It has been
in the works for quite some time, and will be a building site for several years
still, but the UK is finally standing up its own Combat Aviation Brigade to
bring some order in the convoluted and overlapping command arrangements of its
helicopter forces.
I’ve known
about this plan for many months, but couldn’t really talk about it before some
sort of official announcement was released. This finally happened yesterday,
even if, primarily because of the pandemic, it was an extremely low-key news.
I’ve been
and I remain extremely critical of much of what the Army is doing and saying
about its future, but for all it’s worth I can certainly say I am a big
supporter of this one move. It is arguably long, long overdue and the brigading
of the units involved in fielding aviation groups in support of british land
forces has long featured in my recommendations for the future structures of the
Army.
The Wings
of what once was 24 Air Mobile Brigade have been chosen as the TRF for the new
1 star command, 1st Aviation Brigade (1st Avn Bde). Fun fact: in my proposals for the future, as far back as 2013, I had seen this coming. It has to be admitted, however,
that it was a relatively easy guess: the other likely candidate was the
Striking Eagle badge that used to be 16 Air Assault Brigade’s symbol until the
return of Pegasus In 2018 and which has stuck around since as badge of the
Attack Helicopter Force.
Back to serious
matters, 1st Aviation Brigade is the main component of a wider
restructuring of Army aviation (known as Project COLINDALE) which has been
very, very slowly progressing ever since 2015.
Primary
drivers for change are the need to generate efficiencies; the need to build a
C2 construct capable to brigade aviation elements in support of a Divisional
deployment, rather than penny-packet groups only suited to brigade or
sub-brigade deployments; and the ongoing review of the infrastructure footprint
of the Army Air Corps.
Notoriously,
all three Services have had to craft a plan to divest a lot of bases, barracks
and land in an effort to achieve savings and enable the modernization of the
remaining infrastructure. Army Aviation is supposed to do its bit in this
project, but decisions on the future footprint remain elusive. Essentially, the
biggest dilemma is whether to close down Middle Wallop or Wattisham, since
Yeovilton is going nowhere and there isn’t a real alternative to keeping
Aldergrove for operations in Northern Ireland.
 |
| Operations in Arctic conditions have been intense between 2019 and 2020, with the debut of british Apaches in Norway and their first arctic use of Hellfire missiles. This is part of the as yet unpublished "UK Defence in the High North" strategy in which the UK committs to a much increased role on the Norway flank of NATO for the next decade. |
From what
can be observed from the outside, the closure of Wattisham with the migration
soutwards of the Apache squadrons is the desired outcome, but clearly the
complexity and cost of the move are very much preventing the sealing of a
definitive plan. It is clear that the time for such a move is now, if not
yesterday, since the transition between the current AH1 standard and the new
Block III standard is soon to begin on the flightline, with the first
remanufactured helicopters arriving this year. The Army would like to co-locate
all Apache training phases, currently split between Conversion To Type carried
out by 673 AAC at Middle Wallop and Conversion To Role done by 653 AAC, Wattisham, with the ultimate
objective of also merging the 2 squadrons into a single one (653 AAC).
3 and 4
Regiments will remain otherwise relatively unchanged, each with its two
frontline squadrons and with an uplift to manpower in the ground element to
sustain an higher operational tempo for high intensity operations.
In terms of
Command and Control, aviation groups have so far deployed under the control of
HQs pieced together from disparate Joint Helicopter Command resources, assigned
to the commander of one of the constituent forces. The Commander of the Attack
Helicopter Force has been the core for one such “makeshift” Aviation Task Force
(ATF-1); Commando Helicopter Force provides another (ATF-2) and Support
Helicopter Force (RAF Chinook and Puma 2 squadrons) provide the basis for a
third.
The use of
Force Commanders and augmentees from JHC is no longer judged sufficient as it
lacks the command capacity and battle staff power needed to plan, refine and execute multiple
tasks at the necessary speed, concurrency and endurance.
