The United Arab Emirates announce officially that there won't be at all a Rafale order.
France had been bullish over the deal, which they saw as imminent, for 60 airplanes.
Instead, at the Dubai air show the UAE first asked the UK to give them information and an offer for the Typhoon, then announced that Rafale is rejected.
Now the Typhoon's rivals are the americans, from F15 to F18, but especially F16.
However, it comes as a big new chance in a market that for months looked unattractive.
This pays for the probable failure in Japan, were, despite initial optimism, beating US rivalry will be really, really difficult.
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
EMALS ordered
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified U.S. Congress Nov. 15 of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to the Government of the United Kingdom.
The UK made the request for one kit of long lead sub-assemblies for the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System/Advanced Arresting Gear (EMALS/AAG) and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $200 million.
The EMALS long lead sub-assemblies include: Energy Storage System, Power Conditioning System, and Launch Control System. The AAG includes: Power Conditioning, Energy Absorption Subsystems, Shock Absorbers, and Drive Fairleads. Also proposed are other items for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, software support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and all other related elements of program support.
It is the first step in the acquisition process for ensuring that the Catapults and Arresting Wires are delivered for installation on HMS Prince of Wales in the coming years.
In time, hopefully, a second kit will be ordered to fit both vessels.
The UK made the request for one kit of long lead sub-assemblies for the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System/Advanced Arresting Gear (EMALS/AAG) and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $200 million.
The EMALS long lead sub-assemblies include: Energy Storage System, Power Conditioning System, and Launch Control System. The AAG includes: Power Conditioning, Energy Absorption Subsystems, Shock Absorbers, and Drive Fairleads. Also proposed are other items for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, software support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and all other related elements of program support.
It is the first step in the acquisition process for ensuring that the Catapults and Arresting Wires are delivered for installation on HMS Prince of Wales in the coming years.
In time, hopefully, a second kit will be ordered to fit both vessels.
NAO: MOD Major Projects Report 2011
The report of the NAO contains interesting information. It is available for everyone to see, here.
The usual sorry story of rising costs, delays, and political decisions costing more than they save in the short term. The SDSR "cost saving" has actually caused a 500 millions cost increase, and a mismatch in the Astute-Trafalgar replacement, which means that the UK will go down to as few as 6 operational submarines before the last Astute, HMS Ajax, is delivered in 2024. This, of course, unless the newest Trafalgars are kept in service longer than planned.
But i'm sure that plenty of people will bitch about the economic aspects. I want to focus on the news that emerge from the report about the decisions taken during planning round 2011, to see what impact they are going to have on equipment and capability.
Nimrod MRA4
The savings from the destruction of the Nimrods are estimated in 1.9 billion out to 2020, little more than 200 million per year: the cost of supporting and using the planes in service.
Worse, the banter about “mitigating the gap” with other assets is bullshit, and now i'm not alone in screaming it, but have the backing of the NAO as well.
They note:
The MOD is aware of the very serious need for a proper replacement, and there's the confirmation that, while the budget is worked at to try and fit a MPA somewhere within its tight constraints, the crews are being sent abroad to keep expertise alive:
This sends us all the way back to rumors, already out from months, about the UK's interest in the P8 Poseidon, of which 5 or 6 could be acquired, at a cost of 800 millions / one billion. I covered the story here.
Wildcat Lynx helicopter
Holy hell!
Here there was the biggest of all surprises. And the shocking bit is that it is a good surprise.
Until now, the Wildcat programme seemed set in stone, with:
34 Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopters for the Army, but with 6 actually going to 847 NAS for supporting 3rd Commando brigade as part of Commando Helicopter Force
28 Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft for the Navy
Planning Round 2011, according to the MOD, introduces a big change:
I’m guessing that the plan is to trade 4 Wildcats, in order to obtain 8 “Light Assault” helicopters (armed with LMM? Perhaps even Hellfire?) for 847 NAS: 4 would be Battlefield scout fitted with additional kit and weaponry, with four more new-built airframes in addition.
So far, it was planned that 847 would get 6 Wildcats from the Army total.
So, effectively, the Army would have lost six helicopters, while now it would only lose 4, with 4 additional Wildcats being built, for a total of 8 weapon-capable ones, and total of Wildcats growing to 66 instead of 62.
The Army and Marines would both benefit from this change, a true win-win solution.
A very interesting development. I had heard nothing at all about this before, so it was a total surprise.
Consequence of experience with attack helicopters in Libya, perhaps…? Having read the reports about the issues of Apache being not quite naval enough for operating for long periods from HMS Ocean, and having seen the list of requirements the AAC compiled to make the AH64 fully naval capable, i'm tempted to guess that giving more power to the Marines's Wildcats was seen as a less expensive alternative.
It would be interesting to know exactly what the "Light Assault" Wildcat will be capable of doing and carrying. The Thales LMM, i'm guessing, but CRV7 rockets, gunpods and even Hellfire are also offered, and could be used if integration was funded.
In exchange, the Army will avoid spending any money on additional navalization measures for the Apache AH1. But again, i'm guessing, since there are no details for the moment.
There are are still, in the Army, some 50 Lynx MK7 in addition to 22 updated Lynx MK9A. The 9A might be in service until 2018/19, while the MK7 will be retiring as the Wildcat army comes in service, from 2014.
However, in particular when the Lynx 9A will retire, there won't be enough Wildcats to equip all squadrons of the AAC, unless more Wildcats are acquired later on in the decade.
A total of 80 Wildcats has been approved when the programme started, but only 62, now to grow to 66, have been funded for the moment. Unitary production cost is 13 million, Unitary cost including all expenses is 26 million.
The Light Assault Helicopter should provide much needed additional attack helicopter capability, particularly for amphibious operations and on-ship usage.
It will bite a bit into a gap in capability that is recognized from years: it is worth remembering that there are 48 frontline Apaches in service, and some 60 crews, but the Army had planned for 72 active Apaches, in 9 squadrons, one of which would have been 847 NAS.
There are also some problems, however: the Data Link 22 integration on Wildcat has not yet been funded, nor has the Bowman software release 6.0, and both these issues will affect networkcentric capability of the recce helicopter.
Besides, the Future Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons (Heavy) risks to incur in a delay and not be available in 2015 when the Wildcat enters service with the Navy.
Puma HC2
It is now confirmed that the updated helicopter will be 24, not 28, and their planned out of service date is 2025. The Initial Operating Capability is set at six helicopters ready for operations, and should be reached in November 2013.
Full operational capability is set as a Forward Available Fleet of 22 airframes, 22 crews and trained ground personnel, all delivered by October 2014.
Currently, cost is set at 326 million pounds.
The Puma HC2 is seen as indispensable to provide helicopter lift while the Merlin HC3 fleet is navalized and the Sea Kings retired.
A400 Atlas
A majorly worrisome detail emerges, in the form of a 238 million savings which will see only 9 out of 22 cargo airplanes fitted, at delivery, with the Defensive Aids Sub-system. 23 millions will also be saved by not acquiring one of (N) planned simulators for training. The cargo hold will also NOT be configured for civilian pallets, but only NATO pallets, saving 5 million.
Unit cost expected 141 million. Payload requirement to be met.
Meteor Air to Air missile
Will be in service in 2015. Unit cost is 2.1 million per missile, but number of missiles acquired is classified and not disclosed. Some 715 million pounds have been expended, over a planned cost of 1115 million for the Demonstration and Manufacture phase. Upped boundary for the approved cost is set at 1249 million pounds.
The missile will be ready for delivery and integration in August 2012, and it is expected to be in service on the Typhoon in July 2015. Integration will clear carriage of 6 missiles, and full use of the two-ways data link.
F35
Confirmation that, at least "for the few years" there won't be an Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) in the UK, but instead reliance on US Navy training system for initial throughput and training of early instructor pilots and squadron pilots.
"Initial" force element at readiness is set at 10 airplanes, with Initial Operating Capability to be declared when 6 planes will be available for embarkation on the Strike Carrier at readiness Level 2 (2 to 5 days notice).
Full operating capability target not disclosed. Until at least 2009, full operational capability was indicated with the reaching of a Force at Readiness of 36 airplanes available for embarked operations.
The new target has yet to be set.
CVF
There has been no change to the requirement for the Queen Elizabeth of being able to conduct deployments away from port facilities for operations lasting 9 months continuously and support air operations for up to 70 days.
However, the NAO, assuming that one carrier is to be mothballed, now projects the Availability of the carrier as to not meet the stated RN requirement.
No surprise. The carriers are two for a reason.
FRES SV
Future Rapid Effects System Specialist Vehicles entered its Assessment Phase (Assessment Phase 2) in June 2008. The approval covered the anticipated Specialist Vehicles fleet scope, with high priority afforded to Scout (Recce Block 1), given the pressing need to replace Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked). Specialist Vehicles was assumed to consist of three Recce Blocks plus Medium Armour and Manoeuvre Support components, all mounted on a common base platform. In broad terms the Assessment Phase Studies confirmed that the Common Base Platform concept was viable for all platforms and also set the time, cost performance and risk envelope for Recce Block 1. In accordance with the endorsed acquisition strategy, the Common Base Platform design will be used for Recce Block 2 and 3 with the addition of role specific sub-systems for each variant. Assessment studies will be used to determine the scope of each subsystem
fit for each specific role.
The information, as you can see, is not disclosed. Current working numbers and dates are not revealed.
The cancellation of the Medium Armour segment is likely to be a definitive end for any ambition of fielding Medium Tanks.
However, perhaps a number of Direct Fire platforms will appear as part of Block 2 or 3.
The deletion of Maneuver Support seems to open wide the door for the Warrior bridgelayer/engineer vehicle, which BAE has self-developed and already showcased at DSEI this year. The MOD is following this new Warrior variant closely.
