tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post707625004803832297..comments2024-02-29T11:45:01.870+01:00Comments on UK Armed Forces Commentary: Informing, or justifying Army 2020…?Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comBlogger44125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-11227413676819035382013-02-02T04:07:43.635+01:002013-02-02T04:07:43.635+01:00You should be a part of a contest for one of the h...You should be a part of a contest for one of the highest quality sites on the web.<br />I am going to highly recommend this web site!<br /><i>Here is my blog post</i> :: <b><a href="http://www.makanna.com/blogs/9056/29922/immediate-solutions-for-ultimate" rel="nofollow">seo companies</a></b>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-32893712097003774812012-07-18T22:56:19.468+02:002012-07-18T22:56:19.468+02:00You still completely miss my point.
There is no ...You still completely miss my point. <br /><br />There is no blind faith. I am saying that you don't have all the facts but act like you do and criticise as such and that AW actually shows a healthy inclination to reflexivity, thought, experimentation and learning. My evidence for that is the existence of AW. <br /><br />I'd suggest getting a thicker skin, your article is after all available to be viewed by at least a billion potential readers. <br /><br />I apologise if I don't engage in the mutual backslapping.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-25927862723486897192012-07-18T22:49:08.937+02:002012-07-18T22:49:08.937+02:00You are starting to annoy me, sincerely, you know ...You are starting to annoy me, sincerely, you know that? <br />I do not agree with your reasoning. I find that it goes way too far in optimism, and while there are things i can relate with, your point remains based on hopes and assumptions. <br /><br />I might be focusing too much on what is there and too little on what is not shown, but you are doing the opposite, putting blind faith in what you -suppose- is there. <br /><br />As for your point about AW being good as a demonstration that thinking in the army is alive and well, i can agree to a degree. <br />It's surely better than nothing. <br /><br />But please, don't try and pass it as this great new shiny innovation. It is not. Doctrinal documents, studies and assessments come out all the time, and they rightly should. <br /><br />It is not like the Navy does not do its Future Maritime Operating Concept documents. They do publish "Navy visions" quite regularly, too. So, what? <br /><br />And here it ends.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-71227822265567972482012-07-18T22:40:43.710+02:002012-07-18T22:40:43.710+02:00"I cannot agree with it."
Then your pie..."I cannot agree with it."<br /><br />Then your piece is exactly what you accuse the Army of being.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-83305772144472229612012-07-18T22:39:18.981+02:002012-07-18T22:39:18.981+02:00"For example, the Army and RAF mastered close..."For example, the Army and RAF mastered close air support in Palestine using portable radios and so on with response times that haven't been bettered even today but we struggled with the concepts in Europe until well into WWII"<br /><br />Perhaps it has something to do with the far larger scale of ETO operations and the resulting massive increase in complexity. <br /><br />I think, when analysing the Army in 1939 you have to take into account that it was not until very late in the day, to be used on the continent and it was the poor step-sister of the three services because of the perceived power of the bomber in the inter war years. <br /><br />Once you take these into account it starts to make sense why it was not ready or fully equipped for continental warfare: few wanted it to be so used and others didn't think it useful in a major war.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-29338440758025750862012-07-18T22:36:53.562+02:002012-07-18T22:36:53.562+02:00As i've already said, you have your opinion. I...As i've already said, you have your opinion. I cannot agree with it.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-56167952305557384952012-07-18T22:34:41.082+02:002012-07-18T22:34:41.082+02:00"Unless you can accept the premise that indiv..."Unless you can accept the premise that individuals have the right to comment on issues and criticize even if they are not in full possession of every single fact, I cannot see that we can take this much further."<br /><br />I have never said this. You are missing the point. My point is to be taken seriously the analysis should take into account the data limitations. I have never said that nobody should criticise, but it should be done constructively and the comments qualified. <br /><br />"Gabby has every right to point out what he feels are weaknesses, inconsistencies and omissions in Army doctrine and policy."<br /><br />I never said he does not. I am saying his analysis is flawed.