The incoming aircraft carriers: more than just carriers

HMS Queen Elizabeth will be officially named in a ceremony planned for July 4, and the ship will be pulled out of dry dock soon afterwards, so that a major, historic milestone is quickly approaching. The importance of these new carriers for the Royal Navy goes beyond the "simple" regeneration of naval fixed wing aircraft capability, expanding well into the amphibious domain. This truth has not yet been fully understood by many external observers, which continue to focus on impressive, but far less relevant aspects of the program. In this article i want to take a look at the current situation and explain how the carrier's air group is taking shape.
There is still confusion about what role the new aircraft carrier(s?) will have in the Royal Navy once they enter in service. Of course there’s realistic worrying about having enough aircraft embarked, both because doubts reasonably remain on how the RAF will utilize the aircraft (which it owns) and because the UK’s order for the F-35B is currently standing at 48, down from what once was an ambition for 150, then 138 from roughly 2006 onwards. More orders might be made in the 2020s, but no one is willing to bet on those as of now, and actually even the planned buy of 48 has to pass through the SDSR 2015 and multiple successive Gate points, which might actually reduce the number even further. I will try and provide a more in depth explanation of what is happening.

More than anything else, however, in this article i want to explain just how important the new carriers are for the future of the british amphibious capability as well. This is a key aspect, which needs to be cleared, because getting the carriers wrong would not only end the Fleet Air Arm's fixed wing branch once and for all, but also deal a very heavy blow to the Royal Marines. 

The aircraft to be carried

  

The Joint Combat Aircraft program, which is the purchase of the F-35B, is currently sitting at its Main Gate 4 decision point. This major development was announced a few weeks ago, with Philip Hammond releasing an interview to the BBC and with several reports appearing on the press. This main gate reportedly covers the purchase of 14 F-35B plus spares and infrastructure investment, not better specified yet, to support the whole planned fleet. It was understood that a formal announcement in Parliament would follow, but so far this has not happened. 

Of course, this silence has been interpreted by some as a way of the british government to distance itself from the F-35B, but this is absolutely false. There was never going to be a big contract signed at once for the 14 jets, but only an internal budget-setting exercise to cover purchases that will happen over several years, in different production lots, over multiple contracts signed through the F-35 Joint Project Office and the Pentagon.

The idea seems to entail receiving 14 F-35B by 2018, in order to form the training fleet in Beaufort and stand up the core of the first operational squadron (617 Sqn RAF). The UK has already ordered four jets, three of which are instrumented test aircraft destined to the soon-to-stand-up OEU Sqn (XVII Sqn RAF) on Edwards AFB, in the United States. BK-1, BK-2 and BK-4 are the instrumented aircraft, while BK-3 is not instrumented and will join the operational or training fleet.

The training fleet (expected to eventually number some 6 aircraft, judging from earlier plans) will be based on the US Marines air base Beaufort, where, in 2016, 617 Sqn will officially stand up again (the squadron disbanded on 1^st April this year, with the Tornado GR4). The core of the squadron will be trained in America, before transferring in the UK, in Marham, by 2018. 

Aircraft Carrier Alliance image

 

If this plan is respected, the 14 aircraft the UK will soon be ordering will have to be spread at most on LRIP 8, LRIP 9 and possibly LRIP 10. This is based on the roughly 2 years it takes from contract finalization to delivery. The UK has long been expected to order 4 F-35B in LRIP 8, and on March 25, 2014, the Long Lead contract for the LRIP 9 has been signed, including materials for 6 F-35Bs for the UK. That leaves 4 more to be ordered later in LRIP 10 to make up the total of 14. The aircrafts in production lots beyond the 10^th would only be delivered in 2019 and in the following years, as roughly two years separate the signing of the final production contract and the delivery of the airplane. 

In early march there was also the news of a 7 million dollar contract signed for site-activation activities for starting to make RAF Marham the main operating base for the british F-35Bs. So, even if without a formal announcement in Parliament, the acquisition programme is indeed going on.

RAF Marham is expected to be built up to include a full Integrated Training Centre, which means the UK plans to step away from training in the US to do things domestically. The ITC won’t begin operations before 2019, but we can expect investment for it to begin soon enough, if the plan does not change. The UK appears interested to gain money by selling training services in its ITC to other European customers of the F-35. Mainly, talks are ongoing with Norway. A recent agreement is pretty clear in foreshadowing the idea at the base of the collaboration: Norway’s state-owned AIM hopes to do depot maintenance for the engines of the british F-35 fleet. AIM signed an agreement with Lochkeed Martin and Pratt & Whitney in april 2012 to secure its role as a depot maintenance hub for the F-135 engine, and now wants to secure a long term gain, exploiting such role.

Norway, in exchange, would send its pilots training in the british ITC, instead of sending them all the way to Luke, in the US. 

It has been announced in Parliament that the F-35s will not wear squadron specific colors, but only the low-visibility grey national markings. Hope there will be a rethink...

 

... so we can see something like this. Image by savetheroyalnavy.org

 

Or at least, something like this, in grey. Image @ Al Clark, janetairlines.com

 

Depending on how things go with the announced new Defence White Paper in Italy, UK and Norway will probably have new talks with Rome about expanded cooperation. The Italian FACO in Cameri is expected to become the regional MRO facility for the F-35, which means doing depot maintenance and upgrades installation for the aircraft of the USAF-Europe as well as those of all other countries that will buy in.

As of today, a single MRO centre is expected in Europe and in the Mediterranean area, so that the options will be restricted: UK and Norway will have to choose between Cameri and the MRO facilities in the US.

Italy could collaborate with the UK by co-financing Meteor missile integration (discussions ongoing) and by sending its personnel to the UK for training in the british ITC, instead of sending people all the way to Luke and Beaufort in the USA. In exchange, the british F-35Bs could have their depot maintenance done in Cameri. Finding a fair agreement with Norway will be tougher, as Italy has already agreed to have its F-135 engines serviced by the Dutch, which are getting their F-35s assembled (and in future maintained) in Cameri in exchange.

As of October 2013, Lockheed Martin expects that the UK, in 2018, will have taken delivery of some 17 aircraft, with 9 based in Marham with 617 Sqn, 3 in Edwards with XVII Sqn, and 5 more as training fleet in Beaufort. 

The expected 2018 situation for the F-35, as of October 2013

In terms of UK-specific trials, work to develop and validate the Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing tecnique has resumed after being stopped over 2010 and 2011 when the plan was temporarily changed in favor of acquiring the C variant of the F-35. Work is now ongoing with computer simulations in Warton. SRVL will improve performance in hot climates, produce less stress on the vertical lift system and add thousands of pounds of useful payload at recovery. The F-35B is to be capable to land vertically with some 5000 pounds of unused fuel and ordnance, which is a value far higher than the Harrier's and close to the 6000 pounds carrier bring back of the old F-18 Hornet, but it could prove insufficient were the aircraft to be heavily loaded with, for example, Storm Shadow cruise missiles that the UK hopes to integrate in the future. 

SRVL could add some 2000 lbs of additional payload margin, which would do wonders to enable safe operations with heavy configurations. 

It has also been reported that it is likely that up to three F-35Bs, including one of the british ones, will do their first flight across the Atlantic in the Summer, to participate at the RIAT and Farnborough airshow. 

Beyond the F-35B

The CROWSNEST program for the replacement of the Sea King MK7 ASaC has finally started to roll, and the In Service Date has been moved closer in time, to reduce the gap that will be formed when the Sea King goes out of service.

The Merlin HM2 fleet will be fitted with a palletized radar suite enabling the helicopters to take up the role of Airborne Surveillance and Control platforms. 

The Merlin HC3 and HC3A of the Royal Air Force are going to be navalized and transformed into amphibious support helicopters, under a contract which has finally been signed. It will however take time to have the whole fleet of 25 machines fully ready.

Last, but not least, the Apache attack helicopters of the British Army are now being all fitted with additional naval features, including an emergency flotation device, to enable them to serve on board of warships in a safer and more effective way.

