The results of the 2012 edition of “Agile Warrior”,
the future-informing series of exercises and studies that the Army is using for
shaping its future structure and capabilities have been released via RUSI
during the Lad Warfare conference in June. Agile
Warrior 2012 is said to have significantly informed the Army 2020
restructuring.
Agile Warrior has been hailed as an “innovative” and
open thinking exercise of thought, open to the general public scrutiny (at least
in part), constituting an example of how the forces should try and see into the
future to re-shape (read reduce) themselves.
Is there anything really that innovative or good about
Agile Warrior? I’m far from convinced.
For example, until Agile Warrior 2011, the exercises
had been centered on developing the Multi Role Brigade on which the Army has
been working at least since 2008, when the hope was to have 8 such brigades. In
2010, this had reduced to 5 as we know, but the MRB concept was still the way,
and Agile Warrior 2011, albeit showing some reserve on some factors,
significantly hailed the MRB as the way to go.
Then, as we know, Army 2020 took a sharp turn to the
side and broke away from the MRB concept altogether, and apparently moved away
also from much of the sound concept of unit standardization and modularity that
had been worked upon. As far as I’m aware, there has not been an Agile Warrior
assessment of this complete change of direction. It just happened, and Agile
Warrior 2012 is considerably less expansive of AW11, and just avoids expanding
on any kind of brigade or force structure.
This, in my opinion, already undermines the
credibility of the whole thing. Is AW actually influencing something in a
meaningful way, or are the decisions made and then “justified” with a suitably
general and vague document published later? It very much feels like it is the
second option.
But let’s see what the major thinking exercise of the
Army has brought forwards this year, also building on the experiences of Urban
Warrior 3, the third major urban warfare simulation conducted:
• Recognise that it is
more likely than not that the Army will be required to fight in a city within
the next 10-15 years.
• Prepare and employ
combined arms brigades, with expeditionary and mobile headquarters for manoeuvring
to seize the tactical initiative.
• Invest in the
divisional level, where operational art should be practiced using a
comprehensive approach.
• Re-mechanise. Beyond
2020, ensure that the equipment programme includes a capable main battle tank,
an armoured reconnaissance vehicle, an armoured artillery piece and armoured
vehicles for armoured and
mechanised infantry;
with command and support vehicles to match, in order to ensure the necessary
levels of firepower, protection and mobility.
• Move from assured to
confident targeting, based on judgements, the law and accountability, rather
than mechanistic processes.
• Invest in specific
preparations for operating in urban areas: inter alia, intelligence
awareness of the terrain; a method for simplifying the common operating
picture; communication that works in built up areas; psychological inoculation
of personnel; and tactical training for fighting in buildings and underground.
• Re-invest in
logistics, medical and equipment support pushed forward and integrated with the
fighting echelon.
• Ensure that aviation can operate effectively in
urban areas.
Perhaps I’m cynic, but I can’t see any innovative
thinking or any great discovery here, while I continue to be amazed by just how
vague and generalist these documents can be.
“Invest in the Divisional Level” can mean pretty much
anything, but the hard fact is that we are getting a single Divisional HQ of
which the Army has not yet decided the structure, plus another (presumably)
deployable following augmentation, and another HQ with divisional rank for
internal operations in the UK and daily management. Investing in the Divisional
Level is certainly desirable, but what this “investment” is about, who knows.
Obviously the Army won’t tell everything to the general public, but the
sensation is that there aren’t many hopes of seeing anything particularly
revolutionary. Ideally, the Division level should be able to provide a deployed
brigade the theatre-level logistics, a strategic direction, “big picture”
intelligence, and it should also provide a number of enablers such as, for
example, an Air Assault Battlegroup (this is what happens in Afghanistan, where
the Regional Battlegroup South is kept separated from Task Force Helmand and
employed as an air assault formation for maneuver and for rapid reinforcement
when necessary, with one Company held at 6 hours readiness to move, and the
rest at 12 hours notice) and air support (via collaboration with the RAF) plus
other elements as and when necessary.
