Vertical Launching Systems and the Type 26

Much discussion has been caused by the Type 26 model shown at DSEI 2013, as this new model showed just 16 VLS Strike Length cells instead of the 24 shown earlier at Euronaval 2012. Reportedly, the main reason behind the difference is the fact that at Euronaval the model was fitted with the European SYLVER VLS system, while the DSEI model was fitted with the American MK41.

Why the very noticeable difference? 

In this photo by Navy Recognition, the Type 26 model seen at Euronaval 2012: there are 24 SYLVER A70 cells

 

The photo from DSEI 2013, showing only 16 cells, MK41 Strike Lenght. Overlayed in red, the big question: is there under-deck space for fitting two more MK41 modules, replacing the CAMM cells? The deck area is not a problem, but space under deck might be, as CAMM cells only go around 3 meters deep, while MK41 Strike would go down over twice as much.

MK41

The MK41 vertical launch system was conceived in 1976 and first appeared on the cruiser USS Bunker Hill. The vertical launch system, conceived by FMC but produced by Martin-Marietta (now part of Lockheed Martin), was a major upgrade from the MK26 launcher, which employed a twin-arm ramp with an under-deck ammunition depot for 44 missiles. The same space occupied by a MK26 launcher, thanks to the MK41, became a 61-missiles silo, with all missiles constantly ready to be fired, against only 2 ready to fire on the arms of the MK26 ramp. 

Two graphics showing the complex MK26 twin-arm launcher that the MK41 replaced.Missiles were vertically struck down in the two conveyors, and vertically pushed up onto the launcher's two arms.

 

The MK41 comes in modules which have 8 missile cells each, arranged in two rows of four aligned on the two sides of a vertical uptake used for venting hot gas. Originally, there was also a module with just 5 missile cells, with the space of the other three occupied by a fold-down crane for at sea reloading, as we’ll see. 

 

MK41 quick overview. Also shows the two large multi-module silos on Arleigh Burke-class ships

Each module carriers its own launch sequencer, motor control panel and gas exhaust system. When a missile is fired, it exhausts downwards through the blowout bottom end of its canister; the hot gas goes down into the MK41’s plenum and then vents upwards through the uptake, which has its own hatch opening between the two rows of cells.

The plenum can withstand 7 launches from each cell, plus a restrained firing with full motor burn from any other cell. A deluge system is installed to provide flooding of missile cells to prevent warhead explosions. 

The uptake hatch between the two rows of four cells is very evident in this image, showing the launch of a Tomahawk. Notice the high pressure, high-temperature gas venting upwards from the hatch.

 

Multiple MK41 8-cell modules can be assembled together in a silo: Ticonderoga class cruisers were built with two large silos, each containing seven 8-cell modules plus, originally, a 5-cell plus crane module, giving the ship a total of 122 missile cells. 

What looks like a 5+crane MK41 module is being lowered into the silo, to join three 8-cell modules already in position. Note the density of the installation. A further four 8-cell modules will follow, to form a 61 cell large silo.

 

A 61-cell silo, completed, with a caniser being lowered towards an empty cell. Note the 3-cell wide hatch of the crane, in the second module from the bottom, to the right of the image.

On the DDG-51 Flight I and II, the MK41 modules were arranged in a silo with 29 cells on the bow (the equivalent of three cells taken up by the crane) and 61 on the stern. 

The All-Up Round missiles used in the MK41 come in sealed canisters which are used for storage, transportation, handling and, ultimately, for launch. Once a canister is struck down into a VLS cell, it becomes an integral part of the launcher system. Each canister has a common external envelope to support system launcher module interfaces, while internal mechanical and electrical components are tailored to specific missile shapes and interface requirements. In other words, to each missile, its own canister:

MK13 canisters are for Standard SM-2 series missiles;

MK14 canisters are for Tomahawk

MK15 canisters are for ASROC

MK21 canisters are for SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles

MK22 canisters are for Sea Sparrow

MK25 is the special, quad-pack canister for ESSM 

There are successive variants of the canisters. Today, the Tomahawk All-Up-Rounds come in MK14 Mod 2 canisters. Before it came the Mod 1, which had a launch security device for the control of Tomahawk employment, and by the Mod 0, which had a key-operated security device against unwanted launches, as it was meant to carry the now withdrawn nuclear-tipped Tomahawk.

The canister MK21 Mod 3, instead, is a slightly modified MK21 used with the new Standard SM-6 missile.

Canisters have a shell structure is a steel weldment with corrugated steel skins and cast steel end frames. They are fitted with a variety of vital equipment and characteristics, including: adjustable lateral restraint shoes, longitudinal shock isolators, an ablative coated steel baseplate structure, ablative blocks, deluge piping, nitrogen fill piping, cables, a code plug and a Canister Safe and Enable Switch. The Canisters also contain a telemetry antenna and monitoring connection.

The canisters are not simple boxes. They contain precious equipment, and the missile cannot do without its canister. 

Open MK41 cell hatches, showing the empty shafts. Without canisters, the MK41 is little more than a metallic frame.

An overview of the MK14 canister, employed by Tomahawk

The Tactical Lenght MK15 canister, containing the ASROC missile, and showing the MK18 canister adapter that allows the use of shorter canisters in the Strike Lenght cells

Inserting a canister down a MK41 cell

MK41 comes in different lengths, which determine the size of the canisters that can be installed and, consequently, decide which weapons can be integrated.

The canisters have a square base, with a total diameter of 25 inches. Inner diameter of the space for the missile is around 22 inches. There are three canister sizes:

-          170 inches; for self-defense weapons only (Sea Sparrow, ESSM)

-          228 inches; add SM-2 and ASROC

-          264 inches; add Tomahawk, SM-3

These canisters fit into into different length MK41 launchers, obviously. This value refers, effectively, to the heights of the modules to be installed in the ships.

-          Self Defense Launcher is 209 inches

-          Tactical launcher is 266 inches

-          Strike launcher is 303 inches

The Tactical Length canisters, however, can be and are fitted into Strike Length cells with the aid of the MK18 Canister Adapter, a steel weldment with appropriate dog-down connections that serves as a conduit for rocket motor exhaust vented to the plenum. Fitted to the bottom of the shorter canister, it allows it to fit easily down like it was a strike-length canister.   

The deck area of a 8 cell module, instead, remains the same. The short side of the launcher is 81.75 inches, while the long side is 124.63 inches. Depending on their height, empty 8-cell launcher modules weight 26.800 lbs or 29.800 lbs or 32.000 lbs for the Strike Length launcher. 

The old 5-cell plus crane MK41 module. This is no longer produced or employed, as the crane never worked as well as hoped. It remains an impressive bit of kit, though.

 

Using the crane at sea for reloading

The fold-down crane for at-sea reloading of missile cells was contained under deck in a space equivalent to just 3 missile cells, and elevated outwards during reload operations. The requirement was for the replenishment of 10 VLS cells per hour, even in Sea State 5, with the missile canisters being transferred via RAS (UNREP for the Americans) rigs.