Details of these and other helicopter programs can be found in this detailed article.

A key role in amphibious operations

A factor that not always is kept in mind when talking of the new carriers, however, is that they will not just be fundamental to restore the british capability to deploy airpower at sea and from the sea, but they will also be absolutely vital for ensuring that the amphibious capability of the UK continues to exist and to respect the levels set by the SDSR 2010.

The defence planning assumption is that the Royal Navy has to be able to land a Royal Marines commando group with related vehicles, helicopters and supports, sealifting and then landing a total of roughly 1800 men.

This is only possible using one LPD of the Albion class, one LPH and the three remaining Bay class LSDs. The LPD is fundamental because it brings to the party the command and control facilities and the most part of the landing crafts available to the group, as well as vehicles and substantial amounts of stores. The LPH is fundamental as it carries the most men and almost the totality of the helicopters. The LPD and the LSDs have very limited aviation facilities, and no hangar, so the LPH is absolutely vital in order to ensure that the battlegroup can be supported from the air and moved by air.

The LSDs transport men, boats and landing crafts, bulky materials, normally at least one army workboat, mexeflotes and a lot of the vehicles and stores of the group.

None of these components can go missing, otherwise the whole force is in serious trouble. The 1800 men figure is not casual: it is quite clearly calculated on summing the capacity of the vessels remaining in force.

LPD: 305 men

LSDs: 356 men (x 3)

LPH: around 600   

The Royal Navy has two LPDs, but only one is in service at any one time, following the SDSR 2010. Currently, HMS Bulwark is in service and acting as the flagship of the fleet, while HMS Albion has been de-stored, disarmed and tied up in Devonport, in the amphibious center now known as HMS Tamar, where it is languishing, sealed up and fitted with controlled humidity devices to preserve her. The plan as of now is that in 2016, when HMS Bulwark hits refit time, HMS Albion will be re-activated, and the two ships will swap places.

The LPHs are also two, as of now, but again this is virtual only: HMS Ocean is about to come out of major refit, while HMS Illustrious has been working as LPH / Commando Carrier in the meanwhile.

HMS Ocean will be back into action soon enough, but that will be the end of HMS Illustrious, as she will be decommissioned.

HMS Ocean is more or less just air assault. It can lower a pontoon in the water at the back that serves as a steel beach. Light vehicles can drive down a ramp and use the floating pontoon to board landing crafts, but the LPH carries just a relatively tiny number of small vehicles and trailers (tipically Land Rovers). Other than that, she is pure air assault. 

HMS Ocean with the floating steel beach deployed

An LCU MK10 carrying BV206 vehicles comes to the steel beach during exercises in Norway

HMS Ocean normally carries just L118 Light Guns, land rovers with trailers and some BV206s

This photo of HMS Ocean during operation Ellamy shows the steel beach pontoon folded up and stored on top of the structure protecting the vehicle ramp going down from flight deck to vehicle deck

HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark are LPDs with an alarmingly low capacity for soldiers (only about 300 unless you start being less permissive with the space each man has, but that is not good for months-long deployments abroad which are now the norm for amphibious task groups including the RN's RFTG), and the LPDs offer limited air facilities, with no hangar.

The Point-class RoRo strategic sealift vessels are fundamental to carry stores and lots of vehicles for the support of the landing force, but they have no accommodation for troops, and can only carry vehicles and stores meant to be loaded ashore later, when the beach head is secure.
Besides, the Points are down to 4, from the 6 they used to be, as two were released from MOD service, despite the SDSR 2010 document promising specifically that all six would stay. 

The Point class Ro-Ro ships carry huge amounts of vehicles and stores

The LSDs used to be four, but the SDSR 2010 saw Largs Bay withdrawn from service and sold to Australia. Of the three that remain, one is permanently deployed in the Persian gulf (right now it is Cardigan Bay) to act as mothership for the MCM force based in Bahrain. Cardigan Bay has been fitted with a prefabricated shelter on deck, as a hangar of sorts, and has been recently assigned a permanent Lynx helicopter flight. It has also now been equipped with a Sea Eagle UAV system, which is entering in service in this week.

The end result is that the daily reality of the amphibious force is the ability to sealift and land a smaller force than the 1800 promised in the SDSR. The vessels can of course be crammed with more men for short periods of time (up to 700 on the LPD and LSDs, and over 800 on HMS Ocean) but this is not a very realistic capability, because it is not accompanied by an increase in stores and vehicles carried. And anyway, the men will start finding the crowded vessels unbearable very quickly, in a matter of days.

For a normal, yearly deployment such as Cougar 13 this year, the Response Force Task Group spends months at sea, so the ships are preferably lightly loaded in terms of men. The already mentioned Cougar 13 is a good example: 42 Commando, the formation currently at high readiness, did not embark whole on the ships. For example, Lima company was flown out to Albania ahead of the rest of the formation moving on the ships. The occasion was exploited to conduct mountain training.

The company then traded place with Kilo company. The end result is that the amphibious battlegroup pretty much never was fully present at once on the ships. Aside from the training requirements dictating the independent movements of companies, the availability of only 2 Bay-class LSDs has obviously part of the responsibility.

The big problem on the horizon, however, is the planned decommissioning of HMS Ocean, without replacement, in 2019. The task force however obviously continues to require a big platform for the amphibious assault helicopters and for the transport of hundreds of men, and this is where the carriers step in.

Since the platform for helicopters is going without a direct replacement, the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers will have to be hybrids. It is not a choice, it is an unavoidable necessity. And hopefully the new ships can pull such a mixed role off. They will be, in fact, closer to America than to a supercarrier. The Royal Navy and Royal Marines will need to be able to cram hundreds of marines into Queen Elizabeth, along with some stores and perhaps some air-liftable vehicles and L118 Light Guns too. Helicopters, including Chinook and Apache, will have to be carried. And in addition to that, at least a squadron of F-35B, if airpower is to be finally brought back to the fleet.

The fact that the new vessels are so large gives hope that the hybrid role can be covered well, despite the design of the ship being clearly centered on delivering fast jet sorties, not to land and support troops ashore.

The Royal Navy has finally formally recognized the need to operate the new carrier as a hybrid in the SDSR 2010, with the public description of the Carrier Enabled Power Projection concept. A surprisingly detailed note was shown in the SDSR fact sheets, when it was described that:

We will plan concurrently to operate a mix of helicopters as well as Joint Strike Fighters from the carrier. This will include up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transport helicopters and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix will depend on the mission.

There are obvious challenges to be faced and won, if this has to work. Embarking and employing simultaneously jets and helicopters for amphibious assaults is not at all easy. The US Marines do it routinely on ships smaller than the QE-class carriers, but specifically thought all along for such use. And anyway, the fixed wing component they use in such cases is normally made up by just 6 Harriers (possibly growing up to 10 F-35B on the new America LHAs). Obviously, they enjoy the formidable cover offered by the US Navy supercarriers: the UK doesn’t, so it will have to embark more jets to give the task force proper cover.

A key difficulty is finding suitable space for the many hundred men needed. Fast jets and helicopters require a large number of maintenance and deck personnel, and having to add hundreds of Royal Marines means needing lots of accommodations.

The needs of the Royal Marines are different from those of an aircraft ground engineer, besides: the Marines need space for their weapons and kit, and also need to be accommodated in spaces properly dimensioned and located around the vessel: they need to be able, once kitted up and ready to go, to walk easily up to the flight deck or to the ship’s boats, to board landing crafts and helicopters.

Fortunately, a secondary role as Commando Carrier was always part of the aircraft carriers design, so that there are wide corridors and spaces for the embarkation of troops. The December 2013 issue of Navy News includes one of the very first, rare mentions of these arrangements. There are accommodation quarters for “easily” 250 men, with wide assault routes. 250 men, however, will not be enough, and it will always be a struggle to balance embarked forces and air wing personnel numbers and accommodations. 

