Thinking about MARS Solid Support Ship

A post by Solomon up at SNAFU has pushed me towards a return to the subject of the crucially important and very interesting MARS Solid Support Ship requirement. I want to briefly explain why, in the Royal Navy that is taking shape in these years, the MARS SSS is crucially important and why giving it RoRo and amphibious capabilities would be an excellent investment.

The discussion is inspired by some early concept images of the MARS SSS ship which have made it out of MOD circles, reaching the public. These images show large, ambitious supply ships with three Heavy RAS stations, two large cranes supporting a couple of LCVP MK5 landing crafts, a RoRo deck with ramp and, apparently, an enclosed well dock, in addition to a large two-spot flight deck and hangar arrangements for three Merlin helicopters, folded.

The objection moved is that MARS SSS looks like a ship that is trying to do too much. In part, it is a correct observation, because MARS SSS comes from the merging of two different requirements. In origin, the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program was due to deliver six fleet tankers, two Solid Stores replenishment ships and three Joint Sea Based Logistics vessels.

Years of budget cuts have had a dramatic impact on MARS, with its separation in separate workstreams and with a tough reduction in the number of hulls. The MARS FT (Fleet Tanker) workstream, after many long delays, settled for the delivery of four 37.000 tons tankers, with hulls built in South Korea to british design.  The Joint Sea Based Logistic requirement has been killed by the insufficiency of funding, leading to a merging with the Solid Stores replenishment requirement. From an initially envisaged 5 vessels of two types, we are down to aspirations for three vessels of the same design.

With MARS, the Royal Navy had hoped to return to a clean separation of roles between Auxiliaries, taking a step away from the concept of “one stop” replenishment vessels such as Fort Victoria and Fort George, which have been built to be able to provide both fuel and solid stores during a single RAS contact with supported warships.

Following the cuts, while the neat distinction between Tanker and Solid Support vessel will be reinstated, some degree of fusion between requirements is expected to be part of the Solid Support Ship, as the alternative is abandoning every ambition of providing better afloat logistics support to ground troops ashore. The JSBL vessels was to be able to provide stores and support, including maintenance workshops for helicopters and land vehicles, for a up to a complete medium weight brigade engaged on operations even well inland. We’ve never quite gotten to explore the design of such a vessel, since the requirement has been killed before we could reach the stage of the first designs, however extensive Forward Aviation Support (FAS) capabilities, plus a RoRo cargo deck and some means for the transfer of large loads and vehicles to and from landing crafts for delivery ashore were all key points of the ship’s concept.

The MARS SSS will thus need to harmonize the requirements of a Stores replenishment ship, optimized for the support of aircraft carrier operations, with the requirements connected with the support of ground forces in action ashore.

This merging of requirements fits into a wider picture which sees the Royal Navy condemned to do a lot more with a lot less. With the effective, silent death of any program for the replacement of the LPH capability offered by HMS Ocean and by HMS Illustrious, the Royal Navy is reduced to hoping that both of the Queen Elizabeth (CVF) class carriers can make it into active service not as pure strike carriers, but as multirole Landing, Helicopter, Aviation vessels (LHA). This need has been recognized publicly and openly for the first time in the SDSR 2010, with the unveiling of the Carrier Enabled Power Projection plan. The QE-class ships will routinely only carry a single squadron of F35B, but will complement it with elements of a Royal Marines battlegroup, with support helicopters including Chinooks, Merlin and Apache gunships.

As a consequence, the Solid Support Ship will be required to support a carrier which is also an amphibious assault platform, at the centre of the Response Force Task Group of the Royal Navy, an integrated force which replaces the earlier, separated Amphibious Ready Group and CVS battlegroup.

MARS SSS should enter service “around the middle of the next decade”. In fact, during planning round 2011, the Ministry of Defence decided to extend by two years the service life of the current replenishment vessels, Fort Austin (which had been mothballed in 2009 but was brought back in service with an SDSR 2010 decision and a big refit) and Fort Rosalie, so that they are now due to retire in 2023 and 2024. I’ve not been able to find an official, up to date indication of OSD for Fort Victoria, which is younger but has the problem of being an Auxiliary Oiler Replenisher carrying fuel in an outdated single-hull structure. My guess is that she could bow out in 2025.

Fort Austin and Fort Rosalie have a full load displacement of over 23.800 tons, and can carry up to 3500 tons of solid stores in four holds with a total capacity of some 12.200 cubic meters. They have a single spot flight deck and a large hangar, the top of which can be used as an emergency landing platform. Up to four helicopters can be embarked.

Fort Austin has been fitted with two Phalanx CIWS guns, on the two wings of the bridge, prior to sailing with the Cougar 13 task force. You can see them in the photos by Cherbourg Escale. 

The concept art released for MARS SSS clearly shows a Ro-Ro ramp access (closed), a couple of LCVP MK5s with cranes, a triple hangar for Merlin helicopters and a large, two-spot flight deck. The stern view shows what seems to be a well dock, open for boat operations. Two H-RAS masts are present on the port side, while only one is provided starboard. The RAS masts on the port side are positioned to be able to link up to aircraft lifts openings in the hull of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.

Fort Victoria is newer and larger. Designed as a single-stop support vessel capable to provide both fuels and dry stores, she can carry some 70.000 barrels of fuels and oils along with 6234 cubic meters of dry stores. She displaces more than 32.000 tons. She can operate with up to five helicopters and is fitted with a couple of Phalanx CIWS guns for self defence but is no longer compliant to law as she is a single hulled oiler. 

Her sister, Fort George, was decommissioned in the SDSR 2010.

Roles for MARS SSS

The MARS SSS depicted by the concept art is a large, ambitious vessel, but far less compromised and overtasked than other proposed or realized European “Joint Support Ships”, as the JSS normally combines tanker, solid stores and RO/RO amphibious role all in one.

MARS SSS would at least be relieved of the tanker role, and the vast cargo holds needed for solid stores, including ordnance, are relatively compatible with the need for a RoRo deck, with ramp, and even with a well dock. The well dock would be the best way to ensure that the vessel can send stores and vehicles to the forces ashore, in mostly every sea condition, thanks to the controlled environment of the enclosed dock.

