NOTE: the following article starts by mentioning the MOD's White Board. This is an element of the 10-years budget plan for defence, and it is important to read the following article not as a purely technical review or, worse, as a fantasy fleet exercise. This article is meant to be a realistic analys of the best way to close the Maritime Patrol Aircraft gap as part of the future investments in the 10-year budget.
It is important, as a consequence, that you have an idea of what the White Board is, and how the MOD is planning for the future financial years. If you haven't read about it, or do not remember the details, check the budget explanation.
One item i would expect to feature
on the White Board at the MOD, possibly the most important piece appearing in
the list, is a new, capable Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Even accepting the claim
that Nimrod MRA4 was never going to be other than a budget-draining, flawed
aircraft (and, to be sincere, I cannot believe it), the loss of maritime patrol
capability is unjustifiable and very dangerous. The MOD was forced to admit that the Nimrod left holes all over
the place, as it was a fundamental part of the military plans for eight out of the 15 security priority risks
set out in the National Security Strategy and its loss “reduced our ability to
conduct Strategic Intelligence gathering tasks, long range Anti-Submarine
warfare [ASW], provide support to Search and Rescue, Maritime Security and
power projection tasks.”
 |
| The NAO wrote a rather honest assessment of the Nimrod gap, but was actually too kind still. |
The gap was felt during operations
in the Mediterranean sea during Operation Ellamy, and US help was exploited, with
the Americans providing airborne overwatch to the fleet. The lack of aircrafts
to employ to track and guard the Russian navy carrier battlegroup “visiting”
the UK’s shores was also rather embarrassing, and, while we won’t hear much
about it, rumors have been circling about Russian submarines sneaking a bit too
close to Faslane, now that there are no MPAs.
The MOD’s claim that the gap is
being covered using other platforms and capabilities is just rubbish, and has
been exposed as such by the NAO with the following observation:
Using other existing assets would provide a reduced capability compared
with Nimrod, and diverting resources from existing tasks would have wider
implications for defence. The Sentry surveillance aircraft is already at
minimum crew and aircraft numbers to cover NATO commitments. Using helicopters,
such as the Merlin or Lynx, would affect national commitments or training of
crews for other tasks. Other alternatives are fully committed to current
operations.
Not that it wasn’t evident already
and we needed to hear that. The NAO statement is actually “generous” still, as
the “reduced capability” actually does mean that while something can be done to
drop a raft into the sea to aid Search and Rescue, and ships on the surface can
more or less be tracked, there is no long range airborne capability to survey
what’s going on beneath the surface of the sea.
8 Type 23 frigates (those fitted
with the 2087 towed sonar) and the Merlin helicopters are all what’s left which
is really up to the task of submarine-hunting and both platforms are already
overcommitted as it is.
The security of the UK’s waters,
shores, ports and nuclear deterrent submarines is at risk, and the ability of
the Navy to set sail into dangerous waters where submarines could be in ambush
has been dramatically reduced. It is very, very urgent and necessary to close
these bleeding gaps, especially since even relying on allies in this area very
much won’t do: NATO as a whole is short on Maritime Patrol Capability and is
looking to pool what’s available to try and improve the overall situation.
A series of studies are ongoing
within the MOD on how to fill the gap, and there have been insistent rumors of
deep interest for the P8A Poseidon, the new US maritime patrol aircraft. At one
point in 2011, a purchase was given as imminent, with the UK expected to order 5 airplanes under the guidance of
Royal Navy Commodore Simon Kings.
In the facts, it was premature, as
there won’t be a chance to order a new MPA before the 2015 SDSR, but it is an
indication of what the thinking inside the MOD is.
An initiative to retain aircrew skills - dubbed Project
"Seedcorn" – was started to place 33 UK personnel with maritime patrol
aircraft squadrons in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA in 2012, and
represents an in-year financial commitment worth £3.2 million.
The Seedcorn effort will continue through 2019 under current plans, but
both the committee and industry have questioned its sustainability: even
ensuring that british crews have their share of action oversea with allies’ own
MPAs, Seedcorn will only preserve a minimum core of knowledge, and not for
long. If by 2019 the UK hasn’t filled the MPA gap, giving the crew an actual
purpose, a career and airplanes to fly, quick, progressive loss of hard-gained
experience will be unavoidable.