The Marines will probably be able to board boats and landing crafts from the boat boarding area in the stern of the carriers, which can be accessed via stairs going down from the hangar deck. It has not yet been cleared whether the boat areas of the carriers feature spaces and cranes sufficient for the embarkation of LCVP MK5 landing crafts. 

This photo, courtesy of navyrecognition.com, shows well the stairs leading down to the boat boarding area. A crane is fitted to a sponson just beneath the flight deck level, and it could be useful to move stores to and from boats coming up behind the carrier.

 

It is not yet clear if the larger boat areas are LCVP MK5 capable. Image from navy-matters.beedall.com

 

This image from earlier phases of the building process shows (evidenced in blue by me) one of the large openings in the sponsons for the launch and recovery of ship's boats.

Other problems come from trying to operate large number of helicopters as well as fixed wing jets. The design of the deck of the carrier is being developed and refined with these conflicting needs in mind. As of September 2013, the Royal Navy was reportedly trying to carefully design the deck to achieve 10 helicopter ops spots.

If the “hybrid carrier” works, we will have a high value vessel which will be forced to sail far closer to the shore than we'd like it to. It is true that the Royal Navy is planning for escort ships sporting flight decks big enough to easily accommodate even the Chinook (Type 45 already in service, and even the new Type 26 frigate is planned to have such capability), which could be used as forward refueling sites to allow the carrier to stay further back and still fly troops ashore by helicopter, but the feasibility of such concept is questionable.

At least, even with all the conflicting requirements crammed together, all the three key capabilities of any naval / amphibious task force will be present: fast jets for air cover and support, helicopters, troops.
But if it does not work, we will have a disaster, with amphibious capabilities badly maimed and with air strike capabilities set to remain dramatically limited by the very small number of F-35B that are going to be purchased. In practice, the gap in embarked fixed wing aviation would be closed (at least in part), but a gap in amphibious rotorcraft capability and simply in amphibious troops lift will open, making the whole task force just as crippled. It would be a case of swapping  a problem for another.

The next time someone asks what the carriers are for, or wonders why they are so big, remind them that they are very much needed, and that their huge sizes are to be blessed, as smaller vessels would never be able to approach the kind of mixed role that lays ahead. And no, there is no guarrantee at all that building smaller carriers would have been made it possible to also build dedicate LHDs. It is pretty likely that the cost of more numerous, relatively smaller ships would have been equal, if not higher, especially considering that the CVF vessels have very small crews. More, smaller ships would have almost certainly required more personnel to crew and support them, and personnel is exactly what the Royal Navy post SDSR does not have.

It is painful to watch two fine LHDs of the Mistral class being built for Russia, knowing that having at least one such vessel in Royal Navy service would solve much of the problem, and represent an excellent boost in capability. But I’m not going to spend much time daydreaming: the deal will go ahead, as the money is too much and too good to pass up. Paris is highly unlikely to truncate the deal, and even if it did, the MOD has no budget to procure the vessels. Not one, and certainly not both. Besides, the ships would need some serious work done to remove the Russian kit and have Royal Navy equipment fitted in its place, which would make the purchase even more financially challenging.

Even in the best case scenario, the problem won’t be solved until HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark are replaced, most likely by large LHDs. Until then, the Royal Navy will have to make do.

This leaves the big question: will both carriers enter in service, or will the Royal Navy get only one?
If both carriers are kept, but one is held in reserve, mothballed like Albion, only coming out of its "coma" every six years to replace the sister as she goes into refit, the problem remains: perhaps a major operation (but it has to be really big) would see the second hull hastily reactivated (ala HMS Intrepid back in 1982) with the fleet then faced by the decision of perhaps using one as carrier and one as LPH, so only one of the two has to sail close to the shore.
However, this neat separation would probably be judged unworkable because if either of the two ships was damaged the task force would lose most or all of either air power or amphibious helilift. Probably, even with both ships in the task force, fast jets, Marines, helicopters and stores would still be split among the two in roughly equal terms for prudence.
In normal years and normal operations, the RFTG would still be faced with the problems coming from having a single flat top for two roles.
The above situation (with one carrier active, one tied up in port with sealed doors and Controlled Humidity kit installed to try and keep it together while it languishes in port for years on end) is probably the best outcome we can realistically hope for in 2015. Which is a bad scenario, but... not the worst of possibilities, at least.

If both ships are regularly operated, side by side, the RFTG could sail (most of the time) with both carriers in the group, one working as LPH, one as carrier (in "peacetime". In war, the split described before would probably still be preferred). This would cost more in terms of money and manpower, and i'm not optimistic. I don't think we are going to see it happening, sadly.
Even if we do see it happening, there will still be periods in which only one of the two hulls is available, with the other in refit. So the problem still pops up, but at intervals. 

Chinook night operations on HMS Illustrious during exercise Joint Warrior 14-1, in april 2014

So, the Perfect Solution is already out of the window, and it has crashed to the ground already years ago: the problem won't be eased until Albion and Bulwark are (hopefully) replaced with (hopefully) two LHDs, allowing the carrier to act as a carrier, while the large LHD carries both the large landing crafts and the helicopters, and more men.
The question is whether or not the Good Enough Solution (hybrid carrier / assault ship ala America but with greater number of fixed wing aircraft embarked, operated and supported) is achievable and workable. Considering that QEC is considerably larger than America, i think it should be achievable. But it is far from sure. It depends on how the spaces inside the carrier have been configured, on accommodations, on lots of other factors.

The worry here is that this reality has apparently been fully grasped only in 2010, with the emerging of the famous Carrier Enabled Power Projection acronym, which includes this double role problem (along with other things less directly connected to the carrier, such as MARS and CROWSNEST). My hope is that proper thinking about this problem was actually going on from many years earlier inside the RN and the design team which worked on the carriers. I hope they actually worked on the "Commando Aircraft Carrier" (which is something different from both the Commando Carrier and from the Aircraft Carrier) from much earlier, and that 2010 only marked the date in which the Royal Navy publicly admitted that, with no replacement for Ocean on the way, QEC would have, in a way or another, to do it all. Some provisions for a secondary LPH role are understood to have been into the requirements all along, and i hope they have provided a good base to build upon.

If it wasn't so, and planning for it only began in haste in 2010, the carrier design is probably going to struggle in taking the full burden of the requirements on the horizon because the time for making adequate adjustments was allowed to pass and go.

In a way or another, the concept must be made to work, because there is no real alternative in hand’s reach. What is clear is that the carriers are definitely needed. Next time someone asks, you’ll know how to reply.

Italy and the F-35: the PD document that backs the cuts - UPDATE

Current status of the program: the defence ministry has agreed to freeze the negotiations for further aircraft, while the defence white paper is produced, for publishing by December according to the current plan.
The freeze in the payments, according to italian defence analysts, actually applies only to the early long lead orders for the LRIP 10 production lot, for which negotiation began in february this year. The firm order for the production of these aircraft would come in 2016.
In the meanwhile, the acquisition of the 3 F-35A of LRIP 6, the 3 F-35A of LRIP 7 is going ahead. These are the only aircraft that Italy has signed definitive contracts for. In this summer, Italy will also sign the production contract for LRIP 8, with two F-35A, while next year there will be the order for LRIP 9. See the previous article for details of the production schedule for Italy, which was restructured in 2013.

