Lots of words to say positively nothing

An interview of DefenceManagement with Brian Johnson, UK business development director at BAE Systems, about the Type 26, contains the only useful information that the Flexible Deck, also known as "Mission Bay" is still an option being considered. Final design will be settled upon only at Main Gate, in the middle of the decade.
However, one would hope that they do have some clear ideas to work upon from now to 2014. If they have them, though, they are not sharing.

Possibly even more uninteresting is the House of Commons report on F35/JCA just released.
Frankly, coming on this blong and reading my articles, the PAC would have been able to put more detail in it. You can give it a look if you want, but it really adds nothing new.

A real news is the fact that AirTanker is having trouble refueling Tornado GR4s: 20% of the time, the contact results in fuel leaking around the Tornado probe.
The problem must be fixed with money coming from the AirTanker consortium due to the type of contract. This is a good news in the bad news. It also means that it is in the interest of AirTanker to fix the problem quickly, or they will shoulder the losses.

The core fleet of 9 air tankers, including five 3-points tankers (Voyager KC3) is still planned to be delivered in time, by 2014.
Already this year the first RAF crews and Voyagers will be ready to work as flying hospital / medical evacuation airplane, and obviously as troop transports, but air to air refueling training and operations won't start until the Tornado problem is fixed.

No news about the Typhoon AAR trials, which had been cause of delays in the last few months due to the MOD being unable to provide Typhoon jets for the trials...!
Hopefully there won't be further problems.

Lapland test for the thermal optics of the FRES Scout

"The best images i've ever seen"

Comments are very positive from the extreme-climate trials of the FRES Scout thermal sights. The images shown are indeed impressive for their quality.

A report is contained in the April 2012 edition of DESIDER.

It also reports that March 12 saw a meeting of the secretary of state for defence with the colleagues from the other Typhoon partner nations. The meeting was about setting the new schedule for weapons integration on the fighter jet, a process that the UK would like to speed up. The Telegraph reported in the past months that Planning Round 12 would contain progress and confirmation of the Brimstone and Storm Shadow integration.
Unfortunately, DESIDER steps short of telling what the results of the meeting were.

Financial issues are slowing down the decision making, and Italy's air force, for example, is in difficulties at finding funds for Typhoon work and does not really want to move forwards with the plan, selling to the italian government the vision that Typhoon is about air-to-air, mostly to protect from further cuts the existing Tornado and AMX component and to preserve the already downsized F35 order.

This friday should see Admiral Di Paola, minister for defence, present to the italian parliament the plan for defence reform and downsizing. Details are eagerly awaited re: F35 (how many A and how many B in the 90-strong order?), FREMM (no hope of getting the last four?), LHD programme (is it confirmed?), reduction of the Army from 11 to 9 maneuver brigades and other matters.  

Is 1st Battalion The Rifles going to go...?

Is 1st Battalion The Rifles, fourth maneuver battalion of 3rd Commando Brigade since 2008, going to be disbanded, or anyway removed from Commando and amphibious duties?
It is a doubt that has dawned on me also thanks to a comment of Phil. The Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines becoming 43 Commando could be a (poor, but good for politicians) cover up for a reduction to the brigade?

I hope no. But 1st Rifles is not mentioned at all as part of 3rd Commando Brigade in the Royal Navy website, and more worrisome it is never mentioned in the October 2011 "Commando Vision" document which explains the role and force of 3rd Command Brigade following the SDSR.
Of course, 1st Rifles is not part of the Royal Marines, but it is under Navy control, and one would expect to see it listed along other Army-supplied components of the brigade such as 24 Commando Engineer Regiment. The total absence of any mention is worrisome. 

In addition, we've heard that The Rifles, along with the scottish regiment of infantry, are likely to be the hardest hit in the Army reform plan.

It's only a fear / suspect for now, but things do not have a reassuring look about them.

Early April news, waiting for the Planning Round

Selective Precision Effect At Range (SPEAR) is making leaps this year, with MBDA announcing that the Brimstone 2 [SPEAR Capability Block 2] will enter service with the RAF next year and also saying that SPEAR Capability Block 3 is progressing with design and development and flight tests will start next year. At the Farnborough show in July, MBDA has promised that they will showcase more about this new weapon. The last we've heard talked about a 100 kg, 180 km range mini-storm shadow, so to speak, carried on a multiple rack (SDB style) carrying 4 weapons and fitting inside the weapon bay of the F35. SPEAR Capability Block 3 is meant to be a network-enabled weapon capable to hit with extreme accuracy moving and relocatable targets as well as fixed ones.

In addition, Raytheon UK has been awarded a 60 million pounds contract for the replenishment of Paveway IV stocks after many hundred of the bombs have been expended in these years between Afghanistan and Libya. It is possible that as part of this new order a few new variants of the Paveway IV bomb will come to light and be delivered to the RAF, since Raytheon has proudly specified that they are "focused on a technological growth path which, under the UK MOD's SPEAR (Selective Precision Effects at Range) CAP 1 program, will enhance the system's capability with low collateral and penetrator warhead options, enhanced moving target capability and enhanced range."

SPEAR Capability Block 1 is meant to introduce new warhead options and new improvements to the Paveway IV guidance kit. For increasing range, a very likely solution is the adoption of the MBDA Diamond Back wingkit, which would enable the Paveway IV to glide over a distance of many tens of kilometers, giving it a stand-off range. Enhanced moving target capability is notionally expected to be achieved with the addition of a Selex Galileo Imaging Infra Red seeker which could lock on on vehicles moving as fast as 100 kph. A reduced yeld, low frammentation warhead option for urban engagements is envisaged, and a bunker buster warhead is desired, possibly as a replacement for the current capability, represented by the 2000 lbs Enhanced Paveway III with BLU-109 warhead. A bunker-buster warhead could emerge from the HARDBUT (do not laugh, not joking!) joint studies with France.

