Wednesday, September 11, 2013

News from DSEI 2013 - UPDATE



Type 26 frigate



The Type 26 design is progressing towards finalization, but there are nonetheless noticeable changes from what was showcased at Euronaval 2012: the most evident is change is the return of the Chinook-capable flight deck, which was a feature of the very first Type 26 design, but not of the 2012 variant, which instead had a shorter deck, limited to the Merlin. The larger flight deck comes with “wells” at the corners (again like in the very first design) to hide the docking equipment from the radar and to provide machine gun positions for self defence of the platform.

The return of the huge flight deck is not without consequences: the whole superstructure was moved ahead by a fair bit to accomodate a larger flight deck, and this means a more "cramped" bow. A raised protection to shield the VLS missile cells on the bow from the waves has in fact appeared, and the Strike Lenght cells have reduced in number, from 24 to 16.
If the large flight deck is a requirement on which the MOD is unwilling to make compromises, the price the pay is a reduction in VLS cells (and, but hopefully no, perhaps a reduction in the size of the mission bay too?). Frankly, while unpleasant, it is not that surprising. The Type 26 is no longer the 6 or 7000 tons leviathan once envisaged. It is only going to be some 3 to 4 meters longer than an italian FREMM, and it is supposed to displace up to one thousand tons less, while coming with a huge range (so lots of fuel), a 60 days logistic endurance and a mission bay for up to 11 containers or up to four 11.5 meter boats and a few containers, plus accommodation for some 190 people.
There is no space to spare, in other words. Fitting it all in 148 meters and 5400 tons is quite a big feat in itself.

BAE has released a fantastic new video which also shows us the very first official images of the boat area, showing the massive doors on the two sides, the four 11.5 meters boats, a storage module roughly equivalent to a couple of 20’ containers in the middle and “grabber” motion-stabilized cranes like those mounted on Type 45. The ones on Type 26, however, will obviously have different arms, different size and different lift capacity, all much greater than on the 45s.
A second, smaller opening in the port side of the ship is also visible, which might be an access point to the hangar and to the rest of the mission deck, but at the moment there are no details about it.




Another easily noticeable change is a modification in the arrangement of the CAMM missile cells in the funnel mast area. The number of cells (24) is unchanged, but they have been moved back towards the stern, to a position more “clean” of the funnel itself. 



The new images released by BAE, showing the current design


The changes are best seen in the model of the ship displayed at DSEI, which we can admire in the photos by Xav, up at Navy Recognition. So, go look right away: http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1228

Copyright Navy Recognition

The photos of the model on show at DSEI, by Navy Recognition, show the return of the Chinook-sized flight deck and the reduction in the number of the VLS Strike Lenght cells. Unchanged is the number of CAMM cells, 48 in total.
BAE Systems has chosen the first sub-contractors: Rolls Royce, as expected, is in to supply the MT30 gas turbine (1 per ship) and, together with Daimler as part of the TOGNUM joint venture, to provide the MTU diesel generators (4 per ship). The propulsion arrangement is confirmed as CODLOG.
David Brown Gear Systems Ltd will provide the gearbox and Rohde & Schwarz has been tapped for the integrated communications system: http://www.baesystems.com/article/BA...t-ship-awarded

BAE and the MOD are also planning to begin work on in-service support arrangements for the new frigate class before it is even built: significant economic efficiencies could be obtained by giving stone-like stability to the programme from the very start, ordering a full block of 13 sets of major subsystems and also agreeing a 10-year support deal. See: http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/mil-log/dsei-2013-bae-system-initiates-type-26-support/

There is growing foreign interest in the Type 26, too: talks are ongoing with 8 different countries, with combined requirements worth up to 30 vessels. Of course, it remains an uphill struggle for so many reasons, but I think it’s been a long time since a british warship has been so much at the center of international interest: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0...-interest.html

UPDATE: Navy Recognition has a video interview with Geoff Searle, program director for the Type 26. In the interview, he confirms that the Mission Bay can be used to embark "around 10 containers", or four large boats, but it could also be used to extend the capacity of the hangar to support embarkation of UAVs.
A less pleasant news, not really surprising, is that there is not yet a clear plan for arming the Strike Lenght cells of the Type 26. Tomahawk remains an obvious option, but replacing Harpoon with a vertical launch, multi-role missile will have to become a priority in coming years, if we want these warships to actually be capable of doing their job.