Important news have come from Israeli officers, which, after voicing their intention to open a MRO line for their F-35s in Israel are now opening up to the idea of sending their aircraft to the single MRO facility for the European and Mediterranean area, which is supposed to eventually be located in the Cameri FACO, in Italy. The best chance for Italy to get a long term economic and technical return is to be selected as location for the single MRO facility: that would mean maintaining USAFE, Israeli, dutch, british and norwegian F-35s over the coming decades, assuming that negotiations with all these countries go ahead.
Italy has held preliminary talks with other F-35 partners, and the Cameri FACO is going to assemble the F-35s for the Netherlands. Italy, in exchange, will send its F-135 engines in the Netherlands for depot maintenance. It is widely expected that Netherlands will continue to lean on the Italian FACO for the regular depot maintenance of its jets.
United Kingdom and Norway have, in recent times, concluded preliminary collaboration agreements over the F-35: the scenario that is taking shape sees the brits standing up an Integrated Training Centre in the UK, which norwegian pilot could use to avoid the costs of sending their personnel all the way to Luke AFB, in the USA. The British would reciprocate by sending their F-135 engines to Norway for maintenance. None of the two countries will have a MRO depot, so for deep maintenance they are faced by the choice between Cameri or the US.
While Italy is currently planning to have its pilots trained in the US, it can be reasonably assumed that negotiations will be made to have italian pilots trained in the UK's ITC instead, in exchange for a depot maintenance agreement. Negotiations should also eventually resume with Norway, with which Italy had held successful preliminary talks in the early 2000s.
One of the greatest critiques moved to the F-35 program is the industrial and workshare returns aren't satisfactory: the biggest source of work, the depot maintenance, is a promise currently not guaranteed by firm contracts. Forging firm agreements in this area would be a major boost to the popularity of the F-35 program in Italy, so the Israeli opening is particularly important.

It is evident that these industrial plans, and the international agreements already signed or hoped for will have to be considered as part of the White Paper. While workshare returns as of now appear uncertain and mostly based on the conclusion of future collaboration deals, excessive cutbacks to Italy's committment to the program could be the death blow to the hopes of making of Cameri a winning investment.
There are at least two requisites for which Italy absolutely needs the F-35, and in both the A and B variants: the F-35A, at the bare minimum, is needed to replace the Tornado IDS in the NATO tactical nuclear bomber role. At least a squadron of F-35A, eventually to receive integration with the B61-12 nuclear bomb, is planned to replace the current "nuclear" squadron on Tornado on the Ghedi air base.
Another group is needed, with F-35B this time, to equip the aircraft carrier Cavour.
Current plans include further F-35A to replace Tornado IDS in the strike role and AMX aircraft in CAS role, in up to three other squadrons.  One air force group on F-35B as CAS asset is also planned.

While a reduction from 90 aircraft is almost certain, halving the order would have a dramatic effect on the future of the air force, and defence chiefs are unsurprisingly already pushing back with their full force against the misinformed attacks.

Attacks which are misinformed for real. Let's see what the document produced by the PD members in the defence committee says.


The document that backs the cuts 

The internal document produced by Partito Democratico (PD) members that have taken part, over the past months, to multiple hearins with the armed forces chiefs and industry representatives has been revealed to the press. The document is born out of the initiative of Gian Piero Scanu, head of the PD group in the Defence Committee and a well known enemy of defence spending, which never fails to show his very lacking understanding of defence matters. As was to be expected, the document looks like the product of an hour of the attention of an 8-year old boy.

On the F-35 story, which is the one which caught the international attention the most, the document reaches its top levels. The document says it is necessary to explore other solutions for the renewal of the Navy's fighter fleet, made up of STOVL aircraft, the only ones which can take off from the relatively small aircraft carrier Cavour. It will be a short exploration, since there isn't any alternative to the F-35B in this specific area.
The document also says that the air force is wrong in saying that the Typhoon has little to no air to ground capabilities and won't have them for several more years, even with big investments on the way. The Typhoon is "fully operational", the politicians say they have discovered in the hearings.
Of course it is. In the air defence role, since 2005. Big discovery. The real discovery, and this one truly does amaze everyone, is that there is a fully multirole Typhoon in production: it is called RAPHALE and it is the "french variant of Typhoon".
Well, i'm sure Eurofighter and Dassault will both be delighted of finding this out.

A big advantage of throwing more money into Typhoon by producing this "french variant" is that the "works-shearing" arrangements are more favorable than those of the F-35 program.
Fantastic.

Il caccia multiruolo Typhoon, nella versione di attacco al suolo, non solo sarà prodotto, ma risulterà competitivo con il JSF della Lockheed. Questa versione dell'Eurofighter sarà messa a disposizione delle missioni UE, NATO e ONU da numerosi alleati europei (Austria, Spagna, Germania e Inghilterra, mentre la Francia utilizzerà la versione “Raphale”).

E' necessario quindi che il nostro Paese mantenga e rafforzi con convinzione la partecipazione delle aziende italiane a questo programma, tenendone sotto controllo i costi, ma anche avendo presente che il sistema di works-shearing, che tiene insieme tutti i programmi di cooperazione europea, garantisce ad ogni paese ritorni in nessun caso inferiori alle proprie quote di investimento.

Sorry France, we should have told you earlier: you are apparently building a Typhoon variant named RAPHALE...

Yes, the Rafale is a multi-role aircraft with air to ground capabilities much more developed than the Typhoon's, and with an AESA radar already in production.
But, sorry Scanu, it is not in any way a Typhoon variant named Raphale...

The "Raphale" is not the only priceless discovery of this document. The terrible english isn't, either. Not even the terrible italian used in some passages, even if it is rape on Dante's language.

The programs of the Navy are seen favorably by the politicians (the new defence minister Roberta Pinotti, born in Genova, has her electoral base in the area of the shipyards which would build the new ships, so for this and other reasons it is not surprising) but even here, of course, they call for some sacrifices. They say that Italy can't afford two aircraft carriers: well, they are a bit late with this discovery, since Italy already has only one aircraft carrier, the Cavour, and no plans to operate another. The older Garibaldi is tied up in port, receiving limited maintenance in the hope of being used for a few more years, but as an helicopter ship in support of amphibious operations, due to the very limited (if not non-existant) helicopter hangarage and maintenance facilities available on the tiny LPDs of the "Santi" class. Garibaldi is meant to be a gap filler on the way to the construction of a 20.000 tons LHD which would replace both her and one of the three Santi ships.
The savings from removing Garibaldi, due to her no longer having an air group and aircraft carrier ambitions, would actually be modest. The Navy has long been considering the option of doing away with the ship, and politicians would want to see Garibaldi sold.
The navy would be fine with selling her, but the problem is that the market isn't really big for ships of this kind: old, manpower-intensive and without air group (Harriers these days are rare and precious, and with the british GR9s sold as spare parts to the US Marines, there really isn't any Harrier on sale anywhere). Any buyer would only be able to put helicopters on her, and even in this role Garibaldi would have to beat the rivalry of the spanish Principe de Asturias, which Spain would also gladly sell off.

The document also makes a mess of the italian army's plans, all of them apparently collectively grouped up under the heading "Forza NEC" and under a notional, impressive and almost certainly wildly speculative pricetag of "20 billions", which obviously should be re-thought. How? Who knows. They seem to be putting in the same basket things such as the future soldier system (Soldato Futuro), the Iveco Lince 4x4 vehicle, the Orso VTMM in all its variants, the modernization of the Ariete MBT, the purchase of the Freccia 8x8 armored vehicle family for the medium weight brigades and many other programs.
The PD politicians are somehow convinced that Forza NEC is not able to operate alongside similar NATO network enabled system of systems, and want european standardization. In part, this might be true, and it would indeed be desirable to achieve better synergies in European defence programs, but sorry Scanu: France, Germany and UK and others aren't exactly going to listen to what you have to say, i fear, and readily follow your orders. 

Finally, Scanu sneaks in another big plan of his: getting rid of the army training grounds in italy, particularly the most important and strategic of them, like Capo Teulada and the weapons training range of Salto di Quirra, in his native Sardinia.
Scanu hates the army's range on the island, it is not a new thing. He has recently stated that the italian army should close all its ranges, in favor of using a "multinational training range" which should be developed in Europe. Somewhere. Anywhere but not in Italy.
Of course, mr. Scanu. I can already see nations rushing forth with money and will to build a mega training range which can fullfil your dream of allowing all european armies to train in the same place.
The document is, thankfully, not so direct as Scanu was in interviews, but it still calls for rationalization of training areas at European level to build common ranges. It also calls for standardization on a single type of rifle, tactical vest, helmet, grenade etcetera. Which, mind you, does have its sense. But, again, it is wishful thinking. Especially since, of course, the unspoken bit of thought in Scanu's mind is that the european rifle should be italian, made by Beretta, as well as probably every other bit of kit the document quotes.