Reloading of missile canisters at sea, however, proved always difficult at best, and the ingenious crane, albeit fascinating, was never capable to deal with the larger and heavier canisters, such as the MK14 containing the Tomahawk. The failure of the VLS replenishment at sea is summarized as follows:

The original development of the MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) for cruisers and destroyers in the late 1970’s included a requirement to replenish ten VLS canisters per hour, day or night in Sea State 5 conditions. The system actually installed consisted of the STREAM rig to transfer the VLS canister to the missile ship sliding padeye; then deck handling the canister to a position where a crane could tilt up the canister over an empty cell and then strike the canister down. The crane was a commercial Swedish folding crane. Three canister cells were combined to make stowage for the crane. An elevator raised or lowered the crane. The at sea VLS Unrep technical evaluation discussed in Miller (1992) identified that the crane did not have the capacity to lift Tomahawk VLS canisters; SM-2 VLS transfer rate was three per hour and the pendulum action of the crane limited Unrep to Sea State 3 conditions. The cranes are now in layup.

Eventually, the ambitions of at sea reloading of MK41 cells were abandoned, and the DDG51 of the Flight IIA were never fitted with the crane, instead getting 32 and 64 cells silos. The cranes were at times used during Desert Storm, to aid the correct placement of missile canisters. Desert Storm, in 1991, provided the US Navy with the first experience of wartime reloading of warships fitted with MK41: the USS John Paul Jones was the first warship to receive a wartime reload of Tomahawk missiles, but did so while pierside in Mina Jebel Ali, in the United Arab Emirates.

The closest thing to an at sea wartime reloading was the transfer of shipborne missiles from support vessels to warships in the lee of Masirah, Oman. The ships were motionless in the protected waters, but not moored to the bottom, as it was felt tactically advantageous to be able to move quickly in case of enemy attack.  

Interest in at-sea reloading is not dead, and a solution might come in service in the future, since the impossibility to rearm a major warship without pulling it away from the fight and into enclosed, friendly waters is seen as a major limitation. The logistics of VLS reloading are complex, and require extensive material handling mechanical equipment, time and adequate portside or shipborne facilities. The new Upper Harbor rearming facility built by the Royal Navy at Portsmouth is a good example of structure thought specifically for the replenishment of VLS cells. 

The new, specialized rearming facility built for Royal Navy use, with the two cranes for VLS reloading.

 

During war operations abroad, having at hand such a well-equipped facility could be a real problem, as US documents have underlined for decades.

"double-ended" VLS ships such as AEGIS cruisers and destroyers can be rearmed twice as fast if two cranes are available (a frequent bone of contention at stateside weapons stations). With both cranes swinging canisters and enough forklifts and pier-side handlers to keep up with them, a motivated AEGIS crew can completely reload the ship's VLS systems in one (long) day. Note the optimum requirements, though: a pier of sufficient length and with water alongside to accommodate ships up to 563 feet long and 32+ feet in draft; cranes, forklifts, trucks, and/or flatbed rail rolling stock; and contiguous or near-contiguous cargo ports or airfields. Such a facility is precisely the kind of "logistics node" that the JFMCC will be attempting either to defend or seize early in a regional conflict. When in friendly hands, such a facility is a prime TBM target in its own right, as seen at Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, on 16 February 1991, when an Iraqi Scud impacted within yards of an ammunition pier berthing seven ships, a supply barge, and the USS Tarawa.

An at-sea rearming technique and equipment is part of US Navy ambitions to modernize Underway Replenishment (UNREP) technology, effects and methods. The following describes one of the possible approaches:

The concept for replenishing 15 VLS per hour in Sea State 5, shown in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 centers around a transportable VLS rearming device that is stowed and maintained on the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship. When the combatant ship comes alongside for at-sea rearming or load adjustment, the rearming device is transported from the CLF ship by the new Heavy Unrep rig to the combatant ship sliding padeye along with a team to operate the rearming device. A swing arm at the base of the sliding padeye is used to position the rearming device onto three low profile rails permanently mounted atop the VLS launcher. A hydraulic power unit on the combatant ship powers the swing arm and also the rearming device after it is on the rails. 

The CLF ship will next transfer a loaded VLS canister to the sliding padeye. The canister will be lowered to the swing arm by the sliding padeye and then be released from the transfer rig. The canister will be swung around and be picked off from the swing arm by the rearming device two clamp rings. The canister will be moved by the rearming device to a position over an empty cell. The cell hatch will open and the rearming device will erect the canister to the vertical. The canister will be lowered by a wire rope hoist into the cell. The rig will be disconnected from the end of the canister, the cell hatch will close and the canister will be connected below decks to the VLS circuits. When the VLS rearming or VLS load adjustment is completed, the rearming device and team will be returned to the CLF ship.

 

The above proposal puts the VLS reloading equipment and specialized team not on the warship, as with the early crane, but on the Logistics Ship. The team and the rearming device will move on to the warship to ream at the beginning of each evolution, and will move back to the support vessel at the end.

The threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial strategies and the focus on the Pacific should both work as powerful budget and strategy drivers in the next few years to encourage the US Navy to bring work forwards on UNREP improvement. At sea logistics will be more important than ever, and we can expect to see big increases in capability.

It is worth noticing that the Heavy UNREP equipment envisaged and experimented by the US Navy appears to be very similar to the Heavy RAS equipment being experimented by the Royal Navy at HMS Raleigh in anticipation of adoption on the next generation Solid Support Ships. The wide loads being moved, in terms of bulk, and the weight mentioned (12.000 lbs) are roughly the same values indicated for the Rolls Royce H-RAS. 

 

The US Heavy UNREP equipment

 

The H-RAS facility at HMS Raleigh, in one photo from Dave Sheffield. According to the blog NavalMatters, we can expect an article on the H-RAS activities in november's edition of Navy News. The shuttle resembles that seen in the 12.000 pound mode of the Heavy UNREP kit for the US Navy, but no actual heavy load can be seen. Trials are still at an early stage

A Mk14 Mod 2 Tomahawk canister comes at 6130 pounds. Both the H-RAS and H-UNREP kit would move possibly two canisters per each lift, with a rhythm as high as 25 lifts per hour. While at-sea rearming of Royal Navy VLS ships is not on the cards, the new Solid Support vessels seem set to have the RAS capability to keep the door open for future adoption of adequate kit and methods.

SYLVER   

The European SYLVER vertical launch system follows the same principles of the MK41, but has been developed more recently, has never had any built-in at-sea reloading kit, and has made some different choices. Getting details on SYLVER is much more complex than getting adequate information on MK41, and it has taken me quite a while to collect information which is not yet as complete as I’d like.

SYLVER comes in three main sizes, in addition to the very small, self-defense for small ships A35 launcher. The main modules are the A43, A50 and A70. The number refers to the approximate length of the cells, which vary from 4.3 meters to 7 meters, roughly matching the MK41 Self Defense, Tactical and Strike lengths. The A43 launcher has a total height of 5.3 meters; the A70 is 7.6 meters tall.

DCNS, the maker of SYLVER, proudly notes that SYLVER is significantly lighter than MK41. Early claims were of 30 to 40% weight savings thanks to the use of more modern materials and composite, but this seems over-optimistic, as the declared weight of the 8-cell standard modules goes from 8 tons (A43) to 12 tons (A70).

