SDSR
2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review
Budget
Army
Solving the problem of hollow army
2020
Royal Air Force
Royal Navy
In general, the SDSR 2015 is far
more likely to bring more cuts and bad news than it is to bring wisdom. So I fear
that trying to reason on how to fix problems is most likely going to be wasted
time. But nonetheless, I plan to write about some of the major challenges
ahead, and explain what I think should be done to fix Future Force 2020 by
making better use of what’s available, and by adding targeted investments in
some specific areas.
I’ve decided to start from the army,
since it is no mystery that Army 2020, in many areas, has never convinced me.
If you’ve been following this space for some time, you are very likely to have
read my sometimes harsh critique of certain decisions. Two of the many points I
raised from the very beginning have actually been addressed (kind of): the
demented decision of sacrificing the CBRN Area Survey and Reconnaissance has
been subject to an epic U-turn, and the Fuchs vehicles and related equipment
have been brought back into service. Meanwhile, 16 Air Assault brigade has been
brought back to a three manoeuvre battalions structure by moving 2 Royal Gurkha
Rifles under its command. This in itself does not make 16 Air Assault a viable
brigade, since supports (medical, engineer, artillery, logistic…) have all been
cut down to Binary structure and there’s no sign that they will be rebuilt
(manpower, after all, is not available for that unless something else is cut).
Nonetheless, they are steps in the right direction, and they are both things I
had been calling for.
Now, let’s go in some detail. About
these two changes, and about the remaining other weaknesses of Army 2020 as
currently thought out.
AREA CBRN
Regarding CBRN, unfortunately, the
U-turn has come not before a lot of hard won experience has been squandered in
an unbelievably stupid way: according to the Royal Tank Regiment, which has
been tasked to rebuild CBRN AS&R in its FALCON squadron, the withdrawal of
the Fuchs and the passage to a Light Role only CBRN structure in the RAF
Regiment has come with the outright cancellation, on the part of Air Command,
of most of the documentation about Fuchs operations.
It is difficult to overstate how
rushed and stupid such a decision was. FALCON squadron has now embarked on the
reconstruction effort, seeking out veterans of the disbanded Joint CBRN
Regiment, to get information from them. Germany’s help has also been sought and
obtained. The Fuchs training simultator has been brought back into operations
and the vehicles themselves are following.
FALCON Squadron is now planning for
an establishment of some 80 men and 30 vehicles. The unit will be at permanent
Very High Readiness, as AS&R elements are rightfully planned to be an
enduring part of the Army’s VANGUARD pool of ready-to-use units. No Whole Fleet
Management: the squadron owns 100% of its vehicles, full time, and it is
responsible for keeping them going.
There are going to be 4 Sections,
each with 2 FUCHS. Earlier reports suggested another would be in HQ squadron
for follow-on confirmation of Section findings, and the remaining two would be
kept back for evaluation and demonstration purposes. However, there must have
been a slight change as apparently one FUCHS is actually going on a plinth to
serve as Gate Guardian at the Harman Lines barracks.
The squadron is also receiving 6
COYOTE MEP vehicles fitted out for Command and Control and for Logistic support.
The MEP (Military Enhancement Programme) is not the open-top Coyote 6x6 best
known these days, but the closed-cockpit, shelter-carrying variant which was
originally procured (in 35 units) to serve as prime mover for the SOOTHSAYER EW
kit, which was sadly cancelled later on. The mechanical base is more or less
the same, the Supacat HMT 600 6x6. Each Fuchs section will receive one MEP,
with two held in Echelon Squadron.
A number of Panther CLVs are on the
way, while the Multi Purpose Decontamination Systems should have been
refurbished and put back in action by this point. For now, they will move on
the legacy DROPS trucks, but by 2017 the MAN EPLS trucks will be assigned,
presumably becoming the MPDS movers.
 |
| The MEP was originally procured to be the prime mover of the SOOTHSAYER EW system, carried inside the shelter visible in the photo. The cancellation of SOOTHSAYER left 35 vehicles without an immediate use, and a big gap in the Army's EW capability. A gap which has yet to be closed, with the LANDSEEKER programme. |
 |
| It will be interesting to see what FALCON squadron's MEPs end up looking like. New shelters might be a possibility. |
As is to be expected in the British
Forces, the chain of command for the squadron is a bit… complex. With the Joint
CBRN Regiment gone, FALCON squadron is an additional sub-unit of Royal Tank
Regiment. But its actual manager is 22 Royal Engineer regiment, so that the
squadron sits under 25 (Close Support) Engineer Group, itself part of 8
Engineer Brigade, controlled by Force Troops Command.
