The Aachen Treaty and Great Power Competition

First of all, a due premise: if it wasn’t already clear, I will warn that I am a convinced Atlanticist. I literally have a NATO star mosaic in the alleyway leading to the door of my home, designed by me and built by my ever skilled father, who has worked so much and for so long in his life to pick up an amazing breadth of abilities.

This week, at my new job at Rivista Italiana Difesa (Italian Defence Magazine, if you want a tentative translation), arguably the best defence-themed periodic in Italy and one with a long tradition, I’ve been reviewing an important geopolitics article titled “The return of Charles the Great?”, authored by an Italian defence commentator with decades of experience. He is most clearly not an Atlanticist, so we cooperate but also regularly disagree, even quite vehemently, since his opinion of the United States is about as moderate of that of Vladimir Putin himself.

For once, though, we are in complete agreement on what is the current direction of travel in Europe. The title of his article should already have given you a clue, and I’ll give you another by telling you that the recent Aachen Treaty is the key element at the center of the reasoning.

Of course, while we read the implications of the event almost in the exact same way, we do completely disagree on whether it is a good or a bad development. He thinks it is a good thing in an anti-american optic; I am horrified.

Another thing we do essentially agree upon, however, is the fact that there has been way too little talk about the Aachen Treaty, what it says and moreover on what it implies without saying it aloud.

While at first glance the Aachen Treaty provisions might sound just like “more of the same”, reaffirming things that have been already said in the past, there is every reason to take it very seriously.

Germany and France are aligning their policies, with defence front and centre, in new and far more ambitious ways. The closeness envisaged by the Treaty in economics and defence and foreign policy matters approaches the terms of a Confederation, and effectively impresses a whole new dynamic and speed to the maturation of an European project. Note that I use “an” European project and not “the” European project because the direction of travel taken by France and Germany actually goes so far past the current EU integration that it might end up finding resistance coming exactly through current EU organizations.

If you have followed the political debate in the last while you will not have missed the repeated claims that an European army is coming. Claims that now come from the like of Merkel and Macron themselves, although some Remain-inspired media continues to approach the issue as if it was fantasy and conspiracy theorism from this or that association. It can no longer be denied that things are moving, and that they are indeed accellerating. 
It might not be EU-wide for many years still, but the Aachen Treaty sure goes a long way towards forming one military force composed of France and Germany. Joint decision-making, joint meetings of ministries, a new joint council, and joint deployments are all part of the Treaty.

You should moreover not have missed the part about France “loaning” its seat at the UN Security Council to Germany. The issue has been reported almost as badly as the “EU Army” one, which is caught between the two extremes of the “absorption by stealth” and “it’s not true at all!”.

France might or might not let Germany sit in its seat for a while, but what France has promised to do is to campaign within the Security Council to obtain the addition of a new and permanent seat specifically for Germany.

While this is unlikely to succeed, it is an unequivocal signal that Germany thinks that its period of repentance for the past is over, and France agrees. It is actually pretty easy to imagine the current hopelessly confused political class in Britain giving support to the initiative just as a way to show that they really still side with Europe. 

You might not have heard about the musings coming from the Munich Security Conference about the role that France’s nuclear deterrent “should” play in “Europe”. Or at least, I’ll correct, in the context of the Aachen Treaty. This aspect gained even less air time on the media, and most of the comments were quick attempts to once more hide the evidence. 
France already tried to get Germany to pay some of the costs of its 'Force de Frappe', but in 2007 there weren’t the conditions for such a move. Not yet.

Now, however, Aachen goes a long way towards opening the door for such a development.

While the European Union is a superpower on paper but not in fact due to its inner divisions, a combination of Germany’s economic might and France’s nuclear deterrent is a major world power from the day one. When you hear all the speeches and comments about the new age of inter-state competition, you’ll better start counting in the France-Germany combination. 

You might not have heard in the generalist news about the renewed and stronger than ever push in Germany against NATO Nuclear Sharing, and against the presence of dual-key American B61-12 nuclear bombs in the country. But it is highly likely that you will hear about this more and more frequently in the future.

Germany has already started landing blows on Nuclear Sharing by arbitrarily excluding the F-35 from the race for the replacement of its remaining Tornado bombers. The F-35A is the intended carrier (together with the F-15E, but that is relevant only to the US) of the B61-12 bomb, with an integration programme already ongoing and other NATO Nuclear Sharing partners already on board.

Germany, on the other hand, is restricting its choices for the replacement of the Tornado to the Typhoon and Super Hornet, both aircraft with no nuclear strike capability and no defined path towards ever acquiring it.

Keeping the Super Hornet as candidate effectively means, with 99.9% certainty, that the “race” is a complete farce, and Typhoon it is. Germany has literally forced the head of its Air Force and a few other high officers to leave post over their publicly stated preference for the F-35, and this tells you something. Considerable political pressure was applied on Belgium as well NOT to chose the F-35, although in this case Germany and France were eventually rebuffed.

The Tornado was European-built and carries the B61, so there is no definitive reason why Germany couldn’t simply add B61-12 integration to the cost of its new Typhoons, but I’d be very, very surprised if the attempt to do this didn’t lead to protests over the cost and, right afterwards, to accusations against the US of making it “more complex and more expensive” than it should be, as a punishment for not purchasing the F-35. It’s really, really easy to see coming.

Ghedi air base: american nuclear bomb, Italian Tornado bomber. NATO Nuclear Sharing is a key component of Europe's security. 

And while Germany has formally sided with the US on the withdrawal from the INF treaty, it has also made clear that new American missile systems in Europe are not welcome, which is kind of a contradictory position to take. 

The disagreements on B61 and on the way ahead post INF are a perfect excuse for Germany and France to press on with their greater alignment. Germany might soon decide to pull out of Nuclear Sharing altogether, and that would be a huge blow to NATO and the obvious first step towards seeking refuge under France’s own nuclear umbrella. Which, naturally, the two countries will then try to present as Europe’s nuclear umbrella, seeking financial contributions from the other European countries as well.

It might take time, but this is the direction of travel. Whoever thinks that France has committed to giving Germany a seat at the UN Security Council virtually for free is either willfully blind or a complete fool.

The bilateral nature of Aachen means that it does not technically affect EU members, which on the other hand have no effective way to counter or influence it in any way. It is immediately clear, however, that this level of integration between Paris and Berlin is going to have immense consequences for the whole European Union. 

Italy, through Prime Minister Conte, has remarked that the new UN seat should, if ever created, go to the European Union as a whole and not to Germany, which is an eminently sensible observation to make, albeit complex to turn into reality. Naturally, his remark was played down, despite being arguably very pro-EU, because he is, of course, “the puppet of Salvini” and thus just another sovranist enemy.

Yes, the sovranists. The new enemy of the EU is Sovranism. Populism was an earlier phase, now the threat is sovranism. Because sovranism means that other countries will try to resist the de-facto instauration of an economic and military hegemony of France and Germany, united politically and economically and shielded by a credible, non-american nuclear umbrella. Sovranism is a reaction against external control and globalisation, and as such it is an obstacle. 

America, and not Russia, is the untrustworthy side for many in Europe. European and American media alike will tell you that it is because of president Trump, but this is, in good measure, a lie or, at best, an half-truth.

Trump is not the beginning of anti-american feelings in Europe, nor is he the end of them. He is a convenient figleaf, a perfect excuse to press on with the new global ambitions of Germany and France while throwing the blame on the Atlantic side.

It is not Trump that is abandoning Europe. He has actually reversed, at least partially, years of American drawdown in Europe, which Obama happily accelerated. He has been extremely tough on the INF breach. He has committed to more American troops in Europe and he keeps asking for a stronger NATO through investment from the European partners (he's been more vocal, but he is not the first to do so). He opposes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, too, which is in the interests of Russia and damages those of Ukraine.