SYLVER has a smaller deck area footprint, of 2.6 meters x 2.3 meters, while vaunting an exhaust duct which, according to DCNS, is 1.5 times larger than that of the MK41. The larger duct is meant to make the system even safer by expelling gas at lower pressure, allowing simultaneous salvo firing even while one missile has an inadverted restrained launch.

The significant difference in width of a 8-cell module (2.6 meters for SYLVER, against 3,17 meters for MK41) explains why the Euronaval 2012 model of the Type 26 had three 8-cell modules fitted abreast, while the DSEI model only had two MK41 modules sitting abreast. The first combination fits in some 7.8 meters, while the same number of MK41 modules arranged in the same way would require 9.51 meters.

The difference, however, comes at a price: the SYLVER’s cells are only 22 inches wide, 3 inches less than the MK41’s. The difference is very significant, as SYLVER of course needs its own canister, and even assuming that these are thinner, the internal diameter available for the actual missile will inexorably be less than 22 inches offered by the MK41 canisters. 

 

The current DCNS brochure says nothing of the detailed sizes of Sylver, but in older documents emerges that the SYLVER cells are 22 inches wide. Early proposals (i don't know if they went ahead or not) included developing the A35 variant using 25 inches cells, to take ESSM quad-packs and compete with MK41 on the export market. Sounds to me already like a bit of an admission that going for a smaller cell wasn't a winner.  An intermediate lenght A6X was also proposed, but never went ahead.

Although DCNS shows Tomahawk as a possible payload for the A70 launcher in its brochure, it is entirely right to question whether it would be actually possible to integrate it in the European cells. The Tomahawk missile is around 20.5 to 21 inches in diameter, so the space available to fit it, complete with a proper canister, into a 22 inches cell is truly minimal.

Integration would be a challenging affair for physical reasons, as well as for politic, economic and combat system reasons. A wholly new canister would have to be designed, and the space available to do everything that needs to be done would be minimal.

Apparently, besides, A70 canisters are circular, not square like MK41’s. 

Loading a SYLVER A70 canister on a FREMM frigate of the french navy, in an image by DCNS. The canister is circular, not square, so more similar to Russian and Chinese systems than to the MK41! 

 

There is also an unanswered question coming to mind when observing the disposition of SYLVER launchers on warships. On each vessel, the 8-cells SYLVER launchers are always in contact at most only by the short side. This can be observed on Type 45, on the Horizon destroyers of Italy and France, on the FREMM frigates and on the Formidable-class frigates of Singapore. The long side of the launcher modules is never in contact: there is always an important space of deck between one launcher and another. 

 

SYLVER A50 modules on the Type 45: two rows of three modules each, touching by the short side, but well distanced when it comes to the long side. 

 

The silo on Horizon-class destroyers. This, specifically, is Italy's Caio Duilio. The 48 launchers are arranged in three rows of 2 modules each. Very different arrangement than Type 45's one, but still there is significant space left between the rows on the long side. Compare all this space to a 4 or 8 module MK41 silo: why all this space wasted?

 

On the italian aircraft carrier, Cavour, in a photo by Chinomar, from the website Mezzi Militari Italiani

On Singapore's FORMIDABLE frigates

On Charles De Gaulle

This is not observed in MK41 silos, which show a very high density, with the separate modules in direct contact. One is left to wonder if the separation between modules is a choice made by all customers so far, or an unavoidable necessity.

Perhaps coming from the fact that the canisters themselves are thinner...? 

If this is the case, the lower deck-area of SYLVER becomes much less of a truth: basically, fitting more SYLVER modules than MK41 ones, in the same deck area, is only possible so long as the modules are installed abreast, like on Type 26. In a large multi-module silo, or in any case when the long sides should touch, a lot of space ends up wasted, for some reason.

The right choice?

It is not easy to judge which system represents the right choice for the Royal Navy. I’ve already discussed in an earlier article about this complex topic, and much of the uncertainty is due to the fact that it is not clear yet what weaponry the RN hopes to fit into the VLS cells. Of course we can assume the Tomahawk in the short to medium term and the SPEAR Capability 5 (also known as UK-FR Future Cruise and Anti-Ship missile) in the longer term (not before 2030).

For the Tomahawk, its eventual successor (American design) and for other possible weapons (LRASM?), the MK41 would be the most appropriate, if not the only choice.

Going for commonality with the US Navy would be, in my opinion, more advantageous and more wise in a long-term analysis, despite the SPEAR 5 work with France. It is very hard to see how investment in SYLVER and in its weapons by UK and France (and eventually Italy) could ever match the level of support and attention that MK41 will receive from the US, Japan and other export customers. In terms of logistics and future-proofing, MK41 would make greater sense.

It is true that it is hard to see at the moment which American weapons, beyond Tomahawk, could ever be selected for the (british) Type 26. With CAMM covering the air defence role, with Sea Viper on Type 45 in the higher tier, it is hard to see british interest for any of the American SAMs for at least a few decades.

When the UK will eventually acquire an anti-ballistic missile capability (because I believe it is a matter of “when it becomes necessary”, more than a question of “if”), we can expect that the Type 45 will be the platform of choice, so being able to embark SM-3 is also not immediately relevant.

As for LRASM, the missile’s future isn’t even certain yet, and the UK will likely not procure it, unless the SPEAR 5 ambitions collapse.

However, there are logistic, support and future-proofing reasons to go MK41. Being tied to the US Navy is the most promising way to ensure that the weapon system is not without support, evolution paths, and new weapons.

I don’t see many reasons to go with the SYLVER. Certainly not Scalp Navale, which is a less performing, more expensive alternative to Tomahawk that the RN frankly does not need at all.

The main cause of interest is the SPEAR Capability 5 missile, but this is little more than a concept, and the few studies started so far are all aimed at a 2030 entry in service, which might easily slip further to the right. If the currently envisaged timelines are respected, the first Type 26 by then will be approaching the first 10 years of service life. Betting it all on a missile that might or might not come by then, does not seem the right way to go.

The main factor, at this point, is the number of VLS cells. Having 24 instead of 16 is obviously much better and preferable under many points of view. The smaller diameter of the cells, however, which already feels tight today, is a concern for the future.

It would be important to know if the Type 26 design can spare the additional under-deck space which would be needed to replace the banks of CAMM-only cells in the bow silo with an additional MK41 module or two. If these is the possibility to do so, as has been suggested to me (but not confirmed by sufficiently authoritative sources), then my suggestion is to go MK41. CAMM could just be quad-packed into some of the MK41 cells, instead of having its own single-purpose spaces.

Even if such space does not exist, I think adopting MK41 could be, in the end, the best choice, although less evidently so. MK41 promises greater certainties for the future: there’s a much larger and richer customer base investing on it, and it has the physical size advantage. You can be reasonably certain than any missile developed for the 22-inches wide SYLVER cell will fit into the 25-inches MK41, while the opposite simply is not true.    