<br /><br />"There is plenty of things that, for a reason or another, and generally for lack of funding, are not working. Talking of them is indispensable."<br /><br />I agree. Reflexivity is vital. But I think you miss the point of AW and you have come to completely the wrong conclusions as a result. As I have said, you have done content analysis, not the analysis you think you have done.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-66480425874351825282012-07-18T22:07:24.552+02:002012-07-18T22:07:24.552+02:00Indeed, i accept (and i hope) that thinking goes m...Indeed, i accept (and i hope) that thinking goes much further than we are shown in open source documents. <br />However, i cannot avoid noting a series of things that simply do not make sense. <br />It is not wholly because of the Army (or the Navy, or Air Force, it is not like it doesn't happen with them), it is not without reasons either, but all the same, it cannot go under silence. <br /><br />There is plenty of things that, for a reason or another, and generally for lack of funding, are not working. Talking of them is indispensable.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-77900024546660505832012-07-18T22:03:55.778+02:002012-07-18T22:03:55.778+02:00Bomber Command, bloody hell, best steer clear of t...Bomber Command, bloody hell, best steer clear of that one :)<br /><br />One thing that I think isn't particularly well explored and it is something I would like to read more about is the difference between the home and away areas of the three forces in the interwar years.<br /><br />For example, the Army and RAF mastered close air support in Palestine using portable radios and so on with response times that haven't been bettered even today but we struggled with the concepts in Europe until well into WWII<br /><br />Hindsight is a wonderful tool !!Think Defencehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14674093099627997373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-30095049490157187212012-07-18T22:01:27.630+02:002012-07-18T22:01:27.630+02:00@Anonymous (and Gabriele if he wants to join in)
...@Anonymous (and Gabriele if he wants to join in)<br /><br />Anonymous<br /><br />Unless you can accept the premise that individuals have the right to comment on issues and criticize even if they are not in full possession of every single fact, I cannot see that we can take this much further. Voters are not in possession of all the facts when they vote at elections but that does not alter the fact that they should be able to point to and say what they think about issues. It’s a recognized part of democracy.<br /><br />Gabby has every right to point out what he feels are weaknesses, inconsistencies and omissions in Army doctrine and policy. He has been specific in mentioning mistakes made by the Army over equipment, for instance, in an earlier post in this thread (concerning Light Mortar, Springer, Snatch Vixen, Vector etc.) Just imagine what it would have been like if journalists and politicians (some far from being in possession of ALL the facts) had kept silent about that lot of appalling decisions.<br /><br />I would agree with you, though, that generally the Army has had a poor press in recent times. In some circles they got the blame for the debacle called FRES, the accusation being that they were unable to make up their minds. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Politicians, specifically those in the previous administration, were to blame, saying money was available at one moment, then suddenly withdrawing it, so that the Army just did not know where it was. I do not doubt either for one moment the sheer volume of work that went into producing something like the Army 2020 policy. People were no doubt poring over their desks and in meetings for unconscionably long hours to produce such decisions. Moreover, I do not doubt the immense expertise our top Army officers have and they have made many fine decisions in recent times, not least over Army 2020, which makes the very best of a rotten hand. <br /><br /><br />I think one of the main thrusts in Gabby’s arguments over recent posts concerns the “open contradictions” he mentions between the Army’s stated intentions and their actual decisions and actions. The example he gives in another post on the Future Land Operating Concept concerning the statement that closer attention would be paid to CBRN at the same time as retiring the best CBRN vehicle available, the Fuchs, makes the point admirably. There is a kind of mental dislocation, an Orwellian doublethink, taking place in such contradictions between statements produced for the public and what is actually happening!<br /><br />I’ll have to leave it there, I’m afraid.MikeWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-25964562307459135492012-07-18T21:55:29.610+02:002012-07-18T21:55:29.610+02:00TD
