tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post6689074132369012317..comments2024-02-29T11:45:01.870+01:00Comments on UK Armed Forces Commentary: Building on strengths Gabrielehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comBlogger14125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-26521092461053763102017-03-31T05:02:17.329+02:002017-03-31T05:02:17.329+02:00I rarely/never comment but I enjoy your content du...I rarely/never comment but I enjoy your content dude. Keep it up. connorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04704876566650725331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-38951309065353770682017-03-23T00:19:03.168+01:002017-03-23T00:19:03.168+01:00What about Canada ? They are as much in nato as th...What about Canada ? They are as much in nato as the rest.Ztev Konradhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06553128132098513643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-91966490819037692252017-03-16T19:15:14.334+01:002017-03-16T19:15:14.334+01:00What kind of integration are you thinking about, t...What kind of integration are you thinking about, though?Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-53828823385356364482017-03-16T18:07:38.673+01:002017-03-16T18:07:38.673+01:00How do you think the British army could (or should...How do you think the British army could (or should) integrate with other European armed forces? and who would be the best to integrate with; France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain etc.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-49544028915655450392017-03-15T11:22:46.249+01:002017-03-15T11:22:46.249+01:00The brigade is not necessarily all going to deploy...The brigade is not necessarily all going to deploy by air. The british army has always had light brigades (it currently has 8 including 16 air assault brigade, but of those 8 not a single one is a "true", complete major formation) and it should continue to have them, as they have their uses. Using 16 air assault brigade's framework (it has all supports, although sized to barely support two battlegroups) is the easiest way to put some order in those resources. <br />Exact deployment methods and exact role would depend on the situation at hand. <br />Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-66821060412725245562017-03-15T09:56:19.877+01:002017-03-15T09:56:19.877+01:00I guess I was a little unclear - I was not arguing...I guess I was a little unclear - I was not arguing against having any airborne/airmobile capability, but instead for having a brigade-level one that would make a significant contribution to deterrence against Russia. It seems to me that your suggested brigade is built around the idea that two battalions fly while two drive: I believe that the flying and driving elements will be found in seperate brigades in a higher-intensity conflict, if only for reasons of command and control. Perhaps you have intentionally made the whole brigade air mobile by including only light vehicles, but then, would foxhound really be much more useful than a landrover in a high-intensity conflict? I thought it was mainly designed around the threat of IEDs? Also, whilst I think we could move a mainly-infantry brigade by air, I think it becomes too challenging if there are significant numbers of vehicles, although I guess we could just leave them at home in such a case (I appreciate the desire to find a role for Foxhound). I also appreciate your point about A2AD limiting the role of airmobile forces in high-intensity conflicts, so I think the most likely role for such a force would be as a fast-reaction force to deploy to the region before hostilities break out. In this case, airborne forces would be less important, but I think we should retain the capability in order to have the flexibility to threaten rear áreas once/if air dominance is obtained.Necessary Evilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05918487108579674113noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-75485171065002308102017-03-14T16:30:37.476+01:002017-03-14T16:30:37.476+01:00Air mobility is not "Afghan" only. You a...Air mobility is not "Afghan" only. You are always going to benefit from being able to move significant amounts of force rapidly by air. In a high intensity scenario, it gets more complex due to enemy air defence capabilities, of course. But it is still valid. <br />Increasing the number of ATGW posts would obviously help the air landed infantry being of more use against a mechanized enemy. Would it be enough? No. But it would allow them to be deadly and gain time for something heavier to move and plug the gap. More likely still, they would be inserted somewhere in not immediate reach of large enemy mechanized formations. <br /><br />I'm all for more mechanized brigades, but the budget is not large enough. MIV is coming only at enormous expense to the rest of the army, and to me it is just not worth it. I'd rather keep more of the tracked armour that is available, instead of scrapping it to purchase an under armour 8x8 because the army is 10 to 20 years later to the party everyone else has gone to. I'd rather stay out of that party for longer but keep more of the army actually useable even if it means having more of a gap between Light Role and Warrior. Mastiff is notoriously not mobile away from hard, solid tracks, but i would not want to smash a 5th of the army's capability in order to correct that one specific problem.Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-38103606767045825792017-03-14T15:15:08.313+01:002017-03-14T15:15:08.313+01:00I agree with Mike W - why build a capability aroun...I agree with Mike W - why build a capability around an Afghanistan-type scenario, when such a scenario (enduring operations) seems to have been ruled out? I think it would be better to tailor existing assets to the Russian threat, where they are most needed (for deterrence). For this theatre, larger formations are required, with airborne/airmobile and mechanized formations forming seperate brigades. The airborne/airmobile forces may not have the firepower of their russian counterparts, but since it is unlikely they will ever face them, this seems irrelevant. They are much more likely to face mechanized or even armoured forces, so the question is what kind of resistance could they put up against such a threat? Previous formations have merely increased the number of Milan posts in the airmobile battalions, but is this enough?Necessary Evilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05918487108579674113noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-4750434820911072682017-03-14T13:47:02.863+01:002017-03-14T13:47:02.863+01:00Although the MOD has not bothered with saying much...Although the MOD has not bothered with saying much about the exact nature of the CSP, it is my understanding that it will follow, as much as possible, the US own re-building process. So, new airframe but refurbished systems coming off older airframes whenever possible. The gun, the radar and the main sight assembly should all be elements that are transferred from old to new. <br /><br />And yes, the M230 is a 30mm chain gun. It is powered by a small 2 HP engine. Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-77494891755101547672017-03-14T13:41:46.870+01:002017-03-14T13:41:46.870+01:00From MikeW:
In your post you mention the possibil...From MikeW:<br /><br />In your post you mention the possibility of fitting "a number of Jackal vehicles with a remote turret armed with the same 30mm gun employed by the Apache." Do you happen to know whether the armament fitted to the new Apache E will be new-buy or will the old 30mm cannon (and perhaps other weaponry) be transferred to the new aircraft? The weapon is described in some sources as a 30mm "chain gun". Is that strictly accurate? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-32143705990085307292017-03-13T21:07:59.663+01:002017-03-13T21:07:59.663+01:00You already know where i'm taking most of the ...You already know where i'm taking most of the savings from: not going Strike Brigade, not going MIV. The UK has indeed faced a lot of operations in the past, and did so without an 8x8. It could have helped at times, but its absence has never stopped the gape. <br /><br />Losing some light role infantry battalions; doing away with the GP frigate in favor of more ASW, even at the cost of perhaps fewer "frigates" in total... these are the kind of things i'd call for in order to keep expenditure focused on what i call "the indispensable and the excellences". <br /> <br />Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-37083856823596570462017-03-13T19:51:15.464+01:002017-03-13T19:51:15.464+01:00From MikeW:
I’ve now had a chance to have a long,...From MikeW:<br /><br />I’ve now had a chance to have a long, hard think about the underlying principle behind your article. I agree wholeheartedly with you views about Strike Brigades (“half-formed, half-tracked “Strike Brigades” able to respond “quickly” to… no one really knows what.”), and I have corresponded with you copiously on that subject previously. <br /><br />I was going to go on to say that I was not sure that I agreed entirely with the main thrust of your argument, which seemed to be that that the UK Armed Forces should focus on certain areas where they still have “the seeds of excellence”. Leaping to conclusions, I thought that that meant that you were in favour of building up on specialist strengths, to the detriment of other areas that contribute to our all-round capability. However, I find that I had rather mis-read the post and I see that you are really in favour of the UK being, first and foremost, ‘a Strategic Enabler: a military power lacking in mass, for obvious reason, but (and this is the point) “with the most complete range of capabilities possible”’.<br /><br />However, is that really possible in every respect? I think that it would be fine if we had sufficient allocated resources to both build on specialist excellence and to retain an all-round ability but with a third of our humungous deficit still to be cleared off, it is not likely that we shall have that luxury for another three to five years.