Indirect Fire Precision Attack
This programme continues to be the favorite in the never ending chase for cuts, and the RA is regularly prevented from continuing its modernization.
A contract for the Demonstration and Manufacture of the first component, Ballistic Sensor Fuzed Munition (SMART 155 mm round, with two sensor-fuzed ammunitions inside), was placed with Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme GmbH in September 2007 and terminated in February 2010. This, coupled with retirement of the old submunitions shell for the AS90 (despite 2000 rounds having been fired in Iraq in 2003, not that long ago...) and added to the retirement and destruction of even the still new GMLRS - submunitions (ordered in 2007 and promptly cancelled, folly!) means that the RA is without an area-attack weapon and anti-tank weapon both.
The Loitering Ammunition, Fire Shadow, is still alive and will start operating in Afghanistan next year. 25 ammunitions will be delivered in March 2012 for use.
Guided Shell - the Excalibur 155 mm GPS guided round - has had its funding deleted in Planning Round 2011; however, the planned capability requirement remains. The RA is still hoping to be able to finally put it in service by 2018.
The Large Long Range Rocket capability (ATACMS missile) was deleted in Planning Round 2011; it is not clear if the RA will ever have a chance to resurrect it.
Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability - Fleet Tanker
In 2010 there was the latest, hundredth invitation for bids for the building of the new, much needed double-hulled tankers for the Royal Navy. The bidders were six:
A&P Group Limited (UK),
Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (Republic of Korea),
Fincantieri (Italy),
Hyundai Heavy Industries (Republic of Korea)
Knutsen OAS(UK) Limited.
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft (Germany)
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft (Germany) dropped out of the competition already in 2010. This year, two more withdrew: Knutsen OAS Ltd in June 2011 and A&P Group Ltd in August 2011.
The final bid will be selected (hopefully) as part of PR 2012 from the three remaining bidders.
While "up to 6" tankers remains quoted, it is much more likely that the contract, at most, will aim for four ships, with acquisition programme shaped in a 2 + 1 + 1 fashion.
The cost of the Fleet Tanker element should be of around 800 million per six ships, and between 500 and 600 for four.
India last year paid Finmeccanica just 159.326.000 euro for the Deepak (21 millions of which are for spare parts), a military resupply ship capable of carrying 15250 tons in fuels and oils, 510 tonnes of ammo and stores, 8 refrigerated containers. She is fast (20 knots) and has full helicopter support for a Merlin-sized machine, at 175 meters of lenght, 25 beam.
500 million pounds should suffice for procuring 4 very good ships.
Operational Utility Vehicle System
The requirement for Operational Utility Vehicle System was reviewed in 2007 by the Army, as lead user,
when the need for vehicles with enhanced protection, capacity and mobility was identified. The Single
Statement of User Need stated that ‘Operational Utility Vehicle System would provide a robust, easily
supported system, comprising operational utility vehicles that are able to carry light cargo (up to six tonnes)
or small groups of personnel, integrate as many special-to-role systems as possible and which can operate
in diverse climatic and topographical conditions worldwide, in order to support and contribute to land
(including land air) and littoral manoeuvre operations’. This capability would be a key supporting enabler for
offensive combat operations providing the following roles; unit level logistic cargo vehicle, systems carrier,
mobile command, liaison and personnel transport.
Mainly aimed at replacing Pinzgauers and Land Rovers in their many variants, OUVS was suspended and was, prior to PR11, expected to be resurrected in 2012.
The Operational Utility Vehicle System project has now been removed from the programme. In other words, cancelled.
The requirement will be re-scoped, and the outcome of the work so far done on OUVS will form the basis for the Multi Role Vehicle- Protected Programme. It is currently planned for Multi Role Vehicle- Protected to commence Concept stage during Financial Year 2015/2016.
Multi Role Vehicle-Protected will have its own Initial Gate and Main Gate approvals.
Type 26 Global Combat Ship
Approval for the Type 26 prosecution will be split into two parts. Approval (Main Gate 1) will seek endorsement of the requirements to be delivered by Type 26 GCS, with Main Gate 2, the main investment decision following in Quarter 4 2013. Main Gate 1 is imminent, as this month the final options should be confirmed, and detailed design activity should be started.
This will allow detailed costing and design work to proceed against a defined requirement so that the project
will be ready for approval at Main Gate 2 and subsequent contract signing.
There are no other changes. The first unit of 13 is still expected "as early as possible" in the 2020s.
Cooperative Engagement Capability
The Co-operative Engagement Capability is a United States Naval System fitted to an increasing number of
United States assets including ships, aircraft, and Army and Marine Corps land systems. Co-operative
Engagement Capability does not replace any single system; rather it optimises war-fighting capabilities
inherent in existing and future combat systems.
UK Co-operative Engagement Capability is a UK Network-Enabled Capability project which provides an
advanced air and missile defence capability by sharing and fusing engagement quality data from suitably
equipped platforms to deliver a single, coherent, stable air picture. It will fill the capability gap originally
identified in Commander-in-Chief Fleet’s Military Capability reports and re-affirmed in the Above Water Effects capability audit in 2007, updated in 2009, to detect, monitor, and counter Air-Warfare threats. It will also reduce a gap in interoperability with the United States.
UK Co-operative Engagement Capability enhances the ability of fitted platforms to work together in detection, tracking and engagement of air targets. This capability represents a major advance in both air and missile defence.
Over simplifying in an inelegant way, the CEC ensures that all targets are engaged in the best possible ways, to avoid sending all missiles against the same "Vampire" while another incoming missile is ignored! It fuses together the informations from sensors of various ships and even air platforms (for the US, the Hawkeye, for the UK hopefully the AEW platform emerging from MASC/Crow's Nest).
It was planned to be fitted to the Type 23 and Type 45 both.
For the Type 45, the date indicated was 2014, but the latest NAO report has all dates obscured:
The Type 23 won't get CEC, while the Type 26 should have it at build, i'm guessing. This, though, still means we are looking at a date past 2020.
Hopefully, at least the Type 45s will get this much needed enhancement earlier than that.
The usual sorry story of rising costs, delays, and political decisions costing more than they save in the short term. The SDSR "cost saving" has actually caused a 500 millions cost increase, and a mismatch in the Astute-Trafalgar replacement, which means that the UK will go down to as few as 6 operational submarines before the last Astute, HMS Ajax, is delivered in 2024. This, of course, unless the newest Trafalgars are kept in service longer than planned.
But i'm sure that plenty of people will bitch about the economic aspects. I want to focus on the news that emerge from the report about the decisions taken during planning round 2011, to see what impact they are going to have on equipment and capability.
Nimrod MRA4
The savings from the destruction of the Nimrods are estimated in 1.9 billion out to 2020, little more than 200 million per year: the cost of supporting and using the planes in service.
Worse, the banter about “mitigating the gap” with other assets is bullshit, and now i'm not alone in screaming it, but have the backing of the NAO as well.
They note:
Using other existing assets would provide a reduced capability compared with Nimrod, and diverting resources from existing tasks would have wider implications for defence. The Sentry surveillance aircraft is already at minimum crew and aircraft numbers to cover NATO commitments. Using helicopters, such as the Merlin or Lynx, would affect national commitments or training of crews for other tasks. Other alternatives are fully committed to current operations.
The MOD is aware of the very serious need for a proper replacement, and there's the confirmation that, while the budget is worked at to try and fit a MPA somewhere within its tight constraints, the crews are being sent abroad to keep expertise alive:
In the short term, the Department has deployed a small number of trained service personnel to operate alongside Canadian forces to preserve the United Kingdom’s maritime patrol skill sets. The Department also has plans to deploy other personnel to the United States, New Zealand and Australia. Although this is currently being funded through money committed within the Defence budget, in the longer term further investment would be required to maintain this training investment.
 |
| The assessment of risk and gap mitigation measures made by the NAO. Frankly, it did not take great study, nor a genius. It was clear from the beginning that "gap mitigation" was actually possible only in the mind of politicians. The effective possibility of covering, even in minimum part, the role of Nimrod, is tiny, and bites away ferociously at assets much needed elsewhere for their own specific tasks. |
This sends us all the way back to rumors, already out from months, about the UK's interest in the P8 Poseidon, of which 5 or 6 could be acquired, at a cost of 800 millions / one billion. I covered the story here.
Wildcat Lynx helicopter
Holy hell!
Here there was the biggest of all surprises. And the shocking bit is that it is a good surprise.
Until now, the Wildcat programme seemed set in stone, with:
34 Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopters for the Army, but with 6 actually going to 847 NAS for supporting 3rd Commando brigade as part of Commando Helicopter Force
28 Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft for the Navy
Planning Round 2011, according to the MOD, introduces a big change:
“Based on the current assumptions within the Rotary Wing Strategy the quantity of Wildcat aircraft to be procured comprises 34 Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopters with a further eight Light Assault Helicopter role variants of the Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter, together with 28 Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft. The Light Assault Helicopter role requirement will be subject to appropriate requirement approvals. Planning Round 2011 Options introduce funding for the Light Assault Helicopter role equipment [weapons, such as LMM, or even Hellfire?] as well as de‑scoping the Battlefield Reconnaisance Helicopter requirement by four aircraft, resulting in a total fleet of 66 aircraft [up from 62]. A further Planning Round 2011 Option was run to revise the profile of the resources available for the Wildcat project between financial year 2014-15 and financial year 2015-16.”
I’m guessing that the plan is to trade 4 Wildcats, in order to obtain 8 “Light Assault” helicopters (armed with LMM? Perhaps even Hellfire?) for 847 NAS: 4 would be Battlefield scout fitted with additional kit and weaponry, with four more new-built airframes in addition.