I don't absolve the Army entirely. As I sa...TD<br /><br />I don't absolve the Army entirely. As I said, knowledge will atrophy for a variety of reasons that Organisational Learning theories are trying to get to grips with. Not least, not needing to use it doesn't help.<br /><br />I think the thinking was there, there's plenty of contemporary literature to show that there was no dearth of good concepts.<br /><br />That the Army failed to harness the potential in the same way as the Germans managed to (with equal amounts of luck and pluck) I think is down to the factors I mention: natural atrophy, lack of resources and a lack of time. The kernel was there in the BEF and there was the institutional desire to create more armoured divisions, indeed there was a proposal for the BEF to be entirely made up of armoured divisions much like a German Panzer Corps, but there was simply no money and no tanks. <br /><br />Anyway, I think we broadly agree, the Army might have done things differently. But you can't get away from the fact that the Army was simply the equivalent to a side arm in the thinking at the time, the real weapon was Bomber Command.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-38089755756068809672012-07-18T21:49:08.702+02:002012-07-18T21:49:08.702+02:00"All you're saying is, without any basis,..."All you're saying is, without any basis, that you assume that there are work concepts in private."<br /><br />There is a basis. The basis is that this data is somewhere. Unless you have evidence that someone or a group have pulled this out of their arses in the Mess over Port then there are reams and reams of data and analysis. <br /><br />"and the documents the army has released ignore/hide the problems."<br /><br />As I said, you're criticising a document but acting like it represents the sum of thinking and knowledge. <br /><br />"But this is the same army that retired the Platoon light mortar as obsolete only to have to urgently reintroduce it."<br /><br />So what? The Army made a change, a completely miniscule one, learned it was not appropriate in the context, and reversed that decision. This is a sign of a healthy, thinking and relfexive organisation. It experimented and the result was found unsuitable. By your logic and accusations they should still be ignoring and denying that they ever made a subsequently poor decision. If you want an Army to evolve and adapt changes need to be made, if you expect it to get it right 100% of the time then you don't know what you're talking about. <br /><br />"Should i continue?"<br /><br />If you want but I don't see how it refutes my point that you're fulminating about a document. You're doing content analysis. <br /><br />I have explained to you the good points:<br /><br />(a) AW shows the Army is trying to retain relevant institutional knowledge and assessing its relevance and experimenting. These are symptoms of an organisation that is primed to learn and to look forward, not atrophy.<br /><br />(b) The Army has made some decisions that were bad, turned out to be bad or were forced to make, in all cases these have been corrected which again shows a healthy organisation. You experiment, you innovate, not all of it will work. Exercises like AW assist that experimentation and innovation by providing evidence as much for what should be done as for confirming that what is being done is right. <br /><br />You criticise the document but miss its actual significance, that it is evidence of exactly the opposite kind of institution you think the Army is - experimental, innovative, evidence based, forward thinking, healthily conservative. <br /><br />Do they get it right all the time? <br /><br />Do they f*ck. <br /><br />But they get it right a lot of the time.<br /><br />Is the Army perfectly innovative, perfectly experimental, perfectly evidence based?<br /><br />Of course not.<br /><br />No organisation manned by mortal men in the context of society will be.<br /><br />I say this to show that I am not some sycophant, the Army can be criticised, but it is not the organisation you think it is from a weak document analysis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-74960973635748603332012-07-18T21:32:02.205+02:002012-07-18T21:32:02.205+02:00The post war journey from the 100 days offensive t...The post war journey from the 100 days offensive to Dunkirk is a fascinating one to study and as you say, no single factor but I don't think we can completely absolve the Army of any blame and just pin it on industrial or financial issues.<br /><br />The main point, that Agile Warrior and Army 2020 represent a serious attempt at innovating on one hand and preserving the basics of combined arms manoeuvre whilst operating within the political, financial and arguably 'cap badge' political constraints that are a simple fact of life is spot onThink Defencehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14674093099627997373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-42142456391279174492012-07-18T21:22:42.569+02:002012-07-18T21:22:42.569+02:00The question is why were we like we were in 1939?