And that is exactly the problem. He is doing too much. The truth, I fear, is that there are very strong currents of thought in Europe which were far happier when American troops were traveling towards CONUS, rather than coming from CONUS to Europe.

We know which side is co-funding Nord Stream 2 and holding hands with Putin. And it is not Trump.

And then there is Brexit. Brexit is the "mother of all sovranisms", the greatest-ever form of resistance against the constant expansion of centralised european powers. This makes it the supreme evil. And yet, on the other hand, Brexit brings the UK away from Veto powers in Europe, which are now one of the greatest problems that Germany and France face. The truth? Brexit is a blessing for France and Germany. 
Their hegemonic project in Europe is now free from a heavy anchor which was holding it back. And they have pretty much said as much, haven’t they? The UK’s constant prudence on European initiatives, especially in the field of defence, has been remarked more than once, in most rude form in the last few weeks. The "british friends" rethoric is incredibly hollow, and one of the most amazing things about Brexit is how many britons helplessly drink from that poisoned spring. 
There have actually been remarkably unfriendly accusations coming from Europe, and the side which has tried to put up walls is not led by London. The amazingly long time it took for Europe to begin reciprocating the promise of rights for british citizens on EU soil is plenty noticeable, yet the Remain side is strangely willing to let it all pass. For some, the EU seems to have turned into some sort of divinity. 

I get the feeling that many in the UK and the US, including most if not all the media, do not realize how much hostility there is in some quarters against America’s perceived control over Europe. And against the UK, historically seen as America’s agent within the European Union. I am amazed to see the naivety with which the issue is debated in the USA and in the UK.

You would be shocked to see the ferocity of the arguments and words used by my illustrious colleague in the article I’ve mentioned. But what you especially don’t seem to realize is that his thoughts are shared by many. Too many, perhaps. Sadly, for many the UK is still the "Perfidius Albion" of fascist memory.  

The UK and US have not yet awakened to the truth. This is NOT a reaction to Trump and Brexit. Trump and Brexit are welcome excuses that are being used to camouflage a sharp acceleration in plans to truly make Europe, or at least the Paris-Berlin core, an increasingly antagonist side to the US. Alignment is over. Disagreements are going to be far more frequent in the future.

When I see American media and commentators wondering if the alliance with Europe “can survive Trump”, I bitterly remark that the alliance has been changing and dying from well before Trump.

Going back to my colleague, he openly talks of NATO as a novel  Delian League, with the US playing the part of Athens and exploiting the alliance to control the other cities / European countries. Do you remember how the Delian League ended?

It is a sorry state of affairs, years in the making. And it is not going to heal easily. If at all. 

Regardless of whoever will be elected after Trump, it is indeed unlikely that things will ever go back to the way they were, simply because it is not an issue of Trump or no-Trump to start with.

The same is true of Brexit. Regardless of who is prime minister, regardless of Customs Union or not and regardless of how much London promises to do against Russia in the Baltic and in Norway, relationships with the new center of Europe will stay tense.

Nothing is ever universal, of course, but let me remark that there is a political current, Europe-wide, which is all too happy to have London’s veto out of the way. The feeling is that America’s “undercover agent” is now out of the room.

The use of inflammatory language over Gibraltar and many other controversies will remain in the long term, regardless of what the UK might do or say. The US and UK should both stop being so penitent about Trump and Brexit and realize that a new phase has begun. Great power competition it is, but China is not the only rival to be worried about. 

Germany-France are a rival. And the EU as a whole will be, if the new center can win over the resistences of the periphery.

The EU is a Superpower, economically. It isn’t a great power politically and militarily because it is still divided. But the new France – Germany alignment, on its own, and particularly if the nuclear deterrent situation goes as we imagine it, will generate a voice that will more often than not become the de-facto “european” position. Exactly as is happening with the new FCAS fighter jet, France and Germany are trying to “define the project” and then have “partners” tag along. In front of an essential "fait accompli", the Union will follow the hegemons. 

And as a major power with a major voice, it will increasingly speak against America and the UK. The sooner the anglosphere realizes this, the better.

If you can’t see what is happening, you are pretty blind. You can either be happy with it, like my colleague, or be worried by it, like me. But please, don’t pretend it isn’t happening! 

The next phase of the struggle internal to Europe is now officially between Germany-France and the periphery of Europe.

The periphery means Poland and in lesser measure the rest of East Europe, which are great NATO supporters as they do not trust (for very good reasons, if you ask me) France and Germany to be able and willing to defend them from Russia.

Poland has already said that it will gladly take those US troops, missiles and nukes that Germany would really like to be gone. Poland has even dared voicing support for the UK, too. Poland is sovranist. Poland is an obstacle.

The next few years might end up seeing Germany and France increasingly in disagreement with the US, increasingly hostile on the economic front, increasingly calling for European “autonomy” from the US, while still effectively defended by US troops, based in Poland. While still blaming the US for the fracture, in fact. Regardless of  what the president’s name will be. Just like now: shame Trump, but demand he does not leave Syria. Protest his every plan and request, but do not contemplate the option of using European soldiers to secure what is, in words at least, seen as a key security crisis right on Europe’s threshold.

Hegemony is an addicting thing: it is not likely that we will see a climbdown from Aachen. There will be disagreements and difficulties between Paris and Berlin (defence export is just one of many potential thorns on this rose), but the axis will hold because it is clearly advantageous for both countries.

The periphery also means Italy. It is not a case that the new “public enemy number 1” is now Sovranism. The greatest danger, specifically, is represented by sovranists with veto powers within the EU. Sovranists which might soon fill a great number of seats in the EU parliament after the elections of May. Sovranists that might turn the EU into a brake, rather than a tool in the hands of Paris and Berlin. 

Salvini is a sovranist: he does not quite advocate leaving the EU (not anymore, or perhaps not yet depending on how you look at it…), but he is certainly a source of resistance and opposition. And he is popular. He, and Italy, are the next big obstacle. Italy either has to be won over (and already years ago Paris tried by proposing a treaty to Italy which would have looked a bit like Aachen) or silenced in some ways. And make no mistake: the international media campaign against Salvini will keep getting more virulent. And Spread attacks against Italy will continue, too. They worked in 2011, after all, when the last Berlusconi government was effectively forced to resign and was replaced by unelected, appointed Mario Monti and the semi-elected leftist, europeist governments that followed.

The same left that went into the 2018 elections under “+ Europa” and “United States of Europe” banners, only to be savagely punished by the electorate.
Italy is in the Eurozone. It has joined the currency that was custom-tailored over Germany's needs. And because of it is greatly vulnerable. 
In the political battle for Italy, even Berlusconi has now resumed usefulness in the eyes of the EU: babysitted by Antonio Tajani, president of the EU Parliament, he is (so far unsuccessfully) trying to simultaneously ride on Salvini’s wake by formally siding with him in regional elections, while savagely opposing the government and sticking to an Europeist agenda. Berlusconi and the candidates of the Left all aspire to being the Italian Macron, defeating the evil sovranism / populism and climbing on a stage with blue flags waving and Europe's anthem blaring in place of the national anthem.

Don’t undervalue the role that Italy has to play, even unknowingly, in the next chapter of Europe’s history.

Regardless of what your misguided media like to tell you, Salvini is probably your most important ally in the next few years.

But you have to awaken from your self-defeatist, absurdly repentant “it’s all our fault” slumber.

Tales from a hundred years of Royal Air Force - The Centenary Collection

The Royal Air Force turned 100 on 1st April this year, and carries its age in great fashion. It was the first air service to become independent of the other two, and was born out of the hard-won experience built up over the battlefields of the Great War by the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service. The achievements of those two corps and of the air force that emerged from their unification are certainly worthy of celebration, and Penguin is doing so by publishing a collection of books that tell some of the countless great stories of the RAF.