So far, it was planned that 847 would get 6 Wildcats from the Army total.
So, effectively, the Army would have lost six helicopters, while now it would only lose 4, with 4 additional Wildcats being built, for a total of 8 weapon-capable ones, and total of Wildcats growing to 66 instead of 62.
The Army and Marines would both benefit from this change, a true win-win solution.
A very interesting development. I had heard nothing at all about this before, so it was a total surprise.
Consequence of experience with attack helicopters in Libya, perhaps…? Having read the reports about the issues of Apache being not quite naval enough for operating for long periods from HMS Ocean, and having seen the list of requirements the AAC compiled to make the AH64 fully naval capable, i'm tempted to guess that giving more power to the Marines's Wildcats was seen as a less expensive alternative.
It would be interesting to know exactly what the "Light Assault" Wildcat will be capable of doing and carrying. The Thales LMM, i'm guessing, but CRV7 rockets, gunpods and even Hellfire are also offered, and could be used if integration was funded.
In exchange, the Army will avoid spending any money on additional navalization measures for the Apache AH1. But again, i'm guessing, since there are no details for the moment.
There are are still, in the Army, some 50 Lynx MK7 in addition to 22 updated Lynx MK9A. The 9A might be in service until 2018/19, while the MK7 will be retiring as the Wildcat army comes in service, from 2014.
However, in particular when the Lynx 9A will retire, there won't be enough Wildcats to equip all squadrons of the AAC, unless more Wildcats are acquired later on in the decade.
A total of 80 Wildcats has been approved when the programme started, but only 62, now to grow to 66, have been funded for the moment. Unitary production cost is 13 million, Unitary cost including all expenses is 26 million.
The Light Assault Helicopter should provide much needed additional attack helicopter capability, particularly for amphibious operations and on-ship usage.
It will bite a bit into a gap in capability that is recognized from years: it is worth remembering that there are 48 frontline Apaches in service, and some 60 crews, but the Army had planned for 72 active Apaches, in 9 squadrons, one of which would have been 847 NAS.
There are also some problems, however: the Data Link 22 integration on Wildcat has not yet been funded, nor has the Bowman software release 6.0, and both these issues will affect networkcentric capability of the recce helicopter.
Besides, the Future Future Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons (Heavy) risks to incur in a delay and not be available in 2015 when the Wildcat enters service with the Navy.
Puma HC2
It is now confirmed that the updated helicopter will be 24, not 28, and their planned out of service date is 2025. The Initial Operating Capability is set at six helicopters ready for operations, and should be reached in November 2013.
Full operational capability is set as a Forward Available Fleet of 22 airframes, 22 crews and trained ground personnel, all delivered by October 2014.
Currently, cost is set at 326 million pounds.
The Puma HC2 is seen as indispensable to provide helicopter lift while the Merlin HC3 fleet is navalized and the Sea Kings retired.
A400 Atlas
A majorly worrisome detail emerges, in the form of a 238 million savings which will see only 9 out of 22 cargo airplanes fitted, at delivery, with the Defensive Aids Sub-system. 23 millions will also be saved by not acquiring one of (N) planned simulators for training. The cargo hold will also NOT be configured for civilian pallets, but only NATO pallets, saving 5 million.
Unit cost expected 141 million. Payload requirement to be met.
Meteor Air to Air missile
Will be in service in 2015. Unit cost is 2.1 million per missile, but number of missiles acquired is classified and not disclosed. Some 715 million pounds have been expended, over a planned cost of 1115 million for the Demonstration and Manufacture phase. Upped boundary for the approved cost is set at 1249 million pounds.
The missile will be ready for delivery and integration in August 2012, and it is expected to be in service on the Typhoon in July 2015. Integration will clear carriage of 6 missiles, and full use of the two-ways data link.
F35
Confirmation that, at least "for the few years" there won't be an Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) in the UK, but instead reliance on US Navy training system for initial throughput and training of early instructor pilots and squadron pilots.
"Initial" force element at readiness is set at 10 airplanes, with Initial Operating Capability to be declared when 6 planes will be available for embarkation on the Strike Carrier at readiness Level 2 (2 to 5 days notice).
Full operating capability target not disclosed. Until at least 2009, full operational capability was indicated with the reaching of a Force at Readiness of 36 airplanes available for embarked operations.
The new target has yet to be set.
CVF
There has been no change to the requirement for the Queen Elizabeth of being able to conduct deployments away from port facilities for operations lasting 9 months continuously and support air operations for up to 70 days.
However, the NAO, assuming that one carrier is to be mothballed, now projects the Availability of the carrier as to not meet the stated RN requirement.
No surprise. The carriers are two for a reason.
FRES SV
Future Rapid Effects System Specialist Vehicles entered its Assessment Phase (Assessment Phase 2) in June 2008. The approval covered the anticipated Specialist Vehicles fleet scope, with high priority afforded to Scout (Recce Block 1), given the pressing need to replace Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked). Specialist Vehicles was assumed to consist of three Recce Blocks plus Medium Armour and Manoeuvre Support components, all mounted on a common base platform. In broad terms the Assessment Phase Studies confirmed that the Common Base Platform concept was viable for all platforms and also set the time, cost performance and risk envelope for Recce Block 1. In accordance with the endorsed acquisition strategy, the Common Base Platform design will be used for Recce Block 2 and 3 with the addition of role specific sub-systems for each variant. Assessment studies will be used to determine the scope of each subsystem
fit for each specific role.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Department's 2011 Planning Round removed the Medium Armour and Manoeuvre Support elements and reset the total vehicle fleet numbers to up to ***, with the delivery profile recast to aspire to the emerging Army restructuring under Strategic Defence and Security Review (Five Multi-Role Brigades). Final size and shape of the Specialist Vehicles fleet will not be set until Main Gate 2, in 20**, when the first major production investment decision will be taken. The Recce Block 1 Planned Assumption for Service Entry was also deferred by nine months from *** to ***.
It should be noted that Specialist Vehicles does not have a single Main Gate Approval. The size of the programme, together with previous lessons learned in other programmes, determined that a two-stage Main Gate approach should be used; Main Gate 1 for entry into Demonstration only, with a second Main Gate (2) for entry into the manufacture phase, the latter being the major investment decision. Further approvals (in effect sub-Main Gates) will approve Demonstration and Manufacture of later vehicle blocks (e.g. Recce Block 2) covering later
variants. Main Gate 1 did not set Initial Operating Capability, Full Operating Capability or total fleet requirements, but merely noted the planning assumptions associated with these for service entry at the time of demonstration launch for Recce Block 1. There was also recognition that the then forthcoming Defence Review would change total fleet requirements and assumptions and these should not therefore be set at Main Gate 1.
The information, as you can see, is not disclosed. Current working numbers and dates are not revealed.
The cancellation of the Medium Armour segment is likely to be a definitive end for any ambition of fielding Medium Tanks.
However, perhaps a number of Direct Fire platforms will appear as part of Block 2 or 3.
The deletion of Maneuver Support seems to open wide the door for the Warrior bridgelayer/engineer vehicle, which BAE has self-developed and already showcased at DSEI this year. The MOD is following this new Warrior variant closely.
Indirect Fire Precision Attack
This programme continues to be the favorite in the never ending chase for cuts, and the RA is regularly prevented from continuing its modernization.
A contract for the Demonstration and Manufacture of the first component, Ballistic Sensor Fuzed Munition (SMART 155 mm round, with two sensor-fuzed ammunitions inside), was placed with Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme GmbH in September 2007 and terminated in February 2010. This, coupled with retirement of the old submunitions shell for the AS90 (despite 2000 rounds having been fired in Iraq in 2003, not that long ago...) and added to the retirement and destruction of even the still new GMLRS - submunitions (ordered in 2007 and promptly cancelled, folly!) means that the RA is without an area-attack weapon and anti-tank weapon both.
The Loitering Ammunition, Fire Shadow, is still alive and will start operating in Afghanistan next year. 25 ammunitions will be delivered in March 2012 for use.
Guided Shell - the Excalibur 155 mm GPS guided round - has had its funding deleted in Planning Round 2011; however, the planned capability requirement remains. The RA is still hoping to be able to finally put it in service by 2018.
The Large Long Range Rocket capability (ATACMS missile) was deleted in Planning Round 2011; it is not clear if the RA will ever have a chance to resurrect it.
Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability - Fleet Tanker
In 2010 there was the latest, hundredth invitation for bids for the building of the new, much needed double-hulled tankers for the Royal Navy. The bidders were six:
A&P Group Limited (UK),
Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (Republic of Korea),
Fincantieri (Italy),
Hyundai Heavy Industries (Republic of Korea)
Knutsen OAS(UK) Limited.
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft (Germany)
Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft (Germany) dropped out of the competition already in 2010. This year, two more withdrew: Knutsen OAS Ltd in June 2011 and A&P Group Ltd in August 2011.
The final bid will be selected (hopefully) as part of PR 2012 from the three remaining bidders.
While "up to 6" tankers remains quoted, it is much more likely that the contract, at most, will aim for four ships, with acquisition programme shaped in a 2 + 1 + 1 fashion.
The cost of the Fleet Tanker element should be of around 800 million per six ships, and between 500 and 600 for four.
India last year paid Finmeccanica just 159.326.000 euro for the Deepak (21 millions of which are for spare parts), a military resupply ship capable of carrying 15250 tons in fuels and oils, 510 tonnes of ammo and stores, 8 refrigerated containers. She is fast (20 knots) and has full helicopter support for a Merlin-sized machine, at 175 meters of lenght, 25 beam.
500 million pounds should suffice for procuring 4 very good ships.
