Regarding Maritime Patrol Aircrafts

A very much recommended read on the MPA problem is the Defence Research Paper written by Wing Commander S. Austin, Royal Air Force. I heartily suggest that everyone reads it.

I will quote a few extremely relevant passages of the document, and its conclusion , as  they represent a perfect, brief but powerful summary of what is also my own opinion on the matter:

Discussions with PJHQ staff have identified that the UK faces a number of capability gaps against the ‘full spectrum defence capability’ which is deemed necessary to carry out the seven military tasks identified in the SDSR. These include the maritime patrol and carrier-strike capabilities already discussed, a gap in the UK’s signals/electronic intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) capability due to the retirement of the Nimrod R1, a lack of Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability, and the inability to conduct Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR). Of these, the requirement for maritime security is the only one which is required all-day, every-day, regardless of whether the UK is engaged in hostilities or not. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that SEAD and JPR capabilities will only be required during intervention operations which are likely to be discretionary and/or conducted as part of an alliance, whilst the replacement capabilities for SIGINT/ELINT and carrier-strike are fully-funded and will enter service in 2014 and 2020 respectively. It is therefore concluded that the lack of a wide-area maritime patrol capability is the most significant gap, and that the regeneration of this capability should be the highest priority for UK defence. Whilst there is still enormous financial pressure on the Government, the MOD has reportedly balanced the budget, not only securing those capabilities already identified for Future Force 2020, but also including an ‘additional £8bn of funding over the next ten years which is unallocated...to respond to emerging equipment requirements.’

It is therefore recommended that serious consideration is given to filling the gap left by the MRA4 which, ironically, was scrapped to save just £2bn over ten years. Unfortunately, it is likely that the recent decision by the Government to revert to the STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and not fit the new carriers with ‘cats and traps’ will be detrimental to any decision on future maritime surveillance in two ways. First, whilst the SDSR did not state that the UK no longer needed an MPA capability, just that the MRA4 would not be brought in to service, any decision to subsequently procure an MPA will be portrayed as another Government U-turn; having recently made a U-turn over the JSF, this is now even more unlikely, at least before the next SDSR. Second, the lack of ‘cats and traps’ severely restricts future options for carrier-based maritime surveillance and/or patrol, be that manned or unmanned.

[...] 

New technologies are becoming available which will assist in the maintenance of maritime situational awareness. For example, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a transponderbased tracking and identification system fitted to ships which works by electronically exchanging data directly with other nearby vessels and shore-based stations or, more recently, indirectly via satellite. The AIS transponder transmits the vessel’s position, course and speed, as well as other data such as the ship’s, name, flag state and destination. Primarily aimed at collision avoidance, the system can also be used to assist with maritime security. NATO is currently developing algorithms which will monitor the AIS feed and automatically identify abnormal activity. However, there are limitations with AIS and it would be foolish to become over-reliant on such technology alone. First, it is not mandatory for AIS to be fitted to vessels less than 300 gross tonnage which leaves a sizeable void in the maritime picture. Second, other than navigational information, the data transmitted simply reflects that put into the system by the crew and provides little insight into the actual cargo being carried or the crew’s intent. A clear example of the vulnerability of the system occurred in July 2009 when the Russian cargo vessel Arctic Sea ‘disappeared’ after transiting thought the English Channel. The official Russian investigation claims the vessel was previously hijacked off the coast of Sweden and forced to sail to Africa; the counter-view is that this story itself is a cover for illegal weapons-smuggling by Russia. Either way, the vessel passed through the English Channel without suspicion before switching off its AIS, and then remained undetected for three weeks until intercepted by a Russian frigate off the Cape Verde Islands.

 [...]

Therefore, for the foreseeable future, no combination of satellite or Remotely Piloted Vehicle/Hybrid Air Vehicles technology can provide a cost-effective or even practicable alternative to the capability provided by a manned MPA; even the US, with the most advanced satellite and RPV technology in the world, is still spending over $25bn on a fleet of 117 new P-8 Poseidon MPA.

[...]

Fundamental to the regeneration of this capability will be appropriate sponsorship and ownership of the requirement, which has traditionally sat across a number of ‘desks’ within MOD. This is exacerbated by current military doctrine, which barely recognises that the air domain needs to be utilised for effective maritime patrol. For example, British Maritime Doctrine (JDP 0-10) barely mentions the use of the air domain for the conduct of wide-area maritime operations. Similarly, whilst AP3000123 defines the fundamental roles of air power, the description of ‘intelligence and situational awareness’ is focused entirely on the land environment, whilst the description of ‘attack’
includes just a single sentence on each of the ASW and ASuW roles. Within AP3002124, the emphasis remains clear; twenty pages are devoted to counter-land operations, whist counter-sea attracts just a single paragraph. Sadly, this reflects the neglect and lack of investment that has befallen the role of maritime aviation for many years, and was almost certainly a contributing factor to the decision to scrap the MRA4. Unfortunately, a review of the written evidence provided to the HCDC by ex-senior officers reveals that whilst there is unanimous agreement that the withdrawal of MPA capability has resulted in significant gaps which should not be accepted, single-Service bias is clearly evident in some of the proposed solutions.