Force Troops Command is responsible
for task-generating the AS&R element at Very High Readiness from FALCON
Sqn, with the ultimate 4-star owner of FALCON being the Commander, Joint Forces
Command.
Confused? Understandable if you are.
 |
| The FUCHS simulator is back online |
With the good news out of the way,
the bad ones: even after the U-turn, the long term future of CBRN AS&R is
floating in the air more than we all would like. As said elsewhere, FRES Scout
brings sensors of its own to help in the wide-area detection of CBRN threats,
but what comes after the FUCHS is still uncertain. Apparently, the Army is
assuming that UAV-based sensors will take up the role. Not clear if it might be
a Watchkeeper role fit equipment one day, or if there will be a specific CBRN
UAV, or what.
I’m a bit… unconvinced still by the
UAV idea, but as always it is the uncertainty that disturbs the most. It looks
pretty likely to me that, barring the eventuality of FUCHS being chopped again
(with HMG and the MOD, you never know), FALCON Sqn can expect to work for quite a bunch
of years with what it has.
Bringing back some jointery with the
now 20 Defence CBRN Wing, RAF Regiment might be desirable for obvious reasons, but the
Army has now awakened to the importance of green control over CBRN, and the RAF
Regiment on the other hand is unlikely to want to let go of the Defence CBRN
scepter without a fight. Watch out for possible incoming mess.
Hollow force
Now for the biggest problem of Army
2020: despite the best efforts of Nick Carter and his team, the political
orders about the preservation of capbadges at all costs have forced the
adoption of what is, at least in part, a hollow force. 16 Air Assault Brigade
itself is an example of hollow force: it is a brigade, but really isn’t. Its
supporting elements have been cut down to size, and are now enough (barely) to
support the generation of an Air Manoeuvre Battlegroup at VHR readiness, with
the sub-units alternating yearly into the role.
3rd Commando brigade has
partly suffered the same fate, since it continues to suffer a chronic shortage
of engineer support, and, even though harsher cuts have been fought back
successfully by Navy Command standing up to the Army, the Artillery element
also has suffered indirect reductions (REME, for example) which make the
survival of all 3 the batteries (down to just 4 guns each, by the way) somewhat
symbolic only.
The “Adaptable Force” is a
collection of false brigades to be raided whenever it is time to build an
actual deployable one during an enduring operation, with supports having been
preserved (partially) to enable the 7 brigades to form just 2, to cover the
fourth and fifth 6-month tours in an enduring deployment.
I say “partially” because there are
recognized shortages of resources even for achieving this base target, which is
the key to achieving the SDSR target of an army capable to sustain a
brigade-level operation in enduring fashion.
Specifically, these is a well known
and rather dramatic shortage of Royal Signals: the need for them has never been
higher, yet their number has been cut and one regiment removed from the count.
In the current army structure, not a single signal regiment is
aligned with the brigades of the Adaptable Force. Gen. Sir Peter Wall named
Logistics and Royal Signals as points of concern in Army 2020 during hearings
in front of the Defence Committee, and while presenting the Corps’s future
after the SDSR, the Royal Signals’s journal made clear that there is not
enough manpower to properly support the brigade-sized enduring operation
ambition.
 |
| Royal Signals are precious and more necessary than ever, but their number is currently insufficient to support enduring brigade-sized operations. |
Finally, the infantry battalions:
the Army was denied the chance to cut more of those, with a firm ceiling put at
5, to prevent the loss of capbadges, notoriously a politically sensible
subject. However, the battalions remaining are simply tiny: Light Role
battalions have now an establishment of a mere 561 men, all ranks, all trades.
This is very, very little indeed, and has been achieved by, among the rest,
cutting all companies down from 3 to 2 platoons. A (very) partial mitigation
has been obtained by re-distributing the GPMGs of the Machine Gun Platoon into
fire support sections assigned to each Rifle Company.