...The question is why were we like we were in 1939?<br /><br />Organisations lose knowledge over time if it is not used or part of a routine, as we probably both know. There is plenty of research on it. <br /><br />That the infrastructure as it were for conventional combined arms warfare atrophied to an extent during the inter war period is not a surprise. Indeed, this shows what a valuable tool AW is, it represents attempts to maintain institutional knowledge that we are not using at the moment by using hypothetical scenarios on an institutional basis, this is innovative relatively speaking - a lot of organisations fail to do this. That the Army is doing it is evidence for deep thinking and practical bent. But I digress from my point which is:<br /><br />Was it a dearth of intellectual mass that saw us some steps behind the Germans in integrating combined arms formations or a dearth of industrial capacity and resources to actually put it into practise? There were very real re-armament problems in the 1930s that physically limited us despite aspirations otherwise. <br /><br />I think that it was all of these things, some knowledge atrophied but there was also not the physical means to equip our forces in the necessitated manner - there were plans for several armoured divisions but not the money or the tanks for them. Also, the German combined arms superiority I think is a bit of a myth and is mainly explained by their aggression at the operational level and the allies allowing the strategic German strength to be arrayed against their strategic weakness. Whenever the Germans hit serious defences they conducted WWI style actions with the difference that radio's and motor vehicles finally allowed tactical and operational success to be exploited at a strategic level.As I was Sayinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14759930522440987521noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-91706470501318323382012-07-18T20:54:15.566+02:002012-07-18T20:54:15.566+02:00Anon, with you on most of your comments but would ...Anon, with you on most of your comments but would disagree about the WWII armoured vehicle piece. At the end of WWI the Army was the epitome of an all arms manoeuvre force at the cutting edge but then proceeded to squander some of that hard won institutional knowledge in the interwar period. Not all of it, as you say, we were in trucks, the Germans still using hay but that does not mean were weren't eclipsed by overall, the facts I would say, tend to speak for themselves. <br /><br />Look at how we treated Percy Hobart, a classic case of institutional inertia.<br /><br />I am nitpicking though, thought your overall response was bang onThink Defencehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14674093099627997373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-17439749049561083942012-07-18T19:55:11.237+02:002012-07-18T19:55:11.237+02:00Neither should experimentation be done for the sak...Neither should experimentation be done for the sake of it or for the novelty of it. <br /><br />Evolution not revolution. Revolutionaries tend to crash and burn.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-1484319020858457582012-07-18T19:14:45.869+02:002012-07-18T19:14:45.869+02:00If that's just it, the fundamentals are pretty...If that's just it, the fundamentals are pretty much the same from many, many years. This does not mean that approaches are and/or should be the same ones.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-18834273512943021222012-07-18T19:09:43.812+02:002012-07-18T19:09:43.812+02:00All you're saying is, without any basis, that ...All you're saying is, without any basis, that you assume that there are work concepts in private. <br /><br />My reply is: maybe and hopefully there are. But as a matter of fact there are no programs assessing the problems i'm underlining, and the documents the army has released ignore/hide the problems. <br /><br />It might well be that some of my criticism is excessive "cruel", so to speak. <br />But this is the same army that retired the Platoon light mortar as obsolete only to have to urgently reintroduce it. <br />The same that removed the GPMG from the section, then put it in Platoon level maneuver support squads, then tried to remove it again, then in Afghanistan had to put it back in sections again, and when not in sections then in Fire Support Groups at Company level at the very least. <br /><br />It is the army that selected that utter disaster that is Springer, the same that after Bosnia retired the excellent (for the time) route clearance solutions it had developed, only to regret it in Afghanistan and Iraq. <br /><br />The same army that for years tried to tell people that Snatch Vixen was, really, fine. <br />The same army that put together that half abort that is the Vector "protected" vehicle. <br /><br />Should i continue? <br /><br />I cannot criticize what i do not know or see. I criticize what the army let us know. <br />If i assumed that, really, in secret they are thinking about it, surely, it is all fine, i would never say a thing. <br /><br />I'm sorry, but i just cannot agree with your reasoning.