Good luck with getting the rest of Europe to agree.

Is this document serious, well researched, belieavable? No. It is junk. Even worse than i expected it to be.
Is it dangerous for the future of the italian armed forces and the F-35? Yes. Politicians of this kind, with this spectacular level of ignorance even after months of hearings and explanations by the defence chiefs (it is clear that lawmakers have listened to very little of what was said in the hearings), are dangerous for any and everything.
Will this document be torn apart in the next phase of studies and decision-making when it is brought before government? Yes. I very much hope and think so.

It is such a piece of garbage that it wouldn't surprise me if it was cancelled from the web to hide the stupidity of it, while a patched up variant is thrown together. Download it and preserve the memory of it: the Eurofighter RAPHALE asks you to do so! 

Download link (in italian) 


UPDATE: trade union that was reported as being happy with cuts to F-35 already starts backing off as it understands that a cut to F-35 will not mean more Typhoons. Says (with some reason) that Italy was unable to negotiate a truly advantageous deal in terms of technology and work sharing, but that it looks forwards to talking about a serious policy for defence and for investments in the defence field. Asks for a "rethink" on the F-35 program, not for cuts anymore. Better to seek better terms on the F-35 than hope in more Typhoons that were never going to come.

Trade union statement

How surprising.

Oh, and of course, nevermind that Forza NEC (Force NEC, from Network Enabled Capabilities) in the statement becomes NEK, an italian singer...

Italy and the F-35: what is actually happening?

Press in Italy and abroad has gone into a frenzy over the news that Italy "will further cut its F-35 order, even halving it". But reality is a bit different. 

Big cuts might be coming. Or might not. 

Prime minister Renzi has announced that he is seeking 2.5 to 3 billion euro savings in defence spending in the next 3 years of parliament. The new defence minister, Roberta Pinotti, has underlined the need for a strategic review that sets the requirements and decides the future of the italian armed forces, and both PM and defence minister have confirmed that a review of the F-35 program will be part of these operations. It is also true that there is strong opposition against the F-35 in many parties and groups, including Renzi’s own party. It is a part of Renzi's own Democratic Party which has called to halve the purchase of the F-35, down to 45. But to report of this call as what is going to actually happen to the program is a very wild call, at the moment. It is obvious that cuts to defence are going to happen and something will go for sure. The F-35 program will contribute to achieving these savings, but there is actually little that can actually be cut off the F-35 program in the next three years, and there are a lot of factors to consider in order to understand what is going on. 

 
F-35 development money is spent and gone. 800 million for the FACO have also already been spent. This money can’t be affected in any way. Italy has actually already slowed down the planned rhythm of its purchases, putting together a different plan already back in July 2013. So far, firm contracts have been signed only for 6 F-35A, spread 3 in LRIP 6 and 3 in LRIP 7.

Four more F-35A were planned to be ordered in LRIP 8, but the plan has already been reviewed downwards to just 2. The LRIP 9 was expected to include the first F-35B for the Navy and three more F-35A, but the plan has been reviewed and from four aircraft we are now down to 3 (1 F-35B, 2 F-35A).

The LRIP 10, in the latest projections, is described as including 4 aircraft (2 F-35A and 2 F-35B for the Navy), against 6 planned earlier (2 F-35A, 3 F-35B for the Navy and the first F-35A for the air force).

The first F-35B for the air force is now not due for delivery before 2021 (was to be 2018, originally). By the same date, the Navy will have received 10 F-35B.

The LRIP 11 appears to have been cut back from 6 to 5 jets: it was to include 2 F-35A, 2 F-35B navy, 2 F-35B air force while now it will include 3 F-35A and 2 F-35B for the Navy.

However, these changes are, as of now, a revised delivery schedule, not a net cut, as the totals remain, for delivery by 2027: 90 aircraft in total, made up of 60 F-35A, 15 F-35B for the Air Force and 15 F-35B for the Navy.

The LRIP 8 order is expected to be placed within the summer, while the LRIP 9 order would be placed next year. The lots 8, 9, 10 and 11 are those realistically most affected by the reduction in spending announced for the next three years. Delaying the purchase of several aircraft is obviously going to result in a short term saving; the question is whether this delay will be enough to achieve the current spending cut targets, or if the plan will be changed once more. 

The modified delivery schedule for Italy's F-35s, as has been coming together since summer 2013, as reported by Italy's Analisi Difesa (analisidifesa.it). Several aircraft are delayed from early LRIPs to later multi-year purchases. This will ensure savings in the next three years: will they be enough?

It is possible that a complete, temporary stop to orders could be chosen. The LRIPs allocations over the next three years could be reviewed downwards again. But it might also not happen. It is too early to say.

Cutting the order to 45 however, appears unlikely. First of all, the savings coming from such a decision would not be available in the short term, unless the program is frozen entirely and orders resume only a few years into the future. The scope for savings in the short term is very small, and changing the long term totals, considering that the purchase is spread over more than a decade, will only bring results in the long term. Renzi mostly cares about saving money now, as it needs funds to re-direct on his own spending priorities and, hopefully, on much needed tax cuts to help the economy. 

Stil, a complete freeze to the purchases is unlikely, i'd think, considering that Renzi openly said he remains committed to the program and to the collaboration with Washington: freezing the orders entirely wouldn’t go down very well with the partners. The chiefs of Air Force and Navy are also arguing with all their voice to ensure that they receive their F-35s relatively soon. The AMX and Tornado IDS are aging and the air force fears capability gaps opening as early as 2018, and while the navy's AV-8B+ Harriers are still relatively young, the Navy is just as eager to move onwards sticking to schedule. The Harrier fleet is tiny, and the airframes being worked have been pretty much always the same: they might be young in terms of years, but they have fatigue on their airframes.

The only way to achieve big savings would be to review the whole requirements in the White Paper, set even smaller aircraft and manpower targets for the Air Force, and likely remove from the ORBAT some squadrons of AMX and Tornado IDS, early and without replacement. Cutting orders of new aircraft which would not actually happen for years and keep spending big money on the aging platforms meant to be replaced by those would have little sense and very much limit the extent of the savings in the near future. Of course such decisions could well be made, but it is all to be seen.

Some press suggests that buying more Typhoons in place of part of the F-35s might be an option. Everything is possible in theory, of course, but it should be noted that this is definitely not what the defence chiefs want. Nor is it a realistic or a financially advantageous proposal.

Building more Typhoons is a wish of Finmeccanica, NOT of the air force. Finmeccanica would get greater gains from building more Typhoons rather than from building F-35, due to how the two programs work. However, the Air Force chief definitely does not wishes to take over more Typhoons: the plan is actually to soon withdraw from service up to 24 Tranche 1 aircraft (the indecision on numbers is due to a decision to be made on the fate of the 2-seat aircraft used for training) leaving 72 or 75 Typhoons out of the 96 being purchased. The Italian Air Force has been the first to start using Typhoon for QRA, but it has also been probably the less supportive partner, in recent years at least.

An (unlikely) order placed for the Tranche 3B Typhoons also risks having political implications in the international arena. The four Typhoon partners (UK, Germany, Spain and Italy) have all expressed their intention not to purchase the Tranche 3B: if one partner was to rethink on the issue, the Eurofighter consortium would probably try even harder to obtain penalty payments from the other countries: UK, Germany and Spain do not want to spend more money on more Typhoons, and most certainly don’t want to pay big penalties either. The matter could end up proving very complex. It is highly unlikely that the proposal could ever gain the willing support of the defence chiefs to start with: the Italian Air Force does not actually believe in the air to ground capabilities of the Typhoon. The service isn’t even quite exploiting the capabilities introduced by the P1E program, and considers the Typhoon a solution for the sole air dominance requirement and, possibly, for the launch of Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the future. And the Italian Typhoons are being delivered missing some capabilities altogether: even the Tranche 3As, differently from those built for the UK, do not have the full predisposition for conformal fuel tanks, nor the fuel dump system. All signals of the enduring unwillingness to invest on a truly multi-role Typhoon which is not seen as the solution for the needs of the service in terms of Strike and CAS.