The well dock would also enable MARS SSS to embark some landing crafts or the future Force Protection Craft when deploying as part of the Response Force Task Group. This capability, along with the Ro-Ro cargo deck, is important because it would make up for the future loss of the four LCVP MK5s that HMS Ocean currently brings to the party. Ocean also has a (relatively small) space for vehicles and stores, which can be driven onto landing crafts thanks to a ramp leading down to a “steel beach” in the stern, which during operations is expanded with the use of a pontoon that the ship carries, folded, on her flight deck.

The new carriers don’t have a reserved space for the embarkation of vehicles, have no ramp and no steel beach. If vehicles for the amphibious force are to be carried, they have to be craned onto the flight deck and moved into the hangar with the aircraft lifts. During an amphibious assault, such stores and vehicles would only reach the shore if they were Chinook or Merlin portable, as under slung delivery would be the only realistic option. It is not clear yet if the boat bays of CVF are compatible with LCVP MK5s. The carriers have a boat boarding area in the stern, which can be reached by soldiers and sailors thanks to stairs. Marines could use this, weather permitting, to climb aboard landing crafts coming from the LPD and LSDs in the task force, but an additional well dock and more landing craft capacity would no doubt be welcome during operations.  

HMS Ocean's ramp and steel beach. The poonton in the water is carried, folded, on deck, and deployed by crane. HMS Ocean has a relatively small vehicle deck and carries four LCVP MK5. The aircraft carriers that will have to replace her due to the impossibility of funding a dedicate replacement do not match these particular capabilities. MARS SSS could step in and remedy to this.

 

Concept Art showing the hangar of the CVF carriers

The boat boarding area

MARS SSS is shown carrying two LCVP MK5s on davits, which could be replaced by Force Protection Crafts were the boats to be more adequate to the missions, but a single-bay well dock capable to take a LCU or support operations of the LCVPs and FPCs once they are lowered in the water would be a major enhancement.

The well dock would also be particularly useful in the Gulf. For what I can see now, I can only guess that the Royal Navy will be busy in Operation Kipton (the enduring presence in the Gulf of minesweepers and support assets) for many more years. And according to MOD data, the current minesweepers will not begin to be replaced by new vessels before 2028, which means that well into the 2030s they will need intimate support of a mothership whenever they go. The Hunt and Sandown are excellent ships, perfect for their job, but aren’t really deployable and only have a logistic endurance out at sea of around 14 days.

That has forced the Royal Navy to constantly support the four ships in the Gulf with a larger support vessel capable to pass on fuel and stores. With the risk of hostilities in the area always being so high, a flight deck for helicopters is also badly needed, being helicopters excellent to detect and fight back fast attack crafts that could, in theory, swarm out of Iran very quickly were things to get hot. UAVs and force protection boats are also constantly in action to keep the force secure, and all the requirements of these supporting elements have made large, capable support vessels simply indispensable.

The US Navy converted an old LPD, the USS Ponce, into a capable Afloat Forward Staging Base, and this vessel provides command, control, communications, a large flying deck for helicopters and a well dock for boat operations.

The Royal Navy cannot afford such a top class solution, and is consequently forced to constantly commit one third of its LDSs to the “Seabase” role in the Gulf: one of the Bay class LSDs is always serving in the Gulf, looking after the minesweepers, and this has a very evident knockout effect on the amphibious capabilities of the UK. The madness of withdrawing Largs Bay from service, selling it to Australia, only made things worse. 

USS Ponce and Cardigan Bay together in the Gulf, followed by the minesweepers that they support and protect. Cardigan bay shows the hangar she has finally been fitted with, and the Marinised Land Phalanx Weapon System installation on the cargo deck.

 

The Bays have been steadily increasing their capabilities in these years: from very simple, lightly-equipped LSDs, they have been evolving into capable seabases. They are being fitted with Data Link 16 and complete communications suites removed from the retired Type 22 Batch 3 frigates. They are getting remotely-controlled 30mm gun turrets as the combat vessels in the fleet, and Cardigan Bay, the ship currently in the Gulf, finally also sports a prefabricated hangar structure on deck, which finally gives adequate protection to embarked helicopters and UAVs and their ground crew as maintenance is carried out. Possibly, the other two vessels will also get hangars of their own in the next future: Mounts Bay has been used as an auxiliary aviation ship while RFA Argus was undergoing her latest refit, and she had to resort to walls formed on deck with empty containers to provide some shelter to the helos. A solution not unlikely the emergency fitting of Atlantic Conveyor for the Falklands War!

Cardigan Bay has been serving as a base for US UAV teams, and is almost certainly going to be the first Royal Navy ship to get the newly ordered, much awaited Scan Eagle drones the MOD finally funded. Cardigan Bay will, at least for the next future, only have a contractor-owned, contractor-operated Scan Eagle task-line, with a second task-line to be made available for embarkation on Type 23 frigates afterwards. Hopefully, it is only the first step towards a greater availability of UAVs for the Royal Navy.

A couple of Diving Teams and reconnaissance parties with REMUS unmanned underwater vehicles also operate from the Bay, which can provide an excellent base to all boats with her rafting system and well dock. Finally, the ship also embarks a Role 2 Medical Team: a tri-service, deployable surgical field hospital.

The Bays are also getting fitted with Phalanx CIWS Block 1B, eventually uplifted to Baseline 2 standard, the latest and most capable. initially the Bays deploying to the Gulf have been fitted with “Marinised Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System" (MLPWS), which are, put simply, the Centurion C-RAM guns that the British Army deployed to Basra during operations in Iraq. Removed from the trailers and bolted to the cargo deck of the Bays, the MLPWS have been the solution so far, but Lyme Bay now shows, first of the three sisters, properly integrated Phalanx guns installed in the intended positions on the superstructure, over the bow and overlooking the stern. It is hoped that the other two ships will be eventually fitted out to the same standard.  