Therefore, if the UK is going to consider the case for the regeneration of a wide-area maritime patrol capability in the 2015 SDSR timeframe, the first challenge is to ensure that the capability does not, once again, fall between the cracks of single-Service in-fighting. Which Service ‘owns’ or ‘operates’ the future capability is far less important than ensuring that the UK actually has the capability at all. The UK should therefore start with the cross-Government development of a UK Maritime Security Strategy which, as this paper has outlined, will confirm the specific importance of the maritime environment to the UK national interest and the threats which the maritime environment presents. This will direct the cross-Government requirement for maritime situational awareness which, when combined with the military capabilities required to conduct ASW and ASuW, will determine which aircraft provides the most cost-effective solution and how this should be integrated into the force mix.

[My note: the lack of any apparent interest for counter-sea missions is evident not just in lacking doctrine but, obviously and consequently, in the equipment and capabilities. Example of this situation is the lack of any anti-ship missile beyond the ancient Harpoons of the Type 23s and the also obsolescent, small Sea Skua missile, helicopter launched. British submarines lost their sub-launched Harpoon variant already in 2003, and the last remains of air-launched heavy anti-ship capability vanished along with the Nimrod]

Given the UK’s vulnerability to maritime threats, which will only increase as the capability gap endures, and the limited window of opportunity to exploit the retention of maritime skills afforded through the ‘seedcorn’ initiative, it is the conclusion of this research paper that the regeneration of a sovereign MPA capability should be the highest priority for UK defence and national security.

Given the current financial constraints, and the Governments recent U-turn on the carrier strike capability, such a decision is not realistic before the next SDSR in 2015. However, much can be achieved in the meantime; for example, a holistic agreement of the capability required for UK maritime security, both within the MOD and across Government, will ensure that this vital capability does not, once again, fall between the gaps of single-Service in-fighting. Fundamental to this will be the clear articulation of the requirement for maritime patrol within joint doctrine, and appropriate ‘ownership’ of the requirement, potentially utilising the newly created Joint Forces Command.
The current position resulting from the decision to scrap the MRA4 was succinctly captured in written evidence provided to the HCDC following the SDSR:

‘...the SDSR has accepted inappropriate capability gaps which we believe cannot
stand. We are confident that they will be changed before the next defence review in
2015: they will be changed either by courageous decision and frank admission of error or they will be changed more cruelly by events, with all the risk which that implies.’

It can only be hoped that the inappropriate capability gap with respect to wide-area maritime patrol is changed by courageous decision, before events conspire to prove beyond doubt that the gap accepted as a ‘tolerable risk’ was indeed a ‘gamble which did not pay off’.

Please, when you have some time on your hands, follow the link and read the document to be given a very clear explanation of why the MPA gap needs to be closed, with the maximum urgency.


As should be entirely clear by now, i firmly believe that a capable Maritime Patrol Aircraftis the first priority of SDSR 2015.
Notoriously, there are a number of Off the Shelf MPA solutions from which we could choose, but in my opinion, most do not properly respond to the needs of the UK, as long as the foreign policy of the country remains as global and as muscular as it is. The armed forces clearly need to be built to operate far away from home, so whatever MPA solution is chosen it must offer the greatest possible mission range and endurance.
Ultimately, i believe the most interesting possible solutions are two: the P8A Poseidon and the Sea Hercules.


P8 Poseidon
I've already written extensively about the P8, with the most up to date information being condensed in this paper.
In this occasion i'll only summarize the reasons i see to pursue a Poseidon solution:

- The Poseidon has a large planned production run. 117 for the US alone, plus more for India and Australia. It will have the formidable backing of the USN, and this gives the UK the possibility to negotiate an agreement resembling the one signed for the Rivet Joint fleet: the UK's 3 Rivet Joints are supported as if they were part of the US fleet (of 17). This means a virtual single fleet of 20 aircrafts, which all get stripped down, refurbished and upgraded at regular intervals of four years. The UK sits at the table and is part of the decision making process on how to upgrade the system, on what capabilities to integrate and what improvements should be pursued.
A similar deal is particularly advantageous for the UK, as it ensures significant efficiencies and, moreover, a constant growth of the platform's capability, which keeps the pace of the US equivalent.
For the P8 it would be a bit more complex as the UK would, of course, want to integrate its own weaponry (Stingray torpedo first of all) but this should not be a show stopper.

- The Poseidon is a modern platform looking to the future. High altitude ASW operations, stand-off engagement of targets with gliding torpedoes and advanced technology for the detection of dangerous, silent diesel-electric subs is already on the way, to keep the platform relevant for many decades to come, even as new threats emerge such as submarine-launched anti-air missiles, which seem to be likely to become a real nightmare for low-flying ASW platforms in a not distant future.

- The Poseidon is not just a Maritime Patrol Aircraft. The US is developing for it a new powerful surface surveillance radar, the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS). This huge podded radar, superior to even that used on the J-STARS, would make the P8 a more than suitable replacement not just for Nimrod, but for the Sentinel R1 as well, which could then be replaced without loss of capability, helping to finance the MPA purchase.

