tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post7498890340831344161..comments2024-02-29T11:45:01.870+01:00Comments on UK Armed Forces Commentary: Towards the SDSR 2020Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comBlogger29125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-48522309605659693192020-07-09T19:56:39.397+02:002020-07-09T19:56:39.397+02:00Sorry, typo. That should obviously be Chinook. Sorry, typo. That should obviously be Chinook. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-13837284294455051122020-07-09T17:49:49.151+02:002020-07-09T17:49:49.151+02:00“Involve the RAF Apache and Puma squadrons” “Involve the RAF Apache and Puma squadrons” Trebor Sille https://www.blogger.com/profile/14323143143330804002noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-91022464350543877342019-12-28T20:11:06.430+01:002019-12-28T20:11:06.430+01:00Very thorough, thank you. With regards to LSS, if ...Very thorough, thank you. With regards to LSS, if this project does indeed come to fruition I can see it being a replacement for rather than in addition to the LPDs. If the future for the RM is maritime operations and raiding, will there still be a place for the traditional opposed landing role? My thinking is that the capabilities represented by the Albions, Bays and Argus could be replaced by 2 X LSS plus 2 x multi-role support ships of some type. So a reduction in hulls but more in keeping with how the force would be used in future. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-8033760682269393032019-12-26T23:58:02.220+01:002019-12-26T23:58:02.220+01:00Brigades, sorry. Brigades, sorry. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-44942362479215352882019-12-26T23:57:22.789+01:002019-12-26T23:57:22.789+01:00In no way it can ever be acceptable for the army t...In no way it can ever be acceptable for the army to have 4 acceptable combined arms battalions out of the budget and manpower it has. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-76557587201691079722019-12-26T23:24:13.531+01:002019-12-26T23:24:13.531+01:00Your implicit assumption seems to be that all thes...Your implicit assumption seems to be that all these battalions need to operate as part of a combined arms force. That's not the entire rationale for an army; countering peer and near-peer opponents is just one, albeit very important element. For example, how much artillery was needed on Op Banner a divisional sized operation sustained over three decades? Otherwise said, perhaps only ten battalions need supports?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-51857434416989194052019-12-26T22:38:09.333+01:002019-12-26T22:38:09.333+01:00Strike, for all i can see, is doing nothing of the...Strike, for all i can see, is doing nothing of the sort, however. They are trying to build a narrative around an Ajax and MIV marriage forced by the fact that Ajax is under contract now, and they can't shift that money towards something else...Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-12600950234172782152019-12-26T22:36:45.161+01:002019-12-26T22:36:45.161+01:00Because there are supports only for 10, and becaus...Because there are supports only for 10, and because to hang on to that many battalions they have been made individually as small and weak as they can be without being completely unworkable. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-25961461511386735382019-12-26T22:23:03.196+01:002019-12-26T22:23:03.196+01:00Don't understand why 31 battalions are absurd?...Don't understand why 31 battalions are absurd?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-77747580032324007262019-12-26T21:48:11.472+01:002019-12-26T21:48:11.472+01:00There's another, less negative, perspective. T...There's another, less negative, perspective. The RE and RA elements are there to allow the RM units to maneuver, they don't exist as of their own right. The demands for these enablers will go up and down depending on the model which the RM adopts (let's assume here that the recent RUSI report is a good in on what the RM/RN are thinking). Moreover the other recent RUSI report on fires said that it thought the RA had the wrong type of artillery. So if you were CGRM would you not work out what you needed, if you didn't have it you'd think hard how to get it and if in any area you had more than you thought you needed, or even if you judged you didn't need it anymore, might not you be tempted to give these up to spend on what you did need? In another service this is, to my mind, what the army are doing with their own Strike programme; going back to fundamentals, asking what they need to do, then how to do it, then experimenting and evolving as needed; drawing upon a deep collective knowledge of military operations, organization, analysis, engineering and logistics.J.T.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-3782857839966646412019-12-26T16:37:04.092+01:002019-12-26T16:37:04.092+01:00Adjust security policy and defense posture to neo-...Adjust security policy and defense posture to neo-Westphalian paradigm.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-58615461310682262542019-12-25T18:24:25.968+01:002019-12-25T18:24:25.968+01:00Need also to make sure that tiny deployments of in...Need also to make sure that tiny deployments of infantry "all over the place" are not just an excuse to hang on to an absurd 31 "battalions". Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-64548217266740095132019-12-25T18:23:37.763+01:002019-12-25T18:23:37.763+01:00I ran a whole series of articles in the past about...I ran a whole series of articles in the past about where the UK still is competitive on the world stage. Hint: it is not in mechanized land forces. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-57333467325029385352019-12-25T18:21:33.271+01:002019-12-25T18:21:33.271+01:00I fear it might well happen, but it would be a 201...I fear it might well happen, but it would be a 2010-level of stupidity. 