The Centenary Collection is a series of six paperback books, united by same style of cover and by the same agile format, which bring together a good selection of tales of that human courage that has seen the RAF through the great challenges of its century.

Naturally, the skies of the Second World War get most of the attention, but of the many stories out there, Penguin has selected an interesting few:

The Last Enemy by Richard Hillary is not only the story of a Spitfire pilot in the terrible hours of the Battle of Britain, but also the extraordinary tale of a man who was shot down and survived through months in the hospital, becoming a member of the “Guinea Pig Club” that Archibald McIndoe created by pioneering plastic surgery.

Every so often, Richard writes the name of a comrade, of a friend, noting “from that flight, he did not return”. It hits home hard, every time. Not much else needs to be added.

There is no attempt on Richard’s part to reconstruct how he was shot down: just falling into darkness and pain, with hands and face burned, eyesight lost. Weeks of suffering, followed by the return of eyesight and a long struggle to get back in control of his hands and have his face rebuilt. It is a tale of courage and also a story of evolving medical practice. The strength of character that emerges from the pages is hard to describe: Richard is direct, sincere and concise in his memories: the intensity comes from what he sees and goes through, there is no need for tinsels.  

Richard decided to write his story, and that of his lost comrades, when he was in the hospital, slowly recovering. He said he wrote for humanity whole, to let at least some of the stories of those men be known, to show what they were ready to do for their ideals.

Richard Hillary was not tamed by what he went through. He helped rescue a mother and her children from a bombed house, and that ensured that he would never rest. He managed to get back to a flying unit.

The Last Enemy was first published in 1941. It is an open ended book, because Richard died 7 months later in a second crash.

Few stories could better underline the value of the men who made the RAF what it is.

Tumult in the Clouds by James Goodson is another inspired choice. Anglo-American, James survived the sinking of the SS Athenia off the Hebrides and distinguished himself by helping other survivors. He decided to become a fighter pilot in the RAF and served in 43 Squadron and for a stint in 416 Squadron, Canadian, before being posted to fly Spitfires with 133 Squadron, one of three Eagle Squadrons set up for American volunteers.  

Eventually, those Squadrons would become the core of Fourth Fighter Group, Eight Air Force when the United States declared war, and the Spitfires were hesitantly handed over to be replaced by P-47s. Including this particular story is a tribute to the long lasting and key relationship between the UK and the US, between the RAF and what wasn’t yet, at the time, the USAF, but the USAAF, with the extra A for “Army”. It is amusing to read of how an impudent Texan joyously asked King George VI permission to wear Texan boots with the RAF uniform, and touching that the original Eagle squadrons asked to continue wearing RAF wings on their uniforms after becoming USAAF units.

The book is rich of action, and recalls combat actions and rivalry with the great Luftwaffe units, and even the meetings with the Me-262, the first combat jet. One of the best stories to experience what it was like to fly fighters in the Second World War, and a great story of long range bomber escort flights and daring strafing through hellish barrages of Flak.

Going Solo by Roald Dahl brings us to Africa, where Roald is caught by the war. He trains in Nairobi, on Tiger Moths, then out to the huge base at Habbaniya, before joining 80 Squadron with its Gloster Gladiators. But Roald crashes in the desert and has to go through a slow and painful recovery in Alexandria, before ferrying a Hurricane out to Greece and staying there to fight alongside the remaining few, and they were really few at that point, trying to carry through a doomed campaign.

The book is full of photos that appear on many of the pages, and original letters sent at the time are also reproduced inside. It is another deserving story: the battles over Greece are not the most famous, so it is great to include them in this collection.

First Light by Geoffrey Wellum contains one of the most impressive recollections of training to become a fighter pilot. The pages transmit all the burning desire and all the fears and hesitations. The night flying, with its challenges. The difficulties in mastering navigation. The entry, with very little in terms of flying hours, in newly formed 92 Squadron. There is everything, and Geoffrey really transmits his emotions from the page. His account of his first flight in a Spitfire is particularly delightful.

The pages that follow are intense: the Battle of Britain, then fighter sweeps and escort missions over occupied France. All of them gripping, and culminating with Geoffrey taking part in Operation Pedestal, the desperate bid to resupply Malta.

Tornado Down by John Nicol and John Peters brings us to the RAF of our times. RAF Flight lieutenants John Peters and John Nichol were captured in the desert of Iraq in 1991 when their Tornado was hit by Saddam’s air defences. They were prisoners for seven terrible weeks of torture, abuse and interrogations.

The narration alternates between one protagonist and the other, telling the story of those days in vivid detail. The book contains multiple good photos and a cutaway of the Tornado, and gives us the chance to discover what it was like to go through that infernal experience and return to normality after it, which is a formidable feat in itself.

Immediate Response by Mark Hammond is the last book of the collection but, I will admit, the first one I began reading. Its great merit is to bring Kandahar and Bastion to life on the page and tell the story of operations that are very close in time, yet already distant. The key turning point in the Afghan campaign was in 2006 and the book shoves the reader into a Chinook flying in support of British troops holed up in the infamous platoon houses.

Major Mark Hammond is a Royal Marine, a bootneck with experience on Lynx and on USMC Cobra attack helicopters that refused to “fly a desk” and went on to serve in the Chinook force. In his story there is the joinery of modern day operations, and the intricacy of dealing with rules of engagement, political implications, media considerations that are a cornerstone of modern operations.

The most vibrant pages of the book are about a casualty extraction from an incandescent landing zone in Musa Qala, which required a major combined effort to be carried out and which resulted in the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. This personal, direct, bootneck-speak story – truly hoofing, if you know what I mean – gives an insight of what Afghanistan was truly like, and shows the hard work of the MERT teams as well.

I want to include this extract from the book, which introduces another powerful part of the book, when Chinooks are instrumental to the first large scale Relief in Place between PARAs and Royal Marines, because it shows the complexity of modern operations and the variety of considerations involved.

Immediate Response Extract - Chapter 27 by Liger30 on Scribd

The book is rich with images from the campaign and is opened by a cutaway of the Chinook.

Immediate Reaction is certainly recommended reading for everyone who wants to better understand operations in Afghanistan. A multitude of good books have been published, and I haven’t read them all so any list I can offer you wouldn’t be complete, but I can certainly recommend Ed Macy’s Apache and Hellfire for the Attack Helicopter side; Aviation Assault Battle Group – The 2009 Afghanistan tour of the Black Watch (3^rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland) might be less known, and is a chronicle more than a novel, but is highly recommended. Rich of photos, maps, data contributed by multiple members of the battle group, this is a great summary of one of the most interesting roles covered by British troops in Helmand, written directly by those who were there. I also suggest picking up Company Commander by Major Russell Lewis and Joint Force Harrier by commander Ade Orchard with James Barrington. For me, Immediate Response was another step in a travel that began with those books and which is by no means finished.

The Centenary Collection is a perfect way to celebrate the RAF’s birthday in this special occasion. The stories that have been chosen show in full the kind of human values and of characters that have made the RAF what it is today. It sheds light to lesser known battles; it shows modern day joint force approaches and shows how the special relationship with the US truly went in force.

It is a collection of tales that I think anyone with an interest in the RAF’s story should possess. I’m certainly glad to add them to my own collection, right by my many aircraft models, because Spitfires and Hurricanes and Typhoons will make a good contour for these books.