This, at most, partially corrects a long
standing deficiency of firepower in british infantry units, by adding a Fire
Support Element in each company, like other armies have been doing for many
years. But it is a nice dress up for bad news: the machine guns are just
removed from the Heavy Weapons Company and reassigned, and the missing platoons
remain missing, and they are supposed to come out of the paired reserve
regiment. In principle it is a decent idea, but whether the reserve regiments
will ever be able to effectively deliver all the pieces needed, is a very big
guess to make.
The 561-strong Light Role Battalion
should be uplifted to as many as 750 men for deployment, a value better in line
with what is found in other NATO armies, the Army says. This in theory requires
almost 200 men from the reserve unit, which is a 50% output from regiments
which are established for 400. Can it be done?
Ideally, yes. In practice, it seems
very, very likely that the regular regiments of the Adaptable Force will be
raided far and wide to piece together something that can be deployed.
This makes the Adaptable Force very
virtual indeed, with a realistic output which is a small fraction of what would
be expected by reading a list of 7 brigade HQs, 3 cavalry regiments (+ 3
Reserve) and some 15 infantry battalions (+ 13 of the Reserve; 1st SCOTS and
the Royal Gurkha Rifles don’t even have a paired reserve unit).
To me, this is a hollow force.
There’s an acute shortage of Signals; enough supports for 2 brigades at most; a
whole lot of questionable, under strength infantry battalions and the elite
brigades which are handicapped by lack of a few hundred men in support roles.
It is pretty clear to me that this
is not what 82.000 regulars could and should deliver. Infantry battalions, even
understrength, are never useless, but it is clear that actual military value
comes, at the lowest level, from battlegroups and then brigades.
Brigades, comprising of infantry,
cavalry, signals, artillery, logistics, REME, medical and intelligence, are the
main element of power for the army. And by associating support sub-units and
infantry, they can produce battlegroups.
A very honest and in depth look must
be given to the other 2-star commands in Army 2020: are a 2-star London
District and a 2-star UK Support Command actually needed on top of the 2
divisions plus JRRF?
Can’t the London District and UK
Support Command be combined into a single non-deployable Division HQ? I think
it is more doable and less damaging than other cuts we have seen. The resulting
Divisional HQ could control a couple of non-deployable brigades: Guards Bde,
for the Public Duty units in London, and 11 Infantry Bde as administrator for
the units posted to Brunei, Cyprus and for the Falklands Infantry Company.
The Army will dismiss it as heresy, but i would also suggest tough questions about the ARRC. Is it justified? Is it a good use of precious Signals specialists and of manpower in general? The UK, Italy, France, Germany and Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Spain... each have one NATO Corps 3-star HQ. But by now, in Europe, there are not enough deployable brigades, and even less Divisions, to form Corps.
Sometimes i read of people saying that the Royal Navy's carriers are a "vanity project". I couldn't agree less. If there is a vanity project within NATO, is the ridiculous number of deployable 3-star HQs. I would suggest the ARRC is an ultimate vanity item: it is there so there is a capability to go in the field and command a big badass Corps of multiple divisions.
The divisions to build the Corps up aren't really there, but everyone gets a Corps HQ. Read this list without laughing:
These headquarters are multinational, but are sponsored and paid by one or more ‘framework nations’ who provide the bulk of the headquarters’ personnel, equipment and financial resources. The United Kingdom is the framework nation of the ARRC, while France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey have sponsored the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps France, Greece Italy, Spain and Turkey, respectively. Germany and the Netherlands share costs for the German-Netherlands Rapid Deployable Corps, while Denmark, Germany and Poland are the three framework nations of the Multinational Corps Northeast and Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain are the Eurocorps framework nations. Romania is currently establishing a Multinational Division Headquarters for south-eastern Europe, which is expected to be operational by 2016.
http://www.aco.nato.int/natos-rapid-deployable-corps-.aspx
Neat, huh?
Perhaps it is time to shift the precious resources down to "lowly" deployable divisions. It will not seem much at first, but getting back a Signals regiment for use with actual deployable brigades would actualy do a world of good...
I will stop short, in this article, of assuming the disbandment of ARRC and re-roling of 22 Signal Regiment, but i want to write it here: it might really be time to consider it.