Concept art of a P8A Poseidon fitted with the long pod of the AAS radar system.

The main problem of the Poseidon solution is the high cost. Secondarily, the Poseidon would require
an integration campaign to add british systems (the Stingray at the very least). It would also be more than desirable to add a refueling probe (the P8A as of now only has a USAF-style fuel receptacle) to make it capable to refuel from RAF and NATO tankers.




Sea Hercules
The Sea Hercules made the news for the first time in 2011, when UK's Marshall first proposed to develop an MPA variant of the C130J, installing equipment taken from the Nimrod. In more recent times, Lochkeed Martin has started to market a more ambitious and detailed solution, which, it has been reported, has been offered to potential customers, including the UK.

The original Sea Hercules proposal by Marshall

The SC-130J Sea Hercules is an interesting proposal, albeit one that exists only on paper, at the moment.
The airplane would be fitted with radar, chin-mounted EO/IR turret, digital MAD boom, ESM, palletized rotary sonobuoy launchers, consoles for five mission operators and a mission system shaped on the proven SOA already flying today on the P-3 Orion. Under the wings, the Sea Hercules would have two large external fuel tanks and two pylons for the carriage of up to four Harpoon-class anti-ship missiles.
For the carriage of anti-submarine torpedoes, LM proposes the development of "sponsons" to be fitted to the fuselage, each containing, in an environmentally controlled bay, 3 torpedoes. The mission range and endurance is good, and exceeds that of the legacy P-3 Orion. Lochkeed Martin details that the Sea Hercules (with an unspecified mission payload of weapons and sonobuoys, though) would have an endurance of 4 hours at a range of 1325 nautical miles (against 4 hours at 1200 nautical miles for the P-3), or 8.3 hours at 940 nm, or 11.1 hours at 462 nm.

The current Sea Hercules improves radar integration, adds two under-wing pylons for anti-ship missiles and conformal sponsons containing environmentally controlled weapon bays for torpedoes. @Lochkeed Martin

The attractive things about the Sea Hercules are:

- The cost, both of acquisition and through life. There is no doubt that a Sea Hercules would cost a lot less than a P8 for hour of flight. Initial acquisition costs should also be much lower. Besides, it is an airplane the RAF already knows very well, with logistics already well established and with refueling probe already installed and working.

- The possibility that the existing RAF C130J airframes could be life-extended and fitted with the MPA kit, lowering even more the cost of the solution. Marshall, in the UK, could be part of the project, covering the life extension intervention and perhaps having a part in the installation of the mission systems. It might also be involved in the design of the sponson weapon bays.

- The retention of a number of C130J airframes for the MPA role could give renewed strenght to the rumored request of the Director Special Forces to retain a number of Hercules in the long term for the execution of future special operations, for which the A400 is apparently seen as unsuited because too large and too precious to risk so deliberately. While mainting a tiny number of C130s for the sole special forces wouldn't be cost effective, the preservation of a larger fleet of C130s busy in the two different roles would be much more realistic.

The Sea Hercules internal arrangements and mission endurance. Images Lochkeed Martin, text is mine.

There are problems regarding a Sea Hercules proposal as well, though. For example, while the C130J is currently expected to be in service worldwide out to 2045, there are risks that the type will age and progressively become less common and, as a consequence, less well supported.
In addition, while LM has great experience in putting complex, modular mission systems on C130s (the Harvest Hawk gunship kit for the USMC being a good example), they have not yet attempted anyhing quite as ambitious as the ASW full kit. The conformal weapon bays in particular would have to be developed from a clear sheet of paper, so that there are risks.
Moreover, the attractive option of using the C130J airframes that the RAF already owns could not be valid if the hard-worked aircrafts are assessed to be too worn out to make it cost-effective to life-extend and modify them.

The Sea Hercules modular's nature could allow the UK to select its own sensors and equipment, even re-using ex-Nimrod kit, but differently from what would reasonably happen with the P8, the UK might be more or less alone in the future when trying to upgrade and keep relevant a platform that, effectively, is born old under many aspects. Such long-term expense might prove too much for the UK alone.

These factors should be considered by the MOD in a honest, in-deep assessment of the possibilities. The Sea Hercules, at first glance, seem to offer excellent capability at a cost which is potentially extremely low compared to other alternatives, starting with the P8.
The retention of C130J as a MPA platform would also make it easier for the Special Forces to obtain the preservation of a few aircrafts in "Project Hermes" configuration, to serve as SOF flying taxi, while the A400 Atlas takes up the standard airlifiting job. This would help improve the insufficient tactical air transport capability as well.
Project Hermes is about moving the special forces gear (EO/IR turret, countermeasures, radios...) from the old SF C130K  onto the newer C130Js. The programme is unfortunately very late compared to the original schedule, because the Block 7 software upgrade for the C130J would not arrive. Finally, a RAF Block 7 aircraft is expected to fly this summer, signalling a much needed step in the right direction, especially since the last 8 remaining C130Ks have had their Out of Service date delayed, but only out to October.