It has been reported that the british pilots posted to the UK (likely to
be the majority) have been involved in bringing into service the P8A Poseidon in the US Navy.
Confirmations arrived from the US: the Chief Naval Operations (CNO) has designated the Commander, Patrol and
Reconnaissance Group as lead for Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force
collaboration with U.K. on Maritime Patrol issues including support of P‐8
introduction. In detail, the UK and US have agreed on non-reciprocal
exchange program for sending two experienced Nimrod crews to the US for a
period of at least three years. In total we are talking of, approximately, 20
aircrew (4 pilots, 6 Naval Flight Officers NFOs, 5 Aviation Warfare system
operators (AWs) and 5 Electronic Warfare operators EWs). The experienced
personnel, welcomed by the US Navy, will contribute to the US Navy’s work in
writing tactics and doctrine for ASW operations, and they are assigned,
unsurprisingly, to the squadron VX-1, currently busy in bringing the P8A Poseidon
into service.
It is possible that the early figure of 33 personnel
changed, as the numbers do not add up: in addition to the 20 men assigned to
VX-1, the UK government said in
a Written Answer in November 2011 that agreements were already in
place for sending 7 men to Canada to fly on the Aurora (local variant of the P3
Orion), 6 in New Zealand, of which 5 on P3 Orions, four men in Australia on the
Orions and a further 3 men in the US, 2 of which on the Orions. SEEDCORN might
have expanded to around 40 men, as a consequence.
The
P8A Poseidon is on track to hit Initial Operating Capability (IOC) this year,
and will then replace progressively the P3 Orion, with the Full Operating
Capability (FOC) planned for 2019.
Six
test aircrafts have been flying for years now, in the squadrons VX-1 “Pioneers”
and VX-20 “Force” and the first (low rate) production aircraft has been
delivered on March 4, 2012 to the squadron VP-30 "Pro's nest" in
March 2012, based on NAS Jacksonville, followed by a further four by November
2012.
In
the year that has just finished, the P8A also had the first deployment outside
the US, when BuNo 167956, the sixth and last test aircraft, employed by VX-1, flew to the UK and operated out of RAF
Lossiemouth for the Exercise Joint Warrior 12-1. It flew 6 missions for a
total of over 36 hours. More hours were collected in a deployment in Australia
and in trials over the Pacific Ocean.
In
addition to six test aircrafts (T-1 to T-6), all flying, and to two static
fatigue test airframes (S-1 and S-2, only the second being full scale) the US
Navy has already signed three successive contracts for Low Rate Initial
Production: a first 1.6 USD Billion order for 6 aircrafts in January 2011,
another for 7 aircrafts in November 2011 and the last, in September last year,
for 11 aircrafts at the cost of 1.9 billion.
And
already in January 2009 the Poseidon won its first export order, with a 2.1
billion dollar contract for 8 P8 aircrafts in “I” configuration, named Neptune.
India has options for more aircrafts, and it intends to exercise them in good
time, bringing the total fleet up to 24 airplanes. The first P8I was delivered
on December 20, 2012.
Now
the US Navy is planning out how to continue the procurement of the P8 (a total
of 117 Poseidon are to be procured, 108 of which are Production airframes) and
it wants to move to a Multi-Year Procurement approach:
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) intends to issue a sole source
follow-on production contract to the Boeing Company for the production years
FY15 through FY19 (Lots 3 through 7) P-8A Poseidon Aircraft. It is anticipated
that this contract will be a five-year, fixed price type multiyear contract or
multiple single year(s) if congressional multi-year contracting authority is
not obtained. This procurement is for the manufacture of 72 aircraft (or other quantities
as may be authorized and appropriated by Congress and/or for Foreign Military
Sales) and related production support, to include special tooling and test
equipment, systems engineering, production management, parts obsolescence,
engineering change proposals and technical, administrative, and financial data.
The Government plans to issue an Advance Acquisition Contract in FY14 for
long-lead material and associated efforts supporting this procurement.
This
indicates that two single annual orders are to be expected, one this year and
one placed in 2014. The US Navy Reserve plans to procure 12 Poseidon to replace the P3C in
its two Maritime Patrol squadrons.
The
unit cost of the P8 in 2012 was $169.2 million. The airframe costs $111.43
million, the two CFM56-7B engines cost $20 million ($10 million each), and the
avionics costs $31.57 million.