The
formation of a permanent 1-star command with associated staff also offers the
benefit of providing a “plug-in point” that better enables integration with
international forces and, primarily, with the US Army’s own Combat Aviation
Brigades. Most countries the UK will be working with, have long had a 1-star
Aviation HQ directing employment of Aviation Battlegroups, and others, like
France, have in recent times gone in the same direction.
1st
Aviation Brigade, based in Middle Wallop, will be born out of the progressive
merging of the current Attack Helicopter Force (AHF) command element (the
overarching command sitting above 3 and 4 Regiments AAC) with the Aviation
Reconnaissance Force (ARF, essentially the overarching command element
overseeing 1 and
5 Regiments AAC) and later of the Watchkeeper Force (WKF) as well.
Instead of
having separate AHF and ARF forces, the Avn Bde will instead be a deputy
commader in chief for the ATTACK and one for the FIND functions.
 |
| In preparation for the more ambitious role of Aviation in future Divisional operations, several large scale operations have seen whole AAC Apache squadrons flying long range strikes across the UK and even deep into France. The teaming of Wildcat and Apache, including the use of the first to laser-mark targets in favor of the Hellfire missiles of the latter, has also been tested and validated |
Watchkeeper
will continue to be operated by 47 Regiment Royal Artillery, which continues to
work on equipping and training 4 equipment batteries. The change of command
won’t be particularly dramatic since 47 RA has been under Joint Helicopter
Command control already since 31 august 2016, when it resubordinated from 1st
ISR Brigade as part of efforts to overcome the problems that have tormented
this UAV capability in its work up to full service readiness.
Under the
31 (HQ) Bty, 10 (Assaye) Bty and 43 (Lloyd’s Company) Bty were the first
subunits to become operational with Watchkeeper, and have since been joined by
74 (The battleaxe Company) Bty and finally by 57 (Bhurtpore) Bty, which
resubordinated from 32 RA during 2019.
 |
| From 2019, Watchkeeper is finally cleared to fly from Boscombe Down. Intense operations are ongoing also from Akrotiri, Cyprus. |
1 Regiment
AAC has had to abandon all ambitions of eventually re-activating 669 AAC and
672 AAC squadrons on AW-159 WILDCAT, as had once been planned. These ex Lynx
units have now disbanded, leaving the Regiment composed of 661 and 659
Squadrons, plus 652 as training unit delivering both Conversion to Type and to
Role. The regiment will have the ability to force generate as an Aviation
Battlegroup for deployment.
4 Regiment
AAC has under command 656 and 664 Squadrons on Apaches. The first is the
specialist in Apache shipboard operations and the primary supplier of Attack
Helicopter support to 3 Commando Brigade. 664 is primarily aligned to 16 Air
Assault Brigade. The regiment will increasingly contributed to the max output
required by Division scale operations, however. It should eventually take
responsibility also for the combined CTT and CTR training unit, 653 Sqn.
3 Regiment
AAC has the Apache squadrons 662 and 663. Both Attack Helicopter regiments will
have the ability to force generate as Aviation Battlegroups for deployment.
5 Regiment
AAC will oversee internal security operations (essentially, Northern Ireland
and Special Forces support) and will also oversee aviation support to training
overseas (7 Flight in Brunei and 29 Flight in BATUS). The regiment is otherwise
made up by 2 squadrons; 665 AAC operates Gazelle helicopters from Aldergrove,
while 651 AAC operates fixed wing ISLANDER and DEFENDER aircraft from the same
base. Since 1 April 2019, however, 651 Sqn has been transferred to the RAF and
once the new arrangements eventually reach Full Operational Capability, 651 will
be removed from the Army’s order of battle. 665 AAC is instead intended to
re-equip with a new helicopter replacing Gazelle. The expectation is that a
small number of H-145 helicopters will be acquired for the role. Some could
also replace the Gazelles of 29 Flight in BATUS, Canada.
658
Squadron, which operates in support of the SAS with Dauphin helicopters, will
sit under the regiment but clearly its actual line of command is somewhere
else.
