400 Atlas. The first can only be solved by procuring a strong enough parachute platform system for use on the Atlas. The British Army has decided to entirely gap Heavy and Vehicle airdrops by withdrawing from service the old Medium Stressed Platform, which was compatible with the old C-130K cargo floor but not with the J’s. After seeking a modification to integrate the platform on the C-130J, the army decided that it was too expensive and accepted the gap. In the last few years, 16 Air Assault brigade has been able to parachute its artillery and other heavy loads into action only by exploiting US help and kit.

A new platform and the A400M are supposed to fix the problem.

The light cavalry mounted on Jackal has a firepower deficit, as the .50 HMG and 40mm GMG alone can’t give the reach and the heavy punch required to stand up to more threatening adversaries. Without even needing to go all the way up to Russian or Russian-style light armoured vehicles, the Jackals could end up being severely outgunned by “technicals” such as those seen in Syria. While the accuracy of fire coming from a ZSU-23 mounted on a Toyota pick-up might be questionable at best, it is not acceptable to step into a fight knowing that the enemy already has a range and firepower advantage almost every time (14.5mm machine guns, ZSU-23s and even old BMP turrets are easily found around in every theatre of war). Syria and Iraq are also showing how dangerous hastily and crudely armoured vehicle-born IEDs are: having a 30mm gun to decisively hit and stop them at a safe distance would make the difference.

The cheapest and easiest solution is to fit a number of Jackal vehicles with a remote turret armed with the same 30mm gun employed by the Apache. It is a weapon the army already has and supports, limiting its impact on logistics, and it would help the Light Cavalry a great deal. It does not weight much and it is getting a boost thanks to US Army plans to have it on top of JLTV in the reconnaissance role.

In this photo by Army recognition, a particularly capable RWS, my Moog Inc., integrating 7.62 coax, Javelin missile and M230 30mm gun. 

A simpler, lighter M230LF installation on M-ATV. The US Army is probably going to require this weapon on top of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles used in recce role. 

From heavily armed technicals to russian Tigr with 30mm guns. The Light Cavalry is not good for much unless it has the firepower to at least compete with this range of threats. 

Another issue, until recently, was the non exploitation of the C-17’s tactical capabilities. Thankfully, in the last couple of years the Army and RAF have begun to open up airdrops, rapid air landing and austere runways capability latent in the Globemaster fleet. Hopefully, it is only a matter of time before the C-17 can be fully exploited.

Heavy Air Drop capability needs to be rebuilt; it cannot be delegated entirely to US help

Relatively small investments can have a major impact on the British Army’s capability to manoeuvre from and through the air. Much of the required equipment exists. Central to my alternative Army 2020 proposal, air mobility is a key attribute of light brigades. Two such brigades, one of which based on 16 Air Assault; would provide the army with a sustainable and quickly deployable core of Aviation Assault battle groups supported by light mechanized formations ensuring post-landing mobility and lethality.

Parachute capability, normally at company group-level, continues to come on rotation from within the 2 PARA battalions, while air assault is more widely delivered by Light Role battalions.