This close up better shows the temporary solution represented by the MLPWS Phalanx fit

RFA Lyme Bay, deployed on Cougar 13 right now, shows, for the first time, a properly integrated fit of Phalanx CIWS guns, placed in the intended, originally Fitted For But Not With positions.

The Bays could have been fitted with Goalkeeper mounts, but the Royal Navy is standardizing on Phalanx and will withdraw from service all Goalkeeper mounts by 2015. The positions evidenced in the photos above have now been used for Phalanx, at least on Lyme Bay. It is hoped that all three ships will be similarly outfitted. A careful look at the photos will also show that Cardigan Bay and Lyme Bay show new radomes, probably part of the Data Link 16 and communications fit coming from the withdrawn Type 22 frigates.

 

The hangar fitted to Cardigan Bay is built by Rubb Buildings Ltd. Australia acquired one of these hangars and had it fitted on the ex-Largs Bay, now HMAS Choules, in the photo.

 

Improved weapons fit: this photo shows Cardigan Bay fitted with 30mm guns an M134 miniguns

The Royal Navy also maintains in the Gulf and Indian Ocean a variety of other support vessels, including a tanker, the forward repair ship RFA Diligence (working hard in support of the SSN presence constantly maintained “East of Suez”) and the Auxiliary Oiler Replenisher (AOR) Fort Victoria.

MARS SSS, if fitted with a well dock, could tick all the boxes and provide a perfect seabase for the UK to maintain in the Gulf Area. Instead of maintaining a tanker, an LSD and an AOR in the area, the Royal Navy would possibly be able to cover both the AOR and minesweeper support roles with the same ship, releasing the LSD back to its main role as amphibious vessel.

The vast hangar, the large flight deck, the unmatched capacity for stores and the well dock would make MARS SSS perfect to sustain the minesweepers and the other vessels working in the Gulf. Hopefully, the Riverine Command Boats employed by the Americans from Cardigan Bay’s well dock would in time be replaced by british Force Protection Crafts, increasing the security of the force in the area. 

Boats in the well dock 

 

American Riverine Command Boats (CB90s) operating from a british Bay vessel in the Gulf. The CB90 has been evaluated by the Royal Marines as a possible base for the Force Protection Craft.

The requirement for extensive, excellent Forward Aviation Support capability is nothing new for this kind of unit in the Royal Navy. The current Fort-class vessels themselves have very extensive capability in this field, with up to 5 or 6 Merlin helicopters able to work from the ships’s deck and facilities. The ability to support a large number of helicopters from the new vessels (the concept art suggests hangar bays for three Merlin, with a big, Chinook-capable, two-spot flight deck) would maximize their capability to operate, even alone, on complex constabulary tasks during peacetime. During high-intensity ops, the ability to embark ASW helicopters would relieve the carrier’s flight deck from some of the pressure, and this is crucially important following the cuts the Royal Navy has suffered: with the carriers now condemned to be replacements for the LPHs as well, they will be required to carry a lot of machines and stores and men. Even as big as they are, in a major operation requiring both a high number of jets and capable amphibious forces with their helicopters they will be filled to capacity quite quickly. If there’s one certainty about aircraft carriers, simply put, is that they are never quite big enough.

Three MARS SSS ships could be tasked to provide one vessel “on station” in the Gulf, and another to assign to the RN Task Group. If MARS SSS was built to the specifications suggested by the concept art, the new vessel would be able to act as a major force multiplier in both roles.

Speaking about Type 26, Cmdr. Ken Houlberg, Royal Navy who, until August 2012 , was the Capability Manager for Above Water Surface Combatants at the MOD, said:

“There will be no more destroyers or frigates. There will be combat ships.”

Similarly, it looks like the RN hopes to build more than simple replenishment ships. Seabases would be a better description.

Cutting costs and complexity with a steel beach?

The usefulness of the well dock is pretty much unquestionable. But in an age of budget difficulties, its cost and the complexity that it adds to the design of the vessel is what caused the most perplexity. It is possible that cost cutting would remove the dock and replace it with a simpler “steel beach”, with a ramp leading down to the water from the RoRo deck. It would be a serious reduction in the capability to support boat and landing craft operations in hostile weather and sea conditions, but it would take less space, less money and it would be much simpler to add in the design.

A good example of support vessel sporting a RoRo deck complete with steel beach is the new multipurpose dutch Joint Support Ship, the Karel Doorman. This 205 meters long, 28.000 tons vessel is an immensely impressive beast, even if it is the result of many compromises. It can support ships at sea thanks to two RAS masts and a 40 tons crane. It can carry 730 cubic meters of ammunition pallets for some 400 tons of ordnance and 1000 cubic meters of dry stores. She carries 8000 cubic meters of fuel for warships, 1000 cubic meters of aviation fuel and 450 cubic meters of potable water.

In addition to all this, she has 2350 lane meters of Ro-Ro deck, complete with ramp of access and steel beach in the stern for cargo transfer onto landing crafts.

She sports a two-bay operating theatre as part of her medical facilities. She carries a couple of LCVP landing crafts as well as other boats, and she is equipped with an integrated I-Mast with a sensor fit comparable to that of combat vessels. For self defence, she is fitted with two Goalkeeper CIWS, two Oto Melara MARLIN turrets with 30mm guns, four Oto Melara HITROLE remote weapon stations with 12.7 mm machine guns and four SRBOC decoy launchers.

Finally, she has a huge hangar for six NH90 medium helicopters (folded) or two Chinooks unfolded, which can make good use of the huge 80 x 30 meters flight deck. 

The dutch JSS shows the stern "steel beach", right near the opening of the RoRo access ramp

Design detail of the steel beach

An image of the hull of the JSS during her building. The large steel beach is very evident

Her max payload is 10.600 tons, of which up to 5000 tons can be made up by armored vehicles and/or Ro-Ro deck stores. Her crew numbers between 150 and 175 men, with accommodations for 300 people on board. Her max speed is 18 knots, with an endurance of 10.000 nautical miles at 15 knots cruise speed.