In 2011 the plan was to have one Fleet Replacement Squadron
(with 12 aircraft) and twelve fleet squadrons (each with 7 airplanes), with the
service life expected to be 25 years, but in November 2012 it emerged that
basing and squadrons structure are still being decided.
As of 2012, the P8A Poseidon still
suffers a number of issues and limitations, but most are expected to be
removed and fixed already by the late-2013 IOC date. By 2015, when the UK could
start seriously considering a purchase as part of the new SDSR, the P8A
Poseidon should be a mature platform, which will be seeing its capability
expanded with the first of several planned Increments.
Capabilities
The P-8 is, notoriously, a Boeing
737 passenger jet modified for Navy use: it has been given a weapon bay and it
has been reinforced to cope with flying at extremely low altitudes over the
sea.
The main sensor for the P8 Poseidon in the APY-10 radar, which is a
vastly upgraded APS-137D(V)5 maritime surveillance radar and signals
intelligence (SIGINT) system from Raytheon. The radar has been redesignated as
AN/APY-10 in June 2006 due to the extent of the improvements and changes on
earlier variants of the APS-137D system.
The radar is installed in the P-8’s enlarged nose fairing. It provides
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) for imaging stationary ships and small vessels,
coastal and overland surveillance, and high-resolution imaging synthetic
aperture radar (ISAR) for imaging surfaced submarines and fast surface vessels
operating in coastal waters. It has a color weather mode and a specialized Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination
(ARPDD) mode, for the detection of periscopes even at great distance.
The Indian variant, P8I, includes an additional Air-Air mode for the
APY-10, which enables the tracking of airborne contacts as well. Another
improvement present on P8Is is the presence of an aft-mounted, aft-looking
APS-143C(V)3 Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) from Telephonics that, together with the
APY-10, ensure 360 degree coverage. In addition, an interleaved weather and
surface search capability has been added to provide the cockpit with up-to-date
weather avoidance information while performing surveillance missions.
Northrop Grumman supplies the P-8's
electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) suite, which includes the Terma
AN/ALQ-213(V) electronic warfare management system (EWMS), directed infrared countermeasures
(DIRCM) set, radar warning system, and BAE Systems countermeasures dispenser. The
Northrop Grumman ESM system for the P-8A has been officially designated the
AN/ALQ-240(V)1.
L-3 Communications Wescam in Burlington, Ontario provides the MX-20HD
digital electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) multi-spectral sensor turret. The
MX-20HD is gyro-stabilized and can have as many as seven sensors, including
infrared, CCDTV, image intensifier, laser rangefinder, and laser illuminator.
The P-8I for India (“Neptune”) also an advanced integrated Magnetic Anomaly
Detection (MAD) system from CAE Inc..
The US Navy plans to arm the P-8A with the MK 54 torpedo as main ASW
weapon. A wide variety of anti-surface weapons, including SLAM-ER cruise
missiles will also be employed. The weaponry, for a total of some 22.000 lbs
(10 tons) is carried in an internal five-station weapons bay, on four wing
pylons and on two centerline pylons, all supported by digital stores management
allowing for carriage of joint missiles, torpedoes and mines.
Up to 120 sonobuoys are carried, and they are deployed by two reloadable
rotary pneumatic launchers. The aircraft is fitted with the processing
equipment and power to concurrently process data from 64 passive and 32
multi-static sonobuoys.
The P-8 has a nine-person crew: pilot and co-pilot in the cockpit, five
mission crew at five mission consoles, a relief pilot and a in-flight
technician. The consoles have dual 24 inch ultra-high definition screens, and there
is space for growth, with room for a total of seven consoles, so that two can be
fitted in future either for new uses and roles or just for workload sharing.
The P8 Poseidon has a 6 hours mission endurance at a range of 1100 km
from the base, and 4 hours at a 2000 km range. Surprisingly, the P8 is built
with a fuel receptacle that can be used to refuel in flight from boom-equipped
tankers such as the USAF’s ones, but it does not have a probe to refuel from
drogue-tankers, used by most NATO allies in addition to the US Navy itself
(chartered, civilian-owned tankers from Omega services) and to the US Marines
(KC130J tankers).
The P8A also employs a new hydrocarbon sensor to detect fuel vapors from diesel-electric submarines.