I suspect this is a reason behind MBDA’s decision to offer European missiles for the MK41. Of course, the main reason is the global diffusion of MK41, but I believe it is nonetheless indicative that MBDA has signed an agreement with Lockheed Martin to integrate European missiles in the MK41 cells, starting with the easier system to transfer, the very interesting Sea Ceptor / CAMM. The greater width of the MK41 cell has allowed Lockheed to develop the Extensible Launching System ExLS: a simple, yet ingenious “launcher within the launcher” which can be slid into MK41 cells (or used as a stand-alone system) to accommodate foreign missile systems, with their canisters and launch electronics. When it first appeared, it was associated with plans for quick MK41 integration of smaller weapons and even countermeasures: the NULKA active radar decoy, a quadpack of RAM Block 2 missiles or a pallet of NLOS surface-strike weapons were all shown as possible payloads.

After being demonstrated with NULKA, the ExLS has now come very much back in the spotlight for its instrumental part in allowing MBDA and Lockheed Martin to get to push-through tests with the CAMM missile in a MK41 cell in very short time. After agreeing to collaborate, in May 2013, the two companies have successfully cleared the first launch trials in September: a record for the slow world of defence technology. This success has been just as quickly rewarded by the selection of CAMM in MK41 cells for the upgrade of the ANZAC class frigates of New Zealand.  

 

CAMM test fired out of an ExLS module clipped into a MK41 standard launcher

It is also worth remembering that the US Navy has already invested in a new generation of Vertical Launch System which share the same base principles but comes with longer, wider cells. The MK57 launcher comes in four-cell modules, and is so far only known for being employed by the sole DDG-1000 Zumwalth-class. These three unique ships will have 20 MK57 modules installed, not in dense silos like on Ticonderoga and Burkes, but in peripheral position along the sides of the hull. 

The new launcher is fully compatible with existing MK41 weaponry and canisters, but offers cells which are 283 inches long and 28 inches wide, with a maximum mass of 9020 lbs. It is a very noticeable increase in all parameters from the MK41 Strike Length.

It is not yet evident which new weapons will require this big space, nor is it likely that the MK57 will replace the MK41 anytime soon. For now, it is tied to a new class of warships which has been cut down to just three hulls. It will be interesting to see if the MK57 becomes part of the requirement for the proposed Arleigh Burke Flight III, or for whatever ship comes next.

The US Navy’s belief, however, seem to be that larger missiles are likely, and while the MK57 is possibly too far ahead of the current requirements, the SYLVER might soon enough fall behind requirements. 

Tankers in the Falklands, C130s to the scrapyard...

Thanks to Tony Osborne's tweeter feed. He is one to follow, if you are not doing it already.

Tony Osborne ‏@Rotorfocus 40m
Tristar retirement still expected in March 14, but RAF has option of six month extension. #avgeeks

Tony Osborne ‏@Rotorfocus 34m @Airtanker will base one Voyager in the Falklands from March after Tristar retirement, but RAF is exploring other tanker options #avgeeks

Tony Osborne ‏@Rotorfocus 35m

A330/Voyager will not fit into hangar at Mount Pleasant airfield, Falkland Islands, among issues #avgeeks

Again i say, could the BAE 146 MK3 become the Falklands tanker after Afghanistan is over...?

Also, one sad but not unexpected news:

Tony Osborne ‏@Rotorfocus 39m

RAF will retire/withdraw four C-130J C5 (short) models during 2016 as part of drawdown of Hercules fleet. #avgeeks

The evolving USMC and USN Aviation Plan

On April 17 this year, the Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives had a hearing on the aviation plans of the services, with the following high-profile witnesses:


• Lieutenant General Charles R. Davis USAF 
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

• Lieutenant General Burt Field 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, USAF

• Rear Admiral Bill Moran USN 
Director of the Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy

• Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle USMC 
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps

• Vice Admiral W. Mark Skinner USN
Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy

• Mr. Michael J. Sullivan
Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government Accountability Office


During the hearing, a juicy information was dropped about the future shape of the fighter/attack fleet of the US Marines Corps, which represents a very noticeable change from earlier plans daring back to the 2010 and 2011 aviation plans. The subject is, of course, the F-35. The US Marines continue to plan for a purchase of 420 aircraft, but the split between F35B and F35C has changed from 340 / 80 to 353 / 67, and the planned number of squadrons has changed very significantly.Let's see how the USMC aviation plan has evolved.


2010 plan
Up to the Memorandum of Understanding for the integration of tactical air fleet between US Navy and USMC, signed in March 2011 by the admiral Gary Roughead, the secretary for the Navy Ray Mabus and the commandant USMC James F. Amos, the USMC planned to operate a force of 420 F35B.
These were to entirely replace the "legacy force" composed by:

7 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet A/C (12 aircraft per squadron)
5 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet D (12 aircraft per squadron)
1 squadron of F/A-18 Hornet C (Reserve) (12 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of AV-8B Harrier (14 aircraft per squadron)

1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of AV-8B and TAV-8B (28 aircraft)
1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of F/A-18 B/C/D (36 aircraft)

with a fleet of:

14 squadrons of F-35B (10 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of F-35B (16 aircraft per squadron)
3 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10 aircraft per squadron)

3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (20 aircraft each)


Post-MOU
Following the signing of the MOU on TACAIR integration, the USMC split its planned buy of F-35s between the B and C variant, with the committment to provide five squadrons of F-35C to complement the 15 US Navy squadrons on the same aircraft, needed to equip all 10 Carrier Air Wings.
This represented an uplift in the CVN responsibility of the USMC, which has so far provided only three squadrons of F/A-18 B/C/D aircraft.

The immediate effect was a change in the number of 10-aircraft F-35B squadrons, which dropped from 14 to 9, as five squadrons were now planned to deploy 10 F-35C each instead.


Today
The new USMC plan detailed in the April hearing is very different, and comes with a significant drop in the overall number of squadrons, probably due to the need to achieve significant savings in the budget.
The USMC now plans to have:

9 squadrons of F-35B (16-aircraft each)
5 squadrons of F-35B (10-aircraft each)
4 squadrons of F-35C (10-aircraft each)
2 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10-aircraft each)
1 Operational Evaluation Squadron (6 F-35B)

2 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (25 aircraft each)
10 F-35C provided for training alongside the USN's own training fleet, probably enabling the US Navy to stand up 16 instead of 15 F-35C squadrons, keeping the total of 20.

The remaining aircraft will be assigned in this way:

58 F-35B
12 F-35C

as Backup Aircraft Inventory

25 F-35B
5 F-35C

as Attrition Replacement Aircraft

The Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) is a reserve of airframes which are rotared into the frontline units to keep them up to strenght while aircrafts undergo scheduled and unscheduled depot-level maintenance, modifications, inspections and repairs.

The Attrition Reserve is an inventory of airframes used to replace unanticipated losses due to peacetime accidents or wartime attrition. The aircrafts can also be used to reconstitute combat units in the event of mobilization. 