The vessel is incredibly impressive and can prove its worth in many different operation scenarios and roles. Its Ro-Ro deck and steel beach provide a visual example of what could be put on MARS SSS, even if, for the reasons covered earlier, a full well dock is desirable.

A capable replenishment ship 

That is not to say that MARS SSS is not primarily thought to be an excellent replenishment vessel, optimized to support the new aircraft carriers, even in high intensity operations. In this that is their primary role, the new ships will be aided by the new Rolls Royce Heavy Replenishment At Sea (H-RAS) equipment, which will increase the current transfer capability of some 2 tons to larger, bulky pallets of five tons each. 
A working H-RAS system has been built on land at the HMS Raleigh base, which is being used to validate and trial the new system. The facility will then be used to train RFA and Royal Navy sailors in RAS procedures. 

RAS operations today with Fort vessels.

 

H-RAS will shape the new vessels, since their design and internal configuration will be largely determined by the need to move around such bulky loads, sustaining the far higher pace of RAS operations that the more than doubled payload transfer capability will make possible. Receiving such large, heavy loads in one go will be challenging for the supported ships, as well. It is likely that frigates and destroyers will mostly continue to receive the smaller pallets, unless Type 26’s design is optimized for the new system.

The larger payload capability will be crucial mostly for the new aircraft carriers. Currently, the standard RAS pallet is a 1000 x 1200 mm NATO base, with a loaded weight of around 1,8 ton. Resupplying an aircraft carrier during high intensity operations is a challenging task, as right now the transfer rate would be about a couple of 1000 lbs bombs with each pallet, for example.

H-RAS is meant to allow the transfer of 25 loads, each of 5 tons, per hour, while the ships travel at around 10 knots, with a gap from hull to hull of 50 or 55 meters. The improvement is dramatic. It is fair to assume that, if MARS SSS was replenishing HMS Queen Elizabeth during a major operation, some of the weapons could be passed to the carrier already strapped to Highly Mechanized Weapon Handling System-compatible skid pallets, which would then be lowered into the carrier’s deep holds and would be readily available to be picked up by the moles of the HMWHS system.

The 5 tons payload capability will also be crucial to enable the transfer of the F35B’s spare engines, enclosed in their transport containers. The current RAS systems are unable to move the heavy, bulky containers, and this would complicate the life for the embarked air group, requiring a greater number of spare engines to be immediately available on the ship.

The increased capacity of the H-RAS system will also be of great help in moving other heavy, bulky loads, such as Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which should be part of the future arsenal of the british F35Bs: enclosed in its shipping container, a single Storm Shadow weights 2150 kg and is well over 5 meters long. 

Storm Shadow missile being pulled out of its shipping container

 

The Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will not have big problems in dealing with the new, bulky loads coming in, since they will adopt the same technique used by the US Navy, receiving the stores directly in the hangar, via the openings of the aircraft lifts. You can see a video and some photos of this evolution, as done by the US Navy. The main difference being that they call it Underway Replenishment (UNREP). 

US Navy UNREP operations aboard supercarriers

Both MARS Fleet Tanker and MARS Solid Support Ships are obviously configured to optimally support the new carriers. MARS FT, for example, has two RAS masts on the starboard side, so that it can easily link up to the two RAS fuel receiving stations on the port side of the QE-class carriers.

The MARS SSS vessel, instead, has two H-RAS masts on the port side, spaced out to coincide with the openings of the aircraft lifts on CVF’s starboard side.

CVF also seem to have another RAS fuel receiving station, under the forward island, on starboard side. 

Model trials of MARS Fleet Tanker and QE-class carrier, showing the RAS Masts and the two receiving bays on the carrier.

This curious image shows the french PA2, once planned to be built on the same design as the british CVF, receiving fuel at the RAS station under the forward wing while also receiving pallets of dry stores through the forward aircraft lift opening. The supply ship seems to be an AEGIR AOR design. None of the depicted vessels will enter french navy service, but the image is interesting as it depicts what will happen with CVF.

Another old image, courtesy of http://navy-matters.beedall.com/, showing H-RAS at work delivering containerized stores into the hangar of a CVF carrier.

This graphic, once released by the MOD as part of the bidding call for MARS FT, has been preserved by http://navy-matters.beedall.com/. The small arrows indicate the RAS stations. On CVF we can see the two fuel-receiving stations on port side. Two arrows clearly indicate the aircraft lifts openings as well, for H-RAS, while a fifth arrow signals another fuel receiving station.

Conclusions  
MARS SSS can and should be more than just a "solid replenisher" ship. In a navy hit so savagely by cuts, each ship must be able to cover multiple requirements whenever this is possible and efficient. It would of course be better to have more ships, and a neat separation of roles. But this is financially impossible in the current climate. And anyway, the british armed forces have sustained cuts so savage that realizing the once planned combination of two large replenishment vessels and three "seabases" would be realistically excessive. There wouldn't be amphibious forces nor aircraft carrier strike wings large enough to fully justify them. It is a sad truth. 
Freeing the Bay LSDs from the duties of Operation Kipton, on the other hand, would be a major achievement that would reinstate higher capabilities for the UK's amphibious force.

MARS SSS is a key component of a navy which is shrinking in size but not in ambition. So long as the UK aims to remain a globally engaged country, it needs expeditionary forces. And MARS SSS is a fundamental component of them. In "seabase" configuration, its usefulness is maximized in all roles. 

Moving the Protected Mobility Fleet into Army 2020

The Protected Mobility Fleet procured under UOR process and now destined to bea n important part of Army 2020, is due to be given a new wealth of life and modifications. Mastiff, Ridgback, Wolfhound and, down the weight ladder, Husky, Jackal and Coyote, are all due to get important roles within Army 2020.

In particular, Mastiff and Ridgback are expected to be used to mechanize three large infantry battalions, one for each Reaction Force brigade. Wolfhound will continue to carry on important logistic and support roles.

