tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post6924171456489506030..comments2024-02-29T11:45:01.870+01:00Comments on UK Armed Forces Commentary: Trying to correct Army 2020 Refine Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comBlogger50125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-55964791362681106342018-02-15T23:19:17.567+01:002018-02-15T23:19:17.567+01:00Reduction in the numbers of Armd Inf Bn is a huge ...Reduction in the numbers of Armd Inf Bn is a huge mistake (especially when they are talking about replacing them with Masstiff). <br /><br />I would ensure that there is the equivalent of 2 MLRS Regts (2 Btys could be permanently detached to the 2 Armd Inf Bdes). <br /><br />The idea behind the Strike Bdes follows the Op Serval/Styker experience. Lighter, more strategically and operationally mobile, rapidly moving forces that could act as flank & rear protection, exploitation in the peer environment. It could also undertake combat ops in potentially near peer/lower level/PSO/COIN/low intensity environment. That concept is sound. What isn’t sound is the Strike idea of 1/2 tracked - it completely defeats the whole purpose. Ajax has no business being in the Strike Bdes, a wheeled recce vehicle (would 40mm cover it? Bigger would be better but note Styker/105mm experience). Experience shows that HMGs & GMGs won’t cut it but themselves and at least some min 30mm’s will be required. <br /><br />They are a tool in the box and realistically they would be replaced by a single Armd Inf Bde. They are intended to do the jobs which Armd Inf are too slow/unsuitable for. Consider them a Mech Inf Bde. <br /><br />The amount of infantry in both the Armd Inf & Strike Bdes isn’t enough, at least 3 are required. They need a 155mm either wheeled SP or towed. <br /><br />The Light Cav Regts could be useful security for the Strike Bdes. <br /><br />I would suggest that the whole point of this plan is that the British Army will be incapable of undertaking Bde sized enduring ops so the Government has another reason why they can’t be (it will be BG only). Hope that makes sense?<br /><br />The proposed SIBs are intended to operate in the soft power/influence/OMLT type tasks, that in itself isn’t a bad idea. However, they cannot be considered combat units. In my opinion, they need to be self sufficient with force protection, engineering, signals, medical etc. For that reason, and the rotation reason, I would give serious consideration to forming an all arms light infantry Bde (with access to Mastiff, Foxhound and Jackal depending on the op). <br /><br />I agree that structures are vital (not cap badge and senior officer retention) but equipment is also very important. All arms combat capability is essential. I also agree that 3 Cdo Bde and 16 Air Aslt Bde need to be independently all arms capable. I wouldn’t organise a 2nd Division, unless the politicians are selling to resource it as a full all arms capable formation if they aren’t it’s pointless. <br /><br />You also need a Logs Bde for the Division and possibly a 2nd Logs Bde for Force/Theatre support. Micknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-23533234814995909032017-08-12T12:34:50.187+02:002017-08-12T12:34:50.187+02:00Basically, blind hope in airpower for any serious ...Basically, blind hope in airpower for any serious scenario and fantasy for out of area operations. And even more fantasy in terms of sustaining the effort while having nothing of what is required. I just cannot agree with a single word. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-8865275806122509652017-08-12T12:27:01.223+02:002017-08-12T12:27:01.223+02:00Well I disagree that it's a stupid force struc...Well I disagree that it's a stupid force structure, although with more resources (i.e. money and people) no doubt improvements could be made. The 1 in 5 roulement was a product of a former policy to be able to sustain an enduring brigade sized operation indefinately, while remaining within harmony guidelines for deployed troops. This is no longer the case, and if it became necessary then the army would surely look to restructure/ regenerate/ re-roll other units in time to ensure any fifth deployable brigade needed. Calling 77 Bde a brigade is I grant you a bit eye-brow raising; although there are precedents for having brigades with only hundreds of troops (e.g WW1 artillery). I expect that when the information manoeuvre command stands up its GOC will will take a long hard look at the formations