On the other hand, the P8 is more modern and more forward-looking, and comes with the potential for very advantageous collaboration with the US. While the P8 would have no part in improving the tactical airlift capability, it would still deliver additional services along the much needed maritime ISTAR: fitted with the AAS radar, the P8 would fully replace the capability provided by the Sentinel R1 and indeed exceed it by a huge margin, allowing a consolidation of manned ISTAR platforms on fewer types.

In the future, besides, challenges lay ahead over the replacement of the aging E3D Sentry and also of the Rivet Joint. The P8 airframe might very well expand into those roles too.

Both platforms have a lot of merits. Probably, however, if the Sea Hercules could realistically be delivered at a really low cost, it would be the choice of the MOD. And it would not be bad at all.

Fuchs resurrection and a new MBDA concept for future weapons

Fuchs to resurrect? 

The Telegraph reports that, as part of a review into the Army's capability to deal with contingency scenarios (shaped, in this case, on Syria's situation), the defence chiefs have concluded that the early retirement of the armoured Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Reconnaissance Vehicles, the Fuchs, was a grave mistake. The MOD is now reportedly scrambling to find money from other voices of expenditure to re-direct on CBRN, to bring the Fuchs back out of storage and into an active role. 

If the Telegraph's information is correct, Rheinmetall's technicians have already been called in the UK to survey the storaged vehicles and overview their return to service. The 9 armored vehicles (from an original number of 11, gifted to the UK by Germany on the eve of the involvment in the first Gulf War) used to be operated by the soldiers of 1st Royal Tank Regiment as part of the Joint CBRN Regiment, formed by Army and RAF units. 

The Fuchs CBRN wide area recon / survey vehicle

The Joint CBRN Regiment was terminated in 2011, however, with the early withdrawal from service of the Fuchs and the passage of the whole CBRN role to the sole RAF Regiment (even if a small number of army and navy personnel continues to be part of the team). 
The Joint CBRN Regiment, born from the Labour-led Strategic Defence Review of 1998/99, was based in RAF Honington and comprised 1st Royal Tank Regiment (minus A Squadron), elements of the Royal Yeomanry regiment (Territorial Army), 27 Field Squadron RAF Regiment and 2623 Sqn
RAuxAF Regt. 

In December 2011, the Army moved out of the picture with the Regiment becoming the "Defence CBRN Wing", manned by the RAF Regiment. In the occasion, the Commandant General RAF Regt issued the following message to the Corps:

“On Tue 2 Aug 11, the Secretary of State for Defence agreed to the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) measure - subsumed by a PR11 Option - to delete the Joint Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Regt and transfer all of Defence’s specialist CBRN capabilities to the RAF Regt.

The key implications of this decision will be as follows: there will be no impact upon those capabilities currently provided by the RAF Regt (26 and 27 Sqns RAF Regt and 2623 Sqn RAuxAF
Regt, and the RAF will remain the Lead Service for CBRN); the wide area CBRN reconnaissance and survey capabilities, based upon the Fuchs armoured vehicle, will be gapped; all other capabilities currently provided by the Army element of the Jt CBRN Regt (the Multi Purpose Decontamination System, some of the Light Role Teams, and all command and control) will transfer to a wholly-RAF Regt manned Defence CBRN Wg, which will include 26 Sqn RAF Regt, 27 Sqn RAF Regt and 2623 Sqn RAuxAF Regt. Whilst there will be a modest increase to the RAF Regt
establishment, there will be a net reduction of 319 Army posts in the current specialist CBRN Force. The total saving to Defence will be £129 million over 10 years.

The Commander-in-Chief UK Land Forces informed 1 Royal Rank Regt (1RTR) personally yesterday of the decision to cease all Army involvement in specialist CBRN.
No decisions have been made on the future of 1RTR; this will be considered as part of the wider requirement to restructure the Army in light of the recent outcome of the ‘3-Month Exercise’, and is wholly a matter for the Army. 1 RTR will remain at RAF Honington for at least the medium term, while the transfer of capabilities takes place and their future is decided.
 
This decision brings to a conclusion a protracted period of intensive, sometimes understandably impassioned debate over the future provision of specialist CBRN capabilities for Defence. Detailed planning for the implementation of the measure will now commence.
This will be the responsibility of the AOC 2 Gp, on whose behalf I will develop plans for the appropriately timely transfer of operational command and control and operational capabilities, the continued delivery of which remains the Defence priority. This will be done in close cooperation with HQ Land (specifically, Director Royal Armoured Corps) to ensure that Army personnel matters are addressed positively and sensitively.
 
1RTR have made a quite extraordinary (and often largely unsung) contribution to Defence over the past 12 years. They have done so with all the exemplary professionalism and commitment typical of their proud heritage. It has truly been an honour to serve alongside them, and I know that all members of the RAF Regt will wish them every success in whatever the future may hold.
 
As for the RAF Regt, this decision will leave the Corps as the UK’s sole provider of specialist CBRN capabilities for Defence. Clearly, given the circumstances of the MOD’s preparedness to take risk against the deletion of the Fuchs capability in the context of a parlous financial climate, this is the right decision for Defence and it is not the time for inter-Service triumphalism. Be under no illusion that the responsibility placed upon the RAF Regt will be enormous and expectations will be high - we must deliver, and I know that we will, no matter what the challenges that lie ahead.”