These days I often stand accused of being a navy type, while my interest is the health of the UK’s military capabilities as a whole. Those that accuse me of an anti-RAF bias clearly do not know me, and misinterpret my comments. They can’t know, and some might not believe even if told, that it was the Spitfire that started my interest in the military. They can’t imagine that I was reading The Great Circus, the memories of Pierre Henri Clostermann, when I was just a boy; nor that the Dambusters Raid and the “thousand bombers” attacks were arguments of my readings and studies at an age when they probably should not have been. I grew up with pilots such as Guy Gibson as an ideal hero and with a great interest in the Pathfinders and in the agile, fast “wooden wonder” Mosquito which managed to improve the picture for Bomber Command while it was paying such a bloody price to get past German defences. The friends who have lived up with me ranting on about the RAF’s exploits could definitely shoot down any accusation of me having anything other than love for the Light Blue.

That doesn’t mean that I always have to agree with its decisions and their impacts on wider Defence, but that’s a story for another time.

The Centenary Collection is an ideal addition to my vast library, and a source of new inspiration. While I’m writing, though, let me also again recommend that you get your hands on The Great Circus (or The Big Show, in other editions) as well, if you get a chance to do so. Clostermann, Free French ace in the RAF, first on Spitfire and then on his beloved Tempest nicknamed “Grand Charles”, has another great story to tell.

It might have also been responsible, at least in part, for my special, (not) secret love for the Hawker Tempest and Fury... 

Interesting words

A written answer of interest was given yesterday in Parliament, which provides a bit more detail on the Core Defence Budget and, crucially, on what fits into it. It is worth reading into it, and point out a few things.

17 Dec 2012 : Column 611W

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what airlift capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132888]


Mr Dunne: The airlift capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support costs for which funding is allocated:

A330 Voyager

A400M Atlas

BAE 146 Quick Change - interesting to see the two QC airplanes included in the Core budget: they have been procured as an Afghanistan UOR, but the inclusion of them in this list suggests that they might well have already a long-term future ensured, which would be very good news.

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what helicopter capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132889]

Mr Dunne: The helicopter capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support and training costs:

Chinook Mk6 New Buy

Apache Capability Sustainment Programme - i covered this point in great detail here.

Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme - albeit not specified, this should include the CSP for the HC3 utility Merlins (to be known as HC4 following CSP), not just the soon-to-be-completed HM2 upgrade for the Navy's own Merlins. From other answers and documents we know this will also include at least the assessment phase funding for navalisation of the HC3. The HC4 navalised is expected in service in the Commando Helicopter Force from 2017. The HC3 will be working with the CHF already from 2016, however.  

Puma Life Extension Programme

Falkland Island Search and Rescue and Support Helicopter - a decision on how this will be delivered after 2016 has yet to be taken

Wildcat—Army and Navy variants - Still unclear what is happening with the 8 Light Assault Helicopters that were announced in planning round 2011. The annual NAO Major Projects Report should help us understand what is going on in this field.

At the start of this year Jane's reported that the work ongoing to define the Merlin HC3 CSP and navalisation had generated a list of modifications including:

- Cockpit and avionics from the HM2 upgrade, to maximize logistic and training commonality
- Powered folding main rotor head and tail pylon
- Radar Identification System
- Flotation gear
- Lashing points for deck operations at sea
- Telebrief equipment

I'd expect a full fitting of fast roping equipment, which is not indicated but nearly certain to be among requirements. The folding tail i would personally put on the "we'd like to, but...": already in 2010, the Royal Navy had been quietly saying that, since on the new carriers the space is not as much of a problem as on HMS Ocean, they'd content themselves with the folding rotor, in order to save money.
So i wouldn't be surprised if the tail stays as it is. Of course, we'll have to see what happens.

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, (1) what carrier strike capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme; [132890]
(2) what the surface fleet is in the Core Equipment Programme. [132891]

Mr Dunne: The Carrier Strike capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of the following equipment programmes and their support and training costs for which funding is allocated:

Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers

Joint Combat Aircraft - F35B

Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) Tankers - contracts signed, first tanker to be delivered in late 2015 and the other 3 to follow at six months intervals 

Crowsnest—Airborne maritime surveillance and control, to be fitted to the Merlin Mk2 helicopter, which will replace the Sea King Airborne Surveillance and Control (SKASaC) system - Assessment Phase to be launched early in the new year. Reportedly won't be in service before 2020, leaving a very dangerous, damaging gap in the Navy's capability for several years. I still hope in common sense to prevail: i'm sure the pace of Crowsnest can be speeded up immensely if there is the will to do so.

In other documents, notably the MOD Top Level Messages, it is reported that money is also included for the first phases of the design of the 3 Solid Support Ships meant to replace the current Forts. No explicit promises about funding for their acquisition yet. It would thus appear that the SSS will be either built in the 2020s, outside the current financial planning horizon, or that it is on the list of things competing to get part of the 8 "uncommitted" billions in the 2015 SDSR. If the Forts aren't life extended further (very possible) they will retire in the very first years of the new decade, making their replacement rather urgent. 

The latest concept renders of the MARS SSS design. Not at all sure they will be like this when the day finally comes, but the design is very promising, including apparently a well deck, a vehicle deck with RoRo ramp and craneage for a couple of LCVP MK5 landing crafts or boats of the same general sizes. We do know, at least, that the SSS will use the Rolls Royce Heavy-RAS equipment, capable to transfer 5-ton pallets instead of the current 2-ton pallets. The H-RAS is already being installed onshore at HMS Raleigh base to provide the long term Underway Replenishment (UNREP) training facility.

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the Statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what fast jet capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132892]

Mr Dunne: The fast jet capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support and training costs for which funding is allocated:

Typhoon Tranche 3 - 3A only, i'm assuming.

F35-B Joint Strike Fighter (Lightning II) - 48 of them?

Typhoon Future Capability Package 1 - Paveway IV and other improvements, in service from next year

Typhoon Future Capability Package 2 - Integration of Storm Shadow and Brimstone included. RAF wants and needs it before Tornado GR4 leaves service in March 2019. Some thought will also be in order regarding Imagery Intelligence currently provided by Tornado with RAPTOR pods. 

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what heavy armoured platforms are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132894]
17 Dec 2012 : Column 612W
 
Mr Dunne: The heavy armoured platforms in the Core Equipment Programme consist of the following in-service capabilities:

Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank - a 500+ million CSP for 227 tanks is also part of the budget, we have been told.

AS90 Self Propelled Artillery piece

Challenger Armoured Repair and Recovery Vehicle

Titan Armoured Bridge Layer

Trojan Armoured Engineer Vehicle

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132895]

Mr Dunne: The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support costs for which funding is allocated:

Aircrew Protective Equipment and Detection

Hazard Management

Light Role Team Enhancement

Medical Countermeasures

Networked Biological, Radiological, and Chemical Information System

Personal Decontamination

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what submarine capabilities form part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132896]

Mr Dunne: The submarine capabilities in the Core Equipment Programme consist of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support and training costs for which funding is allocated:

Astute Class submarines - 7 vessels

Successor programme to replace the Vanguard Class submarines. The main investment decision is due in 2016.

Maritime Underwater Future Capability - initial studies into the shape and capabilities of the next generation SSN meant to replace the Astute class

Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-64, on defence budget and transformation, whether the cost of personnel from all three services is included as part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132897]

Mr Dunne: The cost of service personnel is not included as part of the Core Equipment Programme.


Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-64, on defence budget and transformation, whether any items on the single integrated priority list are included in the Core Equipment Programme. [132899]

Mr Dunne: The Single Integrated Priority List is a consolidated list of the Ministry of Defence's future priorities for investment in military capability. It is separate from the core equipment programme, which consists of those equipment programmes to which we have already made a commitment to invest, their support costs, and the support costs for in-service equipment.