How many infantry battalions?
Solving the problem entirely is
always going to be very problematic, as there are other considerations that
need to be made. One of the UK’s battalions is committed in Brunei and is kind
of out of the scope. Two more are routinely committed in Cyprus: one as
garrison, one as Theatre response unit, forward positioned for action in the
Med and Middle East.
Two more, plus elements of a third,
get swallowed up by the Public Duties in London, with 5th SCOTS -
Balaklava company in Edinburgh.
Another battalion is a Ranger-type
unit, the SOF backup to the Special Forces proper.
This means that a minimum of 6
battalions are committed outside of a notional brigade-level Force Generation
Cycle. There are also political (and in lesser measure military) considerations
that dictate the presence in both Wales and Northern Ireland of regional
brigade HQs and of at least a battalion.
Assuming an ideal force structure
made up by 16 Air Assault brigade, 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades and 3
Medium/Light brigades, the minimum number of infantry battalions needed is 27.
That is four less than the current
31, and includes 3 battalions for 16AA, 18 for the 6 “line” brigades, and 6 for
the other tasks. The Light Brigades would have to forcefully “lack” two or
three battalions as these would be based in Northern Ireland and Wales, and
under daily control of brigade HQs in those regions.
Effectively, they would however be
part of the force generation cycle for the three Light deployable brigades.
Two of the current 7 brigade HQs
would also be cut.
A cut of 4 battalions, while keeping
the 82.000 men target, would release some 2250 invaluable regular positions,
which would shift out of the infantry to go to supports. Some reserve manpower
would also be made available for other uses, while there would be no more
unpaired regiments.
The problem is even these numbers would
not be quite enough to obtain the ideal force structure.
Brigades first
The ideal structure for the British Army, in my opinion at least, would have two
Deployable Division HQs, each with 3 deployable brigades and with 16 Air
Assault in addition. 3rd Division would not need to change from how
it is now, while 1st Division would lose 2 subordinate brigade HQs
and four regular infantry battalions in favor of uplifted supports. The
Divisional HQ itself would need a manpower uplift to be restored to deployable
status. Currently, it is envisaged as deployable only with augmentation, within
the scenario of an enduring operation.
The actual doctrinal work made alongside the Army 2020 restructuring has concluded that it is absolutely desirable to have effective 2-star HQs that can sit between the brigade in the field and the MOD / Government back in London. The Brigade HQ can so focus on the tactical side and on the combat operations, while the Division takes care of the strategy and of higher level management.
The actual doctrinal work made alongside the Army 2020 restructuring has concluded that it is absolutely desirable to have effective 2-star HQs that can sit between the brigade in the field and the MOD / Government back in London. The Brigade HQ can so focus on the tactical side and on the combat operations, while the Division takes care of the strategy and of higher level management.
Obtaining a third light brigade (as we said, elements for two such brigades are already available) for
1st Division and restoring 16 AA and 3rd Cdo to actual
brigade efficiency would require significant additional Signals, plus
reinforcements to the support units in 16 AA and 3 Commando. The third of
the Light brigades would need to gain a hybrid artillery regiment, a hybrid
engineer regiment, a hybrid medical regiment, a REME and a Logistic regiments.
The biggest manpower drain would
come from new Royal Signals regiments, followed by the new RLC regiment and by
the engineer. The Artillery would be relatively better placed as the regular
regiments in the Adaptable Force already have an additional Tac Gp battery
which could migrate to the new hybrid regiment.
Existing Adaptable Artillery Regiments (4 Royal Artillery and 3 Royal Horse Artillery) would
be split to supply 2 gun batteries to each of the three new hybrid regiments, which
would each have two regular gun batteries, a regular Tac Gp battery and 2 reserve gun batteries.
The number of reserve batteries would remain unchanged from now: the current two reserve Light Gun regiments would be removed and their batteries reassigned. The regulars would instead have to provide an additional RHQ and two
additional gun batteries.
The Adaptable Force currently has
two Hybrid Engineer Regiments. Under my restructuring suggestion, each gains a
second reserve sqn. They were already technically planned to have 2 reserve
squadrons each, but this was to be achieved only by taking control of the
reserve Commando and Parachute engineer squadrons. This most evidently made
very little operational sense, and the decision was changed, with 299 PARA and
131 Cdo now due to joint respectively 23 Parachute Engineer Regiment and 24
Commando Engineer Regiment.