The Defence CBRN Wing, which has taken over the number, nameplate and identity of 20 Wing, RAF Regiment, is composed by Wingg HQ, 26 Sqn RAF Regt, 27 Sqn RAF Regt, 2623 Sqn RAuxAF Regt, and a CBRN Operational Conversion Unit (OCU).
The transfer of capability from the Army elements of the Regiment to the RAF includes the formation of 6 new RAF-manned Light Role CBRN Teams (in addition to 2 that the RAF element already provided), the transfer of the Decontamination capability (with the Multi Purpose Decontamination Systems) and of the specilistic CBRN Command & Control capability. 

The 8 Light Role Team (LRT) is a strategically mobile, easily deployed self-sufficient CBRN investigation team. It is composed by 8 men, assisted by a bespoke Pinzgauer 6x6 vehicle fully loaded with CBRN Detection, Identification, Monitoring and Analysis Equipment.
The elements of kit retained to be used by the LRTs comprise both in service and Commercial Off The Shelf equipment, which can be dismounted and loaded onto other platforms. The team is self-sufficient for a period of 3 days, during which it can carry out up to three missions, each lasting up to 8 hours.

A Light Role Team showing off its kit

27 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment, holds the Integrated Biological Detection Systems (IBDS) platforms. The IBDS is a detection suite with atmospheric sampling equipment, a meteorological station, chemical agent detection and cameras for 360° surveillance, all housed in a rugged 14 feet container meant for quick air deployability. It can be airlifted by aircrafts and helicopters and ground-dumped or installed on a 4x4 truck. The system is operated by a team of four and comes with its own independent power supply, GPS, NBC filtration and environmental control unit for operation in all climates. 

The IBDS

Another fundamental piece of capability is the Multi-Purpose Decontamination System (MPDS), produced by Karcher. This is a high-pressure, high-temperature water/steam pump, installed on a water tank carried by a Leyland DROPS truck. It is used for the washing and decontamination of vehicles and has been upgraded with the installation of the Direct Application Decontamination System (DADS), which dispenses a decontaminant agent.

The small number of MPDS available brought to a UOR order on the eve of operation TELIC, with the purchase of the Bruhn Newtech/Cristinini Vehicle-Borne Decontamination Capability (VBDC). The system is actually a small, back-worn device that can be carried inside or outside a military vehicle and be employed by a single man to decontaminate the vehicle with the dispensing of BX24 (chlorine bleach) decontaminant through a telescopic brush.

The Defence CBRN Wing also provides two SIBCRA teams: Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents Military Sampling Team (SIBCRA MST) that are deployed globally to exploit CBRN programme/event scenes, recovering evidence and intelligence to approved analytical agencies in a safe & forensically-sound manner in order to support national strategic decision-making. Notably, the SIBCRA team from 26 Squadron RAF Regiment was in recent times involved in the british deployment of a Radiation Monitoring Team to the damaged nuclear power plant of Fukushima, in Japan (Op PEDIGREE, March 2011). 

The loss of the Fuchs, however, has severely reduced the capabilities of the CBRN force, so much so that a generalist "Detect and Warn" CRN capability, capable to operate on the line of fire, is to be provided by a suite of sensors installed on the FRES SV Scout.

The integration of such a CRN sensor suite on a non-specialized vehicle is a first, for the UK: it has not been done before on other vehicles. 

Scout will have three Radiological detectors - two external and one internal, that will have the ability to calculate the duration a crew will be able to stay in a Radiological hazard area without causing long term illness from the accumulated dose received. There will also be one internal and one external Chemical vapour detector with the ability to detect Toxic Industrial Chemicals.

The sensor suite is meant to create a CBRN report that can be quickly sent up the command ladder thanks to the advanced communications suite of the Scout vehicle. The timely transmission of such reports is meant to cue the intervention of specialist CBRN vehicles and survey teams. The CRN detection capability of the FRES Scout is not a replacement for the specialist kit found in the CBRN force, nor an appropriate replacement for the Fuchs's capability, but it will of course better protect the soldiers on the frontline and enable a faster response. 

The crucial fact remains the gap in capability caused by the retirement of the Fuchs. The highly mobile, armored wide area reconnaissance and survey capability is gone, and the MOD has been well aware of the gap, from the very start. 

Well before the Telegraph's article was written, i first heard of internal reviews and discussion within the MOD over the gravity of the gap introduced, so it is not really a surprise to hear that the Fuchs might be in for a resurrection. 

I very much hope it does return, it would correct one of many errors made in the rushed SDSR, when the need to find quick, easy savings ruled supreme. 

1st Royal Tank Regiment, having left the CBRN arena, is now engaged in a return to armoured warfare ahead of the merge with 2 RTR and the transformation in a single Type 56 Challenger 2 regiment in the Reaction Force. 
A Squadron is about to assume the 18-tanks structure envisaged as part of Army 2020, while the other squadrons are training to return to the Challenger 2, while also serving in exercises and experiments meant to refine the concepts of the new army organisation. Their flag is not planned to be lowered at Honington before next year, though, so one squadron still relatively "fresh" of work on the Fuchs could still be re-directed. 
Otherwise, the call might go out to the TA. 