under his command, and reorganise if assessed as needed. Well what would a strike brigade be useful for? Assuming that it's not facing a highly advanced armoured threat (i.e. ops in the non-NATO area), then any enemy heavy armour is likely to be dealt with in very short order by UK/ coalition air power (Typhoon with Brimstone, AH-64 or other allied air), hence it's difficult to see the need for heavy armour in that case. Ajax will give much better mobility over difficult terrain (compared to Warrior, FV432, Challenger 2). Its 40mm CTA is considerably better than higher calibre conventional alternatives, hence it can be used not only to carry out both traditonal cavalry tasks (screen, deep recce etc.) but also to take ground; i.e. together with its better tactical mobility it should therefore presumably give greater firepower over a greater suface area of the battlefield. In terms of the protected mobility/ MIV infantry battalions I expect that they would be used for support, security and holding ground tasks (albeit not with the same difficult ground mobility capabilities as Ajax). What type of operations would these be useful for? Well I expect most campaigns outside those of NATO territory. What might the 'review of the review' bring? Well I guess if it reassesses the NATO/ non-NATO territorial defence balance then one might possibly just see a readjustment towards dealing with higher intensity peer competitors (clearly the heavy armour would be needed in the case of an advanced armour threat). That might of course have implications for force structure and equipment (and one certainly can't rule out something along the lines you propose). Penultimately I notice that RUSI has recently published a paper on the logistics implications of Strike brigades: https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/british-army-transition-army-2020-strike-brigades-and-logistics-future . Finally, no force structure will ever be perfect or cover all eventualities, and I certainly can't rule out your proposals. My view continues to be however that the 2 Strike + 2 Armoured Infantry brigade model strikes a reasonable balance between the campaigns which one is more likely to undertake and the lower likelihood higher end operations which one sincerely hopes the UK (and NATO) will never need to fight.J.Tnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-82476169603503093272017-07-29T16:01:37.466+02:002017-07-29T16:01:37.466+02:00It fails to live up to basic common sense. Stated ...It fails to live up to basic common sense. Stated policy, you can always appear to meet, considering that this is the same army that calls "brigade" an organization (77 Brigade) that hovers at around 400 men in total. <br /><br />Biggest problem of Army 2020 is that it fails to deliver even a single brigade in acceptable state of completition. Armoured Brigades have a deficit of tanks and completely lack a reconnaissance cavalry element; all brigades have just 2 battalions of infantry and the Army no longer has the supports to maintain a 1 in 5 tournation to sustain an enduring brigade-sized operation abroad, despite having "6 infantry brigades" which are essentially a regular reserve of infantrymen devoid of any organic support, aka false brigades. <br /><br />It ranks pretty high on the list of the stupidest force structures ever designed. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-12590931838604844742017-07-29T11:38:03.039+02:002017-07-29T11:38:03.039+02:00Indulge me then. In your view what particular aspe...Indulge me then. In your view what particular aspects of UK government policy does Army 2020 Refine fail to deliver on?J.Tnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-66536201477306720852017-07-27T16:03:40.749+02:002017-07-27T16:03:40.749+02:00The Army has more manpower than RN and RAF combine...The Army has more manpower than RN and RAF combined, so it is not entirely surprising or weird that their annual budget is so much larger. Still, it means that they also tend to get asked for savings. The RN annual budget, excluding procurement, is in the order of 2 billions or so. Not too much scope for cutting there, by now. <br /><br />Equipment share of procurement for the next ten years sees Air Command winning with over 32 billio, Navy 31, Army around 29. The perception of the Navy being disproportionately ahead of the others comes from the expenditure tied to the SSBN and maintenance of the nuclear deterrent, but that is literally managed by a different Top Level Budget Holder. It is a responsibility more than a benefit. The Navy has paid a big price for Polaris and then for Trident. <br /><br />You will find more data and more considerations in my newest article, published today. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-8730451552051319552017-07-27T15:58:49.311+02:002017-07-27T15:58:49.311+02:00Many thanks for that honest and interesting reply....Many thanks for that honest and interesting reply. I suppose I should take some consolation from the fact that you say: “I do not expect it to be good, but I do not expect the "headline-making" commitments to shift, either.”<br /><br />You are of course quite right to say that “the vast majority of the programmes in the Equipment Plan are obscure in timelines, targets, budgets and exact position within the plan. . . . . ./ . . . We have to expect a lot of the changes to take place in these dark areas. Which does not mean it doesn't hurt, but it means it can be hidden to a great extent.”<br /><br />I did not know that the Army’s yearly budget was greater than the sum of RAF and RN budgets for the same period. I suppose that my response has been shaped by the fact that Royal Navy and RAF’s acquisitions in terms of major, expensive equipment always seem more impressive than those of the British Army. Just think of the new Aircraft carriers, F35 JSFs, Astute class submarines, Type 45s (fairly recent), Type 26s, Wave and Tide class tankers etc. for the Royal Navy and the new F35s, A400M Atlas s, RC-135W Rivet Joints, Voyagers, Reapers etc. for the RAF.<br /><br />However, the “sizeable chunk of money over the next ten years for (Army) procurement” does seem to hold out some promise. I have also come round to the idea that the Strike Brigades concept should be postponed until the organization of them can be done properly, although, perhaps paradoxically, I do believe that Army does need a wheeled vehicle something like the MIV, even if only procured in smaller numbers.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-19687400701803481622017-07-26T22:25:01.983+02:002017-07-26T22:25:01.983+02:00The only honest response is that i do not know how...The only honest response is that i do not know how bad it will be. I do not expect it to be good, but i do not expect the "headline-making" committments to shift, either. <br />I think that very few, if any, know, at this stage, the extent of the problem and where new cuts will bite. These news reports always focus on the (relatively few) big-ticket items in the equipment budget, because they are literally the only ones we know something about. The vast majority of the programmes in the Equipment Plan are obscure in timelines, targets, budgets and exact position within the plan. Entire programmes can vanish or be moved years into the future without us on the outside knowing much of anything about it. We have to expect a lot of the changes to take place in these dark areas. Which does not mean it doesn't hurt, but it means it can be hidden to a great extent. <br /><br />As for the savings being sought from the army first of all, it is kind of to be expected. Its yearly budget is greater than the sum of RAF and RN budgets for the same period. And they do still get a sizeable chunk of money over the next ten years for procurement, too, although the confusion in planning is making it look like nothing at all is progressing in any way. <br /><br />I've been told that the STRIKE experimentation has been put on hold. I don't know whether to believe it or not, but i wouldn't be surprised if it was. MIV is very, very vulnerable as it is not a project most of the public is immediately aware of, and it is not tied to any sunk money or signed contract. It has yet to get moving, and this means that making it vanish is still easy to do. MRV-P too, to an extent. Apache, for example, not. Don't think we'll see cuts there unless it gets really ugly: too much visibility in there. <br /><br />We'll have to wait and see. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-71756017340805478822017-07-26T22:12:08.489+02:002017-07-26T22:12:08.489+02:00From MikeW:
I wondered whether you’ve read the r...From MikeW: <br /><br />I wondered whether you’ve read the report on the “Defense News” website headed: “UK launches new Strategic Defence and Security Review” (today Wednesday 26th July).<br /><br />I know that you are already know a good deal about the review and the fact that it is expected to report toward the end of the year. You have already written something on the subject, I believe.<br />Apparently, One MoD source “claimed the review was not about the affordability of the equipment plan but refreshing cross-government priorities”. However, what is particularly disturbing about the “Defense News” report is that it states at one point that, “the defence budget going forward appears to be in a mire, exacerbated by the steep fall in the value of the pound against the dollar and the euro.”<br /><br />However, to me what is even more distressing is the statement that £20 billion of efficiencies must be made over the next 10 years and more alarming still is the statement which follows shortly afterwards that “Almost half of the 10-year savings is expected to come from the British Army.”<br /><br />What! Hasn’t the Army already borne the brunt of the cuts, while the Navy and RAF appear to have fared much better. If the Army is cut any further we really shall be left with what General Sir Richard Dannatt described just recently as “a gendarmerie”. Good grief, where is it going to end? With the exception of AJAX, the British Army has not received a decent new fighting vehicle for 25 years and those in charge can’t even maintain the reduced target of 82,000 personnel.<br /><br />I suppose one good (?) thing might be that Strike Brigades and MIV are postponed until such time as we can afford to do them properly. And perhaps only a sufficient number of MIV will be purchased to succeed Mastiff in the Armoured Inf. Brigades (at least to start with), perhaps even heralding a return to the idea of the old Mechanized Brigades,(not far away from the idea of Multi-Role brigades? Still, I am speculating wildly and have probably got it entirely wrong again!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-23536183143401948382017-07-24T23:14:05.255+02:002017-07-24T23:14:05.255+02:00The above plan is done within the 82.000, yes. To ...The above plan is done within the 82.000, yes. To do 3 mechanized and three armoured brigades you'd need, basically, everything. Artillery, Logistic, Tanks, and more and larger infantry battalions. It'll take thousands of personnel extra, and quite a lot of extra vehicles and kit. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-72253274931011159702017-07-24T22:40:13.062+02:002017-07-24T22:40:13.062+02:00Is this plan designed under the 82K army personnel...Is this plan designed under the 82K army personnel cap? If so what manpower increase and budget increase would be necessary to do the 3 armoured, 3 mechanised brigade structure you mention as impossible currently? I only ask as you said that 3 units were necessary rather than 2 in the armoured brigade and assume that it translates into the larger structure?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-72022617540523159852017-07-24T16:34:38.191+02:002017-07-24T16:34:38.191+02:00An eloquent response, Anonymous, to JT ...
I hone...An eloquent response, Anonymous, to JT ...<br /><br />I honestly believe that the generals have made a complete hash of, in particular, vehicle procurement, and sustainment, for a generation... [and I am speaking as someone most happy to assign blame to the clueless, cliche spouting political class we have now]<br /><br />In defence of the generals the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, made funds [although belatedly] available that allowed them to make, very necessary short term acquisitions, that they are now finding, are no longer optimal [Mastiff], or too expensive [foxhound], or down right inappropriate [jackal in deepest east european winter] or completely inexplicable [Panther] ...<br /><br />What we have also is an SDSR cycle of 5-years [or less if the 'refreshment' is anything to go by] where a vehicle procurement cycle could be up to 20 years! ...so we have the keystone cop mentality of decisions made, revised, withdrawn over a couple of SDSR cycles, various PowepPoint brigades imagined, re-imagined, while the authors of both have moved on...<br /><br />it is a recipe for what we have now...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-12263198426676564622017-07-24T16:10:14.012+02:002017-07-24T16:10:14.012+02:00Anonymous,
Very well put.
I agree completely.
Phil...Anonymous,<br />Very well put.<br />I agree completely.<br />Phil (the ex pongo)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-8347960407177707712017-07-24T14:12:58.018+02:002017-07-24T14:12:58.018+02:00I agree with anonymous above.