Sheperd News is reporting that an important program of modifications is due to finished by mid-2016 over the Mastiff, Ridgback and Wolfhound fleets. This program of work includes uplifting the older, worn-out and less performing Mastiff 1 to Mastiff 2 standard, and also includes conversion work to change an unspecified number of Troop Carrying vehicles into Communications and Command vehicles.

The contract notice says: 

Short description of the contract or purchase(s):

Armoured military vehicles. To provide Fleet Conversion services for the Army's Protected Mobility (PM) fleet of vehicles to achieve the correct variant mix to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 (A2020) Force Development Strategy, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as 'The Platforms'.

Mastiff – all variants,

Ridgback – all variants,

Wolfhound – all variants,

Fleet Conversion.

Currently envisaged deliverables to include, but not be limited to:

— Mastiff Troop Carrying Variant (MAS TCV) to Mastiff Enhanced Communications Variant (MAS ECV) Conversion,

— Ridgback Troop Carrying Variant (RBK TCV) to Ridgback Command Variant (RBK CV) Conversion,

— Wolfhound Explosive Ordinance Disposal (WHD EOD) variant to Wolfhound Military Working Dog (WHD MWD) variant Conversion,

— Mastiff 1 to Mastiff 2 Conversion.

Note that none of the variants mentioned are new. The Mastiff 2 Enhanced Communications Variant is already in service. Work to outfit this variant, as well as the Ridgback Command Variant was done in 2010 by General Dynamics UK.
These variants are among several others that are less known that the standard troop carriers. The MOD in 2010 stated, via DESIDER magazine, that "just under 200" Mastiff 2 had been procured since December 2008, in six variants:

- Troop Carrying Variant (making "more than half" of the fleet)
- Battlefield ambulance
- Protected Eyes
- Interim Electronic Countermeasures
- Interim EOD (at least 23)
- Enhanced Communications Variant



There is even a RAF Regiment variant of the Mastiff, the PRAETORIAN, which in itself very closely resembles the Mastiff PROTECTED EYES, the command vehicle for the Talisman route clearance convoys. They appear to be fitted with the same ROTAS eletro optic sensor turret on telescopic mast and with the same M151 Protector Remote Weapon Station. PRAETORIAN isn't listed among the variants, possibly because it is counted together with Protected Eyes. EDIT: observing the photos better, front crew doors are open, which suggest that PRAETORIAN is built on Mastiff 3, not on Mastiff 2. This could explain why it does not figure among Mastiff 2 variants.

Mastiff 2 Protected Eyes, leading a Talisman convoy during training. Beautiful photo by Rick Ingham, all credits due to him.

A photo of the PRAETORIAN Mastiff. The open crew door is visible, and it suggests that the vehicle is actually built on Mastiff 3, not on Mastiff 2

The Enhanced Communications Variant carries the BOWMAN Enhanced Communications Suite, comprising HF and VHF radio, plus satellite communications. A similar suite equips the Ridgback command vehicle.

Evidently, however, the vehicles available in these specialist variants aren't enough to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 force structure, so a number of conversions are needed. It would appear likely that these conversions will mostly be done to Mastiff 2 and Mastiff 1 uplifted to MK2 standard, leaving the more modern and capable Mastiff 3 (around 100?), which offers greater mobility, for the troop carrying role.

The Mastiff 3 in fact introduced a more powerful engine, assisted by a gearbox with six speeds instead of five. Increased braking power is also available, while comfort and ease of embarkation for the two crew members and eight dismounts is given by a roof height increased by 7 inches and by opening armoured front doors.  

American sources suggest that the UK has bought a total of 314 Mastiff vehicles, all MKs, all variants.
The Wolfhound order total sits at 125, on two separate contracts.
The Ridgback order was for 154 vehicles.
For obvious reasons, it is likely that not all of them will be useable and retained once their use in combat operations in Afghanistan ends.

It is curious to see that Wolfhound EOD variants are apparently considered excess to requirement, while a greater number of Military Working Dogs pods are required. This might indicate that the EOD regiments have settled on different platforms for their needs (Mastiff itself, perhaps?) while the Military Working Dog regiment is happy with its own variant.
Again, both variants are in fact already in service: according to MOD sources, at least 44 pods for the transport of dog kennels have been procured, alongside an unspecified number of EOD pods. The wolfhound is also used for general, tactical transport duties and has also been used in theatre as towing vehicle for the L118 Light Gun. In fact, three variants exist: general purpose flatbed cargo carrier, EOD and Military Working Dog carrier.

The MOD also procured 30 surplus american Cougar 6x6 and 4x4 vehicles, to be used as basic training fleet. The Cougar 6x6 is the base vehicle which, with many extensive modifications, turns into Mastiff, while the 4x4 is the base for Ridgback. These 30 vehicles, known as Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV) might or might not be kept in the long term as training fleet. The uncertainty comes from an earlier contract notice put out by the MOD for the provision of: 

Post Design Services (PDS) including the design and development of modifications and the delivery of associated mod kits, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as “The Platforms”.

— Mastiff – All variants;
— Wolfhound – All variants;
— Ridgback – All Variants;
— Roll Over Drills and Egress Trainer (RODET);
— Possibly, Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV);
— Possibly, Buffalo – All Variants;
— Possibly, CHOKER Mine roller System.

Note that in the "possible" platforms are not mentioned in the newer contract notice. This could mean a separate contract will eventually follow, but among the possible meanings there is also the intention of the MOD not to continue investing in this valuable equipment. This would be particularly painful in the case of Buffalo Rummage A2 and Rummage A2 MK2 (improved, safer and 1 ton heavier), as these are fundamental pieces of the Talisman route-clearance convoys. Abandoning CHOKER would also be quite a waste of equipment which continues to have a value, was high in demand until very recently and would again be in high demand as soon as the armed forces were once more dealing with the IED and mine menace. 

Buffalo Rummage A2 towing a PANAMA unmanned Land Rover with IED search equipment. The future of the excellent Talisman "system of systems" remains unclear. What is the Army planning to do with it?