Operational Utility Vehicle System
The requirement for Operational Utility Vehicle System was reviewed in 2007 by the Army, as lead user,
when the need for vehicles with enhanced protection, capacity and mobility was identified. The Single
Statement of User Need stated that ‘Operational Utility Vehicle System would provide a robust, easily
supported system, comprising operational utility vehicles that are able to carry light cargo (up to six tonnes)
or small groups of personnel, integrate as many special-to-role systems as possible and which can operate
in diverse climatic and topographical conditions worldwide, in order to support and contribute to land
(including land air) and littoral manoeuvre operations’. This capability would be a key supporting enabler for
offensive combat operations providing the following roles; unit level logistic cargo vehicle, systems carrier,
mobile command, liaison and personnel transport.
Mainly aimed at replacing Pinzgauers and Land Rovers in their many variants, OUVS was suspended and was, prior to PR11, expected to be resurrected in 2012.
The Operational Utility Vehicle System project has now been removed from the programme. In other words, cancelled.
The requirement will be re-scoped, and the outcome of the work so far done on OUVS will form the basis for the Multi Role Vehicle- Protected Programme. It is currently planned for Multi Role Vehicle- Protected to commence Concept stage during Financial Year 2015/2016.
Multi Role Vehicle-Protected will have its own Initial Gate and Main Gate approvals.
Type 26 Global Combat Ship
Approval for the Type 26 prosecution will be split into two parts. Approval (Main Gate 1) will seek endorsement of the requirements to be delivered by Type 26 GCS, with Main Gate 2, the main investment decision following in Quarter 4 2013. Main Gate 1 is imminent, as this month the final options should be confirmed, and detailed design activity should be started.
This will allow detailed costing and design work to proceed against a defined requirement so that the project
will be ready for approval at Main Gate 2 and subsequent contract signing.
There are no other changes. The first unit of 13 is still expected "as early as possible" in the 2020s.
Cooperative Engagement Capability
The Co-operative Engagement Capability is a United States Naval System fitted to an increasing number of
United States assets including ships, aircraft, and Army and Marine Corps land systems. Co-operative
Engagement Capability does not replace any single system; rather it optimises war-fighting capabilities
inherent in existing and future combat systems.
UK Co-operative Engagement Capability is a UK Network-Enabled Capability project which provides an
advanced air and missile defence capability by sharing and fusing engagement quality data from suitably
equipped platforms to deliver a single, coherent, stable air picture. It will fill the capability gap originally
identified in Commander-in-Chief Fleet’s Military Capability reports and re-affirmed in the Above Water Effects capability audit in 2007, updated in 2009, to detect, monitor, and counter Air-Warfare threats. It will also reduce a gap in interoperability with the United States.
UK Co-operative Engagement Capability enhances the ability of fitted platforms to work together in detection, tracking and engagement of air targets. This capability represents a major advance in both air and missile defence.
Over simplifying in an inelegant way, the CEC ensures that all targets are engaged in the best possible ways, to avoid sending all missiles against the same "Vampire" while another incoming missile is ignored! It fuses together the informations from sensors of various ships and even air platforms (for the US, the Hawkeye, for the UK hopefully the AEW platform emerging from MASC/Crow's Nest).
It was planned to be fitted to the Type 23 and Type 45 both.
For the Type 45, the date indicated was 2014, but the latest NAO report has all dates obscured:
The Planning Round in 2010 delayed the planned In-Service Date to ***, extending the Assessment Phase.
Planning Round 2011 has changed the platform fit from Type 23 Frigates to Type 26 Global Combat Ships and brought forward the In-Service Date to ***. The outputs from the extended Assessment Phase activities will support the main investment decision currently forecast for ***. Further Operational Analysis, a review of technology assumptions since the Initial Gate approval in 2000, and a revised Investment Appraisal have also been commissioned.
The Type 23 won't get CEC, while the Type 26 should have it at build, i'm guessing. This, though, still means we are looking at a date past 2020.
Hopefully, at least the Type 45s will get this much needed enhancement earlier than that.
Monday, November 14, 2011
One french effort to keep under a watchful eye
As France begins to seriously move towards its Véhicule Blindé Multi-Role, the British Army is going to look with more and more interest into their effort. The VBMR is intended to be a multirole troop carrier, with which the French army plans to replace the Véhicule Avant Blindé. The new vehicle is actually intended to be a 20 ton range 6×6 wheeled armored base for a whole family of vehicles destined to Marine and Mechanized Infantry formations of the french armed forces.
The Troop Carrier variant would carry some 9 fully equipped soldiers and offer the same NATO STANAG 4A protection level of the VBCI, but at lower cost. The vehicle will also carry stores for 48 hours of high intensity operations.
France has a requisite for some 1000 vehicles, to replace 4000 VABs in the various variants. Ambitiously, they expect to pay 1000 vehicles with just 1 billion euro.
For the British Army, the VBMR might become an attractive starting point for FRES Utility Vehicle, which even in this period of cuts, remains in the plan, with the Army reportedly aiming to restart it by 2016 or 2018, aiming for a 2022 in-service date.
France aims to put the first vehicles in service in 2016, so, if times were roughly respected, the UK could piggy-back on the production line and achieve, by collaborating, significant advantages and economies of scale.
The VBMR is a fundamental part of the french effort for the modernization of their land vehicles fleet, and in 2010 R&D contracts and feasibility studies were awarded by the french ministry to Renault Trucks Defense and Nexter Systems.
Both companies were asked to produce platform demonstrators with full mobility, as well as conceptual armor protection suits, to be delivered within the next two years.
Nexter has so far showcased the XP-2, while Renault came up with its own 6×6 design, called AMC, along with a potential VAB upgrade idea.
Now, however, the two companies have decided to team up to pursue the contract full-force, and ensure their long term survival.
More in the report from DefenseUpdate.com.
At the same time, Lockheed Martin UK is now entering negotiation with Panhard and Nexter to gain a role as weapon and systems integrator in the French land vehicle programmes.
LM Uk is the leader in the Warrior upgrade effort, and also provides the turret for the FRES Scout.
Lockheed could collaborate with the French in the fields of turrets and related systems; weapon integration, including the CT40mm cannon with which it is working so heavily in the UK; and in weapon handling systems, electronic architecture, vehicle health monitoring and energy management.
The FRES UV contenders in 2008 were larger, 8x8 vehicles bordering on the 30 tons or more. A contender was the french VBCI, along with Boxer and Piranha V (in reality, since the Piranha V was still a paper tiger, the trials were done with a Piranha IV "Evolution"). The Italian Freccia was briefly considered as well.
However, financial reality has reportedly meant that the British Army is already reconsidering its option, and interest for the VBMR is said to be growing.
For sure, both the VBCI and the VBMR are going to be examined a lot more carefully if FRES UV survives and effectively restarts as wished. In the meanwhile, following the progress of the VBMR will be very interesting.
The Land Modernization programme of the French Army is known under the name SCORPION, and is meant to bring together several very different but related effort. Scorpion is conceived as a system of systems, encompassing tanks, armored personnel carriers, the Tiger attack helicopter and battlefield management systems down to the Felin infantry kit, with networkcentric warfare as its main objective.
The Scorpion effort thus brings together very different programmes, from updates of existing kit to networkization of the various parts, to introduction of whole new vehicles. On the vehicle side, Scorpion includes:
Leclerc MBT modernization
Véhicule Blindé de Combat d’Infanterie (VBCI) - 630 on order; last one expected for delivery in 2015. It is the IFV of the French army, and replaces the earlier, tracked AMX-10P
Véhicule Blindé Multi Role (VBMR) - replacement for Véhicule Avant Blindé (VAB)
Engin Blindé de Reconnaissance et Combat (EBRC), - replacement for the light tanks Sagaie and AMX 10RC, destined for recce missions. Some 290 to 300 are required.
Nexter and Renault now appear to be leading the race for the VBMR, while Panhard is the likely winner of the contract for the EBRC, with its famous and fascinating Sphinx prototype being a likely base for the final EBRC.
More info is available here.
If we really wanted to draw a direct comparison between the French army modernization and the British Army's own, we would see:
Challenger II Capability Sustainment Programme; on hold; assessment phase to be completed "around the middle of the decade"
Warrior CSP; unlike the French army, the British army still holds its tracked IFV dear, and has no plans to replace it with a wheeled platform.
FRES SV; kind of an awkward comparison, it must be admitted, but it is the british effort that relates to the french EBRC.
FRES UV; has its 'companion' in the VBMR, even thought FRES UV is (or at least was) quite more ambitious, and quite bigger on all accounts.
The Scorpion effort is likely to have a great influence on the British Army's own efforts, especially now that collaboration with France is at the top of the agenda.
So it is worth keeping a watchful eye over the development of their own programmes. Particularly in fields such as that of VBMR.
The Troop Carrier variant would carry some 9 fully equipped soldiers and offer the same NATO STANAG 4A protection level of the VBCI, but at lower cost. The vehicle will also carry stores for 48 hours of high intensity operations.
France has a requisite for some 1000 vehicles, to replace 4000 VABs in the various variants. Ambitiously, they expect to pay 1000 vehicles with just 1 billion euro.
For the British Army, the VBMR might become an attractive starting point for FRES Utility Vehicle, which even in this period of cuts, remains in the plan, with the Army reportedly aiming to restart it by 2016 or 2018, aiming for a 2022 in-service date.
France aims to put the first vehicles in service in 2016, so, if times were roughly respected, the UK could piggy-back on the production line and achieve, by collaborating, significant advantages and economies of scale.
The VBMR is a fundamental part of the french effort for the modernization of their land vehicles fleet, and in 2010 R&D contracts and feasibility studies were awarded by the french ministry to Renault Trucks Defense and Nexter Systems.
Both companies were asked to produce platform demonstrators with full mobility, as well as conceptual armor protection suits, to be delivered within the next two years.