An armed MALE for us, please   

It was in the air for quite some time, so the news that Dassault, EADS and Alenia are calling for the joint development of a new, european Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned vehicle is not surprising either. 

This, in a way, signals the failure of the bilateral UK/France, BAE/Dassault "TELEMOS" program. After a very promising start, the bilateral program had very quickly ran aground, with France opening the door to the other european aerospace industries and, at the same time, delaying the actual launch of the program. 

Expected to start already in the summer last year, now TELEMOS appears dead. The UK and BAE have been effectively sidelined, and now a choice will have to be made on wether to join in another european project; go alone, or buy US kit. 

All four nations have requirements (more or less clear) for weapon-capable MALE vehicles. Three of them (UK, Italy and now France) have selected the Reaper. Germany is thinking about it. 

Reaper is considered, more or less by everyone, an interim solution: in the UK it is still only a UOR, funded by Treasury funds that will dry up when operations in Afghanistan end. 

The RAF's Reapers could survive if they are included in the forces that the UK will continue to maintain in Afghanistan after the end of combat operations. When Herrick 21 ends, in 2014/15, all remaining british activities in the country will be known under the collective name Op TORAL. Mainly, it will be about training and the already famed "Sandhurst in the sand" accademy for the preparation of afghan officers. However, it has already been suggested that the Reapers could also stay in Afghanistan, flown by pilots based in Waddington, to ensure the safety of the british personnel and to offer support to the ANA.

The other option is bringing the Reaper into the core defence budget, as an interim (or perhaps even definitive) solution to the Scavenger requirement. It has been suggested that, in this case, the Reapers would not be cleared to fly in british airspace, so they would be stored in their deployment containers and all training would be done with simulators (or in the US, as happens now). The RAF could accept the Reaper as a final solution because it has built a facility in Waddington for their control from UK soil, and it has received support to employ weapons from them. Indeed, the US are helping the UK integrating the Brimstone missile, to replace the Hellfire currently employed.

Italy did not consider the Reaper as an "interim" capability when it purchased them, but now it has changed its mind, because the US have turned down the request to provide weapons for the italian unmanned air vehicles. 

France is ordering up to a dozen Reapers as well, but they will be strictly unarmed and flown from the US, so that they are considered only an interim stop-gap. 

Interesting times ahead: decisions will have to be taken.

A new concept weapon from MBDA 

MBDA has launched its Concept Weapon for the year 2013. The system this time is a vertical launch artillery missile, in two different variants, for use from ships and vehicle or even containerized launchers. The CVS 302 HOPLITE weapon system is formed by the HOPLITE L, weighting 135 kg and equipped with a multimode seeker and a boosted kinetic energy penetrator capable to defeat hardened targets, and by the HOPLITE S, a slightly lighter and simpler effect, with a simpler, non boosted kinetic energy penetrator and a LADAR (LAser raDAR) seeker. 

The missiles are capable of flying at a maximum speed of over Mach 3, granting them devastating kinetic power on impact and allowing them to fly out to 70 km in less than two minutes, flying low under the radar horizon, or to 160 kilometers in around four minutes at high altitude. 

The video shows the missiles fired by launch cells that resemble that of the CAMM air defence missile. In fact, a single Sylver VLS cell is shown filled with a HOPLITE quad-pack. The missile also appears to share the Cold Launch feature of the CAMM, as evidenced by the launch from the inside of a container and from the cargo flatbed of what appears to be a high mobility truck that very much reminds the Supacat platform originally intended for roles such as LIMAWS(G), LIMAWS(R) and FALCON.

The vehicle launcher is, again, remarkably similar to the CAMM vehicle launcher, with two independent blocks of missiles. The blocks are larger (8 missiles each instead of six) but otherwise identical, as appears identical the foldable, mast-mounted data link antenna. 

 

HOPLITE launchers: vehicle, palletized / containerized and quad-packed in a ship's VLS cell

The HOPLITE itself is apparently just marginally bigger than CAMM (the HOPLITE L is 3,75 meters long, while the HOPLITE S is 3.2 meters long, around as much as CAMM). Probably it is just longer, but with the same diameter and, consequently, same canister size. 

The concept is very interesting, but it is only a concept, and aimed "at the 2035". Every year MBDA launches a new concept, and this shows that good thinking is going on, but i would very much prefer to see a project adopted and brought forwards to actual delivery. 

Anyway, i see with pleasure that the Cold Launch feature is being exploited in the way i suggested already long ago, to enable the use of new weapons and systems from vehicles, containers and, that is my proposal for CAMM in particular, from helicopter-mobile pallets.  
The Cold Launch, the sensor-agnostic nature of the new weapon, the data link employed to cue them, are crucial features that enable "artillery and air defence in a box", with a lot of firepower packed tightly into a palletized, stand-alone launcher that can be deployed on ships, lifted onto vehicles, or carried under slung from a helicopter from ship to shore, for example, to quickly deploy air defence missiles around a beach during amphibious operations or in other scenarios where quick solutions with limited logistic footprint are necessary. 