Following the evolution of the Protected Mobility Fleet and its ancillary equipment, such as mine rollers and other kit, will be an important (and challenging) part of studying, analyzing and surveying the fate of the British Army.
At least, the variety of combat proven variants already available means that the Cougar-derived family is the perfect base for building a capable fleet covering all the key roles. That's very important because many of these roles truly need modern solutions rolled into service.
It is also important because, while we are promised that FRES UV will replace Mastiff in the mechanized battalions by around 2025, history reminds us that the 6x6 "super-trucks" could end serving the Army for a far longer time.

In the meanwhile, other vehicle fleets are being brough back home, and restored to full efficiency to return in service.

 

From the News

If it is true, the British Army is dead 

The Telegraph says that in October all the 31 remaining battalions of the army under Army 2020 will be cut back further, to 520-man establishments.

This is a completely new thing. The Army has been planning to reach the 82.000 regulars figure having only Light Role infantry battalions cut back to comparable levels, and even those actually higher: 561 men. Considering that this means removing one rifle platoon from each Company, hoping in a top-up coming from paired reserve battalion before deployment, i can't even begin to imagine what a battalion of 520 men would look like. It would probably be utterly useless.


The reduction to Light Role Infantry battalions and Gurkhas already can't be described as smart because the Reserves recruitment is, so far at least, going horribly, and there are three such downsized infantry battalions which do not have at all a paired reserve battalion from which to draw manpower: 1 SCOTS battalion and the two Gurkha battalions are left unpaired in the announced Army 2020 plan, because there are not enough reserve infantry battalions.

The figures released so far to Parliament and Defence Committee about the establishments of the major components of Army 2020 speak of:

729 armoured infantry battalion
709 mechanised infantry battalion
561 Light Role Infantry
581 Foxhound-mounted infantry
567 Gurkha battalion
660 PARA battalion
587 Challenger 2 tank regiment
528 FRES SV reconnaissance regiment
404 Jackal-mounted light cavalry regiment
370 Adaptable Artillery light gun regiment (apparently with only two gun batteries, a paltry 12 L118 guns. I'm unable to confirm this at 100% certainty at the moment)
around 600 Reaction Artillery regiment (18 AS90 in three batteries, 6 GMLRS in one battery)
around 600 Reaction Royal Engineer regiment
around 500 Adaptable Royal Engineer regiment

An armoured infantry battalion of 520 is frankly unthinkable of. It would probably be able to field a single company.

Since the above are Army 2020 figures, the new cut announced by the Telegraph is either:

- Not true
- Indication that the Army and MOD are total idiots which did not understand the extent of the manpower reduction and are back to square one
- Indication that the 82.000 regulars are to become even fewer already, while sticking to the absurd rule that no more goddamned capbadges must go

In any case but the first, the Army is about to become entirely useless. If the Telegraph is right, the mania of protecting capbadges has reached the level of absolute foolishness.

If the second point is true, serious questions must be asked about Army top brass, and about the Army itself, because if the target is still 82.000 regulars, they have to explain where all the manpower goes. 82.000 should be more than adequate to sustain the establishments announced so far. 



Assembly of the Ski Jump on HMS Queen Elizabeth: more complex than you think 

The 200-ft.-long ramp is the longest ever fitted to a carrier and, like the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers (QEC) themselves, is the first of its type to be purpose-designed from the outset for F-35 operations. Angled at 12.5 deg., the ramp wiii be 20-ft. high and is designed to reduce the required deck roll on takeoff by up to 50%, or allow an increased payload of up to 20%. The ramp achieves this by boosting vertical velocity, giving the aircraft a ballistic launch profile that provides it with additional time to accelerate to flying speed.

The assembly of the Ski Jump on HMS Queen Elizabeth has started, and it is not so straightforward a process. The ramp has been carefully designed by BAE in collaboration with Lochkeed Martin, to make sure that it is fully and safely compatible with the F35B.

You'll find the details on Aviation Week & Space Technology / 19 Aug 2013 pp.33-34, in the article: "RAMP UP - Deck-mounted ski-jump assembly marks key step toward U.K. carrier-based JSF operations", by Guy Norris.

The first section of Ski Jump is already on deck. Photo by

cockneyjock1974

A spectacular diagram showing the current state of the assembly, by

Wizz

Remember that an excellent place where to follow in almost real time the assembly of the new carriers is the huge thread up at MilitaryPhotos.net.



RAF pilot is the first non-US pilot to operate an F35B at sea

RAF Squadron Leader Jim Schofield, is the first international pilot to have conducted sea-based launch and landing in the F-35B.
Schofield made history while flying from USS Wasp, during the ongoing second period of sea trials for the F35B. A third test period is planned for the future, to lead to US Marines Initial Operating Capability in 2015. 

Waiting for Typhoon as the force vanishes

Typhoon: it'll keep us waiting forever

The Ministry of Defence has revealed, in an article on the magazine Defence Focus, issue 273, August 2013, the next planned milestones for the Typhoon fighter jet.
A lot of capability is coming, but, as always with this plane which has sucked the MOD budget dry over decades, slowly. So slowly that, well before the plane is mature, the 52 jets of the Tranche 1 will be withdrawn from service unless there is a (more and more unlikely) change of plan. So slowly that, unless Typhoon gets a mid-life upgrade and life extension, maturity will be achieved just nine years before the type is expected to retire from service.
It is frankly astonishing and depressing to see how the Typhoon sets for itself modest targets and yet constantly fails to achieve them. The weapons that have to get integrated on the aircraft aren't new, except for the Meteor anti-air missile. Brimstone, Paveway IV, Storm Shadow, have all been in service for years and have all long been expected to be integrated on the Typhoon. Yet, even the In Service Date (ISD) for Paveway IV is two years away (2015). A depressingly long time, for the integration of a laser/GPS guided bomb and for the preparation of the force for its use.