Even if more Typhoons were forced down the throat of the air force, the total would not be 121, as the 20 or so Tranche 1 are due to be removed from service as they are going to age badly unless a lot of money is forked out to upgrade them to standards closer to those of the Tranche 2 and 3 examples. They would have, again, to force the air force to do something that is against all planning. Possible, but unlikely that the government will go this far.

Finally, halving the F-35 order would only mostly damage Italy itself, which will have spent a lot of money on the FACO, only to destroy its return with its own hands. Already, the massive reductions already experienced (131 to 90 for Italy, and 85 to just 37 for Netherlands) have reduced, to say the least, the cost-effectiveness of the assembly line, which now pins its hopes of becoming a source of financial and technical returns almost exclusively on being chosen as the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility for all F-35 users in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Alenia's role as  second-source provider of wings for the F-35 has already been hurt by the cut from 131 to 90 aircraft, which has resulted in Lochkeed Martin cutting back its minimum promise of work from 1215 to 835 wing sets, and the deal would only worsen with a new reduction. 

The biggest risk to Italy's industry and financial returns is that some other european F-35 partner could exploit the chance and make a big return in the race for the MRO site and get the contracts and decades of maintenance work, leaving Cameri as an expensive cathedral in the desert. That would be a true disaster. 

All these reasons make further big cuts to the F-35 order relatively unlikely. Possible, of course, but before announcing dramatic changes are coming to the program, i’d be very careful. The review of the program might actually deliver relatively mild changes to the plan.

The effects of the "review" of the F-35 program in Italy could go in many ways: it could cut the (arguably useless) 15 F-35B for the Air Force, hopefully growing the Navy's order from 15 to 20 or so, as for original plan. 

The purchase of F-35B for land use by the Air Force remains arguably the most controversial part of the italian F-35 program.

The 15 / 15 F-35B was a political deal forced on the Air Force and Navy when the 131 F-35 were cut to 90 (original 131 aircraft plan called for : 69 F-35A, 40 F-35B air force, 22 F-35B Navy). Experts generally agree that the F-35B for the air force, officially meant to cover the requirement to operate from “austere” air facilities in expeditionary operations, are a waste of money. There is also bitter consent on the hypothesis that what the Air Force really wants with its purchase of F-35B is to follow the RAF’s example and get rid of the uncomfortable presence of an independent deployable air power capability wearing Navy colours, by absorbing it.

The Navy has been severely hampered in its plans by the cut from 22 to just 15 F-35B, which aren’t quite sufficient to cover training, attrition, back up and frontline requirements, forcing a downsizing of the realistic, routine air group for the Cavour aircraft carrier. 22 jets were meant to support a training fleet of 3 based in the US, 5 aircraft unavailable / in maintenance and a forward available fleet routinely reaching the total of 14 jets.

A fleet of 15 jets, maintaining the training fleet of 3, would support at most 9 deployable aircraft.

The air force’s own F-35B will be based alongside the Navy’s ones on the navy base in Grottaglie, to concentrate the B logistics on the same base. However, the Navy has fought to the end (and successfully) to keep the two squadrons well and truly separated. The carrier deployments are meant to be covered by the sole Navy squadron. The result, as it is, is that the dangerous mess of a “fusion” Joint Force Harrier-style is avoided, but what’s left is two pitifully small groups, with the Air Force’s one lacking a convincing reason of existence. 

The FACO in Cameri has required a huge investment. Getting back the money will become next to impossible if wrong decisions are taken.

Most, if not all experts, agree that if the 90 F-35s are to be cut further, it is the 15 F-35B for the air force that should be at the top of the list of candidate victims.

A reduction from 90 to 80, with a 60 / 20 split between A and B, air force and Navy, would be seen with favour by many, including myself. A better option still would be to keep the order for 90 aircraft, but still reduce the number of Bs to no more than 22, all destined to the Navy. The air force would get 8 more F-35A instead of F-35Bs. The overall cost would shrink (the B is more expensive to both buy and operate / maintain) and, arguably, better overall capability would be delivered. 

The aircraft carrier Cavour, sailing for an exercise in 2012, carrying AV-8B+ Harrier of the "Wolves" group

We’ll see what comes out of the review and of the White Paper. Talking of halving the F-35 order, at this time at least, seems a very wild call. The reality is likely to be quite different. At least if defence chiefs get to say a word in the planning. 

The evolving budget situation: reassuring (with risks) - UPDATE

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces

3: Helicopters

4: Force Structure 

5: Reversing bad decisions 

6: Army programs on the (slow) move 

7: Capabilities in the air  
8: GEOINTELLIGENCE improvements 


The financial aspect

The National Audit Office has today published the annual Major Project Report and, for the second year, the analysis of the 10-year equipment plan. The MOD has released the updated version of the 10-year equipment plan, showing the welcome short term funding re-arrangement which is, among other things, allowing the retention of hundreds of armored vehicles and related equipment purchased as UOR for operations in Afghanistan.

The documents, despite the not unexpected press focus on the cost growth (almost exclusively due to the aircraft carrier contract renegotiation), actually provide a reassuring picture of how defence equipment programs are moving on. The programs have confirmed, for the second year, to be in a stable position after a decade of chaos. The cost of the major programs, if the carriers are excluded from the count due to the particular situation which came into being with the switch to catapults and back, has actually decreased by 46 million in the past year. The cost hike on the aircraft carriers program has a cost of 754 million, leading to a negative figure of 708 million. However, this was not unexpected, and the NAO confirms the MOD position: the cost hike has largely been absorbed by the CVF's program own budget allocation, and has not required using the Contingency fund built into the 10-year budget, which is stable at 4.7 billions.
Over the 10 years from 2013 to 2023, the equipment budget is split in the following way:

Equipment procurement, 63 billion

Equipment support, 87 billion

Central contingency fund, 4.7 billion 

Uncommitted "headroom" fund, 8.4 billion 

The risks remain, obviously. Among them, the most worrisome is the uncertainty on how the budget for the next years will be calculated. The 10-year plan has been crafted on the basis of an agreement with the Treasury that would see the MOD arriving to 2015/16 with the budget levels set by the SDSR; moving to a budget flat in real terms (increasing annually with an inflation rate of 2.7%) out to 2021, with a 1% annual boost for the sole Equipment budget, out to 2023.

Since that agreement and the SDSR, however, the MOD budget has already been cut back twice, with the Autumn Statement 2012 and the Spending Review 2013. The Spending Review for the years 2014/15 and 2015/16 has reduced MOD spending by 2.9 billions overall, mostly in 2015/16 (2.6 billion) with an impact in-year of 890 millions directly on the Equipment spending voice. These reductions have been covered without major shocks to the system, through efficiencies and reprogramming, but the fragile balance achieved in these two years can be shattered in any moment.
The next Spending Review and SDSR will be absolutely decisive: details here are truly the devil. If the Flat-in-real-terms budget is calculated on the base of the reduced spending post-2013 agreement, a 15 billion shortfall in funding will have been generated over the residual life of the 10-year program. Just like that. 15 billions. It would be enough to screw everything up, very badly.

That's why, in NAO style, i'm calling this article "Reassuring (with risks)": because it is enough to look away for one minute, and the whole thing might well collapse.
Even minimum variations on the baseline budget over which the future is planned are enough to very quickly not just head away contingency and headroom money, but bite into the current Core budget as well, with catastrophic implications.

