Army 2020 in detail: Royal Artillery

Previous parts:

1 - Force Troops Command and Royal Engineers

2 – Royal Signals

3 - Royal Artillery

The following tables show the intended restructuring that the regular regiments of the Royal Artillery are to undergo as part of Army 2020. The information dates back to December 2012, and reports on the shape of the force as decided in September 2012. A number of changes had already taken place by that point, with some of the batteries of the disbanded 40th Regiment RA having been re-subordinated to other regiments. The changes outlined in the tables give the final intended Army 2020 structure of the Royal Artillery.

Despite the time that has passed, the information should still be valid in its entirety. Several of the changes outlined in the tables have already happened, others are underway. The fate of 29 Commando Royal Artillery should include the survival of all its batteries, but with a rather savage cutback in manpower: the three gun batteries seem to only line 12 guns in total, or four guns each, down from a normal figure of six. The regiment, according to a note from the commander, had been asked to modify its ORBAT to account for a reduction in manpower going as far up as 20%. The effect of the cut, however, was somehow softened by the uncomfortable truth that the regiment already was understrenght, so the number of redundancies was kept to a minimum.

For a long while, 148 Battery sat on the edge, about to be removed from the ORBAT, but it was eventually saved, thanks to the resistance put up by Royal Marines command and Navy HQ.

Possible further changes beyond those outlined here might come in the training regiment and in the various batteries employed in the training role as the Royal Artillery plans out the future.

The restructuring of 12 Royal Artillery regiment appears confirmed by the Force Troops Command document, which confirms that there will be three Stormer HVM batteries, one aligned with each of the armoured infantry brigades. The third battery on Stormer will be obtained by the re-roling of the current HQ Bty. A new battery identity, coming out of suspended animation, goes to the new HQ for the regiment.

16 Regiment Royal Artillery restructures on four Rapier batteries, and the two regiments share 42 Battery as an air defence support element.

49 Battery remains independent, as the user of the LEAPP system.

The Reserve will no longer supply Rapier formations, but 106 RA will instead deliver two reserve Stormer HVM (295 and 457 Bty) batteries and one LML battery (265 Bty).

Of particular interest is the evolution of the UAS force, which is already switching away from its current campaign posture, meant to support the enduring operations in Afghanistan, to a new structure aligned to the Army’s new shape.

This probably means that at least one battery will lose its “full spectrum” capability to focus only on mini-UAVs. Currently, the batteries are structured to include T-Hawk detachments for the support to EOD work in the Talisman convoys; Desert Hawk III detachments in support of both bases and mobile forces; and Hermes 450 task lines.

The force continues to support operation Herrick, and is also working towards consolidating in Larkhill, with 47 Regiment transferring from its current home in Thorney Island. 47 Regiment RA will move from Thorney Island to Larkhill in the summer, between June and July. 43 Battery is indeed already based in Roberts Barracks, Larkhill, and the rest is to gradually follow.

10 Bty, 47 Regiment also is about to deploy to Afghanistan for Herrick 20, and it seems that they will bring with them one Watchkeeper task line, for the first ever operational use of the new tactical UAS. In the meanwhile, the UAS personnel have seen their tours sized at four months, which means that personnel from the two regiments is rotated in and out of theatre regardless of the battery that is deployed in that specific moment. Personnel rotate under directions coming from the central management, and it is thus pretty normal to end up de-linked from the parent battery for periods of time.

It is very reassuring to see that the UAV force made up by 47 and 32 Regiments will express a powerful capability, spread over six “flying” batteries of unmanned air systems, plus two HQ batteries and a shared support battery.

Three UAS batteries will be aligned with the reaction force armoured infantry brigades, and are likely to retain the full spectrum structure. They will get Warthog vehicles modified to act as carriers for the Desert Hawk III detachments, and they will also have Viking vehicles carrying the ground tactical node of the Watchkeeper system.

Two more support the Adaptable Force, and hopefully will maintain the full-sprectrum structure as well. 21 (Gibraltar 1779-83) Battery, in the Very High Readiness air assault role appears likely to shift to a mini-UAV only role, more realistic to deploy in earnest, possibly from the air and with as little logistical footprint as possible, although I can’t confirm this at present. The battery so continues to be directly aligned with 16 Air Assault brigade, for which it once provided air defence with the Starstreak LML missile system. The air assault, very high readiness air defence role has now moved out to 12 (Minden) Battery in 12 Regiment, instead. 