The milestones ahead are:

January 2014: delivery of first Typhoon Tranche 3A (airframe number BS116) to the RAF
April 2015: 5th (and last, almost certainly) frontline Typhoon squadron stands up on RAF Lossiemouth
2015: full ISD for the Paveway IV
2016: first Typhoon tranche 1 scheduled to be withdrawn from service, a mere 10 years after the first frontline RAF squadron (3 Sqn) was stood up at Coningsby
2017: Meteor initial testing
2018: Meteor ISD. Storm Shadow ISD at the "end of the year"
2020: Brimstone 2 missile ISD
2021: AESA radar expected to reach full capability

2030: currently expected Out of Service Date for Typhoon

A tiny little bit of good news comes from the fact that the 27mm gun mounted on Typhoon (which years ago barely survived a mental plan to get rid of it to save some money) has now been given Frangible Armour-Piercing (FAP) ammunition, made by the german Rheinmetall.

The company thus offers a new type of ammunition for its 27mm automatic cannon. Highly effective against hard- and soft-skinned targets, the company’s frangible armour-piercing (FAP) ammunition 27 x 145mm/ PEB 327 performs its mission without conventional explosives or a fuze. Weighing 260 grams, the projectile is completely inert. It consists of a core made of a frangible tungsten mix, enveloped by several layers of tungsten-steel alloy. When the projectile penetrates the target’s outer skin, it progressively breaks up, causing catastrophic damage as it travels deeper into the internal structure of the target. A high-energy cloud of fragments and shrapnel results, reliably destroying the target. Thanks to its inert projectile and lack of toxic elements, the FAP 27mmx145 is also suitable for training purposes. Moreover, there is no need to store special service ammunition, obviating the need for expensive demilitarisation at the end of its shelf-life. This results in substantially lower lifecycle costs. Rheinmetall has already started to supply the Royal Air Force, the first customer for the 27 mm FAP, with 244,000 rounds of this innovative ammunition.

FAP ammunition is a valuable addition to the Typhoon's capability, especially when coupled with the proper software for land attack, rolling out now with the current program of Typhoon enhancements. This includes gun strafing modes.  

But all the rest is not pleasant. The dates are all uncomfortable. And this is before further delays happen, obviously. In particular, the AESA radar is likely to suffer further slippages, as there is no contract at all agreed by the partner nations with the Euroradar consortium. Only hopes that drag themselves forwards, year on year, barely alive.
Paveway IV integration is ongoing by a long time, and it is depressing to see that ISD is still so far away. I don't think there's any other case in the whole world where the integration of a 500 lbs bomb and its release to service take so damn long.

There is a contract signed for the integration of Meteor on the Typhoon, finally. The document was only signed last June, buring the Paris air show. The 2018 ISD for Meteor represent the hundredth slippage of the intended entry into service of this new air-to-air missile. In the NAO Major Projects report 2012, the ISD for the missile was described as:

The first Front Line Unit is declared Operational with at least (CONF)*** missiles and having demonstrated achievement of In-Service Date 2 Key Performance Measures.

and was scheduled for June 2017, after having been planned for 2015. Earlier still, the ISD had been planned for 2012. 
The extent of the delays to Meteor has been so great that the RAF has had to maintain a stock of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles for use on the Typhoon, which would otherwise have entered service without a medium/long range AA weapon. The OSD for AMRAAM has had to be pushed to the right already twice, and the NAO notes that the AIM-120 missiles could exhuaust their intended shelf life before the replacement is delivered.

There is some risk that part of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile stocks will not endure until the revised In-Service Date and hence we may fall below the minimum required stockpile liability, although this cannot be confirmed at present.

As far as i know, the Storm Shadow and Brimstone situation could be even worse. Their integration has suffered constant delays in the years, and there is not yet a signed contract, which means that further delays are more than possible.
Storm Shadow, however, should begin test flights on the Typhoon this year, thanks to Saudi Arabia's money and requests. Hopefully, at least the (ridiculous) 2018 target will be met.

The Brimstone 2020 ISD is an even greater problem, as the Tornado GR4, the only platform currently employing the missile, will be retired from RAF service by the end of March 2019, meaning that even in the best case scenario, there will be another gap (the hundredth) in the capabilities of the british armed forces. Any further delay would make the situation even worse. The Typhoon is due to receive the Brimstone 2, the new variant, in development, of the successful Brimstone Dual Mode, comprising a new, more lethal and multipurpose insensitive-munition (IM) compliant warhead and IM rocket motor.

It is expected that the Typhoon will be used, possibly as early as next year, as the platform for the flight tests of the SPEAR 3 missile, a new weapon in development specifically for use on (and into, crucially) the F35. It would be a nice addition to the Typhoon's capability, but there seem to be no plan for integration, and judging from the other weapons, it would take a decade anyway...

The Conformal Fuel Tanks aren't mentioned among the milestones, but one has to hope that they will be adopted at some point, because Storm Shadow, despite early promises, seem to only be compatible with the two "wet" underwing pylons. Which means that, in order to carry the larger cruise missile, Typhoon must do away with external tanks, dramatically reducing its fuel load and, consequently, its strike range. CFTs would remedy to this problem.

There is a very real risk (and in some cases, a certainty) that important capabilities will be (at least) gapped as the Tornado GR4 force is swiftly reduced, then wholly removed from service in March 2019. The RAPTOR high-definition imaging reconnaissance pod has not a planned future after the withdrawal of Tornado, and a replacement is not in sight. For a while at least, there might not be the capability to fire Brimstone missiles. And further delays are always possible, which would make everything even worse.
By April 2014, two of the five Tornado GR4 squadrons will be disbanded: 617 Sqn and 12(B) Sqn will go, with the first scheduled to move onto the JSF program to work up to become the first british, frontline F35B squadron.
It will 2016 before the squadron stands up again, in the US, on the MCAS Beaufort airbase, and 2018 before it moves to Marham, in the UK, and achieves an initial combat capability. A second F35B squadron, with navy colors, will stand up later on, with the plan yet to be finalized and announced.

With the fifth squadron on Typhoon to stand up only in 2015, it means that next year the RAF will be down to just 7 frontline squadrons (four on Typhoon, three on Tornado GR4) and only in 2015 will return to 8 (5 + 3).
The consistency of the frontline fleet will further drop in 2019, when the remaining Tornado squadrons disbanded. It is seen as highly likely that, during 2019 and 2020 at least, the UK will be lining a paltry six frontline squadrons of combat jets (5 Typhoon, 1 on F35B) rising to seven possibly within 2023.