A third hybrid engineer regiment would
be required, with 2 regular and 2 reserve squadrons. The additional Engineer
reserve would use part of the manpower freed by adjusting the number of
infantry battalions.
The situation is identical on the
Medical front, with two hybrid regiments that would need to be supplemented,
ideally, by a third.
There are also two RLC regiments in
the Adaptable Force, with a third needed for the third brigade.
The Royal Signals factor is worth a
better look: currently, the regular regiments are roled as follows:
-
1 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 20 Armd
Inf Bde and provides deployable communications for operations
-
16 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 12 Armd
Inf Bde and provides deployable communications for operations
-
21 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 1 Armd Inf
Bde and provides deployable communications for operations
-
2 Sig Regt provides general support
communications services to the Reaction Force Division HQ and to the Reaction
Force Logistic Brigade
-
3 Sig Regt provides general support
communications services to the Reaction Force Division HQ and to the Reaction
Force Logistic Brigade
-
10 Sig Regt provides specialized deployable
support, including ECM (Force Protection)
-
15 Sig Regt provides Level 3 support for
delivered and deployable CIS
-
14 Sig Regt (EW) provides electronic warfare teams
-
11 Sig Regt is the training unit
-
18 Sig Regt delivers communications to the
Special Forces units
-
22 Sig Regt provides communications and data for
the ARRC HQ
-
30 Sig Regt has a mixed role. 1 sqn is committed to ARRC alongside
22 Regt; 1 sqn (244 Sqn) is the air support role, providing communications to
the Support Helicopter Force; the remaining two squadrons deliver HQ
infrastructure and communications for the deployable HQ of the UK Joint Rapid
Response Force
There is no regiment aligned with
Adaptable Force brigades. As said in other occasions, the brigade signal
squadrons, no longer sufficient on their own, have been removed from the army’s
brigades and absorbed into the regiments. The so-called Multi Role Signal
Regiments are meant to provide theatre-wide networking and communications
points. The signal units no longer provide Life Support to the brigade HQs. The
change is one of the most noticeable in the whole of Army 2020, and the Army is
still experimenting and working on defining how deployable HQs will be
resourced, structured, deployed and supported in the future. The final outcome
depends also on the choices that will be made on LeTacCIs (Land
Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems), which is in
practice the replacement for the Bowman radio and data infrastructure, supposed
to deliver around the middle of the 2020s.
Whatever the outcome,
it seems evident that, at a very minimum, 7 Royal Signals Regiment
needs to be resurrected as a Multi Role Signal Regiment aligned with the
brigades in 1st Division. As the divisional HQ is brought back to
deployable status, one between 2 and 3 Sig Regts would also move to support it.
One single additional
regiment might well not be enough, moreover. As we know, the Army works to a 1
in 5 rule, which means that 5 brigade-aligned regiments are necessary to ensure
that an enduring deployment of one brigade can actually be supported. The
“ideal” force structure would have to include a careful study on the need for
communications and networking in brigade operations, so that each deployable
brigade receives the support it needs, adjusting the regiments again as
necessary.
Restoring 16 AA
brigade to a true 3-battalions structure will also require an additional troop
and other uplifts within 216 Parachute Signal Squadron, the one and only
remaining signal unit which is organic to its brigade and which also maintains
a life support role in the field.
16 Air Assault would
also need to uplift to 3 subunits each its artillery, engineer, logistic and
medical units.Currently, it has a two-companies organisation in all of these areas.
16 AA could use a
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Sqn of its own, incorporating the Pathfinder
Platoon and adding a bit more land-manoeuvre capability, considering that it
has lost the support of D Sqn, Household Cavalry. One solution might be to
stand up a Command Support formation, like 30 Commando IX in 3 Commando
Brigade. This unit would include the brigade recce squadron, the HQ support and
216 Signal Sqn, plus the other supporting elements task-generated by Force
Troops Command (vSHORAD missile troop, RMP troop, EW team…).