Currently Paveway IV only comes with a US 500 lbs MK82E warhead, but like all Paveway guidance kits, it could and hopefully will be adapted for use on larger warheads. Currently the Typhoon only uses, for examble, the GBU/EGBU-16 Paveway II, a laser guided (with GPS addition in the Enhanced GBU) bomb using the MK83 1000 pounds warhead (for the RAF, actually, that is the UK-built equivalent mass warhead, the MK13 or MK18 originally, and the updated MK20 or MK22 these days), which will need replacement at some point, as will the 2000 pounds Paveway III which uses the MK84 warhead [the RAF might not use this variant, though] or the BLU-109 bunker buster one [the BLU-109 is now the RAF standard warhead on the Paveway III. A modified BROACH warhead derived from that of Storm Shadow was shown bolted to a Paveway III guidance kit as far back as 1994, but it does not seem to have had great diffusion. Vanished should also be the early-days hybrids which combined a 1000 pounds MK20 warhead, Paveway II wing-kit and Paveway III guidance kit]. Paveway IV will be released for Typhoon use this June, and will be in active RAF service with the Typhoon by September next year.  

Raytheon has sled-tested a bunker buster 500 lbs warhead with Qinetiq collaboration, aiming to SPEAR contracts. While 500 lbs limits the lethality and penetration that can be obtained, the warhead would be readily available as it does have the same mass and centre of gravity of the current MK82E, with no need for any additional integration work. Same approach goes for the reduced-yeld warhead for use in built-up areas. 


The Paveway IV is also being integrated on the F35, and a first pit-drop test of the weapon from an F-35 was already performed at Eglin AFB, Florida, in late March. The bomb will be integrated for internal and external carriage both. 

A glorious unit returns as the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines is re-christened 43 Commando Fp Gr RM. 790-strong, this unit reports to 3rd Commando Brigade and provides protection for the fleet, most importantly for the SSBN fleet and shore infrastructure connected to the nuclear deterrent. It also provides "Green" boarding teams, employed on british warships sent on maritime policing duties in dangerous areas where "warlike" activity is expected.

The RN crews of frigates and destroyers provide the "Blue" boarding teams, which are used on lower-danger searches.

43 Commando is immortal in the memory for its exploits in the battle of Comacchio in northern Italy, in which Cpl Thomas Peck Hunter, in a well-known act of bravery, seized a Bren gun and stormed German machine-gun positions, shooting from the hip and single-handedly capturing or driving the enemy away until he was cut down – but not before his troop reached safety.

The action saw Hunter posthumously given the nation’s highest military honour, the last (to date) of ten Victoria Crosses awarded to Royal Marines.

The Defence Reform progresses as the Joint Forces Command takes shape. 2 april 2012 saw the JFC standing up in its new headquarters in Northwood. 

The Joint Forces Command is expected to reach full operating capability next year, with a number of joint organizations having already been assigned to the Command:

• The Permanent Joint Headquarters (known as PJHQ)
• The Permanent Joint Operating Bases in Gibraltar, Cyprus, British Indian Ocean Territory and South Atlantic Islands
• The Joint Force Headquarters
• The Joint Force Logistics Component
• The Joint Counter-Terrorist Training and Advisory Team
• The Directorate of Special Forces
• The Defence Academy
• The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre
• Defence Intelligence
• Surgeon General's Headquarters and the Joint Medical Command
• The Joint Arms Control Implementation Group
• The Defence Centre of Training Support
• The Defence Cyber Operations Group.

The Joint Forces Command has a central staff of around 150 between military and civilian personnel, but with the controlled organizations it will effectively direct over 30.000 men between military and civilians. First Joint Forces Commander is Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, RAF.

The Joint Forces Command will:

"ensure investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and top-level decision-making."

"ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions and organisations – such as medical services, training and education, intelligence, and cyber – are organised and managed effectively and efficiently to support success on operations."

This centralized approach is similar to that adopted by the German armed forces, which have a Joint Support Service counting some 36.750 men as of 2011. Around 26.000 of these come from the army and the total includes 14.620 men of the Joint Medical Service.

Interestingly, the German armed forces's signals units are considered a joint asset and are part of this command. It would be interesting to consider the application of a similar move in the UK, taking the Royal Signals and the tactical communications unit of the RAF and Navy and put them together in a single, large organization centrally managed.

Again, in Germany the military police is also a joint asset under Joint Support Service, while in the UK there's the Royal Military Police, the sizeable RAF Police, the MOD Police [which is a civilian force currently counting over 3000 men and due to be cut back to 2400 by April 2016], the MOD Guard Service and a Royal Navy Police, which provides a Troop to 3rd Commando brigade.

There seems to be scope for centralization and efficiency in this area as well in the medium term, and i'd suggest planning for it in earnest, since i'd much prefer cutting back on duplication before cutting on frontline soldiers and formations.

Since we have formed the Joint Forces Command, let's give it a meaning and use at least.

FRES SV continues to progress. General Dynamics has been assigning contract after contract in the last few months, as the suppliers of the various components for the new vehicles are selected. The latest contract covers the software and operating system to be used on the vehicles. It follows other contracts, such as those assigned to BARCO for the supplying of the displays and to ViaSat for the onboard data encryption unit.

Over 36 explosive/destructive tests have been completed in the past months to validate the protection levels of the FRES SV hull, and things are progressing well. Expect more contracts to be signed in the months to come, since the list of requirements has been shortened considerably after the various agreements reached, but still has many voices open for tender.

Towards a busy Somali summer? The European mandate for the anti-piracy "Atalanta" operation has been recently broadened in scope to authorize military attack on pirate havens ashore, by helicopter and by naval gunfire (No missiles or ground troops due to German opposition, however).  

Now command of Atalanta has been passed on to France, and the promise is to seize the initiative from the pirates by patrolling close to shore, attacking their bases, and possibly expanding the security patrols in Somali waterways.

France has deployed to the area Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (Nimrod MRA4 was expected to go by this time as well, but we know how that ended...), the frigate Georges Leygues with two Lynx helicopters aboard and the LHD Dixmunde, Mistral-class, which can act as an helicopter carrier with 16 machines.

Despite Germany's opposition and hesitations, France, UK and Netherlands are pressing for a far more active answer to the growing piracy problem. China can be expected to also support such a move: they have long made clear that they regard the only solution to the problem being going ashore and smashing the pirate havens there, indeed.