The Brigade
also commands 6 Regiment AAC with its 4 squadrons of reservists (675. 677, 678
and 679) who backfill ground support roles positions and provide war
establishment uplift to the manpower of regular squadrons.
The
training regiments (2, 7 and 9) of the Army Air Corps will not be included in
the brigade. With WILDCAT training delivered directly by 1 Regiment AAC via 652
Sqn and with the same approach eventually planned for adoption by 3 and 4
Regiments with 653 AAC taking over all phases of APACHE training, it is
expected that 7 Regiment AAC will fold its remaining functions into 5 Regiment
AAC (training for the successor to Gazelle and oversight of overseas flights)
and then disband. There are no firm official dates yet for this to happen; the
main obstacle being the enduring inability to agree on whether to vacate
Wattisham.
2 Regiment
will carry on delivering the early phases of AAC personnel training in 668 and
676 Squadrons.
9 Regiment
has been recently stood up at RAF Shawbury as part of the Defence Helicopter
Flying School and has taken under command 670 AAC and 60 RAF Squadrons. It
works alongside 2 Maritime Air Wing which delivers training through 660 AAC and
705 NAS squadrons. This arrangement will carry on.
The aviation
brigade will deploy under 3(UK) Division for major divisional operations and
will deploy scalable C2 elements and associated Aviation Battlegroups or Units
of Action for smaller scale contingencies. The Brigade will be resourced to
operate with “at least” 4 Avg BGs and will be able to take under command
non-british formations.
In
particular, it is assumed than in any “max effort” scenario requiring 3(UK)
Division to be fielded, 1st Aviation Brigade would have to deploy
the vast majority of all frontline helicopter fleets, as it is expected than
the Littoral Manoeuvre helicopter force (the Commando Helicopter Force with the
MERLINs of 845 and 846 NAS plus the WILDCATs of 847 NAS, reinforced by 656 AAC
with APACHEs and some CHINOOKs for heavy lift) would be required to operate as
the same time as the main ground-based force.
Air
mobility up to Company level is also assumed as requirement for Rear Area
security: during a Divisional deployment, a Light Brigade formed out of units
from 1st (UK) Division would deploy with Rear Area security roles.
It is
assumed that 2 Squadrons of CHINOOKs, for up to 26 helicopters in total, would
be deployed for such a large scale operation. If massed together for a primary
operation, these helicopters could easily airlift a whole air assault battalion
in one wave. If realized, this ambition would mean deploying more Chinooks than
are found normally in American CABs.
24 Apache
would also be the target, same number as are found in an attack battalion
within an American CAB.
The main
weakness of british aviation is naturally Medium Lift. Wildcat has extremely
limited lift capability, while the small number of Puma HC2s is expected to be,
for the most part, busy with Special Forces requests. The Americans,
conversely, employ large numbers of Black Hawks, including several permanently
tasked with CASEVAC / MEDEVAC role. French, Italians, Germans and others count
on large numbers of NH-90 for the medium lift, but, with the sole exception of
Germany, are in turn much weaker in terms of heavy lift.
Apart from
the new and enhanced capabilities of command and execution of multiple
concurrent operations, the Brigade will benefit from a substantial
restructuring of 7 Battalion REME, which also includes 132 Squadron, Royal
Logistic Corps, combining Equipment Support and repair with logistic
sustainment of the deployed force.
Regimental REME
workshops within 1, 3 and 4 Regiments will be restructured and strengthened
with their own Equipment Support platoons and vehicle platoon for sustaining
increased tempo of operations in the field.
 |
| The 3 british Chinooks deployed in Mali give much needed Heavy Lift support to the french forces in the region. In their first year of deployment they flew for 1192 hours, lifting 7,052 soldiers and 475 tonnes of freight |
On top of
those organic resources, 7 REME will provide a 2nd line of Aviation
Close Support in the field, with two Aviation Companies (71 and 72) and a Field
Company specializing in Recovery (70 Fd Coy). 73 Aviation Coy relocated to
Yeovilton in the last few years and will merge with 1 AAC regiment’s workshop
elements to provide organic support.