HOPLITE is a promising sign that the advantages of CAMM's features are not going to stay limited to the sole air defence weapon. 
Quite a lot of possibilities at easy reach!

Typhoon: full steam ahead at last...?

The italian defence-themed magazine "Panorama Difesa" reports on the evolution of the Eurofighter Typhoon, and notes that, with the P1EA enhancements delivered and the P1EB improvements soon to be released, the european fighter is now starting to really look ahead to the next enhancement phases.

The Phase 1 Enhancement, P1E, introduces the following improvements:

- Integration of Paveway IV and EGBU - 16 guided bombs, enabling full exploitation of both laser and GPS aiming modes.
- Software upgrade to enable multiple simultaneous attacks against surface targets

- Full integration of the laser designation pod LITENING III, with in flight retargeting capability
- Digital integration of the short range air to air missile IRIS-T (ASRAAM was already integrated)
- Improved, updated MIDS Data Link 16
- IFF brought to standard Mod 5 Level 2, with full integration in the combat system
- Improved GPS navigation, including the addition of a predictive mode that can warn the pilot about possible incoming connectivity problems that might cause problems to a GPS-guided strike
- Improved auto pilot with Auto-Combat Air Patrol and Auto Attack modes, to reduce the pilot's workload by making the aircraft capable to autonomously navigate its CAP route, or the attack path to one or multiple surface targets
- Introduction of new Air to Ground modes to the Helmet Mounted Sight System
- Improved Defensive Aids Sub System (DASS Praetorian) with automatic response (launch of Chaff and Flares) on detection of a threat, recognized thanks to a register of hostile signatures that is loaded in the computers before take off

These are all very significant improvements. Over Libya, in 2011, the Typhoon could only employ the old Paveway II bomb, and had to operate with significant limitations to its strike capability. The P1E improvements make the Typhoon, finally, a really capable Swing Role platform.

Many capabilities, however, continue to be unavailable and many weapons are left to be integrated.

According to Panorama Difesa, the updated schedule for the evolution of the Typhoon starts during 2014, with the launch of the Phase 2 Enhancement program.
P2E will introduce the AESA radar, which will start being available in 2015/16 and will reach its full capability with two successive releases of improvements, one in 2017 and one in 2019.
The AESA radar will enable the Typhoon to fully exploit the capabilities of the Meteor long range air to air missile, included the 2-way datalink which makes the weapon a fully networked effector, capable of in-flight retargeting. The AESA will be more powerful and reliable, will track a higher number of targets simultaneously and it is also expected to be able to acts as a high-speed communication system (radar to radar) and an Electronic Warfare weapon, with Jamming capability.
The british AESA technology demonstrator, the Bright Adder, is said to be particularly focused on the EW function.
Thanks to AviationWeek, we now have an image of the AESA radar being fitted on the IPA5 test airframe, at the BAE System factory in Warton. The IPA5 will fly with the AESA by year's end.

Photo by AviationWeek (BAE Systems image)

The AESA situation is complex, as there are, effectively, two different evolution paths which will be harmonized into the final product: in addition to the british Bright Adder demonstrator, the Euroradar consortium, led by SELEX Galileo and comprising Cassidian and Indra, is working on the Captor-E, development of which was announced at the Farnborough International Air Show on 20 July 2010.
Both programs were preceded by numerous demonstrators such as AMSAR (Airborne Multirole Solid State Active Array Radar), CECAR (Captor E-Scan Risk Reduction) and the CAESAR (Captor Active Electronically Scanning Array Radar), the latter having already flown on a Typhoon in May 2007.
 
The AESA radar that comes out of the development will be mounted on a repositioner, unlike current AESA plates which are fixed. The repositioner will expand the field of view of the radar well past the frontal 100°, enabling surveillance to the sides and allowing the pilot to manouvre aggressively in an air battle, without breaking radar contact. 

It has been clearly stated that it won't be possible to have a fully-capable AESA radar in 2015: capabilities will be expanded and implemented over time, with the two successive releases of 2017 and 2019. Capabilities such as synthetic aperture radar and electronic attack, including electronic support measures and jamming, will be introduced in service over time.

Physical introduction of the AESA radar will also most likely take time: if the schedule is respected, the first operational AESA radar for the Typhoon will be available for order in 2015/16. At best, the partner countries could finance the integration of it on the Tranche 3A Typhoons yet to be built, but production of most planes on order at that point will be already completed, or very advanced.
In practice, the AESA will have to be purchased and retrofitted, and only the Tranche 3A airframes are ready to take it.
Retrofitting the fleet is unlikely to be cheap, and as a consequence, it will take time. 


In terms of weapons, the P2E will include the integration of the Storm Shadow cruise missile, which is high on the list of priorities of the RAF but also of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Italy. The Italian Air Force current planning position is that the Typhoon will replace the Tornado as platform for the launch of the Storm Shadow, which might (or might not) be integrated on the F35 as well, but only later.
The Storm Shadow should be integrated by 2015/16. 
Panorama Difesa fails to mention the Brimstone, which other sources have instead described as a rather urgent requirement, wanted both by UK and Saudi Arabia. Possibly, Oman is interested as well. It was mainly for the current and future Middle Eastern clients that MBDA demonstrated the anti-FIAC capability of the air launched Brimstone. 
On 25 June 2012, a Brimstone missile fired by a Tornado GR4 at the Aberporth range in Wales sunk a Fast In-shore Attack Craft target. This capability is considered very important by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, as they are faced by the very real threat of swarms of FIACs coming from Iran.