The new plan will of course have an impact on Basing plans, as well. When 21 regular squadrons were planned, they were expected to be spread in the following way:

10 squadrons (plus 1 Reserve Sqn) between MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point
5 squadrons plus OEU Sqn in MCAS Yuma (one squadron would actually be stationed to Iwakuni, Japan) 
6 squadrons in MCAS Miramar

Now it seems that both USMC F-35B training squadrons will be home-based in MCAS Beaufort, with the first, VMFAT-501 "Warlords" squadron, transferring from Eglin AFB in January 2014.
The bases will now be in competition to get a share of 18 (instead of 21) Active Component squadrons, and 2 instead of 3 Reserve Component formations.


The US Navy requirement remains set at 40 Active Duty frontline squadrons, with 440 aircraft, spread over 10 Carrier Air Wings.
In the long term, 20 squadrons will have the Super Hornet (12-aircraft per squadron) while 20 (in 2011 planned to be 15 USN + 5 USMC, now 16 + 4) will have the F-35C (10-aircraft per squadron), giving to the standard peacetime air wing a consistency of 44 strike fighter jets. Each carrier wing has two squadrons of F-35C, one squadron of F/A-18E single-seat Super Hornet and one squadron of F/A-18F twin seat.

Two Reserve squadrons (20-aircraft each) are planned, probably one for Super Hornet and one for F-35C.
There is a Fleet Replacement Squadron on each Coast, for both types. FRS have 30 aircraft each.


The transcript of the Hearing is available here.

Arming the Royal Navy of the future

During DSEI, Navy Recognition had the chance to speak with Geoff Searle, program director for the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, and one factor emerged: apparently, there is not a clear plan, at the stage, for arming the Type 26 with a surface to surface missile. At least, there is not a plan that BAE knows: it is always possible that, within the MOD and Royal Navy, thinking is actually at a much more advanced phase, since there is a long running program for the definition of Future Maritime Fires capability.

At the moment, however, what can be observed is that the Royal Navy does want at least 16 Strike Length VLS cells fitted to the new frigates at build. There just isn’t a precise plan (at least not out in the open) for fitting a specific weapon system in these cells.

More precisely, a definitive choice hasn’t even been made yet about which cells should be fitted: the europen Sylver A70, or the American MK41 system? A choice could be made next year, or later still.

At the same time, the Royal Navy is preparing to fit the Type 45s with the electronics and wiring needed to support the Harpoon Block 1C missile, with four of the destroyers effectively fitted with launchers and missiles taken from the prematurely withdrawn Type 22 Batch 3 frigates.

In addition, a 2012 graphic in a Royal Navy presentation which provided some insight into what programs are included in the famous 10-year Budget Plan, includes an important voice of expenditure detailed as “GWS60 Harpoon sustainment program”, meaning an upgrade and life-extension for the missile currently in service. There is no detail (yet) about the extent of the upgrade, nor an indication of the extent of the life-extension the missile is going to get, but I believe it is fair to assume that the aim of the Sustainment Program would be to delay the OSD for Harpoon all the way to 20230 – 2036.

The 2036 date is not casual: on the current planning assumptions, 2036 is the year in which the last of the Type 23 frigates, armed with Harpoon, leaves active service.

The graphic, which is the only information we have at the moment, does not provide precise numbers on the amount of money that will be devoted to the various programs, but provides a visual indication of when the most of the expenditure is planned, and that is between the 5^th and 9^th year of the 10-year budget. Since the budget covers the period 2011/2012 to 2021/2022, the Harpoon sustainment program should be in full swing in the second half of the current decade. 

This graphic shows the plans the Royal Navy has made for the allocation of its portion of the Core Budget in the 10 years plan. This expenditure is "uncommitted", as there are not yet contracts signed about these programs, but the work is ongoing and the money is allocated. The expenditure for Type 45, CVF and Type 26 is not shown in this graphic as they all are part of the Committed core budget.

NOTE: for an in-depth analysis of the workings of the 10-year budget and of the above graphic, see my earlier article.

The graphic also shows the Future Maritime Fires System expenditure, roughly starting from the fourth year of the Budget. The main item of FMFS is the new medium gun to be fitted to the Type 26 frigates, and in fact, in compliance with the general indication coming from the graphic, the selection of the new 127 mm gun (either the Oto Melara/Babcock 127/64 Lightweight or the MK45 Mod 4 127/62 from BAE/United Defense) is expected next year. There is no telling, at the moment, if FMFS also includes the purchase of new missiles: while missiles (and even the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition) are all part of the study, there is no evidence suggesting that they are part of the funded program in addition to the new main gun. The relatively small amount of money suggested by the graphic makes me think that, for the moment, the budget just covers the guns.

It is anyway in the FMFS voice that the long-running requirement for a Future Surface to Surface Guided Weapon has been likely folded into. The british requirement is indicated under the very generic acronym SSGW (surface to Surface Guided Weapon) and has been around, in a shape or another, from the early 90s. An SSGW system was part of the Type 45 planned mission fit, but was notoriously written off from the list of requirements for the AAW destroyers for the time being. The detailed requirements are not known, but according to some sources, the ambition included developing a rocket boosted-weapon for long range anti-submarine attack as well as providing an anti-ship and land-strike missile. The anti-submarine rocket would restore a capability the Royal Navy has missed for decades, ever since the old IKARA system was retired from service without a replacement. Comparable weapons of this kind in the world include the American ASROC and the Italian MILAS: these rocket-propelled torpedoes enable a frigate to immediately attack a submarine contact at ranges of over 30 kilometers, even if the helicopter is unavailable. They are a good solution for the need to hit time-critical targets at range without having to send the helicopter in the air all the time, and they are good at filling the many gaps in helicopter coverage that come up in a rolling 24 hours period. The Type 23 and 26, which will relay on the big Merlin helicopter for ASW work, and that carry a single such machine, would appear to badly need such a gap-filler, since a single helo can’t be in the air all the time, and obviously can’t be expected to be always in the right place at the right moment. Despite this consideration, it is fair to assume that it will be really tough for the royal navy to develop or even just adopt this kind of very single-role, highly-specialized weapon.

Certain is, instead, the requirement for a genuinely multi-role missile capable to hit enemy warships but also able to strike targets well inland. The new missile will be vertically launched, and it is behind the selection of Strike Length cells on the Type 26. 
The idea seem to be that the old MK8 Mod 1 gun and the old Harpoon missile will be around as long as the Type 23 is in service, which under current plans means 2036. At that point (or by that point) the new Medium Gun can be expected to be retrofitted to the Type 45 to standardize the fleet back on a single main gun type, and the 45s could finally receive their own Strike Lenght cells, losing Harpoon in exchange for new capability. 
There is also the chance that MK41 cells make their debut on Type 45 much earlier than 2030, if the ongoing assessment of the T45s as anti-ballistic missile platforms evolves into a program for the acquisition of kinetic ABM capability.  

With the RAF and with France

The only new anti-ship missile there is currently talk of, is the UK-France Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FC ASW). And to say the truth, it is not like there is much talking going on about it in the open. This new weapon was conceived under the framework of the UK/French joint Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation agreed at Lancaster House in November 2010, but only came to the light in early 2012, when the governments of France and United Kingdom disclosed its existence and announced that a two-year seed contract had been awarded to MBDA in December 2011. The contract was signed by the French Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) with MBDA UK and MBDA France, on behalf of both countries.