1st
Aviation Brigade is very much inspired by the US Army’s own CABs, but, for the
moment at least, will continue to suffer of some of the typically british
over-convoluted and overlapping layers of command and inter-service
arrangements.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, for example, the brigade does not
seem destined to include 244 Signal Squadron, the designate aviation support
comms units, which remains more loosely at JHC level, despite the unquestioned
need for Communication and Information Support. I fully expect experience in
the field to eventually lead to the resubordination of said squadron into the
brigade, regardless of what the assumptions are right now.
More
significantly, while 1st Avn Bde will have very significant organic
FIND and ATTACK capabilities thanks to WILDCAT, WATCHKEEPER and APACHE, it
won’t have direct day to day control over Manoeuvre helicopters as the CHINOOK
and PUMA Squadrons are part of the RAF.
Connection
with these crucial elements will be maintained through the higher level of
command (Joint Helicopter Command), and deployed support helicopters will fall
under 1st Avn Bde control during operations. Even then, it is acknowledged
that “support helicopter squadrons have less organic life support than attack
and recce formations and are not expected to manoeuvre in the same way”.
Similarly,
the brigade won’t have direct control of the Tactical Supply Wing and Joint
Helicopter Support Squadron.
This once
again brings into focus the unhelpful awkwardness of having the troop carrying
helicopters, quite frankly, sitting under the “wrong” Service. I don’t intend
to denigrate the RAF’s commitment to the Support Helicopter Force, much as I
will be inexorably accused of doing exactly that. I believe I’m simply stating
a fact of life.
I will also
immediately acknowledge that it is, at the moment and in the foreseeable future
at the very least, almost unthinkable to prospect a transfer of CHINOOK and
PUMA in Army hands. The effects on manpower could admittedly be disastrous if a
well established RAF “family” was broken up, dramatically changing the career
prospects of those who serve into it. Moreover, the Army is the Service that is
most severely struggling with recruitment and retention, as well as grappling
with decades of accumulated obsolescence across its structures and vehicle
fleets, leading to a budget which is already broken as it is. As a consequence,
I am NOT recommending a transfer at this time, although I will forever remark
that it should be an objective for the future, perhaps to be incrementally
implemented alongside the purchase of new build CHINOOKs to replace the oldest
airframes in the coming years (assuming that the ongoing CHINOOK Capability
Sustainment Programme does survive the new Integrated Review, of course).
Transferring
capabilities is difficult, but not impossible: the already mentioned case of
651 AAC is an example, and the transfer of MERLIN HC3 to the Navy is another.
What I am
unashamedly urging is the immediate consideration of alternative joint
solutions to bring the Support Helicopter Force into the Aviation Brigade and
to restructure CHINOOK and PUMA 2 ground support / life support elements to
deliver a more homogeneous capability for manoeuvre and flexible basing. As of
now, APACHE and WILDCAT units are aiming for an increased ability to deploy
forward and switch between Forward Operating Bases and multiple FARPs to
operate in bitterly contested scenarios, while CHINOOK and PUMA 2 remain more
decisively tied to availability of a better established Main Operating Base.
In
addition, I believe that any honest appraisal of the resources available would
conclude that creating a coherent Aviation Sustainment Battalion by combining
Tactical Supply Wing, JHSS and 132 RLC Sqn is the sound thing to do. 7 REME
could then focus entirely on Equipment Support.
Finally,
proper planning should go into an integrated plan for adjusting / expanding the
warfighting establishment as required, with Reserve support coming both from 6
AAC Regiment and from Royal Auxiliary Air Force formations. 1st
Aviation Brigade will indeed include 6 AAC Regiment in its structure exactly
for that purpose, and RauxAF elements connected to the Support Helicopter Force
will, in a way or another, end up involved in any case.
Better to
properly develop the arrangements in peacetime than scramble later when
deployment time comes.