Nexter has so far showcased the XP-2, while Renault came up with its own 6×6 design, called AMC, along with a potential VAB upgrade idea.
Now, however, the two companies have decided to team up to pursue the contract full-force, and ensure their long term survival.
More in the report from DefenseUpdate.com.
At the same time, Lockheed Martin UK is now entering negotiation with Panhard and Nexter to gain a role as weapon and systems integrator in the French land vehicle programmes.
LM Uk is the leader in the Warrior upgrade effort, and also provides the turret for the FRES Scout.
Lockheed could collaborate with the French in the fields of turrets and related systems; weapon integration, including the CT40mm cannon with which it is working so heavily in the UK; and in weapon handling systems, electronic architecture, vehicle health monitoring and energy management.
 |
| The 17 tons Sphinx from Panhard is the most likely base for EBRC |
The FRES UV contenders in 2008 were larger, 8x8 vehicles bordering on the 30 tons or more. A contender was the french VBCI, along with Boxer and Piranha V (in reality, since the Piranha V was still a paper tiger, the trials were done with a Piranha IV "Evolution"). The Italian Freccia was briefly considered as well.
However, financial reality has reportedly meant that the British Army is already reconsidering its option, and interest for the VBMR is said to be growing.
For sure, both the VBCI and the VBMR are going to be examined a lot more carefully if FRES UV survives and effectively restarts as wished. In the meanwhile, following the progress of the VBMR will be very interesting.
 |
| The Nexter XP2 prototype, developed with the VBMR requirement in mind. The french VBMR experience could have a massive influence on the British Army FRES UV effort |
The Land Modernization programme of the French Army is known under the name SCORPION, and is meant to bring together several very different but related effort. Scorpion is conceived as a system of systems, encompassing tanks, armored personnel carriers, the Tiger attack helicopter and battlefield management systems down to the Felin infantry kit, with networkcentric warfare as its main objective.
The Scorpion effort thus brings together very different programmes, from updates of existing kit to networkization of the various parts, to introduction of whole new vehicles. On the vehicle side, Scorpion includes:
Leclerc MBT modernization
Véhicule Blindé de Combat d’Infanterie (VBCI) - 630 on order; last one expected for delivery in 2015. It is the IFV of the French army, and replaces the earlier, tracked AMX-10P
Véhicule Blindé Multi Role (VBMR) - replacement for Véhicule Avant Blindé (VAB)
Engin Blindé de Reconnaissance et Combat (EBRC), - replacement for the light tanks Sagaie and AMX 10RC, destined for recce missions. Some 290 to 300 are required.
Nexter and Renault now appear to be leading the race for the VBMR, while Panhard is the likely winner of the contract for the EBRC, with its famous and fascinating Sphinx prototype being a likely base for the final EBRC.
More info is available here.
If we really wanted to draw a direct comparison between the French army modernization and the British Army's own, we would see:
Challenger II Capability Sustainment Programme; on hold; assessment phase to be completed "around the middle of the decade"
Warrior CSP; unlike the French army, the British army still holds its tracked IFV dear, and has no plans to replace it with a wheeled platform.
FRES SV; kind of an awkward comparison, it must be admitted, but it is the british effort that relates to the french EBRC.
FRES UV; has its 'companion' in the VBMR, even thought FRES UV is (or at least was) quite more ambitious, and quite bigger on all accounts.
The Scorpion effort is likely to have a great influence on the British Army's own efforts, especially now that collaboration with France is at the top of the agenda.
So it is worth keeping a watchful eye over the development of their own programmes. Particularly in fields such as that of VBMR.
Just how bad it is...?
How bad can things go in the next few planning rounds?
I've been engaged in a few very ferocious battles over the financially absurd decision of retaining Tornado GR4 over the Harrier lately, and while i totally agree that the Tornado GR4 has quite a good margin of performances advantages and more weapons integrated on it, i simply cannot avoid to point out that financially, retaining it was nothing short of a suicide. While more capable than Harrier, the Tornado decision negated savings from 5 to 7 times higher than those obtained with the early retirement of Harrier and Ark Royal.
Savings that remain necessary and that will have to be realized in a way or another.
The true, final size of the cuts to the armed forces is not yet clear. Tornado GR4 itself "won" in October 2010, but it looks more and more unlikely that it will last very long before more more squadrons are cut. In the best case, after the next (and last) two Typhoon squadrons begin to operate, in the worst case, even before that, depending on how bad the next planning round look.
In the meanwhile, the Harrier GR9s are about to accomplish their last mission: gaining some money to use for filling some of the holes in PR12. The whole Harrier fleet, of 74 airplanes, is about to be sold to the US Marines, along with engines and spare parts: the USMC plans to use the Harrier GR9 as a low-cost, readily available solution for filling a hole in their fast jet fleet as aging Harriers and F-18 are retired while the F35B takes much longer than planned to arrive and replace them.
The F35B should have hit service next year, but now it is expected that the USMC will be using Harriers and F/A-18 well into the 2020s, up to 2025, when their replacement with F35B should be completed.
Rear Adm. Mark Heinrich, chief of the U.S. Navy's Supply Corps, confirmed the two-part deal Nov. 10 during a conference in New York sponsored by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in association with Defense News.
A deal for the spare parts is already agreed over. The US will pay the UK around 50 million dollars to acquire all the spares of the Harrier GR9 fleet. A second deal, the value of which should of course be quite a lot higher, will cover the acquisition of the 74 Harriers and all of their engines. The GR9s have been undergoing minimum fleet maintenance, including anti-deterioration measures, in order to keep them airworthy, and are stored in hangars at RAF Cottersmore.
The americans say they are confident for the final deals to be signed within one or two weeks.
The GR 9 and 9As are similar in configuration to the Marines' AV-8B night attack version, which make up about a third of U.S. Harriers, with the rest being AV-8B+ variant, more advanced and with better multirole capabilities, thanks to the APG-65 radar, which enables the use even of AMRAAM missiles, in the air defence role.
The GR9 planes are notoriously without a radar and AMRAAM capability (migrating the Sea Harrier FA2 radar onto them was expected to cost up to 600 million pounds, and was deemed too expensive) only carries the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors in the nose, like the AV-8B.
There are little to no problems of compatibility in terms of engines, too: the GR9 uses the Rolls-Royce Mark 105 Pegasus engine, while the GR 9As have the more powerful Mark 107, which is similar to the Rolls-Royce F402-RR-408s that powers the USMC AV-8Bs.
Lon Nordeen, author of several books on the Harrier, noted that the british Harriers were built between 1980 and 1995, and "are still quite serviceable," he said. "The aircraft are not that far apart. We're taking advantage of all the money the Brits have spent on them. It's like we're buying a car with maybe 15,000 miles on it."
Operationally, Nordeen said, "these are very good platforms. They need upgrades, but on bombing missions they have the ability to incorporate the Litening II targeting pod [used by U.S. aircraft]. They're good platforms. And we've already got trained pilots."
At least initially, the british Harrier will not replace USMC Harriers, but F18D Hornets, which are actually older, in worst conditions, and need most urgently replacement, so much so that the first USMC squadron getting the F35B is also planned to be a F18D squadron.
The money coming from these deals, normally would be clawed back by the Treasury, not by the MOD, but as part of emergency measures taken months ago to fill, without imposing further big cuts in the immediate, a one-billion pound hole in PR11, the money obtained from selling retired kit, such as Largs Bay, but also ships sold for scrap such as Ark Royal, and now the Harriers, will now go to the MOD.
Thankfully, because it appears to be desperately needed.
The problem is that it is just not enough.
As a consequence, the Army continues to get the chop: 7000 posts had to be lost in the British Army by 2015 according to the SDSR, but in July this increased to 12.000 as the long term strength of the regular army was modified from 94.000 to 82.000 in 2020.
And in these days we have assisted to the fuss caused by the famous leaked memo, sent by an unnamed officer to commanders in Afghanistan, outlining the possibility of a further speeding up of the cuts, with expansion in the redundancies tranches, pushing figures up to as many as 16500 posts to go by 2015. Included in that total, up to 2500 personnel recovering from wounds sustained on operations.
The MOD quickly denied the leak, saying that the report was incorrect. However, the 16500 posts lost figure has not been denied entirely: it seems to remain a very real possibility on the table as PR12 is discussed.
The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, has said:
The Telegraph today reports that in the worst case scenario half the Royal Armoured Corps (5 out of 11 regiments) and 10 infantry battalions could vanish in order to reach the 82.000 figure.
This would represent another kick in the crotch of an SDSR that becomes more and more indefensible, as effectively, despite claims of the opposite, it continues to live on and on to deliver more and more cuts.
Politicians calling for a "re-opening" of the SDSR are clearly incapable to understand the reality: the SDSR was never closed, and the document itself was never worth more than toilette paper.
The MOD, of course, promptly assured that:
However, despite what the MOD says, we can assume that, just like in pre-SDSR time, these leaks are actually quite accurate hints of the options on the table.
It is quite safe to assume that the 5 RAC and 10 Infantry cut is the current "worst case option" on the table as discussion continues to go on. Of course, it is not sure (yet) that it will happen. But it is a possibility, which is disclosed after a period in which no cuts to RAC were expected (a Tank Regiment and a Brigade RECCE Regiment are (were?) expected in each brigade), and after 6, then 8 battalions of infantry were candidates for the chop.
It just gets worse as time goes on, and this cannot possibly be a good sign.
The Telegraph also reports that:
Improving the deployability and readiness of the Territorial Army, to make it more comparable to the US National Guard, will indeed be fundamental to give a meaning to the "30% reserves" army plan, but such a change will not be without cost and challenges, and the outcome of the reform, in particular, again, because of the lack of budget, is far from an assured success.