CAMM missile production order 
The MOD, in the meanwhile, has placed a 250 million contract to begin the production of the CAMM missile, which will arm the Type 23 frigates from 2016 as a replacement for Sea Wolf, and will then move on to the Type 26: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/r...ns-500-uk-jobs


MBDA and Lochkeed Martin announce successful CAMM launch from MK41 cell

In record time, MBDA and Lochkeed Martin have made a successful CAMM launch from a MK41 VLS cell using the Extensible Launching System (ExLS)

MBDA's Tweet below: 
Announcing successful first missile launch from a MK41 launcher using ExLS

The ExLS launcher is built of lightweight composite structure attached with drop-in/snap-in connectors and mechanical interfaces as the existing canisters. The launcher features Open System Architecture and Open Software and Cell Based Electronics for rapid interface with the ship's combat management system.
This design enables the rapid deployment of completely assembled weapons and munitions, such as the Nulka, developed BAE Systems Australia, RAM Block II short range air defense missiles or Precision Attack Missiles (PAM), to augment traditional weapons designed for the VLS missions – such as the Standard SM-2 and 3 and Tomahawk, Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESS) and Anti-Submarine VL-ASROC weapon.
Computer graphic image of ExLS modules carrying: 4x NULKA countermeasure rounds, a NLOS-LS missile launch box and RAMBLK2. The ExLS is slotted inside normal MK41 VLS cells and allows the speedy integration of different missile systems with their own All-Up Round canisters. CAMM has now been demonstrated in a similar arrangement, with four missiles packed into a MK41 cell.

A stand-alone ExLS three-cell launcher for CAMM is being developed for ships too small to employ MK41 VLS systems, so MBDA and Lochkeed are both evidently convinced they are in for significant international interest.

There is still time to remove the "CAMM-only" missile cells from the bow silo of Type 26 frigates and replace with 16 more MK41 cells... If there is enough space (depth-wise, critically) in the Type 26 hull for doing it, adding sixteen more MK41 Strike lenght cells would be a dramatic improvement and increase in flexibility. 6 quad-packed cells could still take all of the planned 24 CAMM rounds, and still offer 10 more cells for other weapons, including Tomahawk.




A decision on the new Royal Navy's Medium Gun should be made next year

The MOD has received the two final offers, one by BAE / United Defense with the MK45 Mod 4 127/62 mm gun, and one by Oto Melara / Babcock with the 127/64 LW.
BAE's offer includes the Standard Guided Projectile; and Oto Melara counters with the VULCANO guided long range family of shells, along with the highly automated ammunition magazine.
For details of the guns and ammunition, see here: http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2013/07/a-new-golden-era-for-naval-guns.html

Report by AviationWeek: http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3ad3e6ae5f-fc91-4f63-ae93-7b57c99bb5ba


Planning for Carrier Enabled Power Projection 

The Royal Navy is finalizing new plans for the Air Wing packages for the new aircraft carriers, keeping in mind the (hopefully only initial) size of the F35 fleet and the need to integrate the LPH role in the tasks of the carrier.
This means coming up with a "Fleet Carrier" package which would include 24 F35B, 9 Merlin HM2 in ASW role and a further 4 or 5 in AEW role; as well as with a Littoral Maneuver / LHA package which would add to a squadron of F35Bs the support of Merlin HC4, Chinook, Wildcat and Apache helicopters.

This planning work affects the final organisation of the flight deck. Helicopter operations spots, once planned to be only in six huge areas will be rearranged to achieve up to 10 spots to aid the ability to launch a reinforced company of Marines (up to 250) in a single wave of medium helicopters (Merlin HC4).

Report: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_11_2013_p0-615007.xml


Important contracts expected in the fighter jets arena 

Ministers at DSEI indicated that they expect to confirm the first large order for F35B jets for the first frontline squadron (617 Sqn RAF) in the coming months.


Always in the "coming months" they expect that a contract for the launch of actual AESA radar initiative for the Typhoon will be finally signed and announced.


In addition, minister Dunne downplayed the possibility of the UK adopting a split-type order of F35s jets, when quizzed about the speculated british interest for the F35A variant.


Typhoon AESA contract due in the coming months. Land-attack capability "must be there when Tornado is retired"

Much needed reassurances about Typhoon have been given by minister Dunne and by important RAF officers:



Speaking at the DSEI 2013 defence and security exhibition in London, Minister for Defence Equipment & Technology Philip Dunne - who is heading to a meeting of his counterparts from Germany, Italy and Spain on 13 September - described the E-Scan radar as the "essential prerequisite for successful export of Typhoon".

"We are working with our partners in four nations and the [industrial] consortium to button this down," said Dunne on 11 September. "I am confident we will achieve success and get a contract in a reasonable time frame, not many months from now."

Eurofighter executives had hoped to secure agreement of the formal launch of the Captor-E AESA radar - which is currently being developed by a consortium led by Selex Galileo, containing Cassidian and Indra - last year but the four Eurofighter partners could not agree on how to proceed. The UK has launched its own AESA radar demonstrator project with Selex Galileo, dubbed Bright Adder, as a fallback solution but it is now expected to be subsumed in the Captor-E project after it is formally launched.

RAF officers are relieved the deadlock and delay that had dogged the Typhoon AESA project is coming to an end, and hope the progress will open the way to further upgrades to the aircraft. This includes the integration of additional air-to-ground weapons and sensors on the Typhoon, beyond the existing suite of Raytheon Paveway multi-mode guided bombs and Rafael Litening III advanced targeting pod.