It has been reported that this year's Royal Navy Response Task Force Group, which will set sail in the summer for exercise Corsican Lion with France's Charles De Gaulle carrier strike group, will then set sail for Somali waters to take part in such "active" reaction to piracy. For the second year in a row, the Task Force might set sail for training and end up shooting very real bullets, after Libya events last year.

This time, it won't be Albion and Ocean, but HMS Illustrious and HMS Bulwark, accompanied by escorts and RFAs vessels, including tankers, Bay class LSDs and probably a Fort stores vessel.

Illustrious is widely expected to carry Apaches, that will be tasked with attacks on pirate bases. Cameron has been said to be asking for this since last February.

Busy summer ahead for the Royal Navy.

In the meanwhile, HMS Daring shines in the Gulf and HMS Dauntless is to carry out the first Type 45 south atlantic patrol, and in May the assembly work for the carrier Queen Elizabeth will make giant leaps forwards. LB02 was powered up this March, 6 months ahead of schedule. In May both LB05 (1600 tons) and LB02 (over 6000) are to be moved by barge from Portsmouth to Rosyth, with the start of Assembly Cycle B.

LB04's two halves will be joined up in the next few days, and the Combat System of Queen Elizabeth is making progress and being tested at HMS Collingwood.

Around 25 May the giant LB02 section will start its travel, and it'll be a major milestone in the build programme. And of course, around the 17 of April we should finally have some clarity about the choice of the airplane to fly from the ships.

About time, to say the very, very least.

On 30 March, HMS Liverpool decommissioned, after being in the thick of the action until her very last moments, with Libya, escorting the russian aircraft carrier and then the exercises in Norway keeping her running at full pace. A most distinguished vessel of the Royal Navy bowing out with honor.

And with the Type 22s gone and the Type 42s to be entirely gone by 2013, the shore-based Tyne gas turbine training set has been shut down, closing a long era of Royal Navy engineering. The engine of the gas revolution soon will be no more. The Spey era will last until the 2030s, however, and the WR-21 and MT-30 eras are dawning thanks to Type 45 and CVF. 

F35 updates. The US accountants and DoD have re-priced the F35 program. It was widely anticipated that it would be 15 billion dollars more expensive, turned out being 17, but the US acquisition plan remains unchanged, and there's nothing new about the rumors of the B order of the USMC being cut back down to just 65.

By 2018 USN and USMC will be getting 50 F35s per year.

I also saw a new LM promotional image with upgraded quantities of jet fighters for nations: for example, Italy is down from 131 to 90 as announced in Parliament last month, and Norway is down to 48 from 56 as just confirmed (4 LRIP to be used for training, 42 fighters main order, 6 options to be confirmed later on). The figures for all countries are, in other words, very accurate and very up to date.

For the UK the figure is 3 B (those already ordered, even if the third, BK-3, is to be given to the USMC in exchange for one of their C, probably to be named CK-1) and 135 C.

Unfortunately, this figure is unlikely to mean anything serious, compared to the other numbers, as the UK still has to finalize its plan... But one can hope! 

The US DoD has announced that they expect to produce 50 Navy Department's F35s per year from 2018 onwards, with the order equally equally split, 25 B and 25C, at least in 2018.

2018 is planned to see US orders for:

60 A (to rise to 80 per year by 2021)

25 B

25 C

They have also released updated expected recurring flyaway cost of the full-rate production airframes (in 2012 dollars):

78.8 USD million x F35A

106 USD million x F35B

87 USD million x F35C

If these prices are anywhere near reliable and representative of the cost to be paid by the MOD, 50 F35C would cost some 2718 million pounds [of course, spare engines, spares and all the rest are not included], while an equal number of F35B would come at 3312.5 million pounds. Again, spares not included, and we know that the B-variant spare engines are expensive like hell, so the total difference is likely to be greater still.

That is a difference of 594.5 million pounds, anyway, to start with, and it is enough to buy an EMALS/AAG set and pay for part of the installation work. It does not cover all of the conversion's cost, (458 + 400 million pounds according to the US Navy-sponsorised estimates).

At best, when spares are factored in, the conversion of ONE carrier might be covered. 

But we need two, so the C must prove economically attractive enough to ensure conversion of Queen Elizabety during refit in the 2020s. It is likely to prove very challenging, though.

The choice remains difficult, and the future of the second CVF not at all safe.

Type 26, Type 45, anti-ship missiles

To take a much needed break (and a breath) from the gloom and doom and depression of the latest rumors about the Army cuts, i'm writing a quick article on the issue of anti-ship missiles and weaponry for the Type 26 frigates and Type 45 destroyers, helped in this by some interesting hints contained in an article on the italian defence magazine "Rivista Italiana Difesa".

According to this respected Italian publication and its journalists, the Type 45 might get an anti-ship missile within next year. Nothing is specified about this program, no details, sadly. My guess is that four of the Type 45 destroyers could be fitted with the Harpoon batteries salvaged from the retired Type 22 Batch 3 frigates. Indeed, i've been personally expecting this to happen for quite some time, and i'm more surprised of it not having yet happened than anything else. The Type 45 is fitted for but not with SSM batteries, and the Harpoon quad launchers can be readily installed behind the PAAMS silo.

In the longer term, Harpoon will need a replacement, and the Type 26 frigate will of course need a weapon system other than the CAMM missile for point air defence. The same article on "Rivista Italiana Difesa" drops in a couple of hints about this as well, and confirms the analysis done on this blog on the latest imagery of the Type 26 concept released by BAE in a January 2012 video: the Type 26 main armament will be carried in a silo counting 24 cells. It is not specified which VLS system will be fitted, but it'll possibly be the Sylver A70.

The 24 cells are reportedly going to be used for a modular missile or a family of as common and closely related as possible missiles acting as Harpoon replacement, which is, according to the italian magazine's sources, required to cover three roles:

- Anti Ship

- Land Attack

- Anti submarine

It seems confirmed that, at least as of now, a 24-cell main missile silo is planned. Remove the question mark, the cell count was right, they are 24!