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| Awesome cutaway from Flight International |
The Poseidon is the only maritime patrol platform in the world that
promises comparable capabilities to those that would have been delivered by the
Nimrod MRA4. The Nimrod would have been an absolute world leader, beating the
P8 in every aspect, from the number of sonobuoys (150 against 120) to the
number of weapon bay stations (9 vs 5) to, more importantly, sensors fit and,
crucially, mission range and endurance.
Unfortunately, the Nimrod MRA4 is now gone, and the P8 is by far the
best option among those available on the market. More importantly still, it has
the potential to steadily grow more and more capable, expanding its reach in a
number of roles as we’ll see. Crucially, while the Nimrod would have been a
tiny fleet of 9 flying eccentricities, unseen elsewhere in the world, the P8 is
supported by a huge fleet of civilian 737 and is also going to be in service in
well over a hundred units with the US Navy alone, with perhaps as many as 24 in
India, with more active in Australia and with more nations possibly to join in.
Keeping a british fleet of P8 airplanes flying and keeping their
technology up to date would be immensely easier than going alone on the Nimrod
path.
Adding capability
The P-8A was designed from the
outset to incorporate additional “spiral development” of new weapons and
equipment, and in the current plan the first such evolutional step is known as
Increment 2. It should become operational around 2016, introducing important
acoustic and communications upgrades. In addition, Increment 2 is also expected
to introduce a new delivery method for ASW stores which is intended to
eliminate the need for the MPA to fly low over the waters.
Torpedoes still have to be released from low altitude, from 500 to 100
feet or less above the waves. Launches from higher altitudes would damage or
destroy the current torpedoes, as they aren’t meant to survive the hard impacts
with the sea’s surface that would be inevitable.
There are obviously downsides to this: for the maritime patrol airplane,
flying low over the water is expensive in terms of fuel and stress on the
airframe. In addition, flying low and steady to drop a torpedo makes the
airplane vulnerable to enemy reaction: in recent time interest in
submarine-launched anti-air missiles is on the rise, and in the near future
such systems might well become a concern.
The most advanced offering in terms of Sub-Air missile is Germany’s IDAS, but there are other
examples: France’s DCNS proposes a modern day mast-mounted Mistral missile launcher, which very much reminds of the much older (1972) british
experimentation with the HMS Aeneas
diesel-electric submarine. The Aeneas, already back then, was fitted with an extendable
mast which included a cluster of 4 to 6 Shorts Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles
and the optics to aim them against enemy helos and aircrafts from periscope
depth.
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| HMS Aeneas, the very special "SSG72", fitted by Vickers with the SLAM missile system. Demonstrating successfully in 1972 what DCNS is proposing today! |
The selection of the 737-based P-8A Poseidon means that the US Navy
needs to act on these problems, especially since the P-8A can perform low
swoops if necessary, but its airframe is optimized for cruising at altitude. A
wish to extend the useful life of the hard-worked P3 Orion aircrafts also
contributes to the urgency for action.
The US Navy is, as a consequence,
pursuing a way to launch torpedoes from high altitude, possibly also reducing
the need for the aircraft to maneuver and turn to a suitable release point by
having the torpedo itself navigating to the splash point. With the airplane no
longer required to carry out complex maneuvers and turns at low altitude, the
useful life of the airframe obviously is protected, and the airplane can serve
for a longer time, undergoing less stress. Here comes into play the HAAWC (High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare
Weapons Concept), a program to take the US standard light torpedo, the
MK54, and give it wings.
Lockheed Martin puts forward the LongShot wing adapter kit:
it enables the torpedo to glide on a range well in excess of 10 nautical miles
and is also said to enable "off
axis" launches so the aircraft doesn't have to maneuver to reach a precise
splash point over a contact, but can immediately attack even if badly
positioned.
LongShot is described as a low-cost, self-contained wing kit, which is
available for use on a variety of weapons, from bombs to cluster bomb
dispensers and even sea mines. It includes a flight control computer, a GPS-based
navigation system, and its own power source. Depending on the weapons it is
attached to, and other factors, range can reach the 50 nautical miles.