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-27006549750307406992012-07-18T18:05:18.222+02:002012-07-18T18:05:18.222+02:00And besides, the fundamentals of warfare remained ...And besides, the fundamentals of warfare remained precisely the same as in WWI, however certain aspects of the offensive were enhanced and which meant more freedom in certain environments. In other words, WWII was no different from WWI accept the offensive could now finally potentially exploit success.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-88543720154631492292012-07-18T18:02:31.178+02:002012-07-18T18:02:31.178+02:00"is the view that somehow the Army, because i..."is the view that somehow the Army, because it is party to knowledge that it would be imprudent/unsafe to release to the public, therefore automatically knows best."<br /><br />That is not at all what I said. I said the Army has access to more data, specifically the data that underlies its conclusions in the document. I would bet the farm that ten minutes with anyone behind the thinking in that document would answer most of the questions here. <br /><br />Gabbie in my mind assumes that because something is not in the document, it does not exist as a work stream or a concept, he appears to be assuming that the Army has a gaping hole in its approach. Again I would bet the farm that at no point would anyone go "wow, hang on a minute we hadn't thought of that", they might go "we are working on it" or the "details are not public domain" but I would doubt very much that there are the enormous gaps in knowledge Gabbie accuses the Army of having. Certainly, there are gaps in the document, which is why I believe his article is content analysis masquerading as an analysis of the data underlying the conclusions. <br /><br />"However, the Army has, rightly or wrongly, down through the ages, acquired a bit of a reputation for “fighting the last war” (a phrase very evident in WWII)"<br /><br />The fact is, nobody knows how the Army will be engaged, anyone who says he knows is a liar and a fantasist. The Army only has that reputation in the eyes of people who have not thought these things through. The Army entered WWII with an expeditionary force far larger than WWI and which was ahead of all its peers in being completely mechanised and it was integrated with air support. That it didn't possess a suitable mass of tanks is more down to the industrial limitations of the country which affected the entire re-armament process. <br /><br />"its intellectual core does not have a monopoly on military wisdom."<br /><br />No it does not, but it does have a monopoly on the data behind the document in question.<br /><br />"I fail to see that the Army (or any other institution in national life, come to that) should be immune from criticism. "<br /><br />I never said they should be immmune from criticism. But the criticism must be constructive and informed if it is to be worth anything. <br /><br />"I happen to believe that Gabriele does do his research pretty deeply."<br /><br />Then he is being disingenuous here and analysing the document like it is the sum of knowledge and criticising gaps in the document as if they were gaps in thinking. None of us writing on here as far as I know, is privvy to the data that would enable a proper analysis. Which is fine, but what isn't fine is writing as if you are.<br /><br />"Incidentally, when you state: “Sometimes lessons need to be ‘re-affirmed’ and ‘re-evaluated.’”, there is a direct contradiction between those two terms, isn’t there? Did you mean ‘re-affirmed’ OR ‘re-evaluated.”?"<br /><br />I meant precisely what I said. Previous lessons need to be re-evaluated and in so doing they may be re-affirmed which is just as important when there is intellectual pressure to be radical for the sake of it and a believe that the Army doesn't know how to fight the next war. The Army has no more idea of the next war than anyone else, which is why we are maintaining a core fighting force able to operate across the entire spectrum of likely operations at divisional level.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-90443281052161134442012-07-18T14:29:54.170+02:002012-07-18T14:29:54.170+02:00@Anonymous