Of course, a reduction in MOD spending is not necessarily immediately aimed at the Equipment budget: the department is free to shift money between its main voices of expenditure (and does so rather regularly) to adjust to the various needs of the moment and protect this or that part: but reductions so large could only be absorbed with further, massive cuts in manpower, and the impact would be global all the same, as there really is the risk of having no men left to use the kit.
As has been observed by the Chief of General Staff himself, the Royal Navy appears to be already in a critical situation in terms of manpower. The situation of the Navy appears seriously dangerous: as it is, considering the impact of the nuclear submarines force (almost 5000 men) and the Marines (7000+) on a force that is shrinking to less than 30.000 men in total (29.900 in April 2020, with a low point at 29.850 in 2018), the surface fleet and Fleet Air Arm are being required to run on a number of sailors and airmen that is much inferior to that of even the italian navy. Of course, the RFA personnel is counted separately, but even that is overstretched, and does not change the reality of a navy which is, to say the least, impressively lean manned in comparison to peer and near peer forces.
The Guardian's commenters might find the First Sea Lord's comments unjustified and too partisan, but the data actually sides with the Navy's point: it is going be the struggle of the generation, in order to keep the Navy alive and valid. 

The 8.4 billions left currently uncommitted are needed to start off several important programs, needed to reach the capabilities envisaged by Future Force 2020 and, in the best of cases, close some of the gaps that have opened in these years. More realistically, the money will barely prevent other gaps from occurring, even if things go as planned.
The "White Board" of unfunded programs has been restructured, and despite the NAO's nice wording about the opportunity of looking at capability needs holistically instead of compiling a list of programs locked in a fight for funding, the feeling is that what happened is just a further work of scissors to shorten the list. The MOD has named only a few of the programs in the Equipment plan, and provided only graphics showing the distribution of the spending for macro areas, so that they can effectively cut and change a lot of other activities without it showing.

The release of the uncommitted headroom money seems to have also been pushed to the right somewhat, as there is only mention of committing it starting from 2017/18, and not immediately after the SDSR 2015. This is a passage considerably less reassuring.
The 8.4 billions have been provvisionally assigned to the service commanders, who are taking up the responsibility of deciding the way forwards for their arms. Again, despite the Guardian's annoying and badly informed cry of a Navy "soaring" at the expense of the Army, the picture is far different: as of now, Land HQ has been provvisionally assigned over 50% of the headroom (4.7 billion), while the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have been assigned 1.1 billion each. The remaining 1.5 billion has been assigned to the Joint Forces Command.

This split is hardly promising when it comes to the hope that Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability would be restored. A new MPA would be controlled by Joint Forces Command because ISTAR assets are now (rightly so) seen as force multipliers that interest all services. Even CROWSNEST falls under Joint Forces, not under Navy command. The allocation of a mere 1.5 billion looks too small to accommodate a new MPA program, especially considering that there are most certainly several other requirements to consider. The headroom money would be spent between 2017 and 2023, so it might still be that it covers the beginning of a longer MPA program stretching into later years... but this is wild guessing on my part. The current split of the scarce resources is not particularly encouraging.

The Royal Navy's 1.1 billion can be expected to be largely used for MARS Solid Support, the next phase of the renewal of the logistic fleet, which should replace the three Fort-class ships left in service by the middle of the next decade. The NAO Major Project report itself reminds several times that the existing maritime logistic capability is not sufficient to meet future requirements, and Fort Rosalie and Fort Austin will bow out in 2023 and 2024. There is not an official date for Fort Victoria OSD, but 2025 might be it. And these dates, already now, are the result of life extensions. It looks likely that the First Sea Lord's priority will be largely on their replacement.
From 2018, the Navy also hopes to roll into service new MCM capability under MHPC (not new vessels, but new unmanned vehicles and equipment), and this is another candidate area for additional funding.  




The programs



98% of requirements on the major items of equipment as studied by the NAO are forecast to be met, leaving only 3 technical requirements unsatisfied. Those are:

Typhoon landing distance; the fighter's landing distance isn't as short as was once hoped, but this has been known for years and isn't particularly concerning

Astute SSN top-speed; at least the first three of seven Astute-class submarines will not reach the hoped-for top speed value.

Aircraft Carrier availability: the NAO is still assuming that one of the aircraft carriers will be in mothball, so that availability of one carrier for every day of the year isn't possible. This problem will go away if the MOD will bring both ships into service.


A far higher number of requirements is being met with risks remaining, but this is to be expected.


One program of notice is that for the Astute SSNs. As said, in this program there is probably the only meaningful technical shortcoming in the reported projects. Of course, no one will ever told us what the speed requirement was, and by how much it has been missed. But the confirmation that at least the first 3 boats will be slower than expected is of course disappointing.

I limit myself to the first three boats because the report breaks down the Astute class into boats 1 - 3, boat 4, 5, 6 and 7, and measures their (classified) requirements under different headings. For boats 1 - 3, there's "Top Speed" requirement, not to be met, while the following boats have "Theatre Mobility" as requirement, and are forecast to meet it.
Hopefully this means that corrections have been applied to the later boats to reach the desired speed (something that would also justify hopes of seeing the improvement added afterwards to the first boats during their future refits) but there is simply no way to tell for sure.

From Boat 4 onwards, the submarines of the class will benefit of significant capability insertions and improvements thanks to the full approval, in 2013, of the Naval Extremely / Super High Frequency Satcom terminal and of the Astute Capability Sustainment Programme.
Full Communication and Radar Electronic Support Measures (CESM and RESM) capability has also been funded as baseline fit from Boat 4 onwards. The Spearfish heavyweight torpedo upgrade programme is also underway. Overall, good news.
The Rafael TORBUSTER advanced countermeasures system, which uses decoy which combine seduction and hard-kill capability, has been proposed as part of the Astute CSP by a team made up by BAE, Babcock and Rafael, but we might never get told whether it is being installed or not.

Also on the naval front, the NAO report shows that one of the requirements for the new Tide class tankers (MARS FT) includes being able to support Chinook operations on the flight deck. The ship should include an hangar sized for a Merlin, and aviation stores magazines.

This year the NAO has focused on the Complex Weapons programme, and thanks to this we have a refresh of the list of what it includes:

Future Local Area Air Defence System (Land and Marittime) - FLAADS / Sea Ceptor

Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy and Light) - FASGW(H) / FASGW(L)

Selective Precision Effects At Range 2 (Brimstone 2 and spiral development)

Selective Precision Effects At Range 3 (new stand-off 100 kg-class weapon)

Loitering Munition (Fire Shadow)

Meteor integration in F-35

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Simple

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Complex

Storm Shadow mid-life upgrade (also known as SPEAR 4?)

ASRAAM Capability Sustainment Programme

Very Short-Range Air-Defence Effectors (research into dismounted and vehicle-mounted solutions for replacing Starstreak)

Future Long Range Deep Fires Capability

Future Offensive Surface Warfare (new anti-ship missile)

Deep Fires Rocket System (for Royal Artillery)

Dismounted Effects (future man-portable weapon capability) 

Most of these programs haven't yet been approved and launched, however.

NOTE: missing from the NAO list, for whatever reason, is SPEAR 1 (spiral development of Paveway IV bomb). Also note that Future Long Range Deep Fires Capability and Future Offensive Surface Warfare might become one as UK and France continue cooperation on the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Missile concept, which is intended to replace Storm Shadow, Scalp EG, Harpoon and Exocet.

From the joint declaration on Security and Defence after the bilateral meeting at Brize Norton:

Progress has also been made on the SCALP-EG and Storm Shadow refurbishment and upgrade programme where both governments have agreed to share data associated with national concept and assessment phase programmes. We aim to agree a Memorandum of Understanding for staffing by early summer 2014. Looking further ahead, we continue to work to progress the joint concept study assessing possible solutions to meet our long term requirements to replace Harpoon, Exocet, and Storm Shadow/SCALP. The concept study is due to complete later this summer.

From the UK - France collaboration agreements could emerge another project, if the UK decides to join Italy and France in the effort to expand the capability of the Aster 30 missile, with the "Block 1 New Technology" programme, which in particular greatly expands capability against ballistic threats.