<br /><br />The problem, as I see it Gaby, has also been pointed out by yourself, when you mention “responding quickly, to no one really knows what.” We never know what to expect, never know what we shall be faced with. If you look back at recent campaigns in which UK forces have participated, we have had:<br /><br />i) The Falklands, which involved fairly light forces projected at considerable distance<br /><br />ii) Gulf War One, which involved movement by Heavy Armoured formations<br /><br />iii) Gulf War Two, which involved the same (although to a lesser extent) but also COIN operations, counter IEDs etc.<br /><br />iv) Afghanistan, which involved no heavy tanks but considerable COIN warfare.<br /><br />So we are always faced by the unpredictable and doesn’t reason dictate that we should have a strong all-round ability? Is that reconcilable with your building up of specialist areas where we are strong? Would we not inevitably lose some of that all-round ability because of conflcts in funding?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-57457497831783023352017-03-12T21:35:07.280+01:002017-03-12T21:35:07.280+01:00Keeping the Scimitar and Spartan MK2s is a fascina...Keeping the Scimitar and Spartan MK2s is a fascinating proposition, and one certainly worth considering if there was some money for it. They won't be Chinook liftable, unlike the lighter MK1, but they certainly would be good additions with some merit. <br /><br />The Wiesel is armed with a 20mm gun, i believe. It is another fascinating vehicle in its own right, and the fact that they managed to put a 120mm mortar on it is definitely impressive. It could be an option, again if there was money, to increase the ground mobility after an air landing, and bring some protection as well. But, considering the Chinook as the main mover, it might make more sense to procure a number of Internally Transportable vehicles, wheeled, of the sort USMC and US Army are beginning to work with. I understand the MOD was looking into a purchase of an undisclosed number, probably for SF as well as Joint Personnel Recovery / CSAR. <br /><br />The Wiesel would bring better protection, admittedly, but i'm hesitant to recommend it because it does not seem decisive. It might become more of a political risk than anything else: in terms of air-mechanization no one is more ambitious that the Russians. The fact that they have heavily armed IFVs and even a light tank with a 125mm gun that can be airdropped is quite amazing, and means they cannot be matched like for like by western air mobile formations. <br />I'm wary of adding too much weight to the airmobile force, for several reasons, including not risking to have politicians making ill thought out requests for such a force. <br /><br /><br />Gabrielehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01623558391676151582noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-442909239199162925.post-58708751747622092482017-03-12T21:26:30.166+01:002017-03-12T21:26:30.166+01:00From MikeW
Gaby,
I think you are quite right to...From MikeW<br /><br />Gaby, <br /><br />I think you are quite right to assert that 16 Air Assault Brigade has fared badly in the last decade. It has lost much of its organic support: (you cite Artillery, Logistics and Signals) and, like so many other areas of the British Army, it has been pared down to a significant degree. In fact, to the point where, as you say, it cannot be considered a “true” brigade.<br /><br />You mention how several equipment problems are immediately evident and how “The light cavalry mounted on Jackal has a firepower deficit, as the .50 HMG and 40mm GMG alone can’t give the reach and the heavy punch required to stand up to more threatening adversaries.” Your solution of fitting a number of Jackal vehicles with a remote turret armed with the same 30mm gun employed by the Apache is resourceful, because, as you say, it is weapon the Army already has and is likely to be fitted on top of the JLTV in the reconnaissance role by the Americans. However, we also have a 30mm cannon fitted to quite a few of the CVR(T) 2 vehicles , which are much more recent than the older Scimitars. I think that we might have been into this before and there might very well be a good reason why the CVR(T) 2s do not fit well onto our aircraft but they performed very well in recent conflicts. It would certainly save some money if the “2” versions could be introduced to 16 AA Bde to provide a replacement for the “semi-organic cavalry support” it previously had. And there are approx. 60 of the CVR(T) 2 (all variants) still available!<br /><br />The other question I wanted to ask concerns the German Wiesel vehicle. I know that it is quite in the veteran stage but it seems the ideal size for a support vehicle to airborne/air assault forces and I think it has a pretty full range of variants, including a fire support version with a cannon (30mm?), a mortar vehicle, an anti-tank version etc. etc.. Would a small buy be appropriate? The German seem to think highly of it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com