The requirement is still very much flexible and without a well defined shape. Currently, Vertical launch anti-ship missiles aren't exactly around to start with: a VLS Harpoon has been on the cards for years, but never progressed. In addition, there is not an existing missile on the market which is capable of covering all three roles. There's several anti-ship missiles that have a land attack capability, including systems such as the Harpoon Block II, the RBS15, the Joint Strike Missile and others, but none of these is vertically launched, and none has an anti-submarine capability. The Italian OTOMAT TESEO MK2 is the system that probably goes closer to the requirement, as it is an anti-ship missile with good land attack capability and its booster section is used by the MILAS missile, the italian answer to the US ASROC. The MILAS is launched by the same TESEO tubes, and replaces the front section of the anti-ship missile with a MU90 324 mm anti-submarine torpedo that it can drop in the water in a search area up to 35 km away from the launching ship. It is not, however, vertically launched. It uses standard quad-cell tubes, like the Harpoon.

The british requirement is indicated under the very generic acronym SSGW (surface to Surface Guided Weapon) and has been around as a requirement, in a shape or another, from the early 90s. An SSGW system was part of the Type 45 planned mission fit, but was notoriously written off from the list of requirements for the AAW destroyers for the time being.

So far little hard work has been done to turn the requirement in an actual system, and time is, in my opinion, running out. With the first Type 26 expected in service by 2021, it is time to start some serious activity, as only a new design can met all three roles and meet the VL requirement. Little is known of the performances desired from the missile, but a minimum effective range of 200 km has been indicated. The UK and France have begun funding studies by missile maker MBDA for a future cruise missile, potentially for employment from ships and airplanes alike (the latter as a possible longer-term Storm Shadow replacement). The first results of the studies are visible in the concept "Perseus" that MBDA first showed last year. This missile is roughly 5 meters long (more or less like Storm Shadow) and is said to weight 800 kg (down from 1300 of Storm Shadow) with a range of 300 km or more, the ability to strike ship and land targets with different attack profiles, high speed (more than Mach 3 in certain profiles) and modular space for different warheads to increase mission flexibility. Some 200 kg would be available for the warhead according to MBDA, and they have shown a notional "triple" warhead which features 100 kg of explosive in the missile, along with 2x 50 kg "effectors" that are dropped by the missile in the last stretch of the attack course, to hit either multiple targets in the same area, or to strike a single large target (like a major warship) in several different areas at once for maximum lethality. Other warhead options would include bunker-buster payloads and others, and if it was possible to use elements of the booster for firing a StingRay torpedo, a Perseus-derived family of missiles could be the answer for SSGW. Importantly, the Perseus is shown by MBDA being launched by VLS cells (as well as from a submarine's torpedo tubes), almost certainly Sylver A70 (the shorter A50 cell, used for example on Type 45, is five meters deep, and Perseus is unlikely to fit in with the vertical launch booster).  

However, the studies are very mild at this point in time, and aim more to 2030 than 2020. For the Type 26 that would be more than a bit late.

It looks to me also more than a bit uncertain the feasibility of putting a torpedo on an undoubtedly complex and expensive missile body meant to fly as fast as Mach 3, and it is difficult to say if and how much of Perseus could be effectively used to meet the anti-submarine part of the requirement. Then again, the anti-submarine requirement might well be abandoned, with standard torpedo tubes used instead, as on Type 23. Indeed, the RN has long done without an anti-submarine weapon of this kind, retaining torpedo tubes on frigates for snap-shots and very short range engagements, while leaving to embarked helicopters the work of bringing torpedoes to a distant area.

Of course, a weapon such as ASROC or MILAS enables the ship to timely answer to a fleeting long-range sonar contact, and it overall makes more sense than the torpedo tubes, as it is very likely that, if the submarine is close enough to be engaged so directly via on-board tubes, there's already torpedoes in the water aimed at the frigate. The Royal Navy last fielded a capability of this kind with the IKARA, many years ago now, and with the long-range detection capability of the sonar 2087, a long-range torpedo delivery system would certainly be a great enhancement.       

Apart from Perseus, the western part of the world is not ripe with new anti-ship missile projects. The most inventive system proposed was probably the box-launched variant of the KEPD 350 Taurus cruise missile for use on ships, which did not go very far anyway. 

The SEA Taurus so far did not progress, just like the much more interesting air-dropped Taurus, meant to be parachute-extracted from the rear ramp of cargo planes such as C130, A400 and C17. As many as 12 stand-off missiles on a large, cheap-to-fly cargo plane with thousands of miles of effective range. A beautifully effective solution. But not shiny nor pointy. No air force is investing in this mean of missile delivery. Much better to deliver 12 missiles flying 6 Tornado and 4 air tankers at the cost of millions of pounds, isn't it...?

The Joint Strike Missile from Norway is the only new missile in a world dominated by updates and re-editions of systems which have been around in forever, such as Teseo, Harpoon and Exocet. The JSM is a 1000 pounds weapon specifically designed to fit the F35's weapon bays (perhaps not that of the F35B, though) and good for both anti-ship and land strike roles. It is credited with an air-launch range of 130 naval miles and combines GPS and Imaging Infra Red seeker to find and hit its targets. The ship-launched variant will be installed, in time, on the Nansen frigates and on the Skjold air cushion catamaran corvettes of Norway. The land-launch variant has been chosen by Poland for its coastal defence batteries, and Australia is interested in the F35/JSM combination. The JSM could be ready and integrated on the F35 by 2019, when the Block 4 software release for the F35 is planned. The missile, when used on ships or on land, is box launched, and there is no VLS development in sight. 

The Joint Strike Missile is the sole anti-ship missile planned at the moment for the F35, and definitely the sole one which can fit in the weapon bay. In the UK, anti-ship missiles have been neglected in planning round after planning round, and with the retirement of Nimrod there's not a single airplane left in Britain capable to fire an anti-ship missile. Hopefully, the SPEAR Capability Block 3 weapon, being developed by the UK for internal F35 carriage, will be good enough at hitting mobile targets to have some capability as anti-ship missile. SPEAR Block 3 is progressing, and should be flying in 2013 for tests.

Other than the compatibility with the F35 weapon bays, the JSM is unremarkable. Good missile, but without any particularly impressive feature: no great speed (it is high subsonic, like Harpoon or Exocet) or fantastic range, or sci-fi seeker. 