It is becoming harder and harder to identify a SDSR passage that makes sense, or that can be trusted, other than those about the cuts.
Cuts always happen as planned. Or get increased.
Cutting 8, and even worse 10, battalions of infantry represents a tremendous, and hardly manageable cut. The loss of 5 RAC regiments is even more worrisome, as it potentially represents an even more marked shift away from SDSR assumptions.
The 227 Challenger II tanks retained after the cuts, and promised to be a part of the Multi Role Brigades, might:
A - End up in the Territorial Army
B - vanish...?
C - Get merged into 5 "super-regiments" combining Tank and Brigade Recce role.
Option C would be, potentially, the least damaging, and would deliver (i'm guessing) a Regimental structure similar to that of a US Armoured Squadron: the regiment could end up having three squadrons, each with N Challenger II tanks and N FRES Scout / Protected Mobility / Jackal vehicles.
But such an option would also be the one delivering the least savings and smallest manpower reduction.
B is hopefully inacceptable a planning option.
A, however, risks to give us 5 regiments of tanks with crews not adequately prepared and unable to actually deploy in regimental strength, making this option almost as bad, potentially, as option B.
Bad news, in other words. Lots of uncertainty, again, and clouds that seem to only get darker and darker instead of clearing.
I've been engaged in a few very ferocious battles over the financially absurd decision of retaining Tornado GR4 over the Harrier lately, and while i totally agree that the Tornado GR4 has quite a good margin of performances advantages and more weapons integrated on it, i simply cannot avoid to point out that financially, retaining it was nothing short of a suicide. While more capable than Harrier, the Tornado decision negated savings from 5 to 7 times higher than those obtained with the early retirement of Harrier and Ark Royal.
Savings that remain necessary and that will have to be realized in a way or another.
The true, final size of the cuts to the armed forces is not yet clear. Tornado GR4 itself "won" in October 2010, but it looks more and more unlikely that it will last very long before more more squadrons are cut. In the best case, after the next (and last) two Typhoon squadrons begin to operate, in the worst case, even before that, depending on how bad the next planning round look.
In the meanwhile, the Harrier GR9s are about to accomplish their last mission: gaining some money to use for filling some of the holes in PR12. The whole Harrier fleet, of 74 airplanes, is about to be sold to the US Marines, along with engines and spare parts: the USMC plans to use the Harrier GR9 as a low-cost, readily available solution for filling a hole in their fast jet fleet as aging Harriers and F-18 are retired while the F35B takes much longer than planned to arrive and replace them.
The F35B should have hit service next year, but now it is expected that the USMC will be using Harriers and F/A-18 well into the 2020s, up to 2025, when their replacement with F35B should be completed.
Rear Adm. Mark Heinrich, chief of the U.S. Navy's Supply Corps, confirmed the two-part deal Nov. 10 during a conference in New York sponsored by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in association with Defense News.
A deal for the spare parts is already agreed over. The US will pay the UK around 50 million dollars to acquire all the spares of the Harrier GR9 fleet. A second deal, the value of which should of course be quite a lot higher, will cover the acquisition of the 74 Harriers and all of their engines. The GR9s have been undergoing minimum fleet maintenance, including anti-deterioration measures, in order to keep them airworthy, and are stored in hangars at RAF Cottersmore.
The americans say they are confident for the final deals to be signed within one or two weeks.
The GR 9 and 9As are similar in configuration to the Marines' AV-8B night attack version, which make up about a third of U.S. Harriers, with the rest being AV-8B+ variant, more advanced and with better multirole capabilities, thanks to the APG-65 radar, which enables the use even of AMRAAM missiles, in the air defence role.
The GR9 planes are notoriously without a radar and AMRAAM capability (migrating the Sea Harrier FA2 radar onto them was expected to cost up to 600 million pounds, and was deemed too expensive) only carries the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors in the nose, like the AV-8B.
There are little to no problems of compatibility in terms of engines, too: the GR9 uses the Rolls-Royce Mark 105 Pegasus engine, while the GR 9As have the more powerful Mark 107, which is similar to the Rolls-Royce F402-RR-408s that powers the USMC AV-8Bs.
Lon Nordeen, author of several books on the Harrier, noted that the british Harriers were built between 1980 and 1995, and "are still quite serviceable," he said. "The aircraft are not that far apart. We're taking advantage of all the money the Brits have spent on them. It's like we're buying a car with maybe 15,000 miles on it."
Operationally, Nordeen said, "these are very good platforms. They need upgrades, but on bombing missions they have the ability to incorporate the Litening II targeting pod [used by U.S. aircraft]. They're good platforms. And we've already got trained pilots."
At least initially, the british Harrier will not replace USMC Harriers, but F18D Hornets, which are actually older, in worst conditions, and need most urgently replacement, so much so that the first USMC squadron getting the F35B is also planned to be a F18D squadron.
The money coming from these deals, normally would be clawed back by the Treasury, not by the MOD, but as part of emergency measures taken months ago to fill, without imposing further big cuts in the immediate, a one-billion pound hole in PR11, the money obtained from selling retired kit, such as Largs Bay, but also ships sold for scrap such as Ark Royal, and now the Harriers, will now go to the MOD.
Thankfully, because it appears to be desperately needed.
The problem is that it is just not enough.
As a consequence, the Army continues to get the chop: 7000 posts had to be lost in the British Army by 2015 according to the SDSR, but in July this increased to 12.000 as the long term strength of the regular army was modified from 94.000 to 82.000 in 2020.
And in these days we have assisted to the fuss caused by the famous leaked memo, sent by an unnamed officer to commanders in Afghanistan, outlining the possibility of a further speeding up of the cuts, with expansion in the redundancies tranches, pushing figures up to as many as 16500 posts to go by 2015. Included in that total, up to 2500 personnel recovering from wounds sustained on operations.
The MOD quickly denied the leak, saying that the report was incorrect. However, the 16500 posts lost figure has not been denied entirely: it seems to remain a very real possibility on the table as PR12 is discussed.
The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, has said:
"No-one will be forced out of the Army. They won't leave until it's right for them. Of course the Army is a young man's business. Most people leave within about ten years. So it's inevitable that they are going to have to leave the Army at some point and we've got to focus on being very combat-ready and well-trained.
"There is undoubtedly a limit on the number of injured personnel we can employ, but no-one will be forced out. We've put a lot of effort into this. As part of the Defence Recovery Capability there are six Army Recovery Centres right round the country whose core task is preparing people for transition into civilian life, and I am pleased to say that lots of personnel have made a successful transition.
"All the experts say it is better that they bite this bullet early while they're still young rather than linger on beyond a time when it's not so easy."
The Telegraph today reports that in the worst case scenario half the Royal Armoured Corps (5 out of 11 regiments) and 10 infantry battalions could vanish in order to reach the 82.000 figure.
This would represent another kick in the crotch of an SDSR that becomes more and more indefensible, as effectively, despite claims of the opposite, it continues to live on and on to deliver more and more cuts.
Politicians calling for a "re-opening" of the SDSR are clearly incapable to understand the reality: the SDSR was never closed, and the document itself was never worth more than toilette paper.
The MOD, of course, promptly assured that:
A review of the future structure of the Army is ongoing and no conclusions have yet been reached. Idle speculation on the possible outcomes of that review only serves to bring about uncertainty for serving soldiers and their families.
However, despite what the MOD says, we can assume that, just like in pre-SDSR time, these leaks are actually quite accurate hints of the options on the table.
It is quite safe to assume that the 5 RAC and 10 Infantry cut is the current "worst case option" on the table as discussion continues to go on. Of course, it is not sure (yet) that it will happen. But it is a possibility, which is disclosed after a period in which no cuts to RAC were expected (a Tank Regiment and a Brigade RECCE Regiment are (were?) expected in each brigade), and after 6, then 8 battalions of infantry were candidates for the chop.
It just gets worse as time goes on, and this cannot possibly be a good sign.
The Telegraph also reports that:
'The Army is going to rely much more on the 30,000 soldiers in the Territorial Army to fill front-line roles and for the first time the reserves will come under the direct command of the regular Army.
Legislation will have to be introduced to allow TA units to be deployed on operations in order to bolster regular brigades. But there is a worry that the TA might not be able to “plug the gap”.'
Improving the deployability and readiness of the Territorial Army, to make it more comparable to the US National Guard, will indeed be fundamental to give a meaning to the "30% reserves" army plan, but such a change will not be without cost and challenges, and the outcome of the reform, in particular, again, because of the lack of budget, is far from an assured success.
It is becoming harder and harder to identify a SDSR passage that makes sense, or that can be trusted, other than those about the cuts.
Cuts always happen as planned. Or get increased.
Cutting 8, and even worse 10, battalions of infantry represents a tremendous, and hardly manageable cut. The loss of 5 RAC regiments is even more worrisome, as it potentially represents an even more marked shift away from SDSR assumptions.
The 227 Challenger II tanks retained after the cuts, and promised to be a part of the Multi Role Brigades, might:
A - End up in the Territorial Army
B - vanish...?
C - Get merged into 5 "super-regiments" combining Tank and Brigade Recce role.
Option C would be, potentially, the least damaging, and would deliver (i'm guessing) a Regimental structure similar to that of a US Armoured Squadron: the regiment could end up having three squadrons, each with N Challenger II tanks and N FRES Scout / Protected Mobility / Jackal vehicles.
But such an option would also be the one delivering the least savings and smallest manpower reduction.
B is hopefully inacceptable a planning option.
A, however, risks to give us 5 regiments of tanks with crews not adequately prepared and unable to actually deploy in regimental strength, making this option almost as bad, potentially, as option B.