“It seems the Army just can't win....@Anonymous<br /><br />“It seems the Army just can't win. Never revolutionary enough for the internet fan boi's”<br /><br />I can understand your point of view but only to a certain extent. Although you do acknowledge that “There's nothing wrong with criticism”, what does come across strongly from your comments is the view that somehow the Army, because it is party to knowledge that it would be imprudent/unsafe to release to the public, therefore automatically knows best.<br /><br />“Especially when every fool and his dog believes that the Army is stuck in the past, isn't radical enough”<br /><br />There is something in this. I do remember standing up at a British Army roadshow a couple of years ago and asking a question about whether the Army was shifting too hurriedly and in too wholesale a fashion, over to COIN warfare (in terms of its equipment etc.) and not paying enough attention to preparation for more conventional, high intensity combat (i.e. I was recommending caution – suggesting that it be more conservative, more reactionary, if you like.) However, the Army has, rightly or wrongly, down through the ages, acquired a bit of a reputation for “fighting the last war” (a phrase very evident in WWII) and its intellectual core does not have a monopoly on military wisdom. In fact, there have been numerous occasions when its critics have been pulled back from civilian life to right deficiencies in its thinking or planning (General Sir Percy Hobart of D-Day fame is just one example).<br /><br />I fail to see that the Army (or any other institution in national life, come to that) should be immune from criticism. Well-informed criticism even if it is from individual outside the Armed Forces, should be recognized as such. I happen to believe that Gabriele does do his research pretty deeply. As he says, “ I refuse to say that all is fine the way it is. So I criticize. And I do make some pretty specific observations, backed by as much hard evidence as possible.” <br /><br />Personally, I found Army 2020 quite an elegant solution to the problems the Army faces. General Sir Nick Carter is a very able officer indeed. That does not mean, however, that I found “Agile Warrior 2012” anything other than vague and general.<br /><br />As you say, parts of it will no doubt have been “watered down and redacted and presented for mass consumption.” But, like Gabriele, I did not find find much that was innovative in it.<br /><br />Incidentally, when you state: “Sometimes lessons need to be ‘re-affirmed’ and ‘re-evaluated.’”, there is a direct contradiction between those two terms, isn’t there? Did you mean ‘re-affirmed’ OR ‘re-evaluated.”?MikeWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-8151854883587291062012-07-18T01:09:55.757+02:002012-07-18T01:09:55.757+02:00Your opinions aren't very rigorous if you can&...Your opinions aren't very rigorous if you can't see that all you've done is a content analysis of a document but written up as if you have access to the underlying data. There's nothing wrong with criticism but I think you're misfiring in this article.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-646803414289571532012-07-18T00:57:57.247+02:002012-07-18T00:57:57.247+02:00Ok, we are not going anywhere with this. Keep your...Ok, we are not going anywhere with this. Keep your opinion, i'm going to keep mine.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-71774938577068233312012-07-18T00:55:17.631+02:002012-07-18T00:55:17.631+02:00Come off it you have no idea of the true extent of...Come off it you have no idea of the true extent of the data available to the decision makers, you don't even know how they came to the conclusions they have in the document. Again fine, but again you write as if there are no such limitations on your knowledge which is disingenuous. <br /><br />As for Officers speaking out, the Army does not exist in a political vacuum and do not forget that it is completely and entirely subordinate to Parliament and HMG therefore there very well should be careful consideration as to what they say in the service. They are the servants and that is constitutional fact. I again doubt very much that men who have served to lead for 30 plus years are quite the push overs in private you think they are.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-89622511185283459312012-07-18T00:43:48.489+02:002012-07-18T00:43:48.489+02:00It is questionable how much of the "data"...It is questionable how much of the "data" is actually not available. <br /><br />And i do not question the officer's knowledge of the trade, i question a very evident flattening of their voice on the government's position that prevents them from saying and doing what they probably see as actually necessary. <br />Then, when they become FORMER officers, they come out with open criticism, often quite severe. <br /><br />We all see it happening. You see it too, if you follow defence matters anywhere near as much as i do. <br /><br />The officers should very much have greater courage when they are serving, not wait to speak when they are out of the door.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.com