The Integrated UAS Batteries as shaped by the Afghanistan experience. Note to the equipment detail: Desert Hawk III and T-Hawk are both being brought into core budget. It is almost certain that Black Hornet will also be retained. Black Hornet is the only army UAS that is employed by infantry instead of RA specialists.

 

Another interesting element is the STA force, 5 Regiment RA. The regiment is to have its batteries changed to align them to the Reaction Force. One battery looks set to be “lighter” than the others, as 53 Bty is to be configured to provide STA support to 16 Air Assault Brigade in the very high readiness air assault role. It is probable that the battery will bear greater similitude with the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron of 30 Commando IX than to the other three STA batteries of 5 RA, which will be heavier and include a full range of capabilities to support the three armoured infantry brigades.

These batteries will employ MAMBA, as well as the lightweight counter mortar radar, and the plan appears to include the retention of some of the CORTEZ base-ISTAR equipment, including the large surveillance aerostats. I read time ago that Royal Artillery and RAF Regiment were collaborating on base-ISTAR equipment, including the aerostats, and it makes a lot of sense: it would be very interesting to get fresher and more detailed information about this.

Unfortunately, there won’t be five “ready-to-go” STA batteries with the same, complete range of capabilities, which puts another problem on the planning schedule for a possible future enduring operation, and unfortunately the Adaptable Force misses out completely on having a STA formation aligned with its brigades. Support for training and for future deployments will thus present some serious challenges, in a repeat of the problem already evidenced in ICS support.

There used to be two reserve batteries in the STA role, but it appears that there will be none under Army 2020, as the existing batteries are converting to GMLRS.

The Honourable Artillery Company remains, however, on three squadrons providing additional covert special observation patrols for the reinforcement of 4/73 Sphinx battery.

It is also finally confirmed that the intended structure of the Adaptable Force Artillery Regiments, 3^rd RHA and 4^th RA, includes only two Light Gun batteries, and a doubled complement of Fire Support Teams, in two (three, even, in 4^th Regiment) TAC batteries instead of the canonic one. It seems clear that the idea is that regulars are better employed in the demanding FST role, while reserves from the paired regiment can provide additional guns. 3^rd RHA is paired with 105 RA, while 4^th RA is paired with 103 RA. It seems to remain the plan that, for reasons of geographical convenience, 3^rd RHA will also support 101 RA, the Reserve GMLRS regiment, despite the different roles and equipment of the two units. 

Each of the two Reserve light gun regiments has four gun batteries. 

The Royal Artillery reserve regiments under Army 2020

 

The changes to the Air Assault artillery regiment, 7^th Royal Horse Artillery, have taken place as planned, and the remaining gun batteries have taken up the equipment and role of the gone Aviation TAC Gp Battery, bringing it into smaller but full-capability packages that can rotate in support of the airborne task force at high readiness.

The structure of the Reaction Force artillery regiments is also confirmed, with three AS-90 batteries supported by a GMLRS (and Exactor) precision fire battery.

The future will tell if the Fire Shadow loitering ammunition will find a long-term place in the Army beyond the 39 Regiment’s Troop which has taken it for evaluation and trials. 

ARMY 2020 in detail: Royal Signals

Previous parts:

1 - Force Troops Command and Royal Engineers


The Royal Signals have completed their planning work for the changes to the corps stemming from the Army 2020 cuts. I had written already months ago about much of the major changes, at regiment and brigade level, but much was still uncertain back then, including the fate of the many, many squadrons re-subordinating to different regiments, re-roling, disbanding etcetera. Now a far greater level of detail is available.

The structure of the Royal Signals is based on the two signal brigades, but several elements sit under different HQs

The entire Corps is on this slide, including signal troops assigned to NATO and to the EOD Group. Yellow text denotes Reserve element 

The document produced by the MOD months ago about the restructuring of the Reserves had provided a good overview of the changes to reserve sub-units, but many regular squadrons have moved and are moving around between formations.
For example, all the brigade signal squadrons are being removed from the brigades and brought into the five multirole signals regiments (MRSRs). The tables that follow show the fate of the regular squadrons.