The RAF is simultaneously working to align its budget and plans for upgrading the Typhoon with the international Captor-E project. Speaking at DSEI on 10 September, Air Commodore Guy van der Berg, Assistant Chief of Staff Capability (Planning) at Headquarters RAF Air Command, said: "We are looking to make progress on the E-Scan radar in this planning round and will be briefing industry in the next financial year."

Air Commodore Gary Waterfall, commander Typhoon Force at RAF Coningsby, said that in an "unpredictable world" it was important that the Typhoon stays at the heart of the RAF.
"When the Panavia Tornado GR.4 retires at the end of the decade, the Typhoon has to be ready to replace the Tornado GR.4's capability. Typhoon needs the same capability as the Tornado GR.4 today," stated Air Cdre Waterfall.

"We don't have a fixed date [for additional capabilities to be integrated on Typhoon] to keep the programme as flexible and adaptable as possible. We are working hard to get the MBDA Storm Shadow [stand-off missile] and a smaller family of weapons with low collateral damage capabilities on Typhoon."

This later weapon is understood to be the MBDA Brimstone missile and the enhanced derivative, the Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) Capability 2 Block 1 weapon (known as Brimstone 2). This is undergoing development and scheduled to enter service by the end of the year on the Tornado GR.4. It will then migrate to the Typhoon.






Is there a british army future for Warthog? 

Still some hope for British army’s Warthogs? STK believes there are,. But Viking, BV206 already used in those roles. BV206 does need a replacement, both in the British Army and with the Royal Marines. That's Warthog best chance. But will money be there?


James Fisher Defence presents new swimmer delivery vehicles for special forces

These new toys will sure have the eye of SEAL and Special Boat Service personnel: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_10_2013_p0-615021.xml


Retaining ISTAR capability: Sentinel R1, Shadow R1, Reaper 

Chief Air Staff Andrew Pulford seems to be well aware of the critical importance of the ISTAR fleet the RAF has built up during the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. Along with air vice-marshal Stuart D. Atha, he has provided some very strong evidence of his intention to preserve and bring into core the various capabilities. Sentinel R1, Shadow R1 (a sixth airplane is on the way to entry in service) and Reaper are all capabilities that the RAF needs and wants. Holding on to them will be a big objective for the service. 

UPDATE: in order to secure funding for the Reaper, the RAF is considering whether it can meet the SCAVENGER requirement, while also studying the possibility of adapting the platform's sensors to make them useful for surface maritime surveillance, helping in closing the situational awareness gap left by the loss of Nimrod.  

Another option is to get the MOD and Treasury to agree on making Reaper an element of the long-term british presence in Afghanistan, to be known as Operation TORAL, at the end of the current HERRICK operations. If Reaper was ordered to stay in support of the ANA and of the british and allied presence in the Helmand province, UOR funding might continue. See the report by AviationWeek here: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_11_2013_p0-615465.xml&p=1


Maritime Patrol Aircraft: sights set on the SDSR 2015

The lack of an MPA capability is recognized as the most serious gap in capability, and the SDSR 2015 must look at the issue and make choices.
If an MPA programme is launched by the SDSR, Seedcorn will be inglobated within the project to prepare the crews for the new platform, otherwise it will be terminated by 2016.

Multi-mission capability and role flexibility are seen as major requirements for the new platform: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_12_2013_p0-615385.xml&p=1


Sentinel R1 offered as a maritime surveillance asset

Raytheon and the RAF are becoming "allies" in campaigning for software mods that would enable the Sentinel R1 radar to survey surface maritime targets, including very small, very hard to see objcts such as periscopes.
They are also campaigning to add more sensors (probably an electro-optic sensor turret, i'd guess) to "expand the capability of the airplane". But since the Sentinel R1 had to make do without the once-planned Air to Air refuelling probe because of weight issues, we can safely warn that weight growth margins are very tight.

In any case, there's no way to add ASW capability and the pylons for the employment of any kind of anti-sub torpedo and/or anti-ship missile, so the solution would be very, very limited.
This looks more like a way to secure long term funding for the Sentinel R1 than a genuine attempt to solve the MPA problem.

My readers know that my position is clear: Sentinel is precious and MUST be retained.
But it is not and will never be an MPA, and the RAF shouldn't sell it as such just to secure the funding, while leaving the Navy in trouble with the remaining gap in ASW long-range surveillance.

Anyway, report here, by Jane's 360: http://www.janes.com/article/26917/dsei-2013-raytheon-proposes-maritime-patrol-sentinel-r-1


Scan Eagle will take longer than expected

Despite being a Contractor-Owned and Contractor-Operated system, the Scan Eagle detachments procured as UOR for the Royal Navy will still require at least a small number of trained RN personnel, to provide a safety certification of contractor operations and, crucially, to analyze the data and picture coming in from the unmanned vehicle.
The Navy currently has almost no personnel at all experienced in UAV operations, and training even the small number needed is likely to require more than the six months once planned.
According to evidence provided by minister Robathan to the defence committee, Scan Eagle should enter service on the Bay-class LSD used as MCM mothership in the Gulf only by January 2014.