Currently, we are at a very early stage: the contract covers initial studies over the concepts, technologies and system options that could be employed to bring to life the new weapon, or family of weapons, which is destined to replace cruise land attack and anti-ship missiles currently in service.

In practice, Storm Shadow, Harpoon and Exocet would all be replaced with the weapon(s) that come out of this joint development. Perhaps even Tomahawk would be replaced by this new missile.

In the first quarter of this year, a first selection was made between the concepts emerged so far, with around six being brought forwards for further study and development. The approaches being considered to make this new weapon survivable and lethal against ever improving air defence systems (mostly of Russian design) essentially come down to stealthness and to very high speeds, with Mach 3 having been mentioned more than once in recent MBDA concept works, such as PERSEUS and, more recently HOPLITE.

The aim of the joint project is to prepare the new weapon (or family of weapons) in service sometime between 2030 and 2035. 

Among the requirements that this new weapon will have to satisfy, there’s clearly the capability to be launched from vertical cells on warships, from airplanes and almost certainly from submarine’s torpedo tubes as well.

Being intended also as a Storm Shadow replacement, the FC ASW project is part of the Selective Precision Effect At Range programme of the RAF, as Capability 5.

SPEAR Capability 4 is about the mid-life upgrade and life extension of Storm Shadow. This project, which once again is jointly sustained with France, should start soon enough and aims to keep the missile relevant and effective out to the 2030s. France confirmed in its own White Paper, released earlier this year, that the joint work on Storm Shadow (Scalp, in French service) will be funded.

Together with the Harpoon sustainment programme, this seem to be intended to “hold the ground” before the new system developed under the Capability 5 headline does arrive.

Sylver or MK41?

I first of all invite you to give a look at the following presentation about MK41, which will give you a much better idea of what a VLS system is and how it works: presentation by Mark Zimmerman. 

With the Type 26 frigate, we are back to a debate which never really ended ever since it was opened by the attempts of the Royal Navy to get MK41 VLS systems for the Type 45, attempts that were frustrated by European political considerations and by the worries connected to the possible costs and technical challenges of integrating the European Aster missile in a VLS cell made in America.

The problem is now back on the table for the Type 26, and a decision has not yet been taken.

It is clear that, if the Royal Navy has no real hopes to get a missile into the Strike Length cells before SPEAR Capability 5 comes of age, going Sylver A70 might make sense: since the FC ASW missile is developed jointly with France, compatibility with the Sylver VLS system will be a requirement from the very first moment. The French have adopted the Sylver A70 on their new FREMM frigates, and the same launcher will be expected, in the future, to welcome the new missile. It is to be seen, though, if this is enough of a justification for going again with the Sylver line of VLS systems.

In the short term, in fact, Sylver A70’s only weapon is the Scalp Navale cruise missile, ordered in 250 pieces by the French armed forces. This “European Tomahawk” seems not as capable as the Tomahawk itself, especially the most recent TLAM Block IV, while it is much more expensive, as is to be expected for a new weapon, which has not been (and perhaps never will be) produced in the same huge numbers as the Tomahawk. France is planning to purchase some 250 missiles in four separate orders. 50 missiles will be encapsulated for torpedo firing from the new nuclear attack submarines of the French fleet, with entry in service in 2017, while the rest will be for vertical launch from the A70 VLS cells on the FREMM frigates. The expected cost is 910 million euro, and done the math, the Tomahawk is a much, much cheaper option for the Royal Navy.

Of course, the A70 cells can also be used to embark Aster missiles, but it is a bit of a waste since these only need five meters deep cells (the A50 module) and not the full seven meters of the A70 VLS module.

Until SPEAR 5 eventually happens, the only use of A70 cells eventually fitted to Type 26 would be as launchers for the Scalp Naval: but there is no reason at all to justify the purchase of a more expensive, less capable “clone” of Tomahawk, establishing two separate logistic lines.

Adopting the MK41 Strike Lenght VLS used by the US Navy, instead, opens the door to the possible integration in the Type 26 combat system of a huge variety of weapons, including the full range of surface to air missiles employed by the Americans, plus Tomahawk, ASROC and, in a not distant future, the new LRASM anti-ship and strike missile.

Adopting the MK41 would, in my opinion, offer the greatest insurances for the future. As it is destined to remain the launcher of choice of the US Navy for many more decades, the MK41 won’t be short of support and will be the launcher for which the greatest number of weapon systems will be certified. The sole fact of being fully ready to employ the Tomahawk Block IV is an important consideration, as the TLAM has effectively become the weapon of choice in all military operations. The Royal Navy tried to secure funding for the addition of MK41 cells and vertical launch Tomahawks on the Type 45s already in the early 2000s: the attempt was unsuccessful back then, but there are good chances that it would be successful in a new try.

Gaining the capability to fire Tomahawks from surface ships as well as from submarines would mean having more platforms fully capable to influence events ashore, well inland. It would simplify planning, as it would be much easier to bring a launcher platform in the area of a crisis, and it would not tie a precious nuclear submarine into a “launch box”, a small area of sea where the SSN stations and waits for the order of launching a missile against targets ashore. In the future, the small, precious fleet of SSNs could be needed to cover many other tasks, so avoiding the limbo of the “launch box” would help meeting the other commitments.

There is also an important financial factor at play: an SSN is an expensive launch platform, which is not always necessary. Against an enemy with capabilities as limited as Libya’s, there was no real need to covertly deliver strike missiles from an undetectable submarine: a cheaper surface ship could have done the job almost as safely.

Again, the Tomahawk capsule for torpedo tube firing adds several hundred thousand dollars to the price of every single missile, compared to the Vertical launch variant used on ships from MK41 cells.

Strike Lenght cells aren't an easy fit: they go down into the ship for 7 to 9 meters, so they can't be fitted everywhere.

Lockheed Martin has introduced the very smart idea of the ExLS insert, which is an "adaptor" which can be slid into MK41 cells, with the electronics and canisters made for missiles not initially thought for MK41. An ExLS with quadpack is being validated for use with CAMM. The ExLS can also be used, in some cases, as a stand-along launching system. An ExLS Standalone with three CAMM cells is being jointly developed by LM and MBDA.

The first test ejection of a CAMM missile from a MK41 cell fitted with ExLS module.

Ultimately, Tomahawk has proven to be a highly useful, highly requested and highly useable conventional strike weapon. When TLAM was first purchased, specifically for use on submarines, the british armed forces didn’t think they would end up using it so much, so often. TLAM was almost conceived as a conventional arm of the policy of submarine-based deterrence, but operational experience has proven that it is far more than just that, as Dr. Lee Willett wrote in his essay “TLAM and british strategic thought”. The introduction of the Tactical Tomahawk, the Block IV, has only made the TLAM even more useable, and further improvements are being jointly developed by the US and the UK, including the Joint Multi-Effect Warhead System, which couples fragmentation effect with enhanced bunker-busting capability, making the missile capable to engage pretty much any kind of target. Importantly, TLAM is evolving to be able to engage even relocatable and moving targets, with Third Party In-Flight Retargeting capability already demonstrated, also during HMS Astute’s TLAM firing trials in the US.