A new structure for Brigade HQs with a renewed Mobile
element is also highlighted as necessary, fortunately.
The re-machanization concept is overall sound and in
line of principle we can all agree with it, I think. It is important to note
that command and support vehicles adequate to support the new armour and
mechanized force are highlighted (will we hear of a Mortar Carrier replacement
for the ancient FV430 vehicles in this role, finally? This is a requirement
that FRES SV seems to have forgotten entirely, this far…), and we will see if
this assessment brings to any actual action in the future.
Re-investing in logistics, medical and equipment
support pushed forwards, closer to the fighting echelon is also a concept to be
welcomed, but what will we actually see done about this?
For example I can think of confirming the Royal
Signals Infantry Support Team project as a long term element of the force, and
not as an Afghan-timed measure. These less than 180 men organized in 5-man
teams at battalion level have a hugely beneficial impact on the combat
effectiveness of the formation, and this is amplified by the fact that this
small team prepares up to 50 soldiers within the battalion for the role of
Tactical Signallers, competent in the use of HF, VHF and Satcom radios and also
trained as Combat Medics.
The stable integration of such a combat medic / Tac
Sign at least at Platoon level is absolutely desirable, and more than worth the
investment.
Strenghtening the Electronic Warfare and Electronic
Counter Measure (Force Protection) capability to make it more available at
Company or evel Platoon level is also very desirable. This might be done, as it seems that 14 (EW) Regiment is continuing to
expand (even if Army 2020 strangely decided to cut a squadron from it, barely
weeks after the additional squadron mandated few months earlier stood up…) and
10 Regiment, which contains the Army’s ECM(FP) Squadron is now described as an
ECM regiment. A way to announce an
expansion in this capability? I hope so.
Up to Agile Warrior 2011, the new Logistics element of
the Army was described as having organic escort and force protection fighting
element. This is not mentioned openly in AW12: should we be worried? We will
perhaps know in the next months, as future unit ORBATs are revealed.
The Army also has a long-running requirement for a
Platoon (or lower level) load carrier, ideally a drone, and we’ll keep an eye
on this as well, to see if it brings to something or just vanishes. At Company
level, vehicles such as Coyote and Husky are part of the Logistic picture, but
we’ll have to see if these are brought into core when Afghanistan is over. At
Battalion level, MAN SV trucks and Wolfhound vehicles are meant to deliver the
logistic element. Again, Wolfhound’s future in the long term is far from
certain.
The Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) should replace Land
Rovers, Pinzgauers, Panther and possibly Husky and other UOR platforms in this
logistic and support role, but even in the best-case scenario, the MRV(P) is
years away, so there is a lot of questions and not a whole lot of answers here.
Also, will the UK infantry company gain a CASEVAC
section with a battlefield ambulance as part of the “move forward” of the
support elements, like it happens in other nations, such as the US?
It is too early to know the intended future ORBATs of the battalions, but the Army has determined that the Full Unit Establishment for the main type of infantry battalions will be as follows:
Armoured Infantry (on Warrior vehicles, 6 battalions): 729
Mechanized Infantry (on Mastiff, then on FRES UV, 3 battalions): 709
Light Protected Mobility (on Foxhound, 6 battalions): 581
Light Role Infantry (14 battalions): 561
Again, the US Army has been observing the USMC in Afghanistan
using the K-Max unmanned helicopter to sling heavy loads and carry them to
remote FOBs without putting people in danger and without requiring convoys
moving on IED-ridden paths. They are now planning for adding load-carrying
helicopter drones to their logistic elements in future: this is innovation at
play. I see no sign of it in the british army document.
Is lack of funding constraining even ambitions and
free thinking? Being unable to finance it now should not mean not even
considering it.
Ensure that aviation can better work in urban areas
roughly means “acquiring and fitting improved electronic countermeasures”, one
of those rare but welcome priorities that are actually being addressed.
