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Argue
that the British Armed Forces, in times of severe budget difficulties, should
not pursue “ham tomorrow” at all costs, but focus instead on a number of areas
in which they still have the seeds of excellence.
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Provide
a more detailed background to my “Alternative Army 2020” proposal, showing the
reasoning behind certain approaches.
The approach behind my reasoning is
simple: building on what is available, to secure and improve a number of key capabilities
that make the UK a major player in defence within NATO.
Rather than dismantling mass and
capability even further to pursue new “Strike Brigades”, or seek savings by
cutting back on the more “exotic” specialties, I argue that it makes more sense
to move back a step and watch the picture from a slightly different angle.
It is by now constantly repeated
that the British Armed forces will always operate in Coalition and that this or
that gap are not worrisome because allies will help plug the hole. However,
unless the “ally” is invariably Uncle Sam, certain decisions make no sense as
they are not at all aligned to what the European allies could effectively
provide in a joint operation. The result is that certain cuts and proposals
only exacerbate weaknesses that already exist within NATO and sacrifice precious
specialism.
Does it make sense to cut back on
Heavy Armour when, even with all the well known obsolescence issues of
Challenger 2, the british heavy contingents are the only ones with true, recent
wartime mileage in Europe?
Does it make sense to cut back on
the ability to project power from the sea through amphibious operations when 3rd
Commando Brigade and the shipping available for it remain a very large percentage
of Europe’s capability in this specialist area?
Does it make sense to weaken the
Royal Fleet Auxiliary and pretend that there is no manpower problem, when the
RFA represents the vast majority of complex logistic shipping in Europe, making
it a truly invaluable component not just for the UK, but for its allies as
well?
Does it make sense to cut back on
air-ground manoeuvre when there are 60 Chinooks, 50 Apache and 8 C-17 in
service, giving the UK the best mix of tools for air manoeuvre in all of
Europe?
Does it make sense to still tinker
with the idea of cutting Sentinel, when the air ISTAR elements the UK can field
are without rival in Europe?
Certain suggestions and, worse
still, certain MOD moves appear to me to be absolutely misguided. Dismantling
capability in areas in which the UK is the major European player is not going
to make any favor to Her Majesty’s Government political weight. Being leaders
in a number of specialist areas is more valuable than being able to field
half-formed, half-tracked “Strike Brigades” able to respond “quickly” to… no
one really knows what.
Not to mention that if the
specialist capabilities are retained and nurtured, the potential for
independent action, albeit on a small scale, remains more realistic. And the
ability to take action independently is a key differentiator in the weight of a
country at the table. An independent nuclear deterrent on its own will lose
value if the rest of the armed forces turn into handicapped forces, plagued by
capability gaps, pursuing political clout by being always the first to deploy
in any new crisis. The UK still has a budget large enough and capabilities good
enough to be a leader within NATO, a framework nation to which smaller players
can contribute reinforcements. The UK should be, first of all, a Strategic Enabler:
a military power lacking in mass, for obvious reason, but with the most
complete range of capabilities possible. Even more so because it already
possesses much of what it takes to do so. It is actually cheaper, or at least
more cost-effective, to build upon what there already is.
Air Manoeuvre
While large-scale airborne
operations are of questionable, at best, likelihood and of uncertain wisdom in
this day and age, and anyway outside of the UK’s material possibilities;
smaller scale parachute operations and, above all, manoeuvre by the air at battlegroup
level, remain absolutely valid and useful. Air manoeuvre has been extremely
effective and very widely used in Afghanistan and in Mali. In Mali, the French had
some success with company-group parachute assaults as well, showing that there
is still merit to having this kind of rapid insertion capability.
It is my belief that the British
Army absolutely needs to maintain parachute assault as a capability, albeit at
relatively small scale. Even more important is maintaining a significant
ability to manoeuvre significant forces by air, both for securing key points
ahead of the ground forces and for flank operations.