See report by AviationWeek on the manning challenge: http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_09_10_2013_p0-614962.xml&p=2


AgustaWestland concept for a RWUAS

AgustaWestland's stand shows a concept for a new Rotary Wing Unmanned Air System. The Royal Navy has a requirement for the future acquisition of a machine of this kind, and has signed a contract with AgustaWestland which will result in trials of the SW-4 SOLO optionally piloted helicopter on a Type 23 frigate in October 2014.
This concept art shows how a more mature RWUAS might look by around 2020, when the RN would like to acquire this capability. Report by AviationWeek: http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a79a838cf-118b-471b-9840-0a1650e93d41


Synthetic training call; next SDSR must resolve maritime patrol capability problem

Pulford also signals that next SDSR needs to take wise decisions regarding national ambition and, with it, decisions on restoring the invaluable Maritime Patrol Capability lost with Nimrod.
See: http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...reaper-390425/ and: http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/dsei-2013-air-chief-looks-increased-synthetic-trai/


More Foxhounds

The british army will get a further 24 Foxhound vehicles, bringing the total of machines on order to 400. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-foxhound-vehicles-for-british-army


ACCOLADE decoy round development 

Image by THALES showing the firing trial at Salisbury Plain
THALES reports that good progress has been registered by the ACCOLADE joint UK-France programme for the development of a new ship-launched active radar decoy for protection against anti-ship missiles: http://www.thalesgroup.com/Press_Releases/Markets/Defence/2013/Thales_and_Blue_Bear_reach_major_milestone_in_the_ACCOLADE_programme/


Unmanned minesweeping: moving towards MHPC

THALES and ASV have showcased their HALCYONE optionally-manned boat. This 11.5 meters craft, capable of speeds of roughly 30 knots, is meant to carry and/or tow mine-detection sonars. It can also be fitted with a launch and recovery system that can put into the water Unmanned Underwater Vehicles both for search and for disposal of mines. The HALCYONE shown at DSEI is coupled with SAAB Seaeye UUVs for the underwater search and identification of mines, and with the SAAB Hydra which is a multi-shot mine neutralization UUV.

The Hydra can neutralize up to three mines in a single mission, at the end of which it can be recovered and reloaded for a subsequent mission: a big improvement over the current Seafox C, which self-destructs in order to neutralize a mine, after the re-usable Seafox I round has found and identified them!

HALCYONE can also two combined influence sweep equipment. These capabilities make HALCYONE a perfect fit for the MOD requirement (dating back to 2005 in its first form!) to promive a stand-off replacement sweep capability to make up for the withdrawal from service of the combined sweep kit once part of the Hunt-class equipment. 

HALCYONE (top) and the SAAB Hydra
The MOD has earlier explored and trialed an unmanned boat with similar roles and capabilities, under a 2007 contract with ATLAS: the resulting craft, based on a Combat Support Boat, has been trialed since 2009 under the name Flexible Agile Sweeping Technology (FAST). 

FAST during a recent demonstration. Born to tow sweeping kit, FAST has evolved a lot, and here is fitted with a launch system for the SEAFOX disposal drone. Image by Mer et Marine


An old image showing the proposed modification for the Hunt minesweepers. Two FAST crafts would be carried, with a crane for launch and recovery. HALCYONE would most likely be carried in this same general arrangement.

HALCYONE, FAST, or a system closely related to them, is expected to be part of the MHPC solution planned to start entering service in 2018. The MOD plans to modify the current Hunt minesweepers with the capability to launch and recovery a couple of such unmanned surface vehicles, while wholly new vessels for the replacement of Hunt and Sandown minesweepers are not expected before 2028.

UPDATE: always at DSEI, ATLAS is indeed responding with the Remote Combined Influence Sweeping System (ARCIMS), a similar system, optionally manned, 11 meters long and with a declared speed higher than 4 knots. ARCIMS has already received an order for two crafts, by an as-yet unnamed customer.

ARCIMS, in a photo by Shepard




BAE 146 now is an air tanker too

BAE Systems announced that it is possible to convert the BAE 146 into a cheap tactical / training air tanker, equipping it with a centerline system in the fuselage for the deployment of one hose. BAE says that a lightweight boom could also be developed, on request.

The transferable fuel carried is, of course, far, far away from the well over 100 tons on a Voyager: 7000 kg of fuel can be passed on if only the standard fuel tanks are employed, rising to around 18.000 kg if additional tanks are installed in the cargo cabin.

The RAF has got two Bae 146 Mk3 now, in Quick Change configuration: they can be fitted with seats for troops, or used for the transport of pallets of cargo, or a combination of seats and cargo. They have been procured as UOR to support operations in Afghanistan, and as such, they currently can’t say to have a safe, certain future: they might be simply scrapped as soon as operations in Afghanistan end and UOR funding from the Treasury dries up.

The RAF has also a future problem at hand, however: replacing the C130 and tanker permanently based on the Falklands. Of course, deploying one Voyager and one A400 is a possible solution, but it looks quite expensive both in terms of money, logistics and sheer number of assets (the Falklands based assets would have to come from fleets of just 9 core tankers and just 22 transports, after all). Another possible solution would be two A400, with one AAR kit on one of the two, which would present some serious logistics advantages, but not really solve the problem of having too few assets of all types.