JSM flight trials

Like all western anti-ship missiles, it kind of looks ancient and obsolete when compared to the Indo/Russian Bramhos/Yakhont missile.   

The Bramhos flies at mach 2.8 / 3, with a 200 kg warhead and a range of nearly 300 km. It is launched vertically from ships, fired from aircrafts (big maritime patrol planes, but also from the SU-30 MKI fighter jet), fired from trucks in land-based batteries and can also be employed by submarines. In development is the Bramhos II, aiming for Mach 4 and above, going into the hypersonic realm. Generations ahead of the western systems.

Perseus is merely a concept for now, and is many years away from meeting these targets. In the US, similar results might be reached this year, as the US navy tests the prototypes of a new generation of ship-killers which should enter service between 2018 and 2024.

The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is currently a DARPA study, and the activity is going on with two very different protorypes and mission doctrines.

LRASM A is a "low-slow" stealthy, subsonic, turbofan-powered missile derived from the AGM-158B JASSM-ER(Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range) cruise missile, with a range of over 500 miles and a 1000 pounds warhead. It bets on stealthness and low altitude flying to slip past enemy defences, and on a huge warhead for achieving high lethality. At least initially, the LRASM A will be an air launched weapon.

LRASM B is a whole different story, and by far the most interesting of the two. It will have a 500 pounds warhead, but it will fly at supersonic speed and high altitude, with a dive-attack profile. Powered by a Ramjet, like Meteor or Bramhos itself, it is meant to be fired from MK41 vertical cells and uses the same booster of the SM3 anti-ballistic missile already in service.

LRASM A

Both missiles are being designed and assembled by Lockheed Martin, with BAE systems designing the common targeting and seeker system. 

LRASM B. Fins deployed, in this image it lacks the booster used for vertical launch.

Both LRASM missiles would eventually be refined and end up being employable by airplanes, ships and submarines if they were successful in the tests and brought forwards by the USN. Both missiles will share the on board seeker and targeting sensors, which will be particularly important as LRASM is required to conduct autonomous targeting, relying on its on-board targeting systems to independently acquire the target without the presence of prior, precision intelligence, or supporting services like Global Positioning Satellite navigation and data-links. This is to enable highly accurate strikes in extremely hostile environments where obtaining pre-launch intelligence would be impossible. The missile is to have sophisticate counter-countermeasures to further enhanced its chances of success.

A future development, which could end up merging with the Prompt Global Strike naval-segment, would aim to produce a cruise missile suitable for Tomahawk replacement, VLS compatible and hypersonic, capable of covering 2000 or more naval miles in 30 minutes.

This is to happen "sometime in the future", so to speak, but the LRASM should see at least a few flight trials (2 air drops for the A and 4 vertical launches for the B) within 2013, or already during this summer, when the US Navy could hold a Critical Design Review on the initiative.

Another US solution to the anti-ship problem is the "Tomahawk Block IV Plus". This missile, proposed by Raytheon, could be ready within 3 years of development and testing. It is a modified Tactical Tomahawk Block IV (already in use in the RN as well as, obviously, in the USN) which replaces the current two-ways datalink with an updated one and adds a new seeker head comprising a millimetric-wave multi-mode radar and a passive radar array.

The Tomahawk IV plus would be fired by MK41 Strike Length cells or torpedo tubes, it would fly nearly 2000 naval miles guided by GPS to reach its "hunting area", and then it would seek contacts with the passive radar, by intercepting the transmissions of enemy radars.

The millimetric-wave seeker would then guide the Tomahawk in the final approach on the target.  

The irony of the proposal is that an Anti-Ship Tomahawk used to exist already in the past. The RGM/UGM-109B Tomahawk Anti Ship Missile (TASM) [RGM denotes surface launch from ships, UGM underwater launch from submarines] combined the radar seeker of the Harpoon and the semi-piercing warhead of the Bullpup missile and offered long-range anti-ship capability. The USN acquired it in 1983, but the TASM was very mission-specific, and in 2002 at least 320 missiles, still in good conditions, were modified into standard land-attack Tomahawks, used much more frequently as we know.

The Tomahawk Block IV Plus is much more attractive because technologically mature and much more multi-mission than the original TASM. It will be able to strike land targets without problems, and will be better able, indeed, to pursue moving, relocating targets.

The presence of a passive radar sensors, besides, could easily turn the Tomahawk IV Plus in an extremely effective, ultra-long range SEAD asset, useful to locate and shut down enemy radars to blind air defence networks.   

We will see what happens. But a battery of 24 missiles capable to strike ships and land targets perhaps 300 km away would give the Type 26 a formidable capability, so i hope to see the Perseus concept going ahead, and SSGW taking on a much more defined shape.

With an eye open and looking towards the Type 45 as well: there's space for 16 additional VLS cells, and a 8x2 Sylver A70 module filled with the SSGW would complete the destroyer's capability, giving it the multimission capability it needs.  

Just how bad is it...?

So, the Telegraph is out with an article announcing the incoming (12 april, in theory) announcements into the new structure of the British Army, being drafted under Future Army Structure (Next Steps), with a review led by general Nick Carter informing the Army's chief about the choices to make.

Apparently, meeting the 82.000 regulars ceiling is proving ridiculously challenging, and will require a giant axe swing over the fighting formations and frontline support services.
How can it be so challenging to form 6 deployable brigades that aren't at all larger or more complex than continental ones, it is sometimes hard to understand.
I can accept that the Italian army misses several enablers (there is no comparing the Royal Engineers with the Italian equivalent, the difference is very serious) and has a rather small support component, but it is still an army who keeps a substantial force in Afghanistan and Lebanon, was in Iraq and until now has 11 maneuver brigades, highly mechanized, with some 108.000 men in force as of 2010.
Following the cuts announced recently, the brigades will go down to 9, but the number of regulars per deployable brigade is unlikely to change much: we are looking at around 9000 to 11.000 men in the army for each deployable brigade lined.
I'm fully aware that this is a very empiric and unprofessional way to look into the number of men required to support the force, but nonetheless i believe it is interesting.
With 11.000 men for each deployable brigade the British Army of 82.000 regulars should in theory be able to support 7.45 deployable brigades.