Importantly, the LongShot does not require a MIL-STD-1760 interface, or
even an electrical interface with the aircraft. This means that the system is
particularly platform-agnostic and easily compatible and integrable on a wide
range of aircraft, even older ones that would not normally be capable to drop
GPS-guided bombs. This is important because it means LongShot does not require
expensive, complex and time-consuming re-wiring of the aircraft and/or modifies
to the interfaces of the onboard systems. LongShot can get the targeting
information from a laptop computer or through an in-aircraft knee pad device
that plugs into the aircraft intercom and establishes two-way communication
with LongShot via the aircraft’s UHF radio. Integration of the system, in other
words, promises to be extremely simple and quick.
Similarly, the LongShot wing kit is very simple to attach to the
torpedo: the connection consists of two metal bands, that a device internal to
LongShot forces open when the wing kit GPS confirms that the splash point has
been reached. This means that the torpedo is maneuvered into the right altitude
and position by the gliding wings, and is then released normally, as it was the
airplane doing a traditional launch. The torpedo thus requires little to no
change at all.
An HAAWC Mk54 torpedo was successfully demonstrated and launched at the
Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) in the Bahamas. The
torpedo was launched from the weapon bay of a P3 Orion flying at 8000 feet of
altitude, and it navigated its way to the release point, dropping the ordnance
in the water as planned.
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| LongShot kit on MK54 torpedo |
Raytheon
also has its own proposal, the Fish Hawk, which is very similar
in concept. The addition of a data-link to any of these two systems would allow
constant upgrade of the splash point, ensuring the torpedo enters the water as
close as possible to the target. Retargeting would also become possible.
 |
| Fish Hawk kit from Raytheon |
A Wingkit
for sonobuoys could follow, and there has been talk of giving the P8A the
capability to deploy a number of air launched UAVs: Boeing has been contracted
to develop such a UAV, and came up with a Scan Eagle derivative the MagEagle
Compressed Carriage, which in theory can be readied for several launch modes, including from
capsules fired out of submarine VLS tubes. The MagEagle could also be armed
with guided submunitions, and following launch from the aircraft could be
recovered by a surface ship fitted with the ScanEagle recovery wire. A
MAD-fitted variant (MAD Eagle Compressed Carriage, MECC) deployed from P8A Poseidons is
meant to replace the capability of the missing aircraft-mounted MAD. The use of
a drone allows the Poseidon to stay at altitude, as part of the “High Altitude
ASW” concept of operations, which is expected to be implemented with Increment
2, going live in the fleet in early
2016. This suggests that both the MECC and the HAAWC should be validated and
put in service by then.
As a
baseline, P8A will enter service with Level 2 interface with UAVs, which means
the Poseidon is fully able to receive imagery and data directly from UAVs. With
time, this will grow to Level 4 control, which means full control of the UAV
and its payload, save for the take-off and landing phases.
 |
| Adding a Data Link to the wing kit of the torpedoes would make possible another big increase in capability, allowing corrections and retargeting up to the splash point |
The P8A
will make great use of sonobuoys to detect enemy submarines. A major
improvement to sonobuoys is, as a consequence, planned: this is the Multi-Static Active Coherent, which is to be the main wide-area
acoustic search system for the Poseidon. MAC works exploiting two different
types of sonobuoy (source and receiver) and the onboard processing system.
MAC is an
upgrade to the Navy’s current Improved Extended Echo Ranging (IEER) system, which
employs non-coherent sources to produce loud sounds that reflect off submarine
targets; these echoes are then detected by receiver buoys.
MAC employs the
same receiver buoys, but uses new coherent source buoys that enables multiple
pings, optimized waveforms, and various ping durations, none of which the
legacy IEER system provided.
MAC will begin
operational testing on P3 Orions early this year, and integration activities
for putting MAC on the P8 have begun in late 2012.
An even
more relevant capability insertion is the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS), a
powerful surface surveillance and target tracking radar. The AAS is a black
program, classified: while some contracts and news have been disclosed, there
is little publicly available data, and no visible budget nor technical reports.
The new sensor, however, is said to be extremely capable, and there are
proposals to use it, on P8 airframes, to produce a replacement for the E-8C
Joint Stars of the USAF.