That’s where the Bae 146 MK3 might get a chance: if the range and transferable fuel capability of the BAE 146 are assessed as sufficient, there might be an interesting future post-afghanistan for the two MK3s, in the Falklands. See:
http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/mi...ng-variant-ba/


Support deal for Apache and Merlin engines


A new 6-year deal for the maintenance and support to the RTM322 engines powering Merlin and Apache helicopters in british service has been announced, promising 300 milion in savings compared to earlier deals: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/military-helicopter-support-contract-awarded


Ceramic armor research and production in Wales

A new centre of excellence for research and production of ceramic armor is to begin operating in Newport, in southern Wales. It will be the largest centre of its type in Europe: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-armour-research-and-development-centre-announced


UPDATE: FRES SV progress and problems; Mobile Test Rig on show

The Mobile Test Rig is undergoing rigorous, demanding tests, and will have to demonstrate its worth and reliability before the six planned SV Family prototypes are produced and rolled out for testing.
Unfortunately, no news on whether the MOD did expand the "Block 1" family, as proposed in the Planning Round period, to include the Ambulance and Command Post variants (initially part of the Block 2 family of vehicles, that would only follow on later).
Army Recognition has the photos and the details: http://www.armyrecognition.com/dsei_2013_show_daily_news_coverage_report/general_dynamics_uk_unveils_mtr_mobile_test_rig_precursor_of_prototype_sv_specialist_vehicle_1109131.html

Defense News is reporting that development has hit issues, including excess weight that will have to be shaved off the vehicle. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130914/DEFREG01/309140009/GD-Pay-Lockheed-Millions-Over-Vehicle-Requirements-Delay


SELEX ES contracts

SELEX ES and ULTRA CSS will deliver thermal, day-night cameras for the Situational Awareness fit on Warrior CSP. The current contract is for 13 sets, to be used on the Warrior upgrade prototypes. SELEX will supply the Driver's Night Vision System 4 (DNVS4), while ULTRA CSS will deliver HUBE situational awareness day-night cameras that will be installed on the upgraded Warrior to provide 360° field of view around the vehicle, day and night.

SELEX ES has also been contracted for supporting the GSA8 gunfire direction system installed on the Type 23 frigates. This optical sensor turret includes the General Purpose Electro-Optics Director (GPEOD) which is used to direct the fire of the 4.5 inch MK8 Mod 1 main gun. The GPEOD is also used as a general purpose situational awareness day-night sensor.

Finally, SELEX ES will provide the Royal Navy with 18 Hawk - S medium-wave thermal imaging cameras that will replace the ALBATROSS sensor on part of the DS30M Automated Small Calibre Gun System turrets.
The Hawk-S is a new generation thermal imaging product, that will provide enhanced capability to the 30 mm gun mounts on some of the RN ships. It is fair to expect further orders in the future if the product proves its worth.


THALES provides demonstration of Generic Vehicle Architecture advantages

Thales has displayed a representative "pod" fitted with the basic GVA-compliant system used on British Army Foxhound, and demonstrated how easy it is to readily add and integrate additional capabilities, adding RWS, mast-mounted sensor, more powerful cameras for 360° Situational Awareness and other devices.
The GVA project of the british army is a major technological effort to ensure that new platform can be constantly upgaded and given new capabilites through life, while containing the time and expenses needed. See report: http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/digital-battlespace/thales-showcases-electronic-architecture-gva/



C-Trunk unveils the THOR

This catamaran craft could be a contender in the race for supplying the Royal Marines with a Force Protection Craft, which will also replace a part of the LCVP Mk5 fleet.

THOR as demonstrated at DSEI, in a photo by navyrecognition.com


Kelvin Hughes showcases new SharpEye solutions

KH has made a major effort on showcasing new applications and solutions for the SharpEye navigation and surveillance radar. The Royal Navy has already selected this powerful radar for installation on the new MARS FT tankers, and is working to validate it as NASAR (Navigation and Surveillance Radar), for the future replacement of the Type 1007 navigation radar across the whole fleet.

SharpEye has been fitted to RFA Argus, where it has demonstrated its capability in controlling and directing helicopter operations as well. Another SharpEye set is being evaluated on board RFA Fort Victoria to specifically assess its capability in detecting FIAC-type surface threats.

Report: http://www.sourcesecurity.com/news/articles/co-10726-ga.11725.html


Important news on CROWSNEST

While the Thales proposal remains the same (retaining CERBERUS mission system and Searchwater AEW radar), the Lochkeed Martin VIGILANCE offer is making progress, but does not yet include a firm choice on the radar. Lochkeed, in fact, has test-flown the Mission System and the pods destined to contain the radar antennas and IFF system on a Merlin HM2, but the Northrop Grumman AESA radar which was expected to be inside the pods was not there. Northrop's radar, a development of the AN/APG-80 radar (which might or might not include features of the AN/APG-81 radar used on the F35) remains a contender, but Lochkeed has not yet firmly decided which radar will be offered inside the pods.
The MOD, on its part, has ordered both Thales and LM to consider four different radars: Searchwater, the Northrop AESA, an unspecified Selex ES product and an ELTA radar.