Instead it will struggle to man 6 and cover its roles, if the infantry battalions are really going down all the way from 36 to 25. 25 are just enough for 5 MRBs of 4 infantry battalions each (of which one should be Armoured and one Mechanized, if the SDSR's words are still worth something at all), plus 4 battalions in 16 Air Assault brigade, plus 1st RIFLES in 3rd Commando.
1st PARA is, as always, not counted (it would be the 37th battalion) because is listed as part of the Special Forces.
From the count goes missing the 6th Armoured Infantry battalion that was expected to be retained for rotating with the others in and out of Training & Demonstration role, unless 1st Rifles is cut, which would be another punch in the face of the SDSR and of everything said this far as 3rd Commando Brigade would, contrary to promises, reduced very significantly. 
How Cyprus will be garrisoned, how public role will be covered, how will the Brunei presence be continued, is not yet known.
Unless these tasks are removed, on a normal day the MRBs will have 3, not 4, infantry battalions, because all the others will be assigned to other duties, other countries, possibly other continents. 

Considering that an Infantry Battalion has on average 700 men [679, actually] (Mechanized 667, Armoured 741, Light 630); Artillery regiments can be short of 400, tank regiments hover at 550 and Recce regiments perhaps at 600 (wartime), as few as 25.000 men are the fighting teeth of an Army on 25 Infantry Battalions, 5 reduced tank regiments, 5 downsized "Fires" regiments of Artillery and 5 Recce regiments.

And this in an army that has outsourced even recruitment and training.

At 82.000 regulars and 6 deployable brigades, the British Army swallows 13.666 men for each brigade it has, compared to as few as 9850 for the Italian Army or 12.514 for France [2 Armoured brigades, 2 Mechanized brigades, 1 Light Armoured Brigade, 1 Light Armoured Brigade - Amphibious, 1 PARA brigade, 1 Mountain Infantry Brigade, 1 France-Germany joint brigade, 1 Special Forces Brigade for 125.141 regulars] or 9228 for Germany [little more than 73.000 regulars, but 3 Divisional HQs with 5 highly mechanized/armored brigades, 1 Mountain infantry brigade, 1 Airmobile brigade plus Special Forces and helicopter elements and the France-Germany joint brigade. However they have reduced the holdings of artillery, concentrating what's left at divisional level. We are still talking of a force with more PZH2000 than the British Army has AS90s, anyway].

The British Army seems to be the heaviest in Europe in terms of support and logistics, and there is most likely scope for reductions (even though, really, support is never too much in a war situation), but it must be a reduction carefully thought out, and that leaves the regiments and capabilities needed.  
I think there are no real reasons why the British Army can't fit the units needed in the 82.000 regulars it has been assigned, but it is admittedly a tight fit if one tries to make his calculations basing himself on historical data.   

Using the Telegraph's and historical figures for the main components of the british army we have:

Royal Artillery just 5000 men post cuts [down from 7512 in 2009]
Royal Engineers just 5500 post cuts [9367 in 2009]
Royal Logistics Corps 12000 post-cuts [over 15.000 previously, largest corp in the army]
REME 9895 in 2009 
Royal Armoured Corps 5823 in 2009
Army Air Corps 2034 in 2009
Royal Signals 9000 in 2009
Army Medical Corps 3354 in 2009 + 1147 Queen's Alexandra nurses
Military Intelligence 1607 in 2009
Army Veterinary Branch 260 in 2009
Gurkha 3000 in 2009

I'm at 58.620 men, that become 75.851 with the addition of:

5+1 armoured infantry (741 x 5) = 4446
5 Mechanized infantry (667 x 5) = 3335
15 Light Role Infantry (630 x 15) = 9450

With the addition of over 8000 men (lawyers, dentists, Small Arms school, Adjutant General Corps, chaplains and everything else, counted at 2009 force levels) i'm at 84.745 men, a bit above the target (although 84.000 men has been mentioned more than once, and the final figure could be somewhere in between 82.000 and 84.000). Arguably, all of the 2009 figures should drop at least some, and i'd want the maximum reductions done in non frontline arms before the fighting units are touched, and in frontline i'm including artillery, signals and engineer and intelligence.
The REME are of course not going to stay at 9000 men when several LADs and posts cease to exist with the closure of battalions and the reduction in vehicle holdings. According to the Telegraph the Army Air Corps will also lose some posts as Lynx AH7 helicopters are retired earlier.
I personally expect 1st Regiment AAC to be victim of this cut. 

The Telegraph of course reports that:

A special cadre will also be created to provide what has been called “upstream engagement” — where military trainers deploy to foreign countries in an attempt to prevent future conflicts.

What this special cadre will be like, what it will actually accomplish, and if it is meaningful at all, i can't say. Most worrisome of all is the eventual impact that it will have on the force structure. I will restrain from expressing my opinion because it would not be polite. 
I've seen figures as high as 3000 men quoted for this in earlier rumors.
My opinion will be even less polite about this if the Army loses the sixth armoured infantry battalion for its own training, or the brigade engineer regiment, or the Artillery while going on with this. Forward engagement MIGHT be good and MIGHT prove useful, but not if it costs THIS much.
I'd very much prefer these 3000-some men to be used to retain 5 additional Light Role battalions, to better cover the various tasks that the British Infantry has to face daily.  

What, in the name of all is holy, is happening here?

Is the Telegraph wrong, at least on some accounts? What do the cuts announced by the Telegraph imply?

For example: the Royal Engineers have already undergone some changes. One regiment is going (that of 19 Light Brigade, 38th Regiment), two have been merged (25 Regiment Air Support is closing, its two field squadrons going to 39 Regiment) while other restructuring has already been planned and announced, but with 5 brigade-support regiments to stay, along with 2 General Support regiments and 39 Regt supporting the AAC and RAF deployments by taking care of aviation-related infrastructure. The Telegraph suggestion however paints a quite different picture, i fear, suggesting that additional cuts, very substantial, are on the way. I can't see the announced changes amounting to a 30% manpower cut, after all.
If there are to be 5 MRBs, each of them must have a strong engineer regiment to make military sense, full stop. Perhaps the two General Support regiments can be brought down to just one, with a Squadron lining the M3 amphibious rigs and one ideally keeping Talisman in Route Clearance troops, ready for future usage when the need for a similar system re-emerges (and it is likely to, at some point), but that is about the maximum cut i can envisage before things truly begin to erode away all the capability.