Warrior CSP always ...I agree with anonymous above.<br /><br />Warrior CSP always filled me with horror, putting a new larger turret on a 30yo vehicle that was always marginal on power and has been flogged all over the world. <br /><br /> How many other problems are they going to fund once they open up these boxes? And how many components are now non-sourceable when only two countries operate Warriors and Alvis no longer exists? It sounds like a son of Nimrod and Lockheed martin wouldn't want one of those on its hands. <br /><br />In a perfect world I'd even go further - sweeten the deal for General Dynamics by placing an order for M1 and cancel the Challenger upgrades.Sim'an Dawoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16151212164969060957noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-24545605742387458092017-07-24T10:32:38.614+02:002017-07-24T10:32:38.614+02:00J.T - I am assuming that in some odd way your post...J.T - I am assuming that in some odd way your post is supposed to be funny? You couldn't actually be serious...? Lets take a couple of your points - <br />1. We have civilian control over the military... Gosh and so does every other EU state as well as many of the Anglophone countries<br />2. Despite civilian control, most of them end up with a far better use of the resources available to them and a more effective force structure. To put this into perspective, France, Germany and Italy all spend less money on their ARMY than the UK and yet all are able to deliver a two division, at least 6 Brigade structure. That is surely a key point<br />3. The government does set policy, in conjunction with the armed forces - ie they work together with the civilians giving broad outlines and money and the military developing the structures to meet them. Government would not have told General Carter he NEEDS just one division or he NEEDS new strike brigades. He would have set that himself <br />4. Chall 2 - the decision has been taken to reduce to 116 tanks as a direct result of the org structure taken. If you deployed just one squadron to a strike brigade, the "armoured" brigade would simply not have enough firepower to act in any operation (indeed it probably already lacks that anyway)<br />5. The need to bodge "to make ends meet" - this is as much the result of poor planning and structures as it is lack of resources - indeed the "lack of resource" piece is used as an excuse for other problems<br />6. I note you don't mention the large numbers of infantry battalions that are totally undeployable in your piece..... Not cutting cap-badges is a political imperative, but it is one of the elephants in the room when it comes to why we have ended up here and it is one that the Army has acquiesced to.....<br /><br />I suggest that you read some history. In the mid-80s several commentators noted the British Army's obsession with changing structures over the course of the Cold War (which you appear to embrace). No other power changed its structures as much and in all cases the results (achieved at enormous expense) invariably led to a reduction of combat power. These multiple changes were "looked on with bafflement by friend and foe alike". Governments come and go but this fact alone would suggest that there is an institutional problem in the leadership and structure of the UK Army....Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-35869851035625781002017-07-23T21:04:19.614+02:002017-07-23T21:04:19.614+02:00Air assault, i have. But parachute, is best kept a...Air assault, i have. But parachute, is best kept all in the same place. 2 and 3 para will continue to generate the VHR parachute coy Group, as they already do. The test of the air assault task Force (air assault coys) will come either from paras or from the light Brigade in the other Division. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-28618981075558640962017-07-23T20:33:17.377+02:002017-07-23T20:33:17.377+02:00So why haven't you spread the parachute/ air a...So why haven't you spread the parachute/ air assault capability over the two divisions?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-73852475127511006302017-07-23T18:01:08.737+02:002017-07-23T18:01:08.737+02:00Yes. In peacetime force generation cycle, they wou...Yes. In peacetime force generation cycle, they would rotate into readiness every 18 months (each brigade within the division alternates her 3 battlegroups into readiness at 6 months intervals; 6 + 6 + 6 = 18; with each brigade HQ at readiness for 6 months as well). Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-15994995344709244302017-07-23T17:18:09.045+02:002017-07-23T17:18:09.045+02:00I'm guessing the reason for having two divisio...I'm guessing the reason for having two divisions of that you're proposing that one will be at highish readiness and when it's deployed the other one will backfill its role, with the two divisions rotating in readiness to deploy?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-88518718461681064432017-07-23T16:06:39.354+02:002017-07-23T16:06:39.354+02:00So many problems with what you said here:
1) Warga...So many problems with what you said here:<br />1) Wargames are only as good as the assumptions that go into them. <br />2) "Just because a strike brigade has no armour in peace time doesn't mean it won't have any in wartime" okay... so where will this "armour" come from? There are only 2 places it can come from now, the QRH and the RTR, so.... strip the Armoured Infantry brigades of their armour. Doesn't help. <br />3) If you are going to deploy Ajax from the Strike Brigade Recce formations with the AI brigades why have them with the Strike Brigades in the first place?<br />4) If we don't need to generate 2 Divisions (we do if we want to be able to sustain a single division overseas but hey don't let that reality have bearing here) then we need to do something about the disaster that is 1 Div and provide more support for 3 Div and the Rapid Reaction Forces (3 Cmdo and 16 AA) so that those can actually deploy in meaningful strength. <br /><br />MRAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-57497520673503014322017-07-23T15:23:58.477+02:002017-07-23T15:23:58.477+02:00Thanks for the lesson. Totally unnecessary, but th...Thanks for the lesson. Totally unnecessary, but thanks anyway. <br />The point is: the outcome is a stupid force structure full of holes and waste and things that do not make any sense. <br /><br />Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-15414162772840343872017-07-23T14:09:35.786+02:002017-07-23T14:09:35.786+02:00Gabriele,
I enjoy reading your blogs as much as I ...Gabriele,<br />I enjoy reading your blogs as much as I tend to disagree with them. To start with the basics, in Britain we have civilian political control of the military. This control is exercised through government policy which the civil service and military are constitutionally required to fulfill. The current policy is SDSR2015. ARMY 2015 Refine delivers the army's part of this policy which thus defines the overall cost, size and capability of the army. Within this overall resource envelope it is up to CGS to decide how best to organise his forces to achieve the policy aim, the most demanding aspect of which is to be able to generate a SINGLE division (not two) of up to three manoeuvre brigades, as well as higher readiness forces. General Carter has made the decision to organise around two armoured infantry and two strike brigades. He could of course gone for four identical manoeuvre brigades or three larger brigades. As for most British decisions on force structure I expect that the decision of which organisation to go for was informed by some pretty serious war game simulations by Dstl, in which discipline they are the leaders in Europe and on par with the US, so as to give a scientific perspective on what is the best combat organisation for high intensity war fighting.I would also add that the UK task organises its forces for specific operations, and the army is no exception here. Thus just because a strike brigade has no heavy armour in peacetime doesn't mean that this armour won't be deployed with the brigade if its needed (e.g a sqn of Chally II). Likewise Ajax would be deployed to an armoured infantry brigade when it needs organic formation recce. This might seem a bit untidy but it is the way to make ends meet, and the goal is to have the most effective way of delivering the government's aims in a conflict, rather than an organisational structural that looks pretty, and symmetrical, on an organigramme. Now I somehow think we're not going to agree on Army 2020 Refine, any organisational structure is an imperfect compromise, but in my view it does represent a reasonable approach; albeit one that admittedly had yet to be fully tested. What I would say is that it derives inexorably, and quite properly, from both government policy and the resources it decides to allocate to defence. Of course what is certain is that sooner or later the strategic situation will change and the army will reorganize again to adjust.J.Tnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-20994790038198725732017-07-20T13:15:28.744+02:002017-07-20T13:15:28.744+02:00Fingers crossed. A lot of people are resigned to u...Fingers crossed. A lot of people are resigned to using the 432's until 2030 at least, and ambulance variants of thinks like Ajax, ABSV, MIV always seem to be the first to be axed off. It would be great to get a vehicle with a modern interior, like the US Striker Ambulance variants.<br /><br />MRAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-9454930192109125932017-07-20T10:34:00.989+02:002017-07-20T10:34:00.989+02:00It does indeed. But the ambulance variant of MIV i...It does indeed. But the ambulance variant of MIV is included in the very first selection of variants, for what i've heard so far. Of course a few are needed inside the battalions themselves, but if MIV order is around 350 as expacted it might include those for the medical regiments as well. Probably banking on FBPA for the rest of the unit. Just a guess, though. Ridgeback and Mastiff ambulances probably as interim solution, one would think. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-21030694141702326832017-07-20T07:22:32.443+02:002017-07-20T07:22:32.443+02:00That depends on what the "Strike Medical Regi...That depends on what the "Strike Medical Regiments" will be mounted on. Samaritans? BFA? FV432? Mastiff? None of them seem a good fit for the Strike Brigades so I feel it's very up in the air what they will get (probably a mix of all four).<br /><br />MRAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com