3 Commando is one of the last few working brigades (minus...) the UK has. I don't want it to pay the price for the Army to hang on to its absurd force structure.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-47709756806362996252019-12-25T18:19:19.725+01:002019-12-25T18:19:19.725+01:00So long as it is sensible thought. You could say 2...So long as it is sensible thought. You could say 2010 was "radical". Unfortunately, it was also a pile of steaming bullshit. Nothing survived the test of actual implementation. Nothing. With the Royal Signals now abandoning Multi Role Signal Regiments for good, all reforms have failed. It's a record. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-82322183642025591442019-12-25T18:17:49.464+01:002019-12-25T18:17:49.464+01:00Let's hope so!Let's hope so!Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-60895283903808841792019-12-25T18:17:28.011+01:002019-12-25T18:17:28.011+01:00Thanks for reading and commenting!Thanks for reading and commenting!Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-6840609461306340942019-12-25T18:17:06.374+01:002019-12-25T18:17:06.374+01:00I think it is extremely unlikely there will ever b...I think it is extremely unlikely there will ever be a 138th british F-35, personally. Some very long term purchases are a possibility, but i wouldn't want the force build up for a handful of squadrons to stretch over too many decades... Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-5563137049407494122019-12-25T18:14:16.692+01:002019-12-25T18:14:16.692+01:00It was investigated and is doable. It would be a g...It was investigated and is doable. It would be a good investment, but for pure financial worries i've not included it among the big priorities. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-35572511619101140452019-12-25T18:13:28.116+01:002019-12-25T18:13:28.116+01:00Boxer C2 offers some more protection, but how much...Boxer C2 offers some more protection, but how much, at the end of the day? HQs will mostly be hunted by enemy artillery and air assets. These have so much firepower that if they find you, you are probably dead anyway. The HQ survivability depends on increasing its mobility, relaying on reach back and on fully mobile tactical cells. MRV-P, in this sense, might have an easier time "hiding" among other MRV-Ps which would be lower on the list of priorities for the enemy to hit. It is not so clear cut!Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-15624153339330533602019-12-24T15:16:48.189+01:002019-12-24T15:16:48.189+01:00If the RM are restyled as a raiding force allied t...If the RM are restyled as a raiding force allied to the LSS and other platforms, and working in the "grey zone" as it is called, might we see this as a justification for HMG to cut other areas of 3 Cdo Bde - namely 24 RE and 29 RA?<br /><br />I would imagine that the HQ unit 30 Cdo and the CLR would still be relevant, and of course the CHF and 47 Cdo.<br /><br />If the RM concentrate on raiding, what happens to the Northern Flank arctic role? Would 24 RE and 29 RA survive to enable this?<br /><br />Also. If 3 Cdo Bde does suffer these cuts like I suggest it might give the army the chance to bring 24 RE and 29 RA ( minus Meiktila battery ) back to the Field Army and use them as enablers for a proper Infantry Brigade in 1 UK that we know is sadly lacking. <br /><br />Daniele Mandellihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18001791149281832648noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-24180978531296856552019-12-23T16:29:14.045+01:002019-12-23T16:29:14.045+01:00Need clear, unambiguous defence doctrine. Clearly ...Need clear, unambiguous defence doctrine. Clearly understand the organisations for most likely and most demanding operations and how to minimise entropy moving from new organisational structure to TASKORGs these ops need, plus force recovery implications. Understand trade off between routinely forward deployed forces operating at/ on sub-conflict threshold and graduated readiness for war-fighting as fundamental consideration of force structure.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-49705329787825126862019-12-23T11:13:28.887+01:002019-12-23T11:13:28.887+01:00First need to work out UK foreign policy and secur...First need to work out UK foreign policy and security posture post-Brexit. What are the real threats to UK, and what's their centre of gravity? To what extent lean towards Europe? Who are likely to be really solid international partners? What's UK's defence posture, how much advanced forces and forward basing? What's the appetite for force protection versus agility? What are UK defence's strengths, how to really capitalise or them, how to minimise weaknesses and avoid reinforcing them? How much to emphasise UK industry? How much £ is there likely to be? While some core military capabilities will always be needed, one needs to work out the above before knowing how to build the force needed out to 15 to 20 years rather than the force that might look good now? True success may well look radically bold in some areas and radically uncomfortable in others.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-4417728923456591972019-12-22T18:44:27.731+01:002019-12-22T18:44:27.731+01:00Let's hope there is some fundamental and radic...Let's hope there is some fundamental and radical thought in the review and that it doesn't get knocked off course by the armchair-generals, -admirals or -air marshals populating the press and blogosphere.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-34415119181333367182019-12-22T07:10:19.648+01:002019-12-22T07:10:19.648+01:00Excellent post per usual. I hope it all happens as...Excellent post per usual. I hope it all happens as wished for.BUGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13003720267644530979noreply@blogger.com