There is every reason to consider an expansion in the number of Tomahawks available to the MOD (thought to remain at a total of around 60 to 65 rounds) and, critically, in the number of launch platforms. 

A Tomahawk is launched from a MK41 cell on a US Navy warship. Notice the blast of the rocket venting upwards and wooshing out of the opening in the middle of the launch module. CAMM removes this complexity by adopting the ingenious Cold Launch feature: a piston powered by compressed air ejects the missile and shoots it around 100 feet into the air before the Sea Ceptor's rocket ignites. CAMM, however, is an exception, not the rule: the other missiles need a VLS system, complete with the exhaust system.

The adoption of MK41 cells on Type 26 would be the solution. It would also be a reliable parachute for the Royal Navy, was something to happen with the development or procurement of SPEAR Capability 5: with the weapon potentially more than two decades away from entering service, I don’t think the RN can shape the new ships to be only focused on the hope of getting this particular European product. Was the program to die in future budget cuts, and the Royal Navy had fitted Sylver cells, the alternatives would be very few: the Navy would most likely end up having to fork out new money to try and adapt an American missile to the Sylver system.

Since MBDA and Lochkeed Martin are now collaborating to integrate European weapons in the MK41 launcher, starting with the Sea Ceptor missile, also known as CAMM, I believe there is every reason to go with the proven MK41. After signing an agreement last May, the two companies have very rapidly made tangible progress, and demonstrated in early September a first ejection sequence from an ExLS quadpack inserted in a MK41 cell.

Considering that the Type 26 design is still to be completed, and keeping in mind that SPEAR Cap 5 is many years away, there is all the time to make sure that the missile can fit into the MK41 cells when the day comes. This would ensure the best capability for the new frigate, both in the near term and in the long term.

Anti-ship capability: timeframes do not match

Tomahawk is a ready-to-go solution available to give the Type 26 a punch against land targets, from day one at entry in service, if the MOD will want and find the money for it. There is also the option of adapting the Fire Shadow loitering munition for vertical launch, MBDA says. Fire Shadow only has a range of some 150 km, but it can loiter over a target area for six to ten hours, sending imagery intelligence back to the ship and denying an area to the enemy by being ready to strike as soon as one shows up. It would be a great capability to have, although completely different in nature from the long-range reach offered by the cruise missile.

What about anti-ship capability in the fleet, though?

A new vertical-launch missile, especially if large enough to require strike length cells (which means tubes with a depth under deck that ranges between 7 and 9 meters, meaning some three deck levels) could never be fitted to the Type 23 frigates, which just do not have the space for such a VLS system.

If the missile is longer than around 5 meters, it won’t fit the Sylver A50 cells employed on the Type 45 destroyers, either, but the Type 45’s VLS silo has been built to a design and size values that make it possible to add a further 16 cells to the current 48, and all the cells (newly-fitted and existing ones) could be Strike Length if the need was identified.

The Harpoon currently in use is not a Vertical Launch missile. It can only be fired by the well known stacks of tube launchers employed on the Type 23s. The Royal Navy uses quadruple launchers, but the canister-launchers can also be stacked in couples, or even used singularly. The Type 45 destroyer has been built with space and fittings arrangements for mounting a couple of quadruple Harpoon launchers behind the Aster missile silos, and four of the six vessels will receive their fit of Harpoons in the next future, the MOD has confirmed.

Observation of the current Type 26 design, however, suggests that it is not possible to install the conventional stacks of canister launchers (used not just by Harpoon, but by the likes of Exocet, Otomat TESEO, PRBS-15 and Naval Strike Missile). Observing the images and the models showcased so far, there does not seem to be any adequate allocation of space for the installation of the launchers. On the Type 26, the typical locations in which such an installation normally happens (amidship between radar mast and funnel, or, in british style, behind the main gun/ VL missile silo) do not appear to be properly dimensioned and kept clear of obstacles. In particular, the space between the sensors mast and funnel does appear to be really too restricted. And effectively, the conventional launcher for anti-ship missiles was last seen in the very first concept pictures for Type 26: as the design progressed, they vanished.

The twin quadruple launchers commonly used by current-generation western anti-ship missiles were clearly shown on the very first Type 26 design. Soon, they vanished.

Today's Type 26 has changed a lot, and improved a lot.

The current arrangements of the ship's spaces and armament suggest that the Royal Navy wants to make the big step with the new frigate, moving entirely to vertical launch weaponry.

While the decision to move fully to vertical launch makes perfect sense, the Royal Navy is going to find itself in trouble because of timeframes that do not match.

The Type 26 frigate will, under current plans, begin to entry into service from around 2021, and will then replace, one for one, the Type 23s at a rhythm of roughly one per year all the way out to 2036.

With the Harpoon apparently incapable to move from the Type 23 retiring to the Type 26 entering in service in replacement, the number of royal navy ships fitted with an anti-surface capability will shrink dramatically from the third T23 onwards (assuming that the Harpoons removed from the first two Type 23s would move on to the last two Type 45 destroyers).

With the risk of having to wait until 2030 or 2035/36 before a new missile is inducted, the Type 26 could be without an anti-surface weapon for over a decade, and the Royal Navy could go down to as few as six or seven vessels fitted with such a capability, before a replacement comes with SPEAR Cap 5.

Alternatives?

In theory, there are alternatives to a Type 26 without anti-ship capability for a decade. Going MK41 with the VLS cells would keep the door open for adoption of the LRASM, for example, which the US Navy is developing and trialing right now as a solution to its own Harpoon problem. The US Navy is, in many ways, are already in trouble for an acute shortage of anti-ship capability on its surface vessels. The old Harpoon is seen as increasingly outdated and ineffective against modern decoys and missile defences, and the number of ships fitted with it in the American fleet is much lower than one would think: attempts to develop a vertical launch Harpoon never went ahead, and the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers have not been fitted with Harpoon launchers ever since the Flight IIA production lot started.

The US Navy is, in many ways, in the situation that the Royal Navy seems doomed to experience in the 2020s, and is trying to take swift action with LRASM to remove this dangerous gap in capability.

The alarming fact is that the US Navy at least still has submarine-launched and air-launched Harpoon. The Royal Navy lost the first capability in 2003, and the second in 2009/10, when the Nimrod, last british air platform with a heavy anti-ship missile, was withdrawn from service.

Unfortunately, even the adoption of MK41 cells does not automatically remove the anti-ship missile problem: it is hard to imagine the Royal Navy having the money for a substantial investment in an interim anti-ship missile, while simultaneously having to keep spending on Harpoon and on the development of SPEAR Cap 5.

A large ship-launched anti-ship missile is an important capability, but a bit of a niche one, which hasn’t seen much use in the operations the RN has been a part of. Seeing how complex it is to get funding even for an expanded Tomahawk arsenal, despite it being used all the time, arguing for more investment for the anti-ship niche is likely to be a desperate, hopeless struggle.