During the course of Annual Budgeting Cycle 13, the new discipline in our budgetary regime has allowed us to give the go ahead for a series of equipment projects, some of which were previously on the Single Integrated Priority List, which have now been brought into the core equipment programme. This includes targeting pods for fast jets, 76 additional Foxhound patrol vehicles (the minister here is presumably talking of the two separate orders for 25 and 51 additional vehicles that we have had), better protection systems for Tornado GR4, additional precision-guided Paveway IV bombs and enhancements to Merlin helicopters.

As far as i'm aware, there have been no details released about orders for additional targeting pods: Litening III no doubts, but how many? 
Similarly, there is no details about the 'better protection' for Tornado jets. A wild guess is that the current UOR enhanced countermeasures employed in Afghanistan might have been secured for long term use. This includes the Advanced IR Counter Measures (AIRCM) pod, based on Terma's Modular Countermeasures Pod, flown on the port wing. On the starboard wing, the Tornadoes employ the legacy flares dispenser.  



In recent times, another UOR introduced a Helmet Mounted Cueing System, which might have now received additional funding to make it available to a greater number of crews, since it was initially procured in very small numbers. The HMCS had earlier been used on the Harrier GR9.

The enhancements to the Merlin are also a mystery at the moment. 
As for the additional Paveway IVs, it is a debatable claim that possibly implies uncomfortable truths: substantial Paveway IV orders, after all, are supposed to be funded by the Treasury as part of the net additional cost of Operation Ellamy in Libya, where hundreds of Paveway IVs were expended, along with many Paveway IIs. 
The Paveway IIs that are not being replaced, the expended Stom Shadows neither (part of why the costs announced in Parliament appeared so low!), but the Paveway IVs and Brimstones used are supposed to be replaced with Treasury money. The suspect is that, at the end of the day, the money is actually coming out of the MOD's budget. 

A good news is that, as part of the latest orders, Raytheon UK is progressing with the demonstration of a bunker buster warhead for the Paveway IV assembly. This is part of a series of enhancements and evolutions to the bomb envisaged under SPEAR Capability 1.   


Mr Jim Murphy: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the statement of 14 May 2012, Official Report, columns 261-4, on defence budget and transformation, what Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance capabilities are part of the Core Equipment Programme. [132900]

Mr Dunne: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) in the Core Equipment Programme consists of current in-service capabilities plus the following equipment programmes and their support costs for which funding is allocated:

Airseeker—Airborne signals intelligence - 3 Rivet Joint airplanes to replace the Nimrod R1s

Crowsnest—Airborne maritime surveillance and control

Scavenger—Future armed operational unmanned air system (UAS) - a long expected announcement on the way ahead, to be chosen jointly with France, has been delayed again and again, but it's at least reassuring to see the programme is part of the Committed budget 

Seaseeker—Maritime electronic surveillance - includes the fitting of SIGINT/ELINT equipment to the Type 45 destroyers, underway

Seer—Tactical electronic surveillance deployed on land - UOR brought into core: man-portable electronic warfare equipment, part of the wider Landseeker effort that succeeds the cancelled Soothsayer programme 

Sentinel—Airborne wide area surveillance - very glad to see Sentinel in the core budget: considering how the answer is formulated, this would suggest that plans to scrap the Sentinel in 2014/15 have been finally abandoned 

Sentry—Air command and control and situational awareness

Solomon—A programme to improve the coordination and dissemination of ISTAR

Watchkeeper—Tactical UAS

Replacing Nimrod MRA4

In the meanwhile, the government has replied to the damning report of the Defence Committee on Maritime Surveillance, making clear that the future procurement of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft will necessarily pass through a wider study known as Air ISTAR Optimisation Strategy (AIOS): 

[...] the Department currently has no defined requirement for an MPA capability. The study into Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) concluded that in the near term the most appropriate solution to a potential underwater surveillance requirement was a manned aircraft, but the Department’s longer term objective is to merge as many surveillance requirements as possible into single equipment builds (e.g. radars that can operate in multiple modes and in all environments) and to further refine platform types, capabilities and numbers to achieve maximum effect at minimum cost. As such, those requirements previously covered by the Nimrod MR2/MRA4 capability are now
integrated in the Air ISTAR portfolio and work is underway in the form of the AIOS to understand how these requirements can be best covered from the current and planned Air ISTAR Fleet.

The initial findings of the study will be reported to the Military Capability Board (MCB) in April 2013. Those options that appear to merit further investigation will then be developed to inform a MCB Genesis Option Decision Point prior to CSR15/SDSR15. As set out above, we will keep the Committee informed of our work in this area. In the meantime, we have investigated what military off-the-shelf capabilities exist. For comparison, generation of the AIRSEEKER airborne signals intelligence capability, replacing Nimrod R1 through an extension to the US RIVET JOINT aircraft production line, will have taken just under five years from the identification of the requirement to reaching Initial Operating Capability. Should the situation warrant it, adoption of off-the-shelf platforms, coupled with the Seedcorn personnel, could establish a capability in significantly less time.

This means that the budget holder for the Maritime Patrol Aircraft is the newborn Joint Forces Command. 





Expanding SATCOMs

Another news is that tomorrow the Skynet 5D satellite will be launched. It has already been mated to the Arianne rockets that will bring it into orbit.
The addition of this new satellite to the constellation will dramatically enhance and expand communications for the armed forces.
Skynet 5D will meet its 3 equivalents in space, which are also supported by 3 earlier Skynet 4 satellites and by the old but still useful NATO IVB satellite, which was taken over for free in 2011 from the Alliance which was about to put it on a dead orbit. It now provides two extra UHF channels to the armed forces. 

In 2022, ownership of all the satellites, currently in the hands of prime contractor ASTRIUM, will pass directly to the MOD at no additional cost.




Yearly speech of the Chief Defence Staff

A very interesting speech delivered by general sir David Richards, which contained elements of particular interest regarding Royal Navy and british Army.
The full speech, as available on the Ministry of Defence website, reads:

Introduction

1. Thank you Lord Hutton for your kind introduction. It is good to see so many friends and colleagues here and may I take the opportunity to thank you all for your strong support to the Armed Forces. It is hugely appreciated.
   
2. I am feeling slightly cautious this evening. Our senior Defence Attaché in the Americas tells me that in the Aztec calendar today is the Day of the Lizard. They say:
   
3. ‘The warrior must be like the lizard, who is not hurt by a high fall but, instead, immediately climbs back to its perch. These are good days to keep out of sight; bad days to attract attention.’
   
4. So perhaps today isn’t the best time to be standing before you!
   
5. In honouring my commitment to this august organisation that plays such an important role in the life of UK Defence, I want to take the opportunity to examine where we are today, what deductions we should draw, and what we are doing to ensure we are prepared for tomorrow.
   
6. You are all aware of how much change there has been over the past two years. We have begun to introduce the SDSR, balanced the books and turned a corner in Afghanistan. Yet much of the world seems less stable and more dangerous than was the case even two years ago; a harsh world in which intra-state conflict can be confused by and for new forms of inter-state conflict. A world in which governance vacuums present opportunities for extremist groups to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption, especially as precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments and bio terror weaponry become inevitably more accessible. And this in a period when economic fragility makes us both more vulnerable and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner, a reality aggravated by the huge cost differentials between western forces and non-state opponents.
   
7. All this is demanding much from all of us and is changing the shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces.
   
8. Together with my fellow Chiefs I have been examining, as you would expect, how we should best use what we have and what we need for the future. We have to be hard-nosed realists; accepting we have less than we would wish but that we are still required to protect this nation’s interests through the projection of military force. We cannot shrug our shoulders and hope the problem will go away. We have to be ready to fight and fight effectively, often not on our own terms and accepting the constraints we are under. I have brought this together in a piece of work I will be sharing in the future called How We Will Fight. And I will look at some of its key deductions in a moment.
   