3rd
Commando would need an uplift to its engineer regiment (it has been planned
since 2008, but never really happened) by restructuring on 54, 59 and an
additional (56) Sqn. Sub-units within 3rd Commando and 16 AA should
continue to have an even split of capabilities among them, as they will
continue to rotate into Very High Readiness, as well as training to support a
possible brigade-level deployment.
Ideal, minus
The “ideal” force
structure is not achievable within the manpower and budget figures of Army
2020, so a bit more change is actually going to be required to go as close as
possible to it. One possible solution is having only 2 “full” (complete with
supports) brigades in 1st Division. The manpower margin from the
removal of 4 infantry battalions would be used to reinforce 3rd Cdo
and 16 AA, and to remove the worst weaknesses, principally the lack of Signals
for the “light brigades”. It is not enough to do more.
The result would be a
non laughable 5 “true” brigades, plus para and commando brigades, and some additional
infantry battalions. It would still be better balanced than Army 2020 as
currently envisaged.
Another option is the
removal of 3 further light infantry battalions from the ORBAT, and the transfer
of the Heavy Protected Mobility battalions from the Armoured Infantry Brigades
to the Light/Medium brigades.
The Heavy brigades
would lose their wheeled element, focusing on tracks only. They would have only
two infantry regiments each, but of course, they include the tank regiment as
third manoeuvre unit.
The Light/Medium
brigades would each have one Heavy wheeled battalion, and two light wheeled
battalions (with Foxhound vehicles). The Heavy brigades would become somewhat
“lighter”, shifting part of their support train to the “light” division.
With this additional
sacrifice of a further 1680 infantry posts, more manpower could be moved towards
support units, to build up the elements needed to have 3 brigades in both
Divisions, plus full supports for 16 AA and 3 Cdo.
I tend to support
this option more, since having two complete divisions, one specializing in
heavy & tracked and one on Wheeled and Light/Medium is the most balanced
option. This way there are two harmonic force generation cycles going on at any
one time, and two brigades available. These two brigades at readiness can then be combined to deploy a single,
larger, mixed brigade to a single theatre, or be deployed separately to better
achieve the Defence Planning assumption of two contemporary dispersed
operations.
One remaining problem
for consideration is the higher cost of some support elements, primarily, once
more, the Signals, due to their special training and equipment. Although the
manpower count remains the same, the cost might well increase. Whole Fleet
Management and other carefully thought out measures might be necessary to fit
into the budget.
Cutting so many
infantry battalions would cause a capbadge outcry rarely seen before, and is
not something that I suggest with any pleasure. And it is most clearly
something that could ever happen only with a government and Army leadership with
some serious courage.
I make the proposal,
despite the clear difficulties it would imply, because in an age of cuts and
shrinkage, all the manpower available must be used to deliver actual effect,
not to keep alive scrawny battalions purely to preserve symbols. Symbols are
immensely important, but if we continue on this course at some point the
regiments will have the strength of companies and the brigades will be
battalions, and without supports to add insult to injury.
A working brigade is always
to be preferred to a great number of disjointed light role battalions,
in my opinion. The usefulness that can be squeezed out of a brigade is
countless times superior.
In the wake of Army
2020 there has been a great amount of talking about flexibility, adaptability,
task-organizing, centralization and other catchwords which, again in my
opinion, make little actual sense 90% of the time.
For all the innovation
we might try and achieve, the army remains a construction made of brigades. At
the end of the day, for any operation of any kind of complexity, it will be
necessary to put in the field a communications network and a command and
control HQ; ground units for combat and seizing of terrain, artillery support, logistic support,
equipment repair and support, medical support, engineer support, plus police,
air defence, EOD etcetera. The Adaptable Force and Force Troops Command are no
revolutions and no great adaptability innovations. There is nothing more
adaptable than a brigade complete of its supports, to which higher commands can
require to task-generate battlegroups for the need at hand. There might
be some merit to centralization of support elements into their own brigades to
oversee administration and training in an organic way, but that is about it.
Force Troops Command can certainly stay, but the balance of infantry to supports
needs to change if Army 2020 is to be a realistic fighting force and not a
paper tiger.
Combat
Aviation Brigade?
Personally, I would
also recommend the formation of a Combat Aviation Brigade to unify, not just at
2-star administrative level (JHC), but at the daily working level, the
crucially important aviation elements.
In practice, the
Combat Aviation Brigade would take the Chinook and Puma squadrons of the
Support Helicopter Force, and organize them into regiments.
The brigade would be
structured as follows:
-
244 Signal Squadron (Air Support)
-
1st Army Air Corps Regiment (4
Wildcat Sqns)
-
3rd Army Air Corps Attack Helicopter
Regiment (2 Apache Sqns)
-
4th Army Air Corps Attack Helicopter
Regiment (2 Apache Sqns)
-
1st Support Helicopter Regiment (2
Chinook, 1 Puma Sqn)
-
2nd Support Helicopter Regiment (2
Chinook, 1 Puma Sqn)
-
Aviation Support Regiment RLC (would be built
by bringing together the existing 132 Avn Sqn RLC and the Tactical Supply Wing
to organize a complete ground-support formation for the combat and support
helicopters)
-
7 REME (existing 2nd line aviation
support teams, reinforced by taking in the RAF Support Helicopter ground
elements where applicable)
The Combat Aviation
Brigade would be assigned, alongside with 16 AA and 3 Cdo, to the Permanent
Joint HQ, specifically to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Not just for
deployment, but routinely.
The brigade would be
tasked with supporting a binary Force Generation Cycle, in which, each year, a
Support Helicopter Regiment, an Attack Regiment and 2 Wildcat Sqns are put at
very high readiness, alongside the relevant package of ground support elements
from RLC, REME and Signals.
In my opinion this
would help in obtaining the most out of the very significant Air Manoeuvre fleet of some 60
Chinook and 24 Puma HC2. The regiments at readiness would primarily support the
Air Assault Task Force and the Lead Commando Group. Like it is planned for the
2 Apache squadrons at readiness, the 2 Chinook squadrons at readiness would
focus one on the Air Assault Task Force and one on shipboard ops with the
Commando battlegroup.
The Commando
Helicopter Force would remain responsible for providing one Merlin HC4 squadron
at readiness for the Commando Battlegroup, plus 847 NAS with its Wildcat for
the shipboard side of operations.
The training units
would sit outside the Combat Aviation Brigade, as well as the Joint Special
Forces Aviation Wing. The Chinook force, once at full strength, would be
organized on 4 “line” squadrons of around 12 machines each (HC4 and HC6), with
6 Chinooks assigned to the joint Puma-Chinook OCU (28(R) Sqn, which will stand
up soon in RAF Benson, once 28 is disbanded from its current form as Merlin HC3
squadron) and with the 8 HC5 assigned to 7 Sqn, inside the Joint Special Forces
Aviation Wing.The HC5, with the ""fat" fuselage with the enlarged fuel tanks, was originally procured for SF work. Once upgraded and even retrofitted with Digital Flight Control, i would suggest it finally is assigned to the mission it was originally procured to do.
7 REME currently
includes also the 8 Parachute REME Field Company, which is the equipment
support element of 16 Air Assault Brigade. I would finally split the two units,
which are already located in completely different bases and doing pretty
different jobs, forming 8 Parachute REME.
Summary of
Changes
2 deployable division
HQs, plus JRRF HQ
1 less 2-Star HQ,
1 Combat Aviation
Brigade added by regrouping existing resources, splitting Chinook force in homogeneous squadrons grouped in Support Helicopter Regiments
Regular manpower
total unchanged or slightly inferior to current target
24 Regular Infantry
Battalions (2 PARA, 1 Air Mobile, 6 Armoured, 3 Heavy Protected
Mobility, 6 Light Protected Mobility, 1 SFSG, 5 Light Role) - Down
from 31, with removal of 7 Light Role battalions
Restructure 3 RHA and
4 RA into Hybrid Artillery Regiments, each with 1 Tac Gp Bty, 2 Gun Batteries
and 2 Reserve Gun Batteries; add a third regiment of the same type
Form a third hybrid
Engineer Regiment
Form an additional
Hybrid Medical Regiment
Form an additional
REME Close Support formation
Form an additional
RLC Brigade Support formation
Rebuild the third sub-unit
within 16 Air Assault’s support regiments
Build a Command
Support formation within 16 Air Assault Brigade
Split 7 REME and 8 Parachute Company; uplift strenght of the latter to support 16 Air Assault brigade in its roles
Split 7 REME and 8 Parachute Company; uplift strenght of the latter to support 16 Air Assault brigade in its roles
Form up to 3 Multi
Role Signal Regiments for the brigades of 1st Division
Total Reserve
manpower target maintained or possibly decreased
11 instead of 13
reserve infantry battalions
Remove 2 Reserve
Artillery Regiments, spreading their batteries evenly across 3 Hybrid Reg-Res Regiments (4 RA, 3
RHA and another to be formed)
Add 4 Reserve
Engineer Squadrons (one to 21 Engineer Regiment; one to 32 Engineer Regiment; 2 to
a new Hybrid Regiment to be formed)
Reorganize Reserve
Medical Regiments to account for a third Hybrid Regiment (2 Sqns to be assigned
to it)
The resulting 1st
Division will have all the pieces necessary to support a 3-year Force
Generation Cycle of three wheeled brigades. Up to three battalions will however
be geographically and administratively assigned to 160 and 38 Infantry brigades (Wales and Northern Ireland), while
being part of the force generation cycle under 51, 4 and 7 brigades.