This new
surface search and track radar is in itself the successor to another “black”
radar system, the Raytheon
APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), which flies on a number of
P3 Orion airplanes and only became known to the public in 2006, when Boeing was
authorized to reveal the results of a simulation that saw a LSRS-fitted
airplane (almost certainly an Orion) provide targeting data for a F/A-18, which
was able to fire a SLAM-ER missile and hit a moving simulated missile launcher
vehicle. The LSRS is a wide-aperture, Active, Electronically-Scanned Array
(AESA) sensor designed for targetting-grade tracking of moving targets on land
and at sea and to provide radar images of those targets to intelligence
analysts. The P3 fitted with LSRS have been flying in support of land
operations in the war against terrorism, reportedly due to its “groundbreaking”
capability to track targets smaller than cars, all the way down to insurgents
moving on foot. The LSRS is assessed to be “far superior” to the older APY-7
employed on the aging J-Stars of the USAF, and the AAS is an additional step
forwards. An history of the LSRS is available here.
 |
| A P3 Orion seen with the LSRS "canoe" mounted under the fuselage. The AAS will be externally very similar, and will be installed in the same way on P8A. |
On July 31, 2009 Raytheon was awarded a multi-year
contract to begin development of the Advanced Airborne Sensor. In August, a
second contract followed: worth $25 million, this was a contract modification
awarded to Boeing to update avionics interface documentation for the P-8A
Poseidon to clear the way for installation of the AAS.
In February 2012 Boeing received a $277 million contract the T-1 Poseidon test
aircraft for aerodynamic and structural tests of the AAS radar pod. The
intention of the US Navy is to purchase a number of AAS and “A kits”, which are
the structural parts attached to the airplane’s fuselage to support the radar
and fit them to a selected few P8s. It is suggested that 16 P3 Orion airplanes
carry LSRS, so the number of P8 with AAS could be similar.
The capabilities of the
P-8/AAS combination are such that Boeing is pushing for replacement of the existing,
aging E-8 JSTARS fleet with a “P-8 AGS” fleet, which would be more effective,
more easily sustainable and would cost possibly less than upgrading the E-8s
with new engines, radars, and electronics.
AAS is
useful on water as well as on land: it is meant to provide a targeting picture
and guide missiles to their targets in a network, even in high-clutter, complex
environment, for example in the littoral. Such a long-range, highly accurate
radar guidance would make viable the proposed resurrection of the Tomahawk
anti-ship, which could use in-flight updates from a P8 with AAS to strike enemy
ships at extremely long range.
The AAS includes new features such as
NetTrack, developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to track
high-value targets—for example, key insurgent personnel and their vehicles—in
high-clutter environments, by using high-range resolution radar measurements.
And the AAS is what
would make the P8A a formidable joint asset for the UK, not just a submarine
hunter.
Unmanned
companion
The US
Navy’s maritime patrol capability is going to improve massively in the coming
years thanks to the large P8A fleet and, crucially, to its unmanned companion,
the MQ-4C Triton, also known as Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), which should hit IOC in 2015. The MQ-4C
Triton is a special variant of the Global Hawk High Altitude Long Endurance
unmanned aerial vehicle.
The Tritons will be assigned to two Squadrons (West and East), distributed
each on a Main Operating Base and on a number of Forward Operating Bases, with
the MOB being the main maintenance center and having the Mission Control
System.
The West Coast Squadron has its MOB at NAS Whidbey, with the
drones deployed on the two Forward Operating Bases Beale AFB and Andersen AFB (Guam island).
The East Squadron has its
MOB at Jacksonville, a FOB on the East Coast yet to be determined, another at
NAS Sigonella in Sicily and another with the US 5th Fleet (C5F),
under CENTCOM, in the Indian Ocean.
 |
| MQ-4C Triton |
The Triton at entry in
service will be capable of Surface and Air-to-ground 2D AESA radar surveillance
on 360° and will also have a 360° field of view for its EO/IR turret, plus a
capable AN/ZLQ-1 ESM fit. A
Signal Intelligence capability is planned for insertion in 2019, and in 2021 the BAMS will also be given Robust Communications
Relay and Networking capability to expand the communication lines available to
surface ships and ground forces.
To help in the ASW mission,
BAMS is to fitted with the same hydrocarbon sensor installed on the P8A.