9. We should be under no illusions; the Armed Forces of tomorrow, like those of today, will be engaged in operations around the world. They will require the best of their generation as they always have. People who can think flexibly and with imagination. As Einstein said, “imagination is more important than knowledge”.
   
10. These operations will not be carbon copies of Afghanistan or Libya. But they will require the same skill and dedication that these operations, and all the others we have engaged in since the Cold War, have demanded. They will require the strength and indeed guile that our Army, Navy and Air Force are famous for.
    
11. Building on the battle-winning reputation, proven resilience and technological edge of the past decade, I hope you won’t notice some of the tasks the Armed Forces will be doing. They will be performing a key part of our developing military strategy – deterrence. Preventing conflict, you may recall, is rightly a principal task of Defence.
    
12. I will come back to this theme later but it is worth remembering that your Armed Forces are often most effective when they are not in the headlines. Few operations, exercises or training missions are widely reported but each one communicates that we are strong, credible and reliable. This deters our enemies and reassures our friends.
    
13. And we should be proud of our nation’s record in this respect. The relative peace we have enjoyed here in the UK for the past 70 years is not an accident. It is in large part the result of the quiet work of diplomats building friendships, the skill of our financiers and businessmen in making our economy strong, and the courage of our Armed Forces in deterring and when necessary overcoming threats.
    
14. Afghanistan is an example of this lesson. With our partners in NATO/ISAF and the ANSF we have been more successful than many, regrettably, recognise.
    
15. I have recently returned from a visit there and, I can tell you, we are meeting the tasks laid on us. Over the past decade we have:
    

• a. closed Al Qaeda’s bolthole ;
  
• b. helped underpin a more stable government;
  
• c. overseen elections;
  
• d. trained an Army and police force;
  
• e. and put a country that suffered 30-years of war into a position where industry, education and the rule of law are beginning to grow.
  

1. True, there is a long way to go. The presidential elections in 2014 will be hugely important. But we are heading in the right direction and we have proved what can be done with the right resources and with the right support.
   
2. I look forward to 2013 seeing us increasingly transition to an Afghan lead as we move from mentoring battalions to supporting brigades.
   
3. The Afghan Army now enjoys the support and trust of 84 percent of the country, only 3 percent less than the British Army in this country. That is a fantastic achievement, by them and ISAF. It recognises the integral part they are playing in turning the destiny of a country away from violence and onto a path of peace.
   
4. I am proud of what our Service men and women have achieved in Afghanistan. Alongside partners in DFID and the Foreign Office we have given Afghans a chance they couldn’t have dreamt of only a few years ago.
   
5. Our operation in Afghanistan does not stand alone. It is linked to Pakistan and India and the wider region. In my recent trip to Islamabad, a city I have got to know well, I was very encouraged by the helpful attitude of civilian and military leaders to reconciling the Taliban. The Taliban, like us, are focussed on Afghanistan’s presidential poll and the end of our combat operations in 2014. They know that the window of opportunity to play a role in their country’s future is closing.
   
6. Every day the Afghan Army and Police grow in capability and legitimacy. Every day the government is better able to serve its people and thus better able to marginalise the Taliban. Now, surely, the time is ripe to take risk in order to find that elusive political solution 10 years of military effort and sacrifice has sought to create the conditions for? But in order to pull this off, it is vital that Afghan confidence in the West’s long-term commitment to their country is retained. Why, should this be lost, would they stay the course themselves let alone fight to protect us in 2014 when, absent successful reconciliation, we will be at our most vulnerable? And why should the Taliban reconcile, if they thought we were ‘cutting and running’? Retaining Afghan confidence is the campaign’s centre of gravity. And for the UK, retaining our influence and status within NATO and amongst key allies, is another reason for getting this right.
   
7. While achieving our goals in Afghanistan, British Armed Forces have been active elsewhere around the world. For example:
   
8. In Libya we fought in support of a people who wanted to be free from tyranny. We joined allies from around the world built around a NATO core. Together, we supplied the air force and the navy. The people themselves were the army. They made the change happen.
   
9. In the seas off Somalia we are playing our part in an operation that is controlling the spread of piracy. Alongside navies from around the world, including Pakistan, India and China, reinforcing the benefit of cooperation.
   
10. Closer to home we have also been proud to play our part in HM the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations. And my fellow Chiefs and I were delighted to receive so many letters of support for the actions of our Regular and Reserve Service men and women during the Olympics.
    
11. It reminded all of us in uniform of the level of support that we enjoy amongst the people of this country. We are very grateful.
    
12. All this has happened as we have been going through reforms.
    
13. Over the past two years we have implemented some of the most radical changes to the Ministry of Defence and to the Armed Forces in decades.
    
14. The SDSR shrank the size of the Armed Forces and changed the governance of the department. And whilst we are aware that the Autumn Statement has further implications, a balanced budget means we can start from a firm base and better demonstrate what is at stake.
    
15. The new Armed Forces Committee mandates the Chiefs to resolve problems in the interests of Defence as a whole. It exploits collective military judgment and balances single service requirements in private allowing the CDS to go to the Defence Board with the underpinning authority of a combined Joint service view.
    
16. The AFC, the Defence Strategy Group chaired jointly by John Thomson the PUS and me, and the new style Defence Board chaired by Philip Hammond enable the MOD to be more agile and decisive in responding at the strategic level to developing threats and trends. The world is not a safe place. Some threats to our interests and allies are long term but some are very present.
    
17. The immediate danger of the collapse of the Syrian regime is one. We will support our allies in the region and would all like to see a diplomatic solution but cannot afford to remove options from the table at this stage. Should chemical weapons be used or proliferate, both President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron have made it clear that a line would have been crossed.
    
18. And Syria is linked to Iran. The regime is backed by Tehran so the fall of Assad’s dictatorship will impact the Iranian government. What that means for the stability of the region is as yet unclear.
    
19. In my recent trip to the Manama Dialogue I was struck by the issues that came up. Our host, Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain, emphasised the threat of nuclear proliferation. North Korea’s missile test last week aggravates this risk.
    
20. The Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces have been exemplary in bringing order to Somalia but this has not been without cost. Both have sustained losses, and the retaliation of terrorist groups has endangered Kampala, Nairobi and the Kenyan coast. We must continue to support both countries, as well as the fledgling Somali government.
    
21. To the west, Mali is a major cause for concern. As still is Yemen, despite President Hadi’s laudable efforts. So What?
    
22. Now reducing these short and long term threats, our task is to evolve a force capable of meeting, with allies, various complex tasks. By the early 2020s, these plans result in a powerful Joint force that, on the basis of a balanced budget from Planning Round 12, should be able to meet the requirements laid on it.
    
23. It has not been easy.
    
24. But the Secretary of State, building on the work of the SDSR, has ensured that the department is able to squeeze the most from the resources available.
    
25. By 2020 we will have kit that many of my fellow NATO Chiefs of Defence, saddled with much more sclerotic budgets than we, are envious of:
    

• a. A World Class Carrier Capability with the JSF – Lightning II – on board;
  
• b. Type 45 destroyers on patrol;
  
• c. Type 26 frigates in production;
  
• d. Astute class submarines;
  
• e. Chinook Mk 6 bringing the total Chinook fleet to 60;
  
• f. Typhoon Tranche 3, as well as the Lightning II;
  
• g. Atlas and Voyager air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, underpinned by our now larger C17 fleet;
  
• h. Scout vehicles, upgraded Warrior, Challenger, and Apache to give the Army better reconnaissance, mobility and firepower;
  
• i. Rivet Joint and other critical ISTAR platforms that will ensure we have better situational awareness than ever.
  
• j. And much more emphasis on Cyber, to which I will return shortly.
  