One solution could come, once more, via Tomahawk. The solution could be the Maritime Interdiction Multimission capability proposal, also known as Multi Mission Tomahawk. The MMT would introduce a moving-target seeker and an upgraded data link to the Tomahawk Block IV, turning it into an hunter-killer weapon capable to locate and pursue moving targets including warships out at sea.

The MMT idea has been around since 2009, and has been briefly brought back in the spotlight in August 2012, when the US Navy and Raytheon were reported as “close” to going ahead with the development of an anti-ship capability package for the TLAM Block IV.

Early data for the “Maritime Interdiction” missile, released by the US Navy, assumed that the modified Block IV would be able to search for targets in an area of 30 square nautical miles, accounting for possible errors in the position of the target supplied by third-party directors and, of course, for the movement of the target at speeds of up to 30 knots. The range of the missile for such a complex anti-ship engagement would be around 500 nautical miles. The navigation system, the data link and seeker would have to be reinforced to ensure the missile can find its target even through jamming and decoys.  

The Multi-Mission Tomahawk was intended to be US Navy Interim Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare solution, but as of April 2013 the US Navy seems to have abandoned the Tomahawk Block IV conversion, while DARPA-funded work on the Lockheed Martin LRASM A (a weapon derived from the JASSM cruise missile) is ongoing, with a successful test on August 27 that involved launch from a B-1 bomber against a barge loaded with empty containers acting as target. The missile hit the containers as expected. Preliminary work to demonstrate launch from MK41 vertical cells was completed on September 4, and next year, LRASM should be fired twice from MK41 VLS cells, demonstrating its ship-launch capability. A submarine-launch variant could follow.

For the Royal Navy, a Tomahawk solution would have been easier to acquire, because it wouldn’t have been a total departure from established logistics and knowledge basis, and it would have fitted in the idea of expanding TLAM attack capability, as the missile retains full utility as a long range land strike weapon, indeed adding greater capabilities against complex, mobile targets.

The Tomahawk solution could still happen, though: the US Navy is still working on choosing its next move. LRASM could be chosen without a competition, but Raytheon and Boeing are ready with their own proposals if the pentagon decides to give a chance to other systems.

Sea Ceptor for everyone?

If the anti-ship segment of the RN capability is close to extinction, there is at least some relief in the Anti-Air missile arena. With an order placed for the production of CAMM Sea Ceptor missiles, the Royal Navy can now work to get it on all relevant platforms.

In March this year, a study should have been concluded, on the costs connected with eventual installation of Sea Ceptor on the new Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. There is no open-source evidence of the results of the study, nor can we realistically expect to see an investment made any time soon to fit the missile system, but it remains an option. The carriers are fitted with the Long Range Radar and with the Artisan 3D radar (Type 997 in RN service), both of which could feed targeting information to the missiles, which are, differently from Sea Wolf, fire-and-forget and would pursue their targets autonomously after being launched, with the aid of information relayed from the ship via secure Data Link.

The first platform that will get the Sea Ceptor in current planning is the Type 23 frigate. The first vessel should swap Sea Wolf for the new CAMM during a refit in 2016. The ship has not yet been identified. The work to be carried out will involve the removal of some five tons of Sea Wolf cabinets and old electronics, plus the two guidance radars, in exchange for a far more modern, smaller and lighter data link system.

The missile silo on the bow will be modified with the removal of the 32 Sea Wolf tubes and the installation of CAMM electronics. The Sea Ceptor missiles will be fitted in quadpacks into 12 sealed wells to protect the canisters from the sea water washing over the deck. The number of missiles carried will be boosted to a maximum of 48.  

On Type 23, the CAMM will be feed data on the targets by the Type 997 radar, which is due to replace the earlier Type 996 over the coming years, with HMS Iron Duke having received the first-of-class fit already.

The Sea Ceptor fit will then be physically moved out of the Type 23s as they are withdrawn from service, and installed on the new Type 26. The images and models shown so far about the new frigate show that the 48 air-defence missiles will be distributed in rows of 6 canister-launchers each, with four such rows arranged in the bow missile silo and a further four rows aft of the funnel mast.

The canister-launchers are weather-proof as they have been developed to be used (from around 2020) by the Army as replacement for the elderly Rapier, so they do not appear to have additional protection: on the Type 26, they are installed high enough in the superstructure to be protected by the sea spray without having to be sealed into enclosed wells like on the Type 23.

The Type 997 radar will also move on from T23 to T26.

Around 2016 there will also be the chance to transform a potential problem in an opportunity. The Royal Navy has decided that it will withdraw from service the Goalkeeper CIWS system, to standardize instead on the Phalanx (36 mounts + 5 new on order). This is due to the fact that the number of Goalkeeper mounts in the fleet by then will have fallen dramatically in number, due to HMS Illustrious bowing out in 2014 with her three mounts, leaving the sole Albion and Bulwark with a total of four mounts (although Albion’s ones have already been removed as she was put into reserve and mothballed).

In 2016 it is planned that the two LPDs will trade places in the fleet, with HMS Albion being refitted and regenerated to return into active service, while HMS Bulwark enters her own period of mothball (unless the SDSR, as I personally hope, allocates the 20 or so million a year needed to operate the second LPD as well).

The LPDs should both receive their Type 997 radar during the next refits, and they can be expected to be fitted with a couple of Phalanx CIWS in replacement of Goalkeeper.

The opportunity I see, however, is that of fitting the bow CIWS on top of the deckhouse, instead of on top of the small superstructure used by Goalkeeper. There might be some problem since the two manned GAM-BO1 20mm light guns for surface close defence are located up there as well, but it should not be an insurmountable issue. The GAM-BO1 are arguably well in need of being replaced by the DS30M remotely operated 30mm gun mounts being adopted throughout the fleet, as well.

Phalanx has no under-deck penetration, while the much larger Goalkeeper turret takes one deck of space. By removing Goalkeeper and relocating the frontal CIWS, the LPDs would have a little bit of precious free space on the bow for the fitting of CAMM missile cells.

This would of course have a cost, but it would massively increase the survivability of the LPDs against all kind of threats: the Royal Navy is fully aware of how vulnerable these large ships can be, especially when docked down for landing craft operations. Air attacks, swarm attacks with FIACs and missiles are all very serious threats, and CAMM would counter them all (the missile has a secondary anti-surface attack capability, good against fast and suicide attack boats).  

The LPD problem that could be an opportunity: replacing Goalkeeper

The small superstructure on the bow, currently occupied by Goalkeeper's under deck segment, offers precious space that could be used to fit CAMM cells.

 

Moving Phalanx on top of the deckhouse could be a problem because of the old GAM-BO1 gun mounts. Imagine doing this with a Phalanx mounts a few meters away, buzzing and taking aim and perhaps opening fire. The GAM-BO1 could and should really be replaced by the unmanned 30mm mounts as on the rest of the fleet

On the export front, there is some initial sign of interest from Italy. The Italian army will need to replace its Skyguard batteries in the near future, and CAMM is seen as an attractive option. MBDA Italy and MBDA UK could end up collaborating on the land variant of CAMM, with MBDA Italy looking at the command and targeting system, introducing elements of the SPADA 2000 air defence batteries. For sure, CAMM is a very interesting missile system, with a great potential and very good chances of gaining international success.