The most impressive feature, however, is that the US Navy plans to build
up a 65-strong fleet capable to sustain, 24 hours on 24, 7 days on 7, all year
long, a constant surveillance orbit with a minimum range of 2000 nautical
miles, from each of the 5 BAMS bases.
 |
| The impressive BAMS coverage. Curious to see that the "Atlantic Gap", which so much of a worry was during the Battle of the Atlantic, is still there, even with modern technology. |
At Full Operating Capability, in 2020, it is planned that a force of 866
men will support the BAMS arm. Training for the use of BAMS is expected to be
100% delivered by simulation: BAMS aircraft will generally not be
used to meet or maintain training and readiness except in early development
before simulators are
delivered. The total cost per unit is $186.463 million, so it’s great capability, with a cost.
The UK can
of course not afford such an investment, but the Royal Navy is said to be
involved with the compilation of the list of requirements for the future
SCAVENGER Medium Altitude Long Endurance unmanned air vehicle the RAF is
pursuing: aircraft carrier compatibility is not going to be available, but we
can at least hope that the machine coming out of SCAVENGER will have some
decent capability in surveillance over the sea.
Towards
a P-8K?
We should not forget that the Nimrod MRA4 itself was going to be a
supremely useful joint asset, with great capability on land as well as over the
waters. Its radar and sensor turret and extremely long endurance made it
useful, as the MR2 proved abundantly serving over Afghanistan.
MPA aircrafts do work in support of land operations very frequently:
Australian P3 Orions, among others, have been working over Afghanistan for a
decade, and in these days the French are using Atlantique planes over Mali.
The Nimrod MRA4 would also added,
however, more extensive and specialized capabilities, including a formidable
battery of radios and communications equipment and sophisticate ELINT gear,
namely the Israeli Elta EL/L-8300UK Electronic Support Measures (ESM) suite, a
powerful ELINT system, which would have enabled the Nimrod MRA4 to detect all
sort of electronic radiations and turn them into valuable intelligence data.
One operator was assigned to the ESM, and the MRA4 would always carry a
“swing-role” operator on another console which could help for communications.
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| The Nimrod MRA4 would have been a true world beater |
A british P-8 would have to be a
joint asset, useful in a wide range of scenarios. So true this is, that the
work being done to assess the MPA requirement is done under budget control of
the Joint Forces Command. In the words of government, the future procurement of
a Maritime Patrol Aircraft will necessarily pass through a wider study known as
Air ISTAR Optimisation Strategy (AIOS):
[...] the Department currently has
no defined requirement for an MPA capability. The study into Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) concluded
that in the near term the most appropriate solution to a potential underwater
surveillance requirement was a manned aircraft, but the Department’s longer
term objective is to merge as many surveillance requirements as possible into
single equipment builds (e.g. radars that can operate in multiple modes and in
all environments) and to further refine platform types, capabilities and
numbers to achieve maximum effect at minimum cost. As such, those requirements
previously covered by the Nimrod MR2/MRA4 capability are now integrated in the
Air ISTAR portfolio and work is underway in the form of the AIOS to understand
how these requirements can be best covered from the current and planned Air
ISTAR Fleet.
The initial findings of the study
will be reported to the Military Capability Board (MCB) in April 2013. Those
options that appear to merit further investigation will then be developed to
inform a MCB Genesis Option Decision Point prior to CSR15/SDSR15. As set out
above, we will keep the Committee informed of our work in this area. In the
meantime, we have investigated what military off-the-shelf capabilities exist.
For comparison, generation of the AIRSEEKER airborne signals intelligence
capability, replacing Nimrod R1 through an extension to the US RIVET JOINT
aircraft production line, will have taken just under five years from the
identification of the requirement to reaching Initial Operating Capability. Should the situation warrant it, adoption
of off-the-shelf platforms, coupled with the Seedcorn personnel, could
establish a capability in significantly less time.
What are the challenges, and the gains, of a possible british purchase
of P8 (possible designation P-8K)?
The challenges relate, mainly, to costs. For example, due to its much
shorter range and endurance when compared to Nimrod, the Poseidon would very
much need to be fitted with an air refueling probe. It shouldn’t be technically
nor economically unfeasible, but of course it is an additional expense that the
MOD might well try to avoid, even if it means losing a good bit of capability.
Another “challenge” would be to put the LongShot or Fish Hawk wing kit
on the Stingray torpedo. Again, this should be relatively cheap and
straightforward, but in the current climate, nothing is cheap enough. Not
adopting the US “High Altitude ASW” modus operandi would not be a wise decision
for many reasons, including the much faster aging of the airframe.