1. But our most decisive asset will remain our Service men and women.
   
2. As the private sector puts it, we must look after the ‘talent’. As I see equipment around the world parked with no-one to operate it. Great equipment without talented people counts for little.
   
3. We must ensure our people have the intelligence and confidence to treat the unexpected as an opportunity to exploit. They must be capable of informed, independent action; of what has been described as a ‘brains-based approach’ to operations.
   
4. You have all heard the common refrain that we must do more with less. Well, to be frank, that is what we are doing. At the strategic level, a brains-based approach means deciding to act only when we must and then doing it well, not always kinetically.
   
5. This type of thinking has shaped the work I have started on ‘How We Will Fight’. Assuming the approach I have just outlined, I and my fellow Chiefs have designed our forces to:
   

• a. act jointly and with allies, but able to act alone.
  
• b. be well equipped, but not tied to platforms.
  
• c. adapt as the environment changes.
  

1. But we must prioritise. And as spending has tightened, we must be ruthless in our requirements and getting the most from them. Effectively targeting limited resources is, in large part, the art of military command in war and in peace through force design.
   
2. The new UK Joint Expeditionary Force is an expression of this. The JEF promises much greater levels of integration than previously achieved especially when combined with others, as is already happening with our French allies in the Anglo/French Combined JEF. The JEF must be genuinely synergistic. It is the building block to future alliances and independent action. And we would hope that allies such as Denmark and Estonia, who have fought with distinction in a British formation in Afghanistan, will want to play key roles within the British element of the CJEF.
   
3. What it offers is clear: an integrated joint force with capabilities across the spectrum at sea, on land and in the air. A force that can confidently be allocated a specific slice of the battle space in an allied operation or act alone. It will be the basis of all our combined joint training.
   
4. With the capability to ‘punch’ hard and not be a logistical or tactical drag on a coalition, we will be especially welcomed by our friends and feared by our enemies.
   
5. The JEF will be of variable size; a framework into which others fit. It will be the core of the UK’s contribution to any military action, whether NATO, coalition or independent.
   
6. Together with critical C2 elements such as HQ ARRC and the emphasis placed on the maritime component HQ at Northwood, the JEF is designed to meet our NATO obligations.
   
7. In the Libyan campaign, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were able to play a vital role by bringing their regional expertise into the command structure of a NATO operation. This provided greater military and political reach. I look forward to the alliance, perhaps in part through the vehicle of the JEF, working more with non-member states.
   
8. Britain’s JEF will be capable of projecting power with global effect and influence. Nowhere is more important to us than our friends in the Middle East and Gulf and in line with clear political intent we would expect, with other initiatives, for JEF elements to spend more time reassuring and deterring in that region.
   
9. Let me briefly examine how the How We Fight work affects the single services, starting with the Royal Navy. As the Prime Minister has put it, the Navy “keeps the arteries of trade of the global economy from hardening.”
   
10. The Royal Navy will continue to grow in importance. As our carrier capability comes into service it will be a key part of our diplomatic, humanitarian and military strategy. Prepared to overcome the toughest military challenges. This is its raison d’être. But I know it will be used for much more.
    
11. The Americans demonstrated through their deployment to Aceh and Haiti that aircraft carriers have huge strategic impact supporting people around the world. Seeing US military personnel, ships and helicopters playing such a critical role boosted the standing of the US in the world’s most populous Islamic country and undermined extremist rhetoric.
    
12. Hard power is an essential element of soft power. In this respect especially, numbers, or mass, still matter. We must resolve the conundrum at the heart of Bob Gates quip about ‘exquisite technology’.
    
13. In the future, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I have a vision for a Navy which procures ships differently allowing us to have more, not fewer platforms.
    
14. We must resist the pressure that has shrunk the number of platforms. Clearly that will mean rethinking the Navy, including examining the case for ships that may have a limited role in general war. But this is not new – remember the corvette over the ages – and is similar to the utility of light and heavy land forces, tailored to task. And in so doing we will ensure seamanship skills and leadership qualities, so much in demand by our friends and allies, flourish into the long term.
    
15. The Royal Navy’s maritime and amphibious components, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines at the core of the latter, will be at the heart of Britain’s JEF. As the concept develops we will look to acquire ships that range from top-end war fighting elements through potentially to more vessels tailored to discrete but important tasks, to be deployed on a range of routine non-warfighting duties.
    
    
16. The Army too is changing. Once we come out of the combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it will cease to be on permanent rotation with the burdens that imposes.
    
17. The Army will maintain a hard power war-fighting capability while creating the strategic influence, support and engagement ability essential to modern operations.
    
18. Like the Navy, these land forces must be equipped to pack a punch but war fighting is not all they’re for.
    
19. Conflict prevention, to which I will return in a moment, is not just sensible strategy; it is a military operation requiring appropriately configured and equipped forces.
    
20. The Army 2020 reforms are a fundamental re-set for the Army, making the best of a regular force a fifth smaller than when I commanded it only three years ago.
    
21. While we will retain three high-readiness manoeuvre brigades, we will also have ‘adaptable brigades’ to sustain enduring operations and routinely develop partnerships and knowledge around the world.
    
22. Though more conceptual work is needed, given the importance of the region and clear Prime Ministerial intent, I envisage two or more adaptable brigades forming close tactical level relationships with particular countries in the Gulf and Jordan, for example, allowing for better cooperation with their forces. Should the need arise for another Libya-style operation, we will be prepared. This would greatly enhance our ability to support allies as they contain and deter threats and, with our naval presence in Bahrain, air elements in the UAE and Qatar, and traditional but potentially enhanced roles in Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would make us a regional ally across the spectrum.
    
23. In Africa, brigades would be tasked to support key allies in the east, west and south whilst another might be given an Indian Ocean and SE Asian focus, allowing for much greater involvement in the FPDA, for example.
    
24. If we are to influence, we must know what drives our friends and how to motivate them. This is not something that can be done on the eve of an operation. As these adaptable brigades develop links with countries around their region, this will create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress their careers through linguistic and cultural specialism.
    
25. The Defence Engagement Strategy, prepared with the Foreign Office, will provide what I have often referred to as a ‘strategic handrail’ for engagement.
    
26. This will require tough decisions. If we are to invest properly in some relationships, others will naturally get less attention.
    
27. But if we get this right ¬– and we will – we will have deeper links to specific regional partners giving them the confidence to deal with their own problems and, when appropriate, to act in partnership with us.
    
28. What I have described puts military flesh on the bones of welcome, NSC endorsed, national strategy.
    
29. This all comes as we are increasing the Reserves and integrating them closer with the Regular forces. This will do more to increase our own capacity and ability to help friends and allies.
    
30. Turning now to the Royal Air Force. The rate of technological advance is most keenly felt on air platforms. This is understandable. These are complex fully networked combat and ISTAR platforms. This intelligence cuts the time between understanding and reacting. It allows us better to out-think and out-act our opponents.
    
31. At the same time, lift, both tactical and global, reduces the number of reserves we need to keep, giving the Armed Forces a flexibility that was unimaginable just a few decades ago.
    
32. Understanding and exploiting the opportunities technology presents will be decisive in maintaining our advantage – in sufficient numbers – into the future.
    
33. Remotely piloted air systems and novel anti-air defences have changed our understanding of both what it means to fight and defend. We must not allow sacred cows – such as the indispensability of on-board pilots – to rule the day. The Chief of the Air Staff is leading the change. By giving ‘wings’ to UAV pilots the Royal Air Force is recognising the capability of the platform and skill of the pilot.
    
34. Indeed, it is a reflection of how early we are in this process of transition that we still refer to remotely-piloted air systems or unmanned aerial vehicles. How long was it before we stopped referring to the horseless carriage?
    