However, the hard question in this area is what can be done to protect low
flying helicopters in the urban maze from the threats against which Chaff,
Flares and even direct laser/IR missile blinding rays won’t do a thing: small
arms fire and unguided RPGs fired in volleys. These latter two menaces have
caused most of the helicopter losses in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the obsession
seem to be always about portable SAMs. Other than a few efforts, mainly in the
US and Israel, to develop small-arms fire locating warning devices, and an
Israeli effort for developing an hard-kill anti-RPG countermeasure, there does
not seem to be much of a solution in the works. The British Army should
probably consider acting in this particular area, at the very least by
following US and Israeli efforts, instead of focusing only on SAMs, ignoring
even the operational experience.
NOTE: just this afternoon, the MOD announced a 20+ million pounds order to Thales for developing and demonstrating a major 360° Infra Red situational awareness system for helicopters and aircrafts which will be capable to locate not just missile launches, but rockets and small arms fire. A step forwards in the right direction. This will ease evasive maneuvers. Hopefully, countermeasures will follow.
Another important passage of the report is about the
use of fire support, namely artillery, in future and specifically in urban warfare
scenarios.
Offensive Support. The utility of indirect fires in urban operations was
confirmed. Conventional fires to defeat or neutralise the enemy remain highly
relevant although the balance between yield, precision and suppression demand a
range of capabilities to be available. Non-explosive natures were also seen to have utility, e.g.
marker and smoke. Further study is recommended to investigate how novel
munitions could enable
operations in the urban environment where avoiding collateral damage is a major
factor.
Very generic.
Indirect Fire programs have been chopped savagely in
the years, and the efforts of the Royal Artillery to modernize have been
frustrated. I can think of many questions that could be made:
-
You were shown
81 mm mortar shells converted in precision guided bombs with a change of fuze.
It seems the kind of technology that helps a lot in urban scenario: is it going
somewhere?
-
Maneuver
against enemies other than guerrilla fighters are openly expected, and we are
keeping armored brigades indeed to face said threats. But the Royal Artillery
no longer has an anti-tank shell, after the old bomblet carrier was retired and
its replacement, the SMART 155 (a 155 mm shell containing two precision guided
Anti Tank submunitions) was cancelled. Where are we going with this? Last time
that thousands of bomblet shells were used was in Iraq in 2003, not a century
ago.
-
MLRS was the anti-area,
anti-mass weapon for excellence until 2007, when even the guided variant of the
submunitions rocket was retired, just 2 years or so after being acquired. The
unitary warhead GMLRS is very good for hitting point targets with great
accuracy, but what about enemy maneuvering forces? The US are developing a new,
Alternative warhead for area attack which removes the problem of unexploded
ordnance common with submunitions: will the UK look into it?
-
The AS90 is
ready already since 2010 for adoption of the GPS guided Excalibur shell.
Course-Correction fuzes capable to turn current long-fuze ammo into 20
meters-CEP precious rounds are also available. Yet the RA is being forced to
wait at least until 2018?
-
The focus on
maneuver, including long-range, deep penetration air assault operations, is
likely to require artillery with longer reach to keep the forces in the
vanguard under the umbrella of heavy supporting fire. The Large, Long Range
Rocket requirement (ATACMS) has been de-scoped, but this does not seem wise.
Extended range ammunition and longer-range GMLRS (range of well over 100 km
already demonstrated) will be re-considered? They were part of the Indirect
Fire Precision Attack family of modernization efforts, but one by one they have
been systematically killed.
-
What about
Fire Shadow? Combining UAV and precision missile with low-collateral damage
capability, it could be extremely useful in any scenario, urban one included,
especially when, from October this year if times are respected, the full-motion
video downlink via Strike Hawk device will be validated, allowing troops on the
ground to see Fire Shadow imagery on ROVER portable displays.
Some “innovative thinking” in replying to hard
questions such as these would be a more convincing exercise.