The most welcome news is that the RN is working hard to try and obtain a significant speed up of the whole program. While Main Gate remains officially expected in 2017, the RN is hoping to revert the planned date back to 2014, with a system selection in 2015 and entry in service in 2018.
There would still be a capability gap of some two years in this way (the Sea King ASaC is to bow out of service in 2016), but the AEW skills of the current crews would be preserved and employed in the CROWSNEST development and validation, instead of being lost.
A Main Gate in 2017 would come too late to avoid the loss of precious AEW skills honed by years of operations, including in Afghanistan, unless a new Seedcorn initiative is developed, sending navy crews abroad, or at least on RAF Sentry aircrafts.

Report by AIN Online: http://ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2013-09-13/contenders-vie-british-aew-helicopter-system?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter




Friday, September 6, 2013

Towards the future of minesweeping: an introduction




Deploying today’s minesweepers and keeping them in action for long periods of time out at sea is not easy. The current vessels have glass-reinforced plastic hulls, excellent not to detonate magnetic mines but not so good for ocean travel. They aren’t fast vessels, and they are very small, with a logistical endurance that ranges on the 14 days mark. Minesweepers also happen to be complex warships, very expensive to build and maintain: in proportion to its size, the Hunt-class minesweeper is the most expensive ship in the Royal Navy’s arsenal. It is a very capable minesweeper, but has serious limitations, and although formally all minesweepers have a secondary “patrol vessel” capability, this is very marginal, considering their limited endurance, low speed, lack of helicopter facilities etcetera.

The RN minesweepers can be deployed over long distances, of course: it takes time, but both Hunt and Sandown vessels regularly make their way to the Gulf to replace their sister ships involved in Operation Kipion. Once every three years, there is a ship rotation. The force based in the Gulf (newly grouped under the badge of 9th MCM Squadron) is normally composed by two Hunt and two Sandown, so that the complementary capabilities of the two boats are both readily available in the area (the Hunts are fitted with the hull-mounted sonar Type 2193, while the Sandowns have the variable-depth Type 2093). To counter the weakness of the minesweepers, the RN keeps a Bay-class ship as mother vessel in the area: she carries communications, weapons for the defence of the force, an hangar for a Lynx helicopter flight, a command and control staff, Diver teams, aerial and underwater unmanned vehicle teams and stores and fuel that she can pass on to the minesweepers to extend their endurance. 

Operation Kipion is the constant presence in the Gulf of powerful RN assets, centered on the MCM force of four minesweepers.

The expanded MCM force in the Gulf has now been given the collective identity of 9th MCM Squadron. The badge has already been worn by MCM forces of the Royal Navy in the Gulf in the past

The US Navy does more or less the same using the USS Ponce, an old LPD that instead of being withdrawn from service was refitted and transformed into a capable Afloat Forward Staging Base. The US Navy, which has had to deploy its minesweepers over a greater distance, all the way across the Atlantic, used Float On, Float Off vessels to carry the warships to the Gulf, in a demonstration of how difficult it can be to deploy the current generation of minehunting vessels over long distances. The minesweepers on their own would have needed at least 60 days to reach Bahrain, against 40 days of travel on the back of the FLO-FLO vessels Blue Marlin or Tern (both ships used for the super-transport), and on their arrival they would have needed a drydocking period to have the wear and tear of the travel fixed and remedied to.  

MCM global deployment, US Navy style
 
This is part of the reason why all major western Navies are trying to develop a working, stand-off suite of unmanned boats, underwater and air vehicles that can sweep a wide area of sea to remove enemy mines, without requiring the mothership to actually get close to the minefield. This would allow the removal of the single-purpose, wooden or glass reinforced plastic hulled minesweepers from the fleet, making space for larger, steel-built, ocean-capable vessels which would offer far greater deployability and flexibility.
It is the concept behind the american LCS with its MCM module. France has its SLAM-F project, the UK has the MHPC programme and Italy is planning to eventually replace the minesweepers of the Lerici and Gaeta classes with a OPV/mothership carrying an equal modular suite of unmanned vehicles. In this brief introductory piece to what I hope will be a series of posts I’ll be writing over time, I want to recall a major case of wartime difficulties with minesweeping, going back to the Royal Navy’s experience in the Falklands war. This also gives me the chance to talk about an act of bravery that does not really get recognized enough, and that I’m sure many do ignore completely.

In the task force that sailed south to retake the Falklands in 1982, there initially were no minesweepers, although it was fully expected that sweeping of mines, underwater EOD and other tasks were likely to be required, and a small MCM team sailed aboard the LPD HMS Fearless.
The absence of minesweepers was due to the elderly Ton class’s incapacity to safety face the long transfer from the UK and the heavy seas expected in the South Atlantic. The Hunt class was at the time yet to come, with the first two vessels yet to be delivered, and anyway it would have been a tough call for the newer hulls as well.