35. For all three Services, their role within an integrated CJEF will be the driving force in their force development and training. Whoever the enemy, wherever the threat, we will need partners. Building them now is an investment in our own future and our capacity to succeed quickly should war break out. Cyber
    
36. But there is a new environment within which we must learn to manoeuvre with confidence.
    
37. Today Facebook, with around a billion users, is the third most populous country in the world. It exemplifies one of the most extreme changes we have seen in the past decades.
    
38. Cyberspace is the nervous system of our global economy. We are reliant on the internet and other networked systems for every aspect of our lives. It allows bewildering speed of action and global reach.
    
39. Unsurprisingly, just as crime has become e-crime, spying has increasingly become cyber espionage. We have seen nations, their proxies and non-state actors use this new space for terrorism and conflict.
    
40. Though not conventional assaults, the hostile cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and Burma in 2010 were damaging.
    
41. In the Middle East, there have been unprecedented levels of cyber attack over the past 24 months. Israel has reported over 44 million attempts to disrupt its government websites during recent tension around the Gaza strip. STUXNET demonstrated a new class of threat aimed at process control systems at the heart of modern infrastructure.
    
42. Without doubt, actions in cyberspace will form part of any future conflict. Communication and the control of infrastructure and systems has become a new environment through which combatants will further their objectives.
    
43. Our immediate priority must be to ensure our networks are secure and defensible, working with partners in industry and around the country to drive up standards and ensure we have robust protocols in place. This builds on the excellent work done under the National Cyber Security Strategy but Defence has particular challenges as a department, as Armed Forces and through the contractors and partners with whom we work.
    
44. I am determined that the Armed Forces should understand cyberspace, and how it will shape future conflict, as instinctively as we understand maritime, land and air operations.
    
45. This will mean changes in the way we operate: new doctrine; new capabilities; new structures, with Joint Forces Command at their heart. It will mean a new approach to growing and developing the talent we need to operate in this new, electronic, environment. Like our Secretary of State, I see an important role for reserves in this domain.
    

Winding Up

1. In examining each environment separately I hope I have highlighted some of the key issues on the Chiefs’ plate and how we must respond to them. But the most important is developing an integrated Joint model.
   
2. The JEF is neither the 1980s Canadian model nor, whilst there are some apparent similarities, is it a British version of the US Marine Corps.
   
3. The effectiveness of the UK armed forces relies heavily on the different skill-sets and ethos of each single Service. Each adapted for its environment, and evolving as times and technology change.
   
4. But a joint conceptual approach, based on lessons from the real world, embedded through force development, in training, on operations and though the cohering glue of modern C3I and cyber is vital to delivering the military capability the nation requires.
   
5. This is about ensuring single Service skills meld into joint action so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
   
6. The JEF won’t mean we can do more with less; it will mean, through the synergy it provides, that we get the most from what we have. And doubtless there will be some roles that we continue to leave to others, notably the USA.
   
7. As I close let me draw some lessons from my 41 years in uniform.
   
8. Some constants which may seem obvious in this room but are often over looked:
   

• a. The need for military force to influence, secure and protect is as great as ever.
  
• b. I joined an Army that was geared to defend Britain by fighting in Germany.
  
• c. Today life is more complex but the principle is the same.
  
• d. 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings in London show that we cannot choose our battlefields as we once did.
  
• e. The world is not a safer place and the distinction between home and abroad is strategically obsolete. Today it is part of a continuum.
  

1. We cannot just stand by and hope we are ignored and danger passes us by.
   
2. As the Foreign Secretary said in September last year: “the country that is purely reactive in foreign affairs is in decline”.
   
3. Responses may be based on either soft or hard power, but to divorce the two is strategic blindness. Soft power is not a substitute for strength. On the contrary, it is often based on the credible threat of force, either to support a friend or deter an enemy. Hard power and soft power are intertwined.
   
4. It is not enough to provide aid or speak kindly. Our friends want to know we are there when it counts, not just fair-weather friends. This is the confidence hard power brings. It drives equipment sales and thus industrial growth, as well as diplomatic treaties, just as it has for centuries. But hard power also does more than this: it dissuades.
   
5. Deterrence doctrine has fallen out of fashion so perhaps you will allow me to recall some of the elements. Sun Tzu’s famous maxim is: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.
   
6. Too often this is seen as clever posturing on the eve of battle. It is not. Training, equipping and partnering with allies enhance the aura of British power. They give us presence on the world stage and ensure that we are not tested.
   
7. It is worth being clear: when the Armed Forces train we do not just do it to be ready, we do it to be seen to be ready. When we succeed on operations, we do not just win a battle. We prove that we can win a war.
   
8. In a very real sense, everything the Armed Forces do deters and reassures. With enough numbers, enough equipment and with good leaders at every level, Britain is a credible threat to our enemies and a reassuring friend to our allies.
   
9. This is cheaper than fighting and more credible than talk.
   
10. Reading the record of how the Soviets saw the Falklands War demonstrates this admirably. What many saw as post-colonial folie de grandeur, the Soviet leadership, rightly, saw as proof that the British Armed Forces were united with their government and people – Clausewitz’s famous trilogy – and more than a match for them.
    
11. It was far from the only factor, but the increase in Soviet defence spending in the 1980s which ended up contributing to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was partly due to clarity of their failure to impose their will in neighbouring, occupied countries while Britain could liberate territory some 8,000 miles away.
    
12. As Chief of the Defence Staff I do not wear the burdens of office any more lightly than my predecessors. I have set out some of my concerns for the coming years and some of the ways we will think and act to meet them.
    
13. Under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, The National Security Council, on which I am privileged to sit, considers all the big strategic issues that I have listed and more. It is a hugely welcome addition to Whitehall, directing and bringing clarity to national strategy and coordinating cross-government action.
    
14. But the nature of the world is such that what will later seem obvious, today is opaque and unpredictable. How will Europe emerge from the Euro crisis? How will the Arab Spring conclude? How will global warming affect water supplies? And what of cyber?
    
15. After all, grand strategy, while providing a guide to action in peacetime, is also about being prepared and balanced for what we can never know.
    
16. Ensuring we have enough left in the bag while actively deterring, and when required defeating, aggression against us and our friends, enough left to succeed against those ‘unknown unknowns’, is ultimately what I and my fellow Chiefs are paid for.
    

I have highlighted the passages that i deem more impressive and interesting. They go in the direction i've always suggested to follow: a UK with capable armed forces capable to act indipendently and, perhaps even more crucially, provide a framework in which less well-equipped countries can provide numerical strenght, helped by the crucial enablers fielded by the UK, including the aircraft carriers, the Sentinel R1, the Rivet Joint platforms, the RFA, the strong amphibious fleet and brigade and other elements. 
There is also a return to Nelson's "want of frigates", for which i've also been arguing: Nelson wanted cheap frigates in great numbers to serve as eyes for the fleet, and to cover the immense number of jobs that a navy has to cover every day, leaving the big, powerful and expensive ships of the line free to focus on delivering the thick of the military effect.
The Navy needs that kind of approach today more than back then. With the important difference, not always appreciated, that today's frigates and destroyers are the ships of the line, while OPVs and corvettes are the "frigates". The Royal Navy needs a fleet of simpler, smaller but capable, long range "presence" ships to cover the wide variety of not-warlike standing tasks, so that the "ships of the line" can focus on warfighting, reaction and task group roles.

I can't help but wonder if we can read in this speech a ray of hope for Portsmouth's shipyard, among other things: the CDS essentially agrees with me on the strategic concepts, and i think he would agree on the opportunity to begin the rebalancing of the fleet with an order for a couple of OPVs...


On strategy, i can't help but link back to two articles i wrote long ago on the subject. Reading back into them you will see why i recognize myself in the CDS's speech.

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2011/07/strategy-for-uk.html
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/01/future-force-2020-strategy.html