But the area of the report that more than all others
told me that Agile Warrior cannot and will not generate much of anything is the
part about Command, Control and Information (C2I) needs. I find this part of
the report as depressing as it can get and denotes a total lack of reaction to
even obvious needs. What Agile Warrior tells me, is that the money available
for investment on C2 and communications is tight or non-existent, and the Army
is trying to say that it does not need certain improvements. This is not
innovation: this is telling people that things are going fine while the ship is
sinking. This is flattening the Army’s voice on what government says, even
hiding the reality of the operational needs in order to say that, really, what
we have is fine and beautiful.
This is a criminal way of acting. It is obvious that
financial resources are a factor in what can and what cannot be done, but the
process should be: Identify Needs and Challenges à Develop a Strategy à Identify priorities and fit into the finances
available. Instead, the process seems to have turned into: This Is What You Get
à Tell Everyone That It Is Fine.
But let’s see what the problem is, reading what the
document says:
The exponential growth in information technology has revolutionized operations.
The demand for complex, rich information services in the current and future
operating environments has outstripped delivery. Information and Communications
Services (ICS), and their applications and data, need to be made available,
securely, to a very large number of dispersed users and if necessary within a
contested environment. These users will need access to information services
through ‘points of presence’, interconnected by high bandwidth links, and will
need to be able to reach across the deployed force, to allies and coalition
partners, to the home base and to others in the country of deployment. While
reversionary working needs developing and practice, there is, essentially, no
going back. C2 elements, large and small need access to a ‘flat’, ubiquitous
ICS network to allow them to achieve an operational advantage; all within the
context of cyberspace - with its associated opportunities and threats.
Military
communications specialist, supported by DE&S and contractors, will need to
operate a common equipment platform, carrying common NATO services and
applications, using a single Service Management regime. The scaling of Dii(S)
and Dii(R) to deliver medium scale enduring operations, requires review. There
is also a lack of an agile (smaller/lighter) solution. It will be essential
that the ICS regiments use common infrastructure, networks and service
management, and that there is a common set of user applications.
Without this common
platform, the multi-role approach will be difficult to implement.
Delivering rich information services into the fast
moving manoeuvre elements of a force is challenging and services at this level
will be optimised for voice, situational awareness and battle planning and
control, with some tailored access to richer services; fixed or static HQs,
with relative stable power supplies, can expect the full range of ICS to be
provided; BGs and Coys will rely on Tactical CIS. As there is a direct
correlation between the quality and timeliness of information and decision
making, manoeuvre force elements will need
to readjust to making decisions with less information and thus reduced understanding,
which will have a concomitant impact on the level of assurance, risk and tempo
of operations.
In other words, the Army needs information on the
move, and needs it down to lower echelons than Brigade level, but delivering
information is “challenging”, and the “innovative”
solution the Army comes up with is asking the forces on the field to make do
with the reduced, frammentary situational awareness they have got.
For a document that plans for the future, this is inacceptable.
This should be a temporary (and indeed an as-short-as-possible) gap in
capability, not an element reported in a document for the future of the Army.
It is like being back in 1940, when German tanks had radios and French ones had
not.
Before Agile Warrior 2012 came out, for a lucky case
of destiny, I had chosen to make an article about FALCON, the new communication
system entering service with the Army in these months, introducing this crucial
problem into the discussion. It was very much the right inspiration, it seems.
In the article, I also included an Australian Army assessment of the communications
situation, which painted a picture definitely depressing for the British Army,
which offers sorely insufficient comms support to lower echelons and has
ridiculously low capability for sharing information on the move.
It was also noted in the article how, with contractors’
help, FALCON in Afghanistan has been adapted to exploit commercial technology
to deliver information at 100 Mbps, against the limit of 32 Mbps the system is
built with.
Now, in what I can
only consider as a lie, Agile Warrior tells us that “Estimated broadband WAN
bandwidth
requirements range from
10 Mbps at the smallest C2 nodes up to 32 Mbps at the larger nodes.” This is
not a requirement honestly assessed,
it is, casually, what is available
with FALCON.
The only tiny bit of
honesty comes with the headline:
Their is [error
maintained from original document] an
emerging imbalance between the demand for rich ICS and the ability for supply
to keep pace.
The suspect is that
the British Army is expecting not to be able to invest into the next element of
FALCON, the “Future FALCON”, for several more years at best. So long, indeed,
that they are hushing even their needs down, as they don’t know whether they’ll
ever be able to solve the problem. This is very, very serious.
The lack of an
effective Information and Communication system, deployable, ubiquitous,
reaching all echelons and available on the move is the biggest blow to the Army’s
efficiency.
This conflicts
dramatically with the reality of operations and with all realistic expectations
for the future, which will see the need for communications and data exchange
grow, not shrink. Even instruments such as UAVs, from Watchkeeper to Scavenger,
will deliver far less effect than they could and should, if the final users on
the ground are unable to receive the data and imagery and full motion videos
the UAVs collect. Ever since the dawn of war, information has been the key to
victory, more than almost anything else.
It is crucial that investment in ICS
materializes.
 |
| A FALCON WASP node deployed. Save for the mast deployed directly from the truck, the rest has to be assembled all times the node deploys. On the move, the node does not contribute to the network, and has very limited situational awareness via a Bowman tactical radio. |
FALCON, as it works
now, is roughly comparable to the US Army’s WIN-T (Warfighted InformationNetwork – Tactical) increment 1: it delivers a communication network using IP
(Internet Protocol) infrastructure, with VoIP (Voice Over the Internet
Protocol) capability, optimized for use in command posts down to battalion level,
and with Networking-On-The-Halt capability: the command post arrives in the
intended location, deploys, resets its systems and connects into the network.
On the move,
communications services reduce to Bowman radios, which only ensure voice and
basic data capability. When the command post transfers, most of its capability
is lost until it deploys again. The FALCON network nodes themselves work only
on the halt: on the move, they cease to be working elements in the network.
 |
| On the move, FALCON stays silent. |
The British Army seems
set to be stuck at this point for undetermined time into the future, but the
other allies in NATO are moving on from this limitations. Technology to
overcome the problem is available. The US Army should start fielding in October the WIN-T increment
2, which introduces “On the Move (OTM)” capability all the way down to Company
level. Crucial to this is the adoption of powerful Software-Defined Radios,
capable to automatically switch channel (VHF, UHF, HF, satellite or military
VoIP channel): with the SDR, the old separations in roles and capability
vanish. If until now an operator had to be trained in the use of this or that
channel and then issued with, say, a VHF radio that could talk only to other
VHF radios, today an operator can talk to everyone, as the radios adapt
automatically to the needs of the moment.
In addition, a radio
which is moving on a vehicle, which is talking to another radio and loses the
Line-Of-Sight contact, automatically switches, for example, to SATCOM to keep
the communication going on.
Testing is well underway, and by the end of next year, 8 BCTs might already be equipped with the system.
The consequences of
this improvement are immense, and far-reaching. The need for traditional
headquarters which deploy and expand under canvas is reduced dramatically, as
the commander can stay fully updated on the battle situation inside its vehicle
on the move, be it a M1 Abrams, a Bradley or another.
Behind this
capability, is the NetOps software, which dynamically assigns shares of
bandwidth over the network to this or that unit, ensuring that no one can
saturate the lines.
The physical
infrastructure of the network inside a BCT is made up by 4 different kind of
nodes:
TCN (Tactical
Communications Node)
POP (Point of
Presence)
SNE (Soldier Network
Extension)
VWP (Vehicular
Wireless Package)
The TCN node is the
main hub of the system, and works as Satellite and Line of Sight node, with On
The Move capability. In the US Army, the TCN is installed on FMTV (Family
Medium Tactical Vehicle) trucks. This is
roughly comparable to the WASP node of FALCON, which is mounted on HX60 trucks.
The FALCON node, however, has no OTM capability, as we said.
 |
| US Army's TCN node, deployed along with other WIN-T elements, including a satellite dish. FALCON in the British Army will often work near a REACHER satellite node. |
The echelon
immediately lower inside the Network is supported by the POP network: the POP
systems are installed on the tactical vehicles used by commanders and their
staff, down to Battalion level.
Both TCN and POP use
Highband Networking Radios (HNRs) for Line Of Sight communications, employing
pulse directional antennas for directing a narrow signal (harder to intercept)
over a greater distance. For Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications, TCN
and POP use satellite communication systems with antennas capable to
electronically scan the signal and keep locked on to the satellite while the
vehicle moves.
 |
| The capability to work On The Move being introduced in the WIN-T system is the start of a new era in military communications. |
The SNE is the
expansion of the Network down to the fighting Echelon at Company level.
Installed on combat vehicles, the SNE node has a small satellite antenna and a
VoIP modem that can reconfigure automatically to interface with all portable
radios used by the soldiers, keeping the network working on the move, regardless
of terrain and dispersion, by communicating with the main radio of a Platoon,
which acts as node of connection to the personal radio of each soldier in the
team. The US Army has selected as “Rifleman Radio” the AN/PRC-154 produced by a
Thales/General Dynamics joint venture, of which a first lot of over 6000 was
ordered in June 2011. The Rifleman Radio has been sent in Afghanistan for
in-theatre experimentation with the 75° Ranger regiment last January, and
reportedly met the favor of the soldiers for its low weight, its capability of
talking regardless of obstacles in the way (crucial in rough terrain and, even
more, in urban scenarios) and its 10 hours battery duration.
Finally, the VWP is a
Local Area Network extension node, which keeps the command posts on the move
linked in the LAN with the TCN nodes.
 |
| An US MRAP vehicle fitted with SNE node during trials of the WIN-T increment 2 |
Finally, the WIN-T
Increment 3 to come in the near future will expand the network to aerial
platforms, by fitting the Gray Eagle MQ-1C drone with a 150 lbs Highband
Networking Waveform pod. This will act as a communications relay node working
in Line of Sight (LOS) by dialoging with the vehicle-based nodes below,
reducing the need for satellite use, a crucial factor since satellite bandwidth
is, of course, finite. It is expected that 3 pods will be issued to each Gray
Eagle company, so perhaps a single pod will go to each of the 3 platoons, each
with 4 drones. The Americans have put a Gray Eagle company into each Combat
Aviation Brigade, which is a divisional asset. Brigades have their own UAV
element with the smaller, 6-hours endurance Shadow drone. For the British Army,
the sole Watchkeeper works at brigade/division level.
In Afghanistan, the US
has been regularly using manned airplanes working as communication relay nodes
as well. The installation of such pods on other high-flying, long endurance platforms
is also envisioned and experimented.
[NOTE: the above is a quick and simplified overview of what is a very ample and complex system of systems. A complete view of all components and structures of the WIN-T network is in this document, but don't be surprised if you don't quite get it all, it's quite complex!]
The British MOD itself
tested a communications relay pod on the Qinetiq Zephyr solar-powered drone,
holder of the world record for endurance in flight for a UAV (some 14 days at 21.500 meters of altitude), even if lately it
has apparently vanished from the radars. The Zephyr aims (aimed?) to deliver a
lightweight drone capable to stay over the battlefield for months, making it a
good, low-cost alternative to satellites.
The Watchkeeper drone should
also have some margin for additional payload (weapons are an option being
studied, and the Hermes 450 from which it derives can be fitted with two fuel
tanks for 50 liters each under the wings), so a comms-relay payload might be a
possible fit for the future.
Again, British company
ALLISOPP HELIKITE offers a variety of
small kite-balloons (the smallest is only 3 feet long) that can be used to
launch at altitude a radio antenna offering immediate, long range relay of
signals.
The options are there
to exploit, in other words.
The Future FALCON,
which is meant to deliver communications support to the maneuver forces,
including those on the move, is absolutely crucial for the Army’s future capability,
I repeat once more, and I find it abysmal that Agile Warrior is not used to
assess, measure and explain the full range of needs of the deployed forces on
the field. Lack of money is not in itself a justification for even refusing to
honestly face reality and find solutions. If the Army’s “innovative thinking”
is just a way to hide the dust under the carpet, then they should save the
money and effort of going on with these annual exercises and “studies”.
Moving on, to ISTAR.
Robust ISTAR
structures at each level of command are essential to meet future contingent
needs. Whilst forming a bespoke IX/ISTAR
Group on operations (as seen on Op HERRICK) may be an option it should not
necessarily be the default setting (1). What is needed is better alignment
of collection assets and the process of collection management, with that of
Information Requirements Management in order to better support a commander’s
decision making with an analysed output (Intelligence). The key to success is
the effective grouping of special-to-arm I, S, TA, R force elements in
barracks, holding them at the appropriate readiness and force generating them
at the right stage of the supported HQs Collective Training; CT5 and CT6 events
must include the full suite of ISTAR capabilities.
Specialist support
must be scalable and adaptable to the HQ structure; start small (lean) and get
bigger as required. Following the ‘plug
and socket’ philosophy, which is a key tenet of the A2020 proposition (2), there is a need for a combination
of better educated generalists with appropriate training and experience to be
core staff members in Battlegroup, Brigade and Divisional HQs, responsible for
integrating ISTAR; and specialists (EW, UAS, HUMINT, GMR etc) that are
task-organised when required to bring professional/SME advice and input to both
collection (FIND) and exploitation.
[…]
Each deployed brigade
should have its own organic ground mounted recce, Intelligence, Communication, Geo
and Battlespace Management elements. The division may require the development
of a bespoke deployable reconnaissance / surveillance organization that
manoeuvres to find but in direct support of
divisional information requirements.
A One-Star proponent (Capability Director Information)
will reinforce the professionalisation of ISTAR as a discipline and bring
coherence to its delivery. (3)
Consideration should
be given to introducing a tactical intelligence career stream for infantry and
armoured
Regiments.
(1) This appears
to be a direct contradiction of what the Army said in Agile Warrior 2011, where
an Information Exchange/Exploitation group was assessed as needed at each
brigade level, somewhat mirroring 3rd Commando Brigade with its 30 Commando
IX group.
(2)
It would be nice to see some explanation given about
this philosophy, which is mentioned only in passing, in such a casual way. Who
follows my blog and has followed with me the Army 2020 sage knows that the new
force structure suggests that deploying brigades will “pick” “this” artillery
battery/regiment, “that” Theatre ICS Signals Regiment and “that” one Logistic
element from the “container” brigades of the Force Troops command, but no
official explanation of this has been released yet, nor do we know how this
choice was made.
(3) Possibly this
will be the brigade HQ of the newborn Surveillance and Intelligence brigade, of
which we still ignore the composition, even though I’ve long been saying that I
expect it to reunite Royal Artillery UAV regiments and Military Intelligence
battalions, plus perhaps even the STA regiment of the artillery.
Another crucially
important area is the retention of Afghanistan UORs to bring into the Core
Budget.
About this, AW12 says:
Fires, Targeting and
ISTAR.
• Retain the
significant enhancement in collect capability
• Retain and nurture
the significant enhancement in staff dissemination and processing skills.
Lethality.
• Review of training
progression and the use of simulation.
• Maintain the
competence levels among reserves and support forces across the wide spectrum of
new weapon systems that they have used.
Counter-IED.
• Future training will
need to balance between scenarios constrained by an IED environment with
training for operations that demand speed of manoeuvre.
• UK must maintain its
world class R&D and manufacturing capability.
[Note: in here, I hoped to find an indication about Talisman being
retained. It would be endlessly stupid to once more throw away the route
clearance capability. For 20 or more years, the British Army has been dealing
with mines and then IEDs, across Serbia all the way to Iraq and Afghanistan. It
sunk huge amounts of money on studies and development and acquisition of
several clearance systems, then quickly junked them, only to restart again from
scratch in the following mission abroad. PLEASE, don’t let Talisman be the next
one system developed, used, junked and then soon afterwards missed.]
Vehicles
• Those vehicles used
to provide Equipment Support must have mobility and protection matched to those
that they are
supporting. [So? Husky, Coyote, Foxhound to stay…?]
• Future fleet
requirements must enable units to train as they fight as opposed to wholesale
conversion to type prior to deployment.
Dismounted Close
Combat
• A coherent
assessment of night operating capability is required.
ISTAR / Base ISTAR
• Need for an
integrating hub for all ISTAR collect assets.
• Provision of robust
Full Motion Video capable Information Support Service, separate from Base
ISTAR infrastructure
should be investigated in order to support contingent operations.
• There is an enduring requirement for a layered ISTAR mix ranging from
heavy to light and including a capable aerostat. [Good news for Project
Outpost, meant to preserve for the future some of the Cortez BASE-ISTAR system
used to provide security for FOBs in Afghanistan. It includes 5 PGSS aerostats
bought from the US]
• Provision of
simulation in support of ISTAR training.
• ISTAR Specialists
must be made available for Level 3 Collective Training activities, and above.
Aviation
• Enhanced Defensive
Aid Suites are fundamental for the use of aviation, particularly as the future
airspace is likely to be increasingly contested.
Training
• The investment in
training in support of current operations, and its clear benefits, has been
hard earned and must be retained
• Tactics Techniques
and Procedures (TTPs) that have evolved during HERRICK (and which will have
utility in
future operating
environments) need to be hard wired into training and Tactical Doctrine.
Next Steps:
• Output has informed
Army 2020 and will be used to inform MoD and Army capability balance of investment
decisions.
• Study continues on
this theme in 2012.
The Aerostat used by Cortez is the Persistent
Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) (25,000 ft3) is an helium-filled tethered
blimp that can raise a payload of up to 150 pounds to 1,200-2,000 feet and
remain aloft for up to two weeks. The mainstay PGSS payload is a (98
pound) L-3 Wescam MX-15 EO/IR sensor, but the turret can accommodate
most any payload or payload combination of up to 150
pounds. PGSS has carried various acoustic (shot/mortar
identication) sensors and a SIGINT payload could be another option as well.
The coverage offered by the PGSS with the
MX-15 EO/IR payload is as follows: it can detect a vehicle at 18km; identify a
vehicle at 12km; detect a man at 12km; identify a man at 4km. It is filled with
Helium in around one hour, and can stay in the air for a couple of weeks. While
up in altitude, the aerostat resists to 60 knots winds, and can be launched
with 20 knots. The mooring station of the aerostat weights some 16.000 lbs, but
work has been made to try and make it helicopter-portable for easing future
deployments.
These were procured from the US, but
apparently the UK
has been leading the way on a smaller, far more deployable kind of floating
surveillance device, the HeliKite,
which combines features of kites and aerostats and comes in a far smaller and
easier to manage package that can be used to keep up in the air surveillance
sensors or even communication relay systems.
These HeliKites are produced in the UK, by the already mentioned company,
ALLSOPP HELIKITES. Now this is more an example of what I call innovative thinking.
These are the
highlights from Agile Warrior 2012. I find very, very little to hail as
innovative, imaginative, or particularly reassuring, apart from the fact that
Cortez kit should be safe, along with quite a lot of other UOR material.
Then again, judging
from the IX group, last year mandated as priority and now described as an
option at best (and one to avoid if possible, probably due to the manpower
capping at 82.000 regulars), Agile Warrior 2013 could again cut back on
ambitions.
I appreciate the
effort the Army is making, and I recognize the challenges it is facing. But
Agile Warrior so far has been absolutely unimpressive. And I have the feeling
that it is not doing much to actually inform decisions.
It seems more like it
justifies them once they are taken.