Some time ago, it was suggested that the Tranche 1 Typhoons could be kept into the 2020s, to sustain a sixth and perhaps even a seventh squadron, to keep up the number of frontline fast jets formations. It does not seem to be the plan. The suggestion would appear to have been turned down, if it ever was seriously made within the RAF.
That means retiring 52 Typhoons aging just about 10 years each, while cutting, in the next six years, the number of combat squadrons from 9 to 6.
Before the SDSR 2010, the combat squadrons were 12 (3 Typhoon, 2 Harrier, 7 Tornado GR4), and this means that, in less than ten years, the consistency of the UK's fast jet force will have been brutally halved. And despite promises of possible "additional F35 orders", it is hard to see the force being in the position to argue for the regrowth of combat squadrons if the number is allowed to drop so much, so quickly.

This Typhoon shows off its payload capability: from bottom to top, ASRAAM, Meteor, Storm Shadow, Brimstone 2, Meteors and 1000 liters fuel tank under belly, a SPEAR 3 rack, Taurus, Meteor, ASRAAM. In practice, for several more years, the only stores actually cleared for use on Typhoon are ASRAAM and the belly fuel tank.

Regardless of what you think of the airplane, Typhoon is a disaster under many points of view. It is taking ages to live up to its promises, a lot of its capability will continue to exist only on paper for many more years. It has sucked the MOD budget dry over decades, swallowing billions of pounds. And when the deliveries are completed, around 2018, the RAF will have taken 160 Typhoons without, on current plans, ever having more than 5 frontline squadrons. That's a combat force of 60 aircrafts, from a total order of 160.
For each frontline Typhoon squadron of 12 airplanes, if the retirement of the Tranche 1 between 2016 and 2019 goes ahead, the MOD will have procured and paid for 32 aircrafts. An abomination.



F35: 48 guaranteed. Maybe not.

The F35, in the meanwhile, is moving onwards. Main Gate 4 is due in the coming months. This is expected to mean approving the purchase of 14 jets, which will be used to form the first frontline squadron on the new type (617 Sqn).
The UK has so far received three airplanes, to be used for tests and evaluation. A fourth aircraft will be part of the LRIP 7 lot of production, and long lead orders have been placed for four more inside LRIP 8.
The fourteen jets to be now approved might or might not include these four. It is not clear yet.

17 Squadron has given up its Typhoons (moved to 41(R) Sqn) and has disbanded to move onwards towards an F35B role. Between late 2014 and early 2015, the squadron will stand up again, on Edwards AFB, in the USA, as Operational Evaluation Unit for the british F35B force. 617 Sqn is scheduled to stand up in 2016 as the first operational squadron, based on MCAS Beaufort, where the personnel will be trained and the squadron built up to strenght before it moves back to the UK in 2018.

Flightglobal reports that decisions on weapons integration will have to be made as well. Unfortunately, this part is not as clear as we'd like. SPEAR 3 is described as a replacement for Brimstone, and this is incorrect as they are two completely different weapon systems and will actually co-exist at least for part of their service life. The misunderstanding probably generates from the fact that all complex weapons programs in the air sector have been grouped under SPEAR (Selective Precision Effect At Range); with SPEAR Capability 1 covering development and improvements to the Paveway IV bomb, SPEAR Capability 2 covering the evolution of Brimstone, SPEAR Capability 3 being a whole new weapon primarily developed with the F35 in mind, and with SPEAR 4 being the planned mid-life upgrade to Storm Shadow, to be made in the early 2020s in collaboration with the french. 
Here is interesting to note the 24 number: in order to carry 24 SPEAR 3 missiles, the F35 will have to carry six quadruple racks, which means four will be carried externally, under the wings. This seems a wise approach.

Paveway IV, at least for now, is only being integrated for internal transport, which means just two bombs. Hopefully, this is only valid for Block 3 software, with an expansion to cover external pylons afterwards, because it would be a waste to ignore the other hardpoints.

The ASRAAM situation couldn't be more confused than it is. Once it was planned (who knows why) that it would be integrated for all-internal carriage, with four missiles to be fitted in the bays. This ridiculous arrangement, which would give a stealth load consisting of just four short-range AAM, in a sort of modern imitation of the Sea Harrier FSR1, was abandoned by 2008, with the decision to move to an integration plan comprising two internal and two external missiles.
Now, although it is not clearly explained, it seems we are down (as was to be expected, see my earlier reports on the complexities of using IIR, rail launched missiles from inside the weapon bays) to the sole external integration.

F35 sporting an internal load of 8 SPEAR 3 and two Meteor missiles. Sometime in the future. Hopefully...

The good but bad news of the day is that the MOD is still only hoping to have Meteor integrated as part of the release of the software Block 4 on the F35 fleet (not before 2020, indicatively). The news is good because it confirms that the MOD is working on it, but it is bad because, by this point, we should have much more than just hopes in hand.
One year ago, the US hoped to finalize the list of requirements for Block IV by March 2013, but it seems the target has been missed.
The delay in formulating a final request for Meteor integration might be partly due to difficult negotiations between UK and Italy: the two nations hope to share the Meteor integration costs on a 50:50 basis, but in Italy the F35 is a particularly sore political subject right now, and the italian MOD is probably having a tough time in getting a go ahead for this project.

Perhaps more worrisome is the news that even the 48 F35B order promised as part of the 10 year budget will actually be approved on at least two separate Main Gates: according to Flightglobal, a "Main Gate 5", planned for around 2017 is "expected to approve the remaining balance of the first tranche of F-35 procurement."
In practice, if Main Gate 4 approves the order of 14 airplanes, in addition to the 3+1+4 already delivered, ordered or pre-ordered, Main Gate 5 will have to confirm the order for the remaining 26 airplanes.

In the middle, in 2015, there's a Strategic Defence Review. And they never seem to deliver good news.