This is a complex, demanding and
expensive proposition but, among the good reasons for insisting on this
capability, is the fact that the UK is actually relatively well positioned to
maintain and expand its know-how in this area. It is not my intention to produce
here an history of the various SDSRs and of the procurement decisions they have
generated, because it would take several pages at best, but the important thing
is that the various decisions taken in the past have generated:
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A
fleet of 8 C-17 strategic cargo aircrafts, which provide a lift capability with
no match elsewhere in NATO
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A
fleet of 22 A400M Atlas; not as numerous as desirable but certainly significant
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A
fleet of 14 C-130J to be retained in the long term thanks to a sudden dawn of
wisdom in the SDSR 2015
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A
large and very capable helicopter fleet, composed of, crucially, 60 Chinooks providing
a lift capacity that only Germany, having the CH-53, could hope to match.
Add the 50 Apache E with their
proven firepower and sensors; 23 Puma HC2 and the Wildcats, and the resulting
pool of resources is actually very considerable. It is easy to lose heart in
front of the constant downpour of cuts and capability gaps, but there are
actually still areas of excellence which could and should be better exploited.
Arguably, the UK has better
resources in this area than anyone else (always excluding the US, obviously)
within NATO, yet 16 Air Assault brigade hasn’t fared too well in the last
decade. Its organic supports (Artillery, Logistic, Signal…) have been eroded
down to such a degree that the brigade today cannot be considered a “true”
brigade. It has three regular infantry battalions thanks to the recent addition
of the Gurkha rifles, but for lack of supports it would not be able to convert
all three into battlegroups and deploy en masse. It has also lost the little
bit of semi-organic cavalry support it had, and the Patrols platoons within the
PARA battalions cannot be considered an adequate replacement.
In my opinion, this amounts to
wasting a fine unit and a great opportunity. Those who have read my alternative
proposal for Army 2020 Refine know that I called for a reinforcement of 16 Air
Assault Brigade in its supporting parts as well as, if at all possible, the
expansion to a four-battalions structure. What is needed is an “air-mechanized”
brigade composed of two air mobile battalions and two light mechanized
battalions (on Foxhound and Jackal). The whole brigade remains relatively light
and easily deployed, but comes with everything it needs to be a true Strike
force, tactically as well as strategically agile and able, from within its
constituent units, to replicate the kind of combined air and ground manoeuvre
that the army has most recently carried out during operation Herrick.
It is worth mentioning Operation
Panther’s Claw (Panchai Palang) in the summer of 2009: 3rd SCOTS,
then deployed as Aviation Assault Battlegroup, saw 350 soldiers of A and B
companies (the Aviation Strike Coys in the group) airlifted in a single large
wave to secure key crossing points in the Luy Mandeh wadi, north of Babaji. The
reinforcements came in the form of a 64-vehicles convoy, with Mastiff, Jackal,
Vikings and trucks from Camp Bastion, led by Task Force Thor, an American C-IED
route clearance unit. The single-wave assault was made with 12 Chinooks, both
british and American, supported by 4 Apache and 2 US Black Hawks.
2 weeks later, after holding the
ground, B company carried out another aviation assault to secure another key
passage ahead of the advancing Light Dragoons battlegroup. In July, during the
third phase of the operation, Alpha coy was inserted using 5 Chinook and the
support of 2 Apache. This operation included link-up with an armoured thrust by
Charlie Company, 2 Royal Welsh in Warriors. The Fire Support Group operated on
the ground, mounted in Jackals.
Air manoeuvre remains an essential
capability, and the Army and RAF own the most expensive pieces already: there
is no reason not to expand on them to put meat on the bones of 16 Air Assault
Brigade.
As 3rd SCOTS example
proves, in addition, air mobility is not necessarily a job for PARA troops,
provided that the necessary expertise and procedures are well rehersed and
understood within the army. In my alternative Army 2020 proposal, 51 Brigade
has the same structure: 2 Light Role Battalions replace 2 and 3 PARA, and are
meant to provide the air mobile element, while two light mechanized infantry
battalions provide the ground mobility element. Each brigade also has a Light
Cavalry regiment on Jackal.
Several equipment problems are
immediately evident:
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The
army currently lacks the capability to parachute Jackal into battle, and this means
that the first Fire Support elements are forced to enter the fight as
dismounts.
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The
Jackal is a good vehicle, but it was not engineered to be a rapid air landing
assault platform. As amazing as it might sound, the Jackal cannot charge out,
combat-ready, from a C-130 since the machine gun on top has to be removed in
order to fit. So, even as an air-landed follow on reinforcement, it needs some
time to make ready before it can move into the fight.
The latter problem is possibly going
to go away thanks to the A400 Atlas. The first can only be solved by procuring
a strong enough parachute platform system for use on the Atlas. The British
Army has decided to entirely gap Heavy and Vehicle airdrops by withdrawing from
service the old Medium Stressed Platform, which was compatible with the old
C-130K cargo floor but not with the J’s. After seeking a modification to
integrate the platform on the C-130J, the army decided that it was too
expensive and accepted the gap. In the last few years, 16 Air Assault brigade
has been able to parachute its artillery and other heavy loads into action only
by exploiting US help and kit.
A new platform and the A400M are
supposed to fix the problem.
The light cavalry mounted on Jackal
has a firepower deficit, as the .50 HMG and 40mm GMG alone can’t give the reach
and the heavy punch required to stand up to more threatening adversaries.
Without even needing to go all the way up to Russian or Russian-style light
armoured vehicles, the Jackals could end up being severely outgunned by “technicals”
such as those seen in Syria. While the accuracy of fire coming from a ZSU-23
mounted on a Toyota pick-up might be questionable at best, it is not acceptable
to step into a fight knowing that the enemy already has a range and firepower
advantage almost every time (14.5mm machine guns, ZSU-23s and even old BMP
turrets are easily found around in every theatre of war). Syria and Iraq are
also showing how dangerous hastily and crudely armoured vehicle-born IEDs are:
having a 30mm gun to decisively hit and stop them at a safe distance would make
the difference.
The cheapest and easiest solution is
to fit a number of Jackal vehicles with a remote turret armed with the same
30mm gun employed by the Apache. It is a weapon the army already has and
supports, limiting its impact on logistics, and it would help the Light Cavalry
a great deal. It does not weight much and it is getting a boost thanks to US
Army plans to have it on top of JLTV in the reconnaissance role.
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| In this photo by Army recognition, a particularly capable RWS, my Moog Inc., integrating 7.62 coax, Javelin missile and M230 30mm gun. |
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| A simpler, lighter M230LF installation on M-ATV. The US Army is probably going to require this weapon on top of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles used in recce role. |
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| From heavily armed technicals to russian Tigr with 30mm guns. The Light Cavalry is not good for much unless it has the firepower to at least compete with this range of threats. |
Another issue, until recently, was
the non exploitation of the C-17’s tactical capabilities. Thankfully, in the
last couple of years the Army and RAF have begun to open up airdrops, rapid air
landing and austere runways capability latent in the Globemaster fleet. Hopefully,
it is only a matter of time before the C-17 can be fully exploited.
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| Heavy Air Drop capability needs to be rebuilt; it cannot be delegated entirely to US help |
Relatively small investments can
have a major impact on the British Army’s capability to manoeuvre from and
through the air. Much of the required equipment exists. Central to my
alternative Army 2020 proposal, air mobility is a key attribute of light
brigades. Two such brigades, one of which based on 16 Air Assault; would
provide the army with a sustainable and quickly deployable core of Aviation
Assault battle groups supported by light mechanized formations ensuring
post-landing mobility and lethality.
Parachute capability, normally at
company group-level, continues to come on rotation from within the 2 PARA
battalions, while air assault is more widely delivered by Light Role
battalions.