Multi Role Signal Regiments and 216 Signal Squadron

216 Signal Squadron is the only brigade squadron which does not leave its supported unit. It continues to be a part of 16 Air Assault brigade, and it stays unders its direct OPCON. It is also the only signal formation retaining a Life Support role for a deployable HQ.
3rd Commando Brigade has its own ICS and Life Support elements, provided by 30 Commando IX, and so sits outside of this analysis. 

The Multi Role Signal Regiments are born out of the experience of the Campaign Signal Regiments deploying in support of operation Herrick. Communications and information management have grown in size and in importance in recent times, and the diverse range of needs of a brigade engaged in complex operations means that the old signal squadron is definitely insufficient to cover all requirements. The MRSRs are all taking up on systems such as FALCON, to be able to build up the necessary network of communications and information systems needed to run combat operations in theatre.
The reduction in manpower, however, has constrained the restructuring effort, and has forced a number of decisions. Most notably, the removal of the brigade HQ signals squadrons, and the dropping of the life support role for said HQs. While it makes sense to observe that ICS specialists, precious and expensively trained and much needed in their core roles should not be wasted on life support tasks, but this is nonetheless a requirement that is not going away. It will have to be met somehow with the restructuring of brigade and division level deployable HQs, and it works to demonstrate the pressure the army has to deal with.

Worth of note is that the Air Support Signal Regiment (21 Sig Regt) is definitively losing its AS role. Communications support for Joint Helicopter Command will now be delivered by the lone 244 Signal Squadron (AS), which is being transferred to 30 Sig Regt.

The key weak point in the whole construction is the complete absence of signal regiments aligned with the Adaptable Force. In the words of the Corps' Colonel:

ICS and EW support to the Adaptive Force. No dedicated ICS or EW assets reside within the Adaptive Force to support the maintenance of Institutional Resilience; however, capacity within the MRSRs should allow for some support to be made available if Collective Training to maintain Institutional Resilience is properly programmed. The force generation mechanism for an enduring operation will need to take account of the lean availability of expeditionary ICS and EW force elements. Support to the AF, in homeland roles, will be found principally from the R SIGNALS Reserve.

The Adaptable Force risks being very short on Signals elements to support training, and the key problem is that it will be short of ICS and EW support when the time comes to eventually deploy, as well. As i pointed out multiple times in the past, the ability of the Adaptable Force to provide, as planned, two brigades for two out of the five tours needed on rotational basis to support an enduring operation while respecting harmony guidelines is questionable. The supports are the key, and the supports have suffered cuts that put the target very much at risk.
The MRSRs will have to somehow squeeze out of their resources a package of ICS services for the deploying adaptable brigades, and this might prove to be a real problem. This is a huge weakeness of the whole Army 2020 construct.
I find it surprising, and yet depressingly normal, that the (most likely hopeless) calls for more defence investment following the wake up call of events in Ukraine have focused on "more brigades". Cap badges are, as always, the obsession of the day. Supports rarely, if ever, get mentioned, and yet they are the real, critical weakness of Army 2020.
The Army already has more brigades than it can support, and arguably more brigades than it needs. The problem is that most of these brigades are paper tigers, simple containers of (very small) infantry battalions.
If there's one weakness that needs fixing, is in the supporting area.


Support to ARRC and JRRF

 As said earlier, 30 Regiment is to assume responsibility for the Air Support Signal Squadron as well.


Training, EW, 3rd level Support

Other critical areas include the availability of ECM and Electronic Warfare. Both have proven invaluable and indispensable on operations, and are most definitely going to have crucial importance in the future. Even so, they can't escape cutbacks. Most notably, 14 Signal Regiment, Electronic Warfare, is to lose its fifth squadron, stood up in 2012 (better late than never...) to support the enduring deployment in Afghanistan. Again, this cut represents a serious limitation to the army's effective capability of facing a complex enduring deployment in the future.
As a little item of good news, 14 Regiment has resumed preparing airborne-capable Light EW Teams (LEWT) for the high readiness airborne task force. The Royal Marines have their own EW capability in Y Sqn, 30 Commando IX.


Special Forces 

The regiment should survive with no squadrons lost. I've added the list of squadrons as lat publicly known.