The Royal Signals, not mentioned in the Telegraph article, are losing 7th Regt and will see the 2nd Signals brigade closed down at the end of the Olympics, with its units to be restructured and redistributed to 1st and 11th Signal Brigades. They also have lost the Signal element that was assigned to 19 Light Brigade.
They are reportedly expanding 14th Regiment (Electronic Warfare) to an establishment of 750 men, but their trained strenght overall value is no doubt going down. Hard to guess by how much, though. 

The Royal Artillery so far had planned for a rather nice future as part of FAS: more Fire Support Teams, less big guns (-35% in holdings of AS90 howitzers, 1 regiment of L118 Light Guns to disband - 40 Regiment, 19 Light Brigade), more drones and less howitzers, but still with GMLRS and 5 brigade Fires regiments, each with 2 AS90 batteries and 1 L118 battery. 40 Regiment is gone, but its trained Fire Support Teams have been re-assigned to other regiment's Tac Groups.
95 howitzers are left post SDSR, but the Telegraph now says:

The 15 Royal Artillery regiments will be reduced by a third to 5,000 troops, with almost its entire fleet of AS90 self-propelled guns being mothballed or held at “readiness” by territorial units.

How should we read this? As a complete fuck-up, or as an indication that, say, the regulars will man the L118 battery and 1 AS90 Battery in the regiment, with the other manned by Reserves?
Or are we going to see the first Army in history without artillery? Clowning around for everyone, ladies and gentlemen.

There is little to no room for regiment closures anymore:

5 Fires regiments for each MRB
1 Commando artillery Regt for 3rd Commando Brigade
1 PARA artillery Regt for 16 Air Assault
1 Training regt
1 GMLRS/Fire Shadow regt on five batteries
1 Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regt on 5 batteries

The above are, in my view, untouchable. A brigade without artillery is not a brigade, it is a joke that does not amuse. The other elements in the list are just as indispensable. 

The room for change is limited: the current 2 regiments working to provide, together, 5 UAV batteries, could be brought down to a single Regt to save on overhead, but cutting on the number of batteries planned would be utterly stupid and damaging. 

Air defence has been cut to the bone already. Either it is abandoned entirely, or Starstreak is retired closing 12 Regt, or 12 Regt is folded back into 16 Regt, in a single, large composite formation with Rapier and Starstreak.
But this last solution is unlikely to lower that much the manpower requirement.
Can the reserve take over the Air Defence role? I have my doubts. There is much that can go wrong with the reserves plan.

The armour front will perhaps save its regiments, but lose a lot of manpower.
ArmedForces.co.uk has removed the Type 58 regiment from the British Army armor section, but i believe the Type 44 regiment will not last either. I've long anticipated that Type 38 regiments might be the most the Army gets.
But for the Telegraph it could well be worse still. Regiments whole could vanish (wave a bye bye to the SDSR promise of tanks in each MRB, just to confirm once more how much value that cursed PDF has) and/or the tanks could be manned by, you guess it, reserves.
Will they ever be worked up to genuine readiness level, or will the British Army never be able to deploy a tank again?

Can i be blamed for saying that i'd be more confident in having the reserves put in roles less complex and specialistic, such as RLC truck drivers? Contractors and reserve personnel, i believe, have better chances of meeting the requirements currently faced by as many as 15 Regular RLC regiments than becoming the Army's go-to specialists for heavy armour and air defence. Besides, RLC regiments are among the largest of the Army formations, so there might be scope to save a lot of regulars by having as many RLC posts as reasonably possible taken up by deployable reserves and, where appropriate, by contractors.

Again, in the REME field, the UK might want to consider doing away with the Light Aid Detachment system, centralizing the resources that are currently dispersed into each and every battalion and regiment into Sustainment Battalions to assign to each MRB, on the model of what the US have done in their BCTs, perhaps achieving some efficiencies.
The American Army has removed its LAD-equivalent formation from its battalions, and given each BCT a Sustainment Battalion which combines Logistics and Repair/Maintenance services and comes structured in specialized Companies. Each Company is shaped around the need of a battalion, so there is a Forward Support Company structured to support Artillery, one equipped to deal with the needs of a Tank battalion, and so along.
Centralization should allow efficiencies, but i suspect that, of course, basing concerns are one of the points that go against application of this concept to the British Army, as the units of the same brigade end up spread over a wide area, with the problems that this involves.


We've known for a long time that reductions were on the way, but the picture painted by the Telegraph article is a lot worse than expected.
If the Telegraph is right, the overall good planning done this far is likely to have gone entirely to hell. The information that had come out of official sources this far had been overall reassuring. Reductions, of course, but none this catastrophic. There was, indeed, something to be glad for, with rational decisions being implemented: more EW, more Fire Support Teams, an Engineer force perfectly sized for the Brigades it was called to support, etcetera.
The Telegraph instead puts forwards a picture of near doom, as the numbers it reports are likely to imply further reductions in regiments and capabilities.  

It took me the night to get over the shock of reading the article and think straight again. But the more i look into the article's figures, the more i ask myself what the fuck is being done? 

 

The dodgy rethink - wait a second!

Another episode in the "F35: B or C" saga has just gone on show with an article on The Telegraph reporting that the Gulf Times article which was published a few days ago and that i quoted (without much confidence in it) in my previous article might well have been correct, at least in part.

The US Navy has apparently stepped in loudly in the carrier issue, showing that they care about UK's carrier strike capability much more than even i expected.  It seems that the assistant secretary of the US Navy, Sean J Stackley, has personally written a letter to Philip Hammond to make the case for CATOBAR conversion and for F35C order, ensuring that it will be responsibility of the US Navy to make the EMALS work, and, importantly, stay within a cost of 458 million pounds.
The cost of the work required to modify the ship to fit the EMALS kit is estimated at 400 million, giving a potential total cost for one vessel of 858 million pounds, near the lowest figure of the initial conversion cost estimate (which reported that cost would vary between 800 and 1200 millions).