Unfortunately, the Argies were soon observed planting mines at sea. Admiral Woodward writes in his memories (“One hundred days”, book written with the help of Patrick Robinson):


One of our submarines had already watched the Args laying mines to the east of Port Stanley harbor entrance (called Port William, incidentally), which was after all the most obvious place for us to land. So we knew well enough that they were perfectly capable of laying mines across the northern end of Falklands Sound as well. For that matter they might even go for the Southern end too, depending on how many they had, how much time they had and whether they thought it necessary. And since it now seemed fairly certain that our General Directive would change in a way that which would render Carlos Water our automatic choice for the landings, I wanted to do my best to ensure that we did not lose half a dozen ships and a couple of thousand men four miles short of the landing area.


[…]


If I had been an Argentinian and had suspected even for one moment that the british were coming in to land in Carlos Bay, I would have laid as many mines in the north and south entrances to Falkland Sound as I could. That would have eliminated all worry about the Brits landing anywhere along either side of the Sound. It would have been a considerable weight off my mind. We did not, of course, know whether they had done just that… or something very like it.  

For my part, however, mine-sweepers and their special equipment I did not have, which meant that I would have to use something else – and the hull of a ship was the only suitable hardware available. The only steel which would go deep enough. Now, plainly I could not use the two indispensable Type 22 frigates Broadsword or Brilliant with their close-range Sea Wolf systems. I also clearly could not send in my remaining Type 42s Coventry and Glasgow with their invaluable long-range Sea Dart systems. And equally surely, it really wasn’t on to send a merchant ship or RFA. It had to be a ship though – and it would have to be a Royal Navy warship. But it would also have to be something cheap and cheerful which I could replace, like a 3000-ton Type 21 frigate. Like Alacrity. Like expendable Alacrity.

Now, I did not particularly relish the prospect of ringing up Commander Christophere Craig and saying, “Tonight I would like you to go and see if you can get yourself sunk by a mine in the Falkland Sound. By the way, I will put Arrow up at the northern end to observe events and in case she’s needed to pick up survivors.” Nor, when it came to sending the amphibians in, could I possibly follow the instincts of the fabled American Civil War admiral, David Farragut, who roared at the entrance to Mobile Bay in 1869, “Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!”

I did neither. Instead I phoned Commander Craig on the voice-encrypted network and said, “Er,… Christopher, I would like you to do a circumnavigation of East Falkland tonight, all the way around to the south, then north up Falkland Sound and out past Fanning Head to rendezvous with Arrow.” I also told him to come up the Sound very noisily, exploding a few star-shells and generally frightening the life out of the Args. I added, “If you see anything move, sink it, but be out of there and home by dawn, so you are clear of the land before they can fly.”
He was silent for a few moments and then he said, “Umm, I expect you would like me to go in and out of the north entrance a few times, Admiral. Do a bit of zig-zagging.”
“Oh,” I said, feigning surprise and feeling about two inches high. “Why do you ask that?”
“I expect you would like me to find out whether there are any mines there,” he said quietly.
I cannot remember what I said. But I remember how I felt. I think I just mentioned that I thought that would be quite useful.
He replied, with immense dignity, “Very well, Sir.” Then he went off to prepare for the possible loss of his ship and people the best way he could. I shall remember him as one of the bravest men I ever met. This was Victoria Cross material but, strangely, only if it went wrong.

I personally felt awful not to have had the guts to be honest with him and wondered what the devil he was going to tell his ship’s company about their task tonight and about my pitiful performance, which, for a sea-going admiral to one of his commanders, beggared description.



Fortunately, there were no mines. Alacrity did her dangerous job that night, taking to occasion to sink the argentine tanker Isla de Los Estados, caught in the Sound in the light of a star-shell and pounded with the 4.5 inch gun.



Thus ended quietly, and no doubt gratefully so, an extraordinary story of courage, which will go, I’m afraid, largely unnoticed in the annals of maritime history. COMAW (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, Michael Clapp) certainly was completely unimpressed by Alacrity’s efforts. But had it ended in tragedy it would have joined the sagas of Jervis Bay or Glowworm being presented to young naval officers of the future as a supreme example of selflessness and devotion to duty. If they had hit a mine, Commander Craig would have been most strongly recommended for the award of a VC – but, thank goodness, he didn’t.


Commander Craig lived on and continued his career with distinction. No VC for him, but he became Commodore and was the frontline commander of the british task force in the Gulf War, the conflict in which, showing that many lessons from the Falklands had been learned, a much improved Type 42, HMS Gloucester, with much improved Sea Dart missiles, shot down an iraqi Silkworm anti-ship missile in a worldwide first that has yet to be repeated.  

On 12 May, Carlos Bay became the definite objective for the beach head. Alacrity had done her job and allowed the campaign to proceed. On May 21st, the troops landed on the beaches of San Carlos bay.