Brimstone and Storm Shadow are priorities for the RAF, which will retire the last of its Tornado GR4 in March 2019. It is possible that both missiles will be integrated as part of the P2E program. 
The Meteor itself is still expected to fly on Typhoons in 2015, but it now won't be fully operative before 2017, the ISD currently planned by the RAF. According to some reports, the delay imposed to Meteor is a trade-off made to prioritize the integration of the air to surface weaponry.

On specific request of Saudi Arabia, the Typhoon has been flying with the french, Thales-produced DAMOCLES laser targeting pod, which will be integrated and offered as an alternative fit to the LITENING.

A Written Answer given by mr Dunne in Parliament on 21 May 2013 also reveals that Typhoon will be used to bring in the air for trials the new SPEAR 3 stand-off multi-mission missile.

Mr Dunne: SPEAR Cap 3, an air-to-surface capability for the joint strike fighter (JSF), is currently in its assessment phase. As part of SPEAR Cap 3 development onto JSF there is a requirement to trial and demonstrate the missile on a similar platform. Typhoon will be used for these trials.

This might open the way for a swift, fleet-wide integration of the weapon, which is carried on a quadruple rack, potentially expanding massively the offensive payload of a Typhoon for a strike mission.

16 SPEAR 3 weapons on a Typhoon, and potentially room for 8 more if the underwing fuel tanks are replaced by Conformals on the back of the airframe

Foreign customers, present and potential, are also the driver behind the effort for the integration of a powerful arsenal of Anti-Ship missiles.
The Rafale can carry Exocet missiles, and the Typhoon, on its part, currently offers three solutions:

Harpoon, with up to 3 missiles carried
RBS15, with up to 3 missiles carried
MARTE ER with up to 6 missiles carried

BAE has been wind-tunnel testing the Harpoon solution, which has the interest of Saudi Arabia and of Malaysia, one of the several potential customers that Eurofighter is trying to seduce.
In Italy, Alenia is working on fit-checks and wind tunnel trials of the MARTE ER solution, Panorama Difesa reports.
The RBS15 missile was already offered to India. I have no news on the extent of the trials made to validate the carriage of the RBS15, however.

AGM-84 Harpoon missiles on Typhoon

At least one of the three anti-ship missiles, the one which will eventually be selected by Saudi Arabia, is expected to be integrated by 2016.
If Malaysia order the Typhoon and requested a different Anti-Ship solution, more activity in this field might be seen.
The RAF is unlikely to be interested in Anti-Ship weapons, but personally i'd very much support pursuing the capability, since the retirement of the Nimrod has eliminated the british capability to fire a serious, heavy anti-ship missile from the air. Assuming that the Harpoon arsenal which used to be of the Nimrods hasn't been disposed of (yet), it would be great to reintroduce the capability, which i judge important for a maritime nation like the UK. 

Last, but not at all least, is the Conformal Fuel Tank development. Initially, only Britain had shown interest in having CFTs, and it is mostly because of that interest that the Tranche 3A Typhoons leave the factory with a suitably reinforced airframe and with the connections for the future installation of CFTs.
BAE has already tested a scale model in the wind-tunnel and development is underway with collaboration from GKN Engage.

A mock-up showing CFTs fitted

First wind-tunnel testing

The small bumps on the airframe of this Tranche 3A Typhoon in construction are the connections for the CFTs. The airframe is also strenghtened to support the weight of the two 1500 liters tanks.

Conformal Fuel Tanks are essential to expand the mission range of the Typhoon without compromising the carriage of heavy weapons. The Storm Shadow, for example, can only be fitted at the same wing stations destined to the external fuel tanks. The CFTs also reduce drag, and likely have less of a damaging effect on the Radar Cross Section of the Typhoon.

Panorama Difesa reports that the UK is no longer alone in calling for CFTs, as Saudi Arabia has expressed a requirement in the same sense, and is ready to contribute funding for their introduction between 2016 and 2020. 

CFTs and Anti-Ship missiles would, seen the dates, probably be part of the P3E program (each Enhancement Phase is a 2-year period), which, according to Panorama Difesa, would also see the integration of the Taurus cruise missile, employed by Germany and Spain.

If the above roadmap is correct and is respected, the RAF will be able to hit the Typhoon Full Operating Capability in 2018, as currently planned.
At least one big gap still remains, though: there is not a single reconnaissance system in sight, so far, which means an uncertain future for high quality imagery reconnaissance for the RAF once the Tornado GR4 is retired, leaving the RAPTOR pod without a carrier.
True, the RAPTOR sensor was trialed as far back as 2005 on Reaper, so there are (in theory at least) alternative options: but even the future of the Reaper is still uncertain.

Is it full steam ahead for the Typhoon swing role, then?
It would appear so. Let's hope we are not disappointed.