This cost figure would fit the allocation of 950 million pounds that MOD officers said they could make in the coming planning rounds.
The problem of converting the second carrier, however, remains. And the uncertainty about the long-term cost implications of either airplane choice remain as well, with F35C training and ship costs being higher, while the F35B is burdened by the cost of its engine, by its higher initial acquisition cost and higher maintenance cost.
The question that remains unsolved is:

Is the cheaper and more effective F35C worth the high initial cost of converting the carrier(s)? Or the costs of CATOBAR and associated higher training penalty remove the advantage in the long term when compared to the more expensive B which does however not require catapults?   

As i tried to explain in a previous article, an answer to the above question is not easy to get.

There is also another question that comes to mind, and it regards the conversion cost itself. From where did the sudden "2 billions" figure come out?
There are many possibilities. For sure, there's still a party of MOD officers and civil servants that believe that F35B, while more expensive to acquire, will cost less to run through life, due mainly to the expected training penalty associated with CATOBAR ops and to the ship's own costs inclusive of catapults and arrestor wires if a CATOBAR solution is chosen. This has been the feeling that guided the F35B selection in the 2000s.
The feeling is that the "STOVL" party, fearing future financial difficulties, might be trying to find high-effect reasons to oppose to the F35C, perhaps inflating the conversion cost figure. It wouldn't be the first time that cost estimates are played with regarding an Aircraft Carrier program: the ill-fated CVA-01 Queen Elizabeth, which lost out to the TSR2 (what a sad story that was as a whole...) at one point was given a pricetag that, it was then evealed, included 4 Type 82 destroyers as "defensive systems".
Talk about CIWS...!
It is about as fair as taking Typhoon and adding to its cost the well over 1 billion expense for Meteor, and the nearly 13 billions of FSTA, and perhaps the cost of running the Sentry AWACS fleet as well. It is clear that this kind of creative accounting is highly unfair, and deliberately misguides politicians in their decisions. 

From the outside, it is hard to tell what exactly is going on inside the MOD, obviously. But the intervention of the US Navy might prove decisive. The Telegraph suggests that, after getting the US message, the prime minister has ordered the Treasury to direct an in-depth review of the costs forecast. They say that a report on the outcome of the study is due by April 16, for examination by the National Security Council on April 17.
It is clear that the CATOBAR solution brings the most political weight to the table, as british carriers with catapults would be welcomed by both the US and France. So CATOBAR is a political winner to start with. 

The Telegraph goes farther, by saying that the carrier cooperation agreement in place with the US would see Prince of Wales built with additional and separated accommodations and communications fits, in order to allow a US Navy squadron to work from the carrier. They go, i suspect, way overboard by suggesting that there might be a "US carrier into a british one", with "US eyes only" communications. I believe it will be nowhere near as invasive.
But it is very likely, i believe, that an US squadron or mini airwing could exploit the british deck quite frequently. This would suggest that the british carrier, and to a degree Charles de Gaulle, are seen by the US as stopgaps, as helping hands available to fill all the deployment slots on the map. While the US are committed to maintain 11 carriers and 10 airwings, they do not quite deem them to be enough, and they expect to have to focus their attention on the Pacific and on the Indian Ocean in the future, but they do not want to gap presence in other areas such as the Gulf and the Middle East area in general, or the Mediterranean.
And in these two areas, the UK and France carriers would fill the gaps.

The situation is actually not totally new.
As it is, the US Navy is being required to have 2 carrier strike groups operative at all times in the Indian Ocean to support operations in land-locked Afghanistan, but sustaining a two-carriers enduring commitment while sending flat tops to all the other areas as well is proving immensely challenging, leaving the fleet and its men no time to pull their breath.
France has been helping in the Indian Ocean with Charles de Gaulle replacing a US carrier for some periods of time. When CdG joined the air operations over Libya last year, she was back from the Indian Ocean by less than one month, in fact, factor that had a big relevance in limiting to 132 days the time that the carrier spent on station for Unified Protector: after months and months at sea, for the carrier the maintenance time was by now approaching.

Going further back in time, the US had already experienced the carrier shortage issue at the time of the Vietnam war. Back then, the requirement was not for 2, but for 3 aircraft carrier groups in the area for 365 days a year, year after year, with no pauses.
And back then it was the british fleet that provided an helping hand: throughout the sixties, the big british flat tops Eagle, Ark Royal, Victorious, Centaur and Hermes deployed again and again as far as south west asia to plug the holes left open by the USN's huge commitment to Vietnam. They helped all the way until they were abruptly retired from service with the disgraceful "East of Suez" defence review.
Ark Royal, the last survivor, continued to help the US Navy by taking up the role of strike carrier as part of the NATO Atlantic Strike Fleet, which was intended to always field two flat tops. Ark Royal's presence left one US carrier free to head to the Gulf of Tonkin as part of the rotation of vessels to the Vietnam theatre.

Back then, the british carriers all had their own wholly british airwing, tomorrow they might carry a mixed airwing and sail in the Gulf of Aden, to allow one more US aircraft carrier to take position in the Pacific.

Will US pressure and assistance win the Royal Navy's case for converting Queen Elizabeth as well in the 2020s, during her first major refit? I certainly hope so, if the EMALS and F35C plan is confirmed, as i continue to envisage a two-carriers capability as vital.

Regarding the F35B, the Telegraph joins Gulf Times in shoving the B variant under a wrap of darkness, reporting that the americans might be really considering a massive downsizing of the USMC order for the STOVL plane.
I continue to doubt of this, also because the US Marines have massive political weight to help them make their case heard, but we will have to see.   

Another thing that is not clear is wheter the Planning Round 2012 announcement, so far planned for Monday 26 March, will go ahead without the Carrier Strike bit to be added later, or if it all will be postponed further, past April 17. 



Meanwhile, the European Union has extended the Atalanta Operation mandate, and now the ships involved in anti-piracy operations in the Somali area will be authorized to pursue pirates on land with air attacks or gunfire.
Due to the opposition of Germany and Spain, though, missile attack and insertion of ground troops are still no-no.

Will we see HMS Illustrious or HMS Ocean loaded with Apache sent to Somalia to strike at pirate havens...? Dave apparently was calling for it even before the Atalanta decision, after all.