Each brigade will be
able to field:
-
1 Light Cavalry Regiment + Reserve
-
1 Heavy Protected Mobility battalion
-
2 Light Protected Mobility battalions + reserve
-
1 Hybrid Artillery Regiment
-
1 Hybrid Engineer Regiment
-
1 Hybrid Medical Regiment
-
1 RLC Force Support Regiment
-
1 REME Equipment Support Battalion
The Armoured Infantry
Brigades will have:
-
1 Heavy Cavalry Regiment
-
1 Tank Regiment
-
2 Armoured Infantry Battalions
-
1 Heavy Artillery Regiment
-
1 Armoured Engineer Regiment
-
1 Armoured Medical Regiment
-
1 RLC Close Support regiment
-
1 RLC Theatre Support Regiment
-
1 Armoured Close Support REME Battalion
16 Air Assault and 3
Commando will both be again able to deploy as complete brigades. The
availability of 3 sub-units per role will greatly ease the constant provision of a
battlegroup at Very High Readiness.
16 Air Assault
Brigade will include:
-
1 Command Support Battalion (Identity to be
determined; will have a Reconnaissance and Surveillance squadron combining
Pathfinder Platoon with patrol troops with a cavalry role; 216 Signal Sqn plus the supporting
elements force generated from 14 EW Signal Regiment, 33 EOD and others)
-
2 Parachute battalions. The para companies will
rotate into Very High Readiness.
-
1 Air Mobile Battalion (Gurkha). Gurkhas will
not be trained to parachute, but will help generate the 2 air mobile companies
at very high readiness, spreading the work load across 3 battalions instead of just 2.
-
1 Parachute artillery regiment on 3 Batteries
(+ HAC Gun Troop as reserve), each combining all functions, so that they can
routinely alternate into VHR
-
1 parachute engineer regiment on 3 squadrons (+
299 Squadron reserve), each combining all functions, so that they can routinely
alternate into VHR
-
1 parachute logistic regiment with 3 Air
Assault squadrons to rotate into VHR, plus Air Despatch and Log Sp squadrons
-
1
parachute medical regiment with 3 air assault medical squadrons to rotate into
VHR, plus support
-
156 Provost Company, 4 RMP Regimen, on three troops
3 Commando stays
basically as it is, with one squadron added to 24 Commando Engineer Regiment (54, 56, 59 + 131 Reserve) and reinforcements given to stabilize the 3 sub-units mechanism in the rest of
the support elements. 29 Commando Royal Artillery already plans to establish a Reserve gun troop.
Adding also the
output of the Combat Aviation Brigade the Army’s VANGUARD pool would include,
each year:
-
1 Armoured Infantry Brigade
-
1 wheeled “medium-light” brigade
-
1 Commando battlegroup with full supports plus
1x Apache Sqn, Chinook and Wildcat support and 1 Merlin HC4 sqn
-
1 air assault battlegroup with 1x Apache Sqn,
1+ Chinook Sqn, 1 Puma Squadron, 1 / 2 Wildcat squadrons
Force Troops Command
would continue to add CBRN, EOD, STA, UAV batteries, theatre entry logistics,
VSHORAD and Local Area Air Defence and so on.