We have agreed to launch a bilateral dialogue on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). This would include analysis of the potential to develop a longer range BMD role for the Aster missile; this work has synergies with the One Complex Weapons initiative.

Other projects that could become part of the planned, joined-up "One Complex Weapons" initiative are the Very Short-Range Air-Defence Effectors and Dismounted Effects. France will have to replace its Mistral SHORAD missile roughly in the same period planned for the demise of the Starstreak, and voices about a collaboration in this area aren't new.
France has besides just launched the development of the MMP anti-tank / multirole missile, which might gain british interest going forwards, especially considering that the current Javelin has a (provvisional) OSD set in 2025.

FASGW(H) is finally on the move after significant delays due to France's reluctance in providing funding. A MOU has been signed in Brize Norton, finally, but the MOD had already given its approval in January 2012, hoping that France would follow within March 2012. It took much longer, and now there is no real hope to have the missile ready for use on the Wildcat helicopter in 2015. It might take until 2019, and leave the Navy with another gap in capability for several years, as the current Sea Skua is supposed to go out of service together with the Lynx.

FASGW(L), the Thales Light Multirole Missile, is technically more mature but at the time of the writing of the NAO report, it still wasn't approved.
This information is somewhat contradictory since the MOD secured a contract modification with Thales already in 2011, swapping Starstreak missiles for a batch of 1000 LMM.
It was hoped that deliveries would start in 2013, but the MOD wanted to approve FASGW(H) and (L) together. It is quite likely that the FASGW(L) will now be cleared to proceed, to ensure the Wildcat is not completely without claws when it enters in service.

My interest was also pointed onto Fire Shadow, which slipped behind curtains in silence after the planned deployment to Afghanistan was cancelled.
The report helps, but only so much. A Royal Artillery troop has been formed to use and test Fire Shadow, which has met all the requirements, including internal transport of the launcher and ammunition inside Chinook helicopters. Even this requirement, which was seen as "at risk" last year, was successfully cleared, although June 2012 firing trials weren't as successful as hoped.
Nonetheless, the Army preferred not to deploy the system in theatre, and the future of Fire Shadow remains uncertain. Unfortunately, the whole Indirect Fire Precision Attack capability for the Royal Artillery (of which Fire Shadow is a part) has been revised, and a new assessment phase has been started. Decisions will be made on how to proceed, including in regard to Fire Shadow.

Fire Shadow on its Chinook-portable launcher

IFPA has been plagued by lack of funding and by delays for many years in a row, and it looks like it is back to square one once again. It includes:

Deep Fires Rocket System

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Simple

Indirect Fire Precision Attack Complex

Within these activities (all of which planned but not yet approved), there will be requirements that the RA had formulated clearly already once, but which couldn't be funded and so are sent back to the thinking box: the Deep Fires Rocket was once expected to be the well known ATACMS missile. The M270B1 launchers of the Royal Artillery are ready to take the missile anytime, and were once supposed to do so by 2020. Now, who knows.
A precision guided 155mm shell was planned for adoption in 2018, with the Excalibur round as preferred option, already tested on AS90 in 2010. The procurement of new fuzes able to dramatically improve the accuracy of normal "dumb" artillery shells was also envisaged.
A 155mm shell cointaining precision guided anti-tank submunitions (SMART) was ordered, only to have the contract cancelled soon afterwards.
Fire Shadow has an uncertain future.
And the adoption of measures (again already demonstrated by an international team) to expand the reach of the GMLRS rockets to well beyond 100 km is also currently going nowhere.
The US Army is working to develop a new warhead for the MLRS rockets, which can replace the wide-area effects of the submunition-carrying rocket which proved so deadly in Operation Granby. The british army has abandoned all submunition-dispensers years ago, because they leave dangerous Unexploded Ordnance over the areas they hit, but this has left the M270B1 with only the unitary warhead rocket, and no wide-area suppression capability.
The new warhead in development in the US aims to solve this issue: the RA could and should look into joining in, but there's no telling if this will be possible.

Bringing into core the EXACTOR missile and the Firestorm kit for Fire Support Teams will help keep the RA relevant, but the inability of IFPA to progress to fielding any kind of new capability is worrisome. 

M270B1, traditional and Afghan TES

The Brimstone 2 missile is making excellent progress and showing immense capability, but it has suffered significant delays due to issues with the new, Insensitive Munition-compliant Vulcan rocket and with the new warhead. The biggest problem is that integration on Typhoon is currently not seen possible before 2021 (!) and that would leave a gap between the 2019 withdrawal of Tornado GR4 and the entry in service on Typhoon. The MOD is trying to find a way around the problem.

Other program of interest is the Warrior CSP. Unfortunately, there is not much new information about it, other than the mention in passing that, of 445 vehicles expected to be updated, 65 are intended to become Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicles. There's no information, unfortunately, about the role variants that the ABSV would cover, nor do we know in detail how many IFVs (with turret and working gun) and how many support vehicles (Joint Fires Command, Recovery, Repair) make up the remaining 380. With six battalions of armoured infantry, the requirement for the IFVs should be at least around 300, and actually more if the battalions were to be all fully equipped with their share of vehicles.

FRES SV brings welcome news. The Demonstration Phase has included activities to prove that additional variants, specifically Ambulance, Command Post and Engineer Recce can be obtained by installing the appropriate role fit on the Common Base Platform.
This gives new hopes for a relatively speedy expansion of the number of variants validated and fielded under FRES SV. Initially, it was expected that the separation between Blocks would be wider.
Only Block currently funded for full demonstration is the first, including Scout, Protected Mobility, Recovery and Repair variants.
Test activities have been added to the demonstration phase in the 2012 planning round to prove the feasibility of the variants of Block 2: ambulance, command post, engineer recce.
Assessment studies only, instead, have been started for Block 3, including Formation Recce (Overwatch), Joint Fires Command and Ground Based Surveillance.
These three variants, extremely interesting, should deliver a fire-support platform which would effectively replace the Striker with Swingfire missiles, used until 2005; a vehicle for the Fire Support Team that directs artillery, mortar fire and air support, and a platform carrying (mast-mounted?) long range surveillance system, to complement the Scout.

Early activities are starting on the Apache CSP. The British Army hopes to soon reach the decision point, and sign a contract to replace the current Apache AH1 helicopters with new ones, at Block III (AH-64E Guardian) standard.
The preferred plan is to take the current Apaches, tear them down into pieces, salvage everything still valid (gun, HIDAS, sights, radar, perhaps the engines even though the new US ones are more powerful) and move the components into newly built Block III airframes.
Hopefully, the resulting machine will come with even better navalisation. It has just been disclosed in Parliament that, following a contract with AgustaWestland in October 2013, all Army Air Corps Apaches are being modified to take an emergency flotation gear, deemed indispensable for operations from ships.

Early activities also for the expected re-launch of the (FRES) Utility Vehicle program. Here the most noticeable news is that France will loan 20 VBCI to the British Army, that will be trialed and used to experiment the concepts for the future medium weight armored vehicle.

UPDATE: Defense News reports that the loan of 20 vehicles cannot go ahead due to issues with british law, so that the testing is only being made on one vehicle.

Unfortunately, Wildcat was no longer included in the Major Projects Report. I hoped the NAO document would provide some information about what is happening with the Light Assault Helicopter variant which was added with a modification to the program in 2011. 4 of the Army helicopters had to be modified into LAH, and four new build helicopters had to be added to the total. There has been no further mention of the modification ever since, though. Rumor is that the Lynx AH9A will stay a bit longer and act as LAH (expected to mean they will be used by 657 AAC, in support of special forces) in the interim. It would have been interesting to see this point cleared up somewhat.

A final mention for the A400M cargo aircraft, not so much for its presence in the NAO report (nothing new to report there) but because France and UK have agreed to trade delivery slots, and the RAF will now get its first aircraft slightly earlier than planned, getting MSN 15 instead of MSN 16.