At the same time, going High Altitude could well mean having no MAD if
the UK does not follow the US lead on the UAV-mounted MAD.
The UK would also have to fund the integration of Stingray, and,
hopefully, of other weaponry. In a “Joint” vision, the P8, like the Nimrod
MRA4, should not be seen as “just” an ASW platform, but as a long range
hunter-killer, capable to operate on water as on land, detecting, tracking and
hitting targets of the most various nature.
With time it would be very much beneficial to integrate weapons such as
Storm Shadow, SPEAR 3 and Paveway IV. The rebuilding of a long-range anti-ship
capability would also very much be welcome, as the loss of Nimrod has also
meant the loss of the air-launched Harpoon. With Sea Eagle having gone even
earlier, the UK is currently very low on anti-ship capability.
The UK should also make sure to acquire the AAS radar and related A-kit,
even if it means investing more money. This investment would give the joint
forces a truly world-beating capability, useful in any scenario. In exchange,
and to partially absorb the costs of the P8, the UK should withdraw from
service the Sentinel R1 fleet, using the Poseidon as a replacement for it, as
well as for Nimrod. This not because the Sentinel is an underperforming system
or anything I’m eager to lose (who follows me knows well how I totally opposed
the dumb SDSR idea of withdrawing it without replacement) but because the
Sentinel can’t be of much help beyond its current intended role, despite what
politicians try to sell to the public. Possibly a radar mode for surface
tracking of ships could indeed be added, but there’s too few airplanes to start
with, they have no ASW capability at all and they really haven’t got much
margin for any kind of growth, when you consider that even the original
requirement for fitting a refueling probe was dropped for weight problems.
A fleet of Poseidon aircrafts (which, also considering the inferior
range compared to Nimrod, really should number no less than 9, and ideally
more) can instead cover a multitude of roles, and do well in all of them:
-
With AAS, it is an
excellent replacement for the SAR-GMTI Sentinel R1;
-
It reintroduces much
needed maritime patrol capability, including the crucial ASW capability, which
is the very reason why we bother with MPAs anyway;
-
It provides ISTAR and
precision, long range strike
As we said earlier, there is also room for growth, which could well
include fitting of the Elta EL/L-8300UK Electronic Support Measures (ESM) suite
planned for the MRA4. I can’t think, honestly, of a more flexible and useful
joint asset.
 |
| P8A Poseidon with AAS |
Finally, and importantly, there is justified hope that the P8 Poseidon
could offer some sizeable interoperability advantages, and be "cheap"
by building on the logistics of the 117-strong US fleet. Upgrades and
maintenance of the new plane could be done cheaply and timely by inserting the
UK planes in the scheduled maintenance plan for the US ones, exactly as will be
done with the 3 UK Rivet Joint to be put in service in 2014 as Nimrod R1
replacement under the "Airseeker" programme. These 3 UK planes will
top the 17 US ones, creating a single, joint fleet of 20 planes to be maintained cooperatively under a Memorandum of
Understanding: every 4 years, the planes will return to prime contractor L3 Communications in Greenville, TX for a complete strip down, refurbishment, and system upgrade. What’s
even more ground-breaking is Britain’s joint participation in platform
improvement, under a continuous capability improvement program that is
contracted until 2025, with options to extend work beyond this period: Britain
will be at the table to write the requirements and inform the evolution of the
type.
This is the approach that could and
should be followed for the P8 Poseidon, as it has potential to deliver massive
savings, and machines always up to top specs.
Based
in Waddington, a fleet of P8s would fill a huge gap in capability that the SDSR
2010 has created, and it would make the future plans for expeditionary forces
much more coherent and believable. As always, costs are difficult to estimate, but
the flyaway unit
cost of a P-8A for the year 2012 was $169.2 million. The cost rises
to $197.8 million
including support costs.
The airframe costs $111.43 million, the two CFM56-7B
engines cost $20 million ($10 million each), and the avionics costs $31.57
million. This is likely not the price the UK would pay if it ordered the
airplane (it would be higher, as there would be start-up costs the US Navy has
already faced, and there would be national requirements such as Stingray
integration, too), but it is a basis for an estimate, and is, at least, a
relatively comforting figure. The total cost per unit of the P8A for the US,
including development costs, is 270.240 million dollars, as of 2011.
Considering also the favorable exchange between pound
and USD, it isn’t a bad deal.