It was only on May 26 that the 11th Mine Counter-Measure Squadron, a formation purposefully stood up for the South Atlantic campaign, reached South Georgia. The Squadron was formed requisitioning five deep sea trawlers from Hull and fitting them with rudimentary MCM equipment. The crews for the five ships came from the Ton-class minesweepers based in Rosyth.
The vessels so obtained (HMS FARNELLA, HMS CORDELLA, HMS JUNELLA, HMS NORTHELLA and HMS PICT) initially worked to transfer stores across the task force and towards the beach heads, before serving in their intended role, finally clearing Port William waters between 23 June and July 4. It was only in early July that two new Hunt-class minesweepers could arrive in the area to complete the job.
I strongly encourage everyone who reads this piece to go read this brief but detailed account of the activities of the “forgotten few of the Falklands”: the men of the Minewarfare, Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units.

Waiting so long to have minesweepers, even rudimentary, was a non-starter, during the Falklands campaign, which was dramatically constrained and absolutely had to be closed in short time, before the ships were worn out and the winter could set in.
It is worth remembering that the Falklands Campaign was planned with the awareness that the task group would, in Woodward’s effective words “fall apart” by mid to late june, due to the ships receiving no adequate maintenance and spending all their time out in the hostile South Atlantic. The arrival of winter would have made pretty much impossible to sustain the tempo of the operation, and the ships would have had to turn back and head to a port.
Already in the planning phases it was evident that the land battle had to be won by the end of June at the latest, and preferably a good two weeks before that. As a consequence, to make sure that land forces would have a reasonable time to reach Port Stanley, the soldiers had to go ashore by about May 25, not later. To sustain the campaign, the sky and sea had to be sufficiently clear to allow operations and, crucially, to enable the transfer of stores, men, vehicles, fuel and ammunition from the ships to the shore, by both boat and helicopter.
The margins were incredibly tight, also considering that the LPD HMS Intrepid had been destored in March and put in reserve as part of the disastetrous cuts of the John Nott’s defence review, and she had to be re-stored and brought back to operational status before she could sail south.
Weather and strategic considerations, plus the availability of HMS Intrepid constrained the definition of the “window” of time in which the amphibious landing could take place: it had to happen between 16 April (earlier date at which HMS Intrepid could be available) and 25 May.

It is a good thing that the Args did not have the capability to establish larger minefields. They would have posed a tremendous challenge, and potentially derailed the whole campaign, in consideration of the unavailability of proper minesweeping equipment and, crucially, the pathologic lack of available time. 
Time is always a crucial factor, in any war. But the Falklands campaign is probably the one war that has been shaped the most by choices of timing. It is worth reminding, and admiral Woodward himself never made a mystery of it, that had the Args waited six months more, the islands would now be called Malvinas for real. Six months would have seen the Argies in a stronger position (with the Etendards carrier-qualified, so able to deploy their Exocet missiles far further out at sea) while the cuts mandated by the John Nott's defence review would have had removed Britain's capability to react by removing from the ORBAT the carriers and the LPDs. 

On Sunday 13 June, the Task Group was, as was to be expected, effectively falling apart. Only three vessels in the force had no major OPDEF (Operational Defect) to report, and these were Hermes, Yarmouth and Exeter.
Fortunately, the war was over, with the surrender of the argentine garrison in Port Stanley on Monday 14, in the times that had been anticipated. HMS Invincible, that had had to deal with big trouble almost immediately after setting sail, dealing with a gearbox which wouldn’t work, had now to sail well clear to the north, escorted by the frigate Andromeda, to undergo an engine change.
As expected, by then the weather was changing, and the ships had to endure a monstrous tempest with force 10 gale winds, confirming that, for very good reasons, there was no time to waste.



Conclusions
There are many examples of how much of an impact mines can have on impeding operations. They are very effective at slowing down the pace of the opposition’s ops, and this at times can, in itself, bring to victory. Unfortunately, the current minesweeping vessels are slow, not genuinely globally deployable and limited in terms of usefulness outside of their very specific role. They are as incredibly precious, in other words, as they are frustrating.  

I’m firmly convinced that the times are now mature for motherships much less specialized and much more multirole and flexible, equipped with modular mission payloads. The emerging unmanned stand-off MCM capabilities have the potential to make sure that the unfortunate HMS Alacrity of the future will be able to reconnoiter a waterway not with their own hull, but with the help of unmanned boats and sensors they will be able to deploy from cargo decks. We can think, specifically, to the future Type 26 frigates, with their mission deck capable to take 11 containers of equipment and/or boats, manned or unmanned.

The modular payloads will extend the capabilities of warships in many roles, not just in the MCM field. Unmanned vehicles will most likely grow more and more important in ASW missions as well, for example. And while the minesweeper as we currently intend it will possibly disappear, there will be a new, exciting chance to build multirole vessels with far greater logistical endurance and deployability and with utility across a much wider range of roles.

In the coming posts, it is my intention to talk about the ongoing development programs, from MHPC to SLAM-F to the LCS, tracing a story of this important turning point in the history of naval warfare.