Reserve Signal Regiments and pairing arrangement

The four reserve regiments to remain after the cuts and restructuring provide support to the five regular MRSRs, and retain the Strategic Communications role in 2nd Signal Squadron.
The pairing works as follows:

37 Regiment (R) is asked to support two regular regiments at once.

As already evidenced by decisions made in other areas (es. Engineering), the key weakness of the Adaptable Force is the shortage of supporting units. It remains my belief, as i've been saying for a long time now, that if the Army high officers had been given a truly free hand, they would have taken different decisions, cutting back further on the infantry to ensure a more balanced final output.
Some of these weaknesses are the result of the somersaults that defence chiefs have had to make to obey Dave's order of seeing no more than five infantry battalions losses, and no regiment badge loss.

The result is an army which, despite claims of the contrary, is most evidently not balanced across its parts. The final capability output, to be measured in truly deployable brigades (infantry battalions are awesomely flexible and useful, but on their own they mean relatively little) is disappointing. It is probably the best that could be done given the political limits posed to the plan, but it is most likely not the best use of a given force of 82.000 regulars.
Politics and the need to have a significant number of "spare" infantry battalions to rotationally cover a huge public role liability and a large presence in Cyprus pose a significant challenge to the building up of an army that would otherwise have the chance to genuinely adapt to battlefield considerations and probably express six full deployable brigades (3 Heavy, 3 medium / light role) plus the air assault brigade at high readiness.



Sources: Royal Signals Journal - March 2014

Royal Signals "The Wire" magazine - December 2013

Force Troops Command and Royal Engineers of Army 2020

The Army has produced a good, clear brochure showing the structure of the "new" Force Troops Command, which is more honestly describable as a restructured Theatre Troops command.

Force Troops Command Overview

The brochure is very clear in showing how units are assigned to the various brigades of the FTC, so i'll let you read it directly from the document. It is however worth noticinga few things: after a lot of speculation about the fate of the Self-Propelled Starstreak (Stormer HVM) air defence platforms, we can now say that the system looks like a big winner, not a loser.
Fears for the future of the system were generated by the news, dating back to 2009, that the Stormer vehicle would be withdrawn from service and sold. While it is true that several Stormer vehicles have been put up for sale, a sizeable force of modernized Stormer HVM remains very much in service and important. Under Army 2020, Stormer HVM will equip a total of five artillery batteries, of which three regular and two reserve.

As of now, 12 Regiment Royal Artillery has a couple of Stormer HVM batteries (9 (Plassey) Bty and 58 (Eyre's) Bty), and is apparently due to form a third battery. I've been trying to find out which colors will be assigned to the new battery, but at the moment i still don't have the answer.
Predictably, the three Stormer batteries are meant to support the three armoured infantry brigades of the Reaction Force. 
12 Regiment also maintains 12 (Minden) Bty employing the LML triple launcher. This battery has the task of generating air defence packages at very high readiness, notably to be assigned to 16 Air Assault Brigade.

106 Regiment Royal Artillery, in the Army Reserve, is to have two Stormer HVM batteries (295 and 457 Batteries) and a Lightweight Multiple Launcher (LML) capability in 265 Bty.

The document also finally clears up the position of 49 Bty Royal Artillery, which is confirmed as LEAPP formation, as passing under the command of Joint Ground Based Air Defence and as based in Thorney Island. It will however remain an independent battery, instead of being absorbed by 16 Regiment RA. 
Joint Ground Based Air Defence is under Air Command OPCON, but Force Troops Command will have a coordinating authority over the force.

Less operationally relevant, but still worth noticing, is that the badge for the Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade might not have been firmly chosen yet. In earlier Army 2020 documents produced by the Army, the new brigade was identified by the glorious badge of what in the past was Reconnaissance Corps. But in the whole FTC brochure, the Intelligence and Surveillance Brigade always appears without any badge. This might indicate that the Army is still thinking about it, on the way to the formation of the brigade, which will stand up on 1 September.

Will this be confirmed as the badge for 1 ISR Bde?

Moving to the Royal Engineers, an excellent graphic has been produced by the corps of Royal Engineers, showing the structure that the force will assume as part of Army 2020 restructuring:

SEE IMAGE IN FULL SIZE ON PINTREST

The graphic is clear and immensely useful, but it needs a couple of notes. Since it dates November 2013, it shows 24 Commando Engineer Regiment in red, denoting its uncertain future. It has now