Bad news, in other words. Lots of uncertainty, again, and clouds that seem to only get darker and darker instead of clearing.
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Getting back home
The plan for the return of forces at home from Germany bases by 2020 is taking shape, with a first tranche of transfers announced today. The MOD estimates that the rebasing of troops from Germany will save some £250m a year, but they have also had to admit that without the latest, massive reductions in manpower, the transfer would not have been possible for lack of accommodation in the UK, which would have meant having to spend money (which was of course not available) to prepare bases. This was noted also by the Parliamentary Defence Committee in its SDSR report.
But with the regular Army now set to drop to 82.000 men by 2020, and with several RAF Bases having been vacated, the return of the army of the Rhine can finally be made a reality. It is also expected that bringing the forces currently based in Germany back to the UK will contribute around £650m per year to the UK economy, as wages are spent in the UK instead of in Germany.
The news announced are:
- 2nd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment (2 R ANGLIAN), currently resident in Cyprus, will not return to Trenchard Barracks, Celle, as originally planned. They will now move into RAF Cottersmore instead, in July 2012. The move will involve 620 service personnel and their families.
- 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (2 YORKS), also resident in Cyprus, will move into Elizabeth Barracks, Pirbright, in July 2013, rather than moving to Münster Station in Germany. The move will involve 620 service personnel and their families.
- 7 Regiment Royal Logistic Corps (RLC), part of 102 Logistic Brigade, under Theatre Troops control, will move from Bielefeld in Germany to Cottesmore by Summer 2013. The transfer involves some 450 service personnel and their families.
Cyprus is not being abandoned. Other resident battalions will periodically be based on the island, as normal, without reductions in the number of soldiers present.
These moves mean Waterbeach Barracks will be sold and Trenchard Barracks (Celle) and Münster Station will be handed back to the German authorities, enabling the HQ British Forces Germany to transfer from Rheindahlen to Bielefeld, and making possible the closure of Rheindahlen Military Complex from 2014/15.
- 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) will move from Waterbeach near Cambridge to Kinloss in the summer of 2012, and HQ 12 (Air Support) Engineer Group will move from Waterbeach to RAF Wittering in the summer of 2013.
25 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) will be disbanded within 31 May 2012, with the loss of 43 Headquarters and Support Squadron. Its two Field Squadrons, (34 and 53) will be passed to 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) and move into RAF Wittering.
Unless further changes are announced, this effectively reverses a 2007 decision, which saw 25 ER formed detaching 2 squadrons from 39 ER, funnily enough.
39 Regiment should thus take on this look:
39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support)
71 Engineer Regiment (Volunteers)
73 Engineer Regiment (Volunteers)
Works Group Royal Engineers (Airfields)
Waterbeach Barracks will subsequently be closed by December 2013. The transfer of 39 Regiment and its expansion involve the move of some 930 Service personnel and their families to Kinloss, and 44 Service personnel and their families to Wittering.
The Royal Engineers also face the temporary loss of the M3 rigs, which are being put into extended readiness until 2015. The plan is to bring them back in full service after the Afghan effort is over, so 23 (Amphibious) Squadron of 28 Regiment RE should be safe, even with its main bit of kit being mothballed. It remains a bitter news, especially since the M3 was in action not later than 2003, ferrying elements of 3 Commando Brigade across the Shatt Al-Basrah waterway during Operation TELIC.
- 43 Close Support Squadron RLC will move from Gütersloh in Germany to Abingdon in Oxfordshire to colocate with its parent regiment (12 Logistic Support Regiment) by the end of January 2012. This will affect around 120 Service personnel and their families.
This is likely the end of the "soft" announcements. Save for 25 Engineer Regiment, this Tranche of transfers was painless, but this is highly unlikely to continue, as it is expected that a good share of the battalions currently based in Germany won't be exactly transferred, but more disbanded. The next tranches are very likely to be a lot less pleasant announcements.
Apparently unchanged is the plan for Operation Borona, which is about getting 1 Signals Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade re-deployed from Germany to RAF Cosford, near Stafford, by 2014. 1 Signals Brigade HQ relocated in the UK from Germany in 2010, and is now co-located with HQ ARRC at Gloucester. 7, 16 and 22 Signals Regiments are to follow and move to Stafford.
The Royal Signals will change considerably:
- 7th Signal Regiment; it will disband by 31 July 2012 , following its commitment to supporting the IJC headquarters in Afghanistan.
- 209 Signals Squadron, part of 19 Light Brigade, in early 2013 as the brigade itself disbands
- 2nd Signals Brigade; it will disband around the end of 2012 as its role in supporting the Olympics comes to an end. The units currently in the brigade will move to be under command of the remaining two signal (1st and 11th) brigades, but the plan for the transfer and eventual disbandment of some of the regiments has not yet been completed.
- The Unified System Support Organisation (USSO) became 15th Signal Regiment (Information Support) in September.
- The one-star Signal Officer in Chief post will cease to exist in March 2012. Responsibilities for producing Command Support and EW doctrine and strategy, setting training requirements, designing the Corps’ structures, and integrating and trialling new equipment capabilities will move to HQ Land Forces under a ‘Capability Director’ (which will be, initially, the current one-star Signal Officer in Chief), and join up with similar functions supporting Intelligence, as well as taking on new tasks, including equipment requirement setting. As part of that process the Royal Signals have already taken the Command and Control Development Centre (C2DC) under command. A new post, the "RE Corps Colonel" will be created and he or she will be the head of the serving Corps, with specific responsibilities for ethos, support to recruiting, support to the Military Secretary and the APC, the retired Corps and the wider family, benevolence and operational support, heritage and the Museum. It will be the connection between the Capability Director within HQ Land and the RE force.
Interestingly, the Capability Directorate initiative seems to be cancelling a post, to create two in its place. Not exactly what i expected. Hopefully, it'll work well enough to justify the change.
Project AVANTI also delivered news:
As planned, the three UK regional divisional headquarters in Edinburgh, Shrewsbury and Aldershot will be replaced by a single 2-stars structure, the "Headquarters Support Command", to stand up in Aldershot.
The new HQ Support Command in Aldershot will begin operation in January 2012 when HQ 4th Division in Aldershot will disband.
HQ 2nd Division in Edinburgh and HQ 5th Division in Shrewsbury will both disband by April 2012, although some tasks will continue until at least August 2012 when HQ Support Command should be fully operational.
Despite the closure of HQ 2nd Division in Edinburgh, the Army will retain a General Officer Commanding (GOC) Scotland with the minimum of staff, which maintains the level of senior representation in Scotland to oversee the rebasing changes.
In addition, the Army intends to relocate HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division, currently based in Germany, to Scotland by 2020, which would take over the GOC Scotland role.
The ten regional brigade headquarters and HQ London District will begin restructuring in January 2012 which will be completed by 31 March 2013. The Project Avanti restructuring proposals should save £19m in terms of military and civilian post reductions.
When the SDSR was published, it was announced that at least two regional brigades HQ would be eliminated, but this was lately denied by the announcements last July, which stated:
In the meanwhile, minister Peter Luff has also delivered a speech to the Modern Infantry Conference and Exhibition at Bisley in Surrey. Not without elements of interests and good general points, but as too often happens with these speeches, he gives very little concrete indications about anything at all relating to the future of the British Army infantry formations.
At least, he confirms that later this month the first of a planned 35 Foxhound vehicles destined for training will arrive, with the first operational batch going in Afghanistan next year.
After the speech, he talked to reporters presents, and said that FRES SV will be "perfectly affordable" and that it fits the requirement for adaptability perfectly. It remains a fundamental part of the future army.
On the retention of Afghanistan UORs, he stressed that the UK will have to "make the most efficient use of the vehicles' left over that were developed as UORs, even though the downside of them 'becomes clear post-war, as they were procured for the war, not a war".
In the last few months, Mastiff was reportedly in first line for long-term confirmation, and there are expectations about Jackal as well, ever since officers of the Army announced that the Brigade Recce Regiments are set to have 2 Armoured Squadrons (with FRES) and one "Light" Squadron with wheeled patrol vehicles "open", to make it easier to relate with locals.
The description, and experience of the current shape of Recce Forces in Afghan ops, suggest that said vehicle will be the Jackal, eventually with a long term replacement in the better-protected Fire Support variant of the Foxhound.
Foxhound itself that is already considered Core, and not UOR, and for which there are expectations for at least another order, for further 200 vehicles.
But with the regular Army now set to drop to 82.000 men by 2020, and with several RAF Bases having been vacated, the return of the army of the Rhine can finally be made a reality. It is also expected that bringing the forces currently based in Germany back to the UK will contribute around £650m per year to the UK economy, as wages are spent in the UK instead of in Germany.
The news announced are:
- 2nd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment (2 R ANGLIAN), currently resident in Cyprus, will not return to Trenchard Barracks, Celle, as originally planned. They will now move into RAF Cottersmore instead, in July 2012. The move will involve 620 service personnel and their families.
- 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (2 YORKS), also resident in Cyprus, will move into Elizabeth Barracks, Pirbright, in July 2013, rather than moving to Münster Station in Germany. The move will involve 620 service personnel and their families.
- 7 Regiment Royal Logistic Corps (RLC), part of 102 Logistic Brigade, under Theatre Troops control, will move from Bielefeld in Germany to Cottesmore by Summer 2013. The transfer involves some 450 service personnel and their families.
Cyprus is not being abandoned. Other resident battalions will periodically be based on the island, as normal, without reductions in the number of soldiers present.
These moves mean Waterbeach Barracks will be sold and Trenchard Barracks (Celle) and Münster Station will be handed back to the German authorities, enabling the HQ British Forces Germany to transfer from Rheindahlen to Bielefeld, and making possible the closure of Rheindahlen Military Complex from 2014/15.
- 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) will move from Waterbeach near Cambridge to Kinloss in the summer of 2012, and HQ 12 (Air Support) Engineer Group will move from Waterbeach to RAF Wittering in the summer of 2013.
25 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) will be disbanded within 31 May 2012, with the loss of 43 Headquarters and Support Squadron. Its two Field Squadrons, (34 and 53) will be passed to 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) and move into RAF Wittering.
Unless further changes are announced, this effectively reverses a 2007 decision, which saw 25 ER formed detaching 2 squadrons from 39 ER, funnily enough.
39 Regiment should thus take on this look:
- 10 Field Squadron (Air Support) - RAF Kinloss
- 48 Field Squadron (Air Support) - RAF Kinloss
- 34 Field Squadron (Air Support) - RAF Wittering
- 53 Field Squadron (Air Support) - RAF Wittering
- 60 Headquarters and Support Squadron (Air Support).- RAF Kinloss
- REME Workshop. - RAF Kinloss
39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support)
71 Engineer Regiment (Volunteers)
73 Engineer Regiment (Volunteers)
Works Group Royal Engineers (Airfields)
Waterbeach Barracks will subsequently be closed by December 2013. The transfer of 39 Regiment and its expansion involve the move of some 930 Service personnel and their families to Kinloss, and 44 Service personnel and their families to Wittering.
The Royal Engineers also face the temporary loss of the M3 rigs, which are being put into extended readiness until 2015. The plan is to bring them back in full service after the Afghan effort is over, so 23 (Amphibious) Squadron of 28 Regiment RE should be safe, even with its main bit of kit being mothballed. It remains a bitter news, especially since the M3 was in action not later than 2003, ferrying elements of 3 Commando Brigade across the Shatt Al-Basrah waterway during Operation TELIC.
- 43 Close Support Squadron RLC will move from Gütersloh in Germany to Abingdon in Oxfordshire to colocate with its parent regiment (12 Logistic Support Regiment) by the end of January 2012. This will affect around 120 Service personnel and their families.
This is likely the end of the "soft" announcements. Save for 25 Engineer Regiment, this Tranche of transfers was painless, but this is highly unlikely to continue, as it is expected that a good share of the battalions currently based in Germany won't be exactly transferred, but more disbanded. The next tranches are very likely to be a lot less pleasant announcements.
Apparently unchanged is the plan for Operation Borona, which is about getting 1 Signals Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade re-deployed from Germany to RAF Cosford, near Stafford, by 2014. 1 Signals Brigade HQ relocated in the UK from Germany in 2010, and is now co-located with HQ ARRC at Gloucester. 7, 16 and 22 Signals Regiments are to follow and move to Stafford.
The Royal Signals will change considerably:
- 7th Signal Regiment; it will disband by 31 July 2012 , following its commitment to supporting the IJC headquarters in Afghanistan.
- 209 Signals Squadron, part of 19 Light Brigade, in early 2013 as the brigade itself disbands
- 2nd Signals Brigade; it will disband around the end of 2012 as its role in supporting the Olympics comes to an end. The units currently in the brigade will move to be under command of the remaining two signal (1st and 11th) brigades, but the plan for the transfer and eventual disbandment of some of the regiments has not yet been completed.
- The Unified System Support Organisation (USSO) became 15th Signal Regiment (Information Support) in September.
- The one-star Signal Officer in Chief post will cease to exist in March 2012. Responsibilities for producing Command Support and EW doctrine and strategy, setting training requirements, designing the Corps’ structures, and integrating and trialling new equipment capabilities will move to HQ Land Forces under a ‘Capability Director’ (which will be, initially, the current one-star Signal Officer in Chief), and join up with similar functions supporting Intelligence, as well as taking on new tasks, including equipment requirement setting. As part of that process the Royal Signals have already taken the Command and Control Development Centre (C2DC) under command. A new post, the "RE Corps Colonel" will be created and he or she will be the head of the serving Corps, with specific responsibilities for ethos, support to recruiting, support to the Military Secretary and the APC, the retired Corps and the wider family, benevolence and operational support, heritage and the Museum. It will be the connection between the Capability Director within HQ Land and the RE force.
Interestingly, the Capability Directorate initiative seems to be cancelling a post, to create two in its place. Not exactly what i expected. Hopefully, it'll work well enough to justify the change.
Project AVANTI also delivered news:
As planned, the three UK regional divisional headquarters in Edinburgh, Shrewsbury and Aldershot will be replaced by a single 2-stars structure, the "Headquarters Support Command", to stand up in Aldershot.
The new HQ Support Command in Aldershot will begin operation in January 2012 when HQ 4th Division in Aldershot will disband.
HQ 2nd Division in Edinburgh and HQ 5th Division in Shrewsbury will both disband by April 2012, although some tasks will continue until at least August 2012 when HQ Support Command should be fully operational.
Despite the closure of HQ 2nd Division in Edinburgh, the Army will retain a General Officer Commanding (GOC) Scotland with the minimum of staff, which maintains the level of senior representation in Scotland to oversee the rebasing changes.
In addition, the Army intends to relocate HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division, currently based in Germany, to Scotland by 2020, which would take over the GOC Scotland role.
The ten regional brigade headquarters and HQ London District will begin restructuring in January 2012 which will be completed by 31 March 2013. The Project Avanti restructuring proposals should save £19m in terms of military and civilian post reductions.
When the SDSR was published, it was announced that at least two regional brigades HQ would be eliminated, but this was lately denied by the announcements last July, which stated:
Savings at the brigade level will now be made through structural changes to each of the ten regional Brigade HQ’s and to HQ London District, together with their supporting structures, rather than closing individual brigade HQ as identified in the SDSR.In theory, all 10 Regional Brigade HQs and London District should survive, even if with substantial differences. We will see.
In the meanwhile, minister Peter Luff has also delivered a speech to the Modern Infantry Conference and Exhibition at Bisley in Surrey. Not without elements of interests and good general points, but as too often happens with these speeches, he gives very little concrete indications about anything at all relating to the future of the British Army infantry formations.
At least, he confirms that later this month the first of a planned 35 Foxhound vehicles destined for training will arrive, with the first operational batch going in Afghanistan next year.
After the speech, he talked to reporters presents, and said that FRES SV will be "perfectly affordable" and that it fits the requirement for adaptability perfectly. It remains a fundamental part of the future army.
On the retention of Afghanistan UORs, he stressed that the UK will have to "make the most efficient use of the vehicles' left over that were developed as UORs, even though the downside of them 'becomes clear post-war, as they were procured for the war, not a war".
In the last few months, Mastiff was reportedly in first line for long-term confirmation, and there are expectations about Jackal as well, ever since officers of the Army announced that the Brigade Recce Regiments are set to have 2 Armoured Squadrons (with FRES) and one "Light" Squadron with wheeled patrol vehicles "open", to make it easier to relate with locals.
The description, and experience of the current shape of Recce Forces in Afghan ops, suggest that said vehicle will be the Jackal, eventually with a long term replacement in the better-protected Fire Support variant of the Foxhound.
Foxhound itself that is already considered Core, and not UOR, and for which there are expectations for at least another order, for further 200 vehicles.
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
The Wildcat at sea and the Year of the 45
Lyme Bay, on Monday November 7 2011, at Noon precisely.
As reported by Navy News, an AW159 Wildcat from 700W Naval Air Squadron touches down on RFA Argus's huge flight deck. It's the first time, for the Wildcat, which represents the future of the busiest flying squadron of the UK, 815 Naval Air Squadron.
The deck landing is the first in a long series of trials which will see Wildcat cleared to operate on all classes of Royal Navy and RFA ships in all theatres of the world. In January 2013 the first Wildcat will arrive at Yeovilton, allowing the 700W squadron to establish how aircrews will operate the helicopter on deployment.
700W (Wildcat) will also work to prepare the training courses which, from January 2014, will take place at 702 NAS, the OCU Squadron of the Lynx fleet, which will manage the conversion to the new helicopter and prepare crews for it along its life. From there, the qualified fliers will move to the front-line Lynx squadron, 815 NAS, with the first Wildcat expected to deploy in 2015.
Meanwhile, for the Navy, the next year will be the "year of the 45", as all three the first Type 45 in service will have their maiden deployment, starting with HMS Daring, which has just completed two months in the hands of the team from the Flag Officer Sea Training, specialists who prepare the entire Fleet for all eventualities when deployed around the globe.
FOST put the ship to the test, and Navy News covers it with some beautiful images.
As reported by Navy News, an AW159 Wildcat from 700W Naval Air Squadron touches down on RFA Argus's huge flight deck. It's the first time, for the Wildcat, which represents the future of the busiest flying squadron of the UK, 815 Naval Air Squadron.
The deck landing is the first in a long series of trials which will see Wildcat cleared to operate on all classes of Royal Navy and RFA ships in all theatres of the world. In January 2013 the first Wildcat will arrive at Yeovilton, allowing the 700W squadron to establish how aircrews will operate the helicopter on deployment.
700W (Wildcat) will also work to prepare the training courses which, from January 2014, will take place at 702 NAS, the OCU Squadron of the Lynx fleet, which will manage the conversion to the new helicopter and prepare crews for it along its life. From there, the qualified fliers will move to the front-line Lynx squadron, 815 NAS, with the first Wildcat expected to deploy in 2015.
Meanwhile, for the Navy, the next year will be the "year of the 45", as all three the first Type 45 in service will have their maiden deployment, starting with HMS Daring, which has just completed two months in the hands of the team from the Flag Officer Sea Training, specialists who prepare the entire Fleet for all eventualities when deployed around the globe.
FOST put the ship to the test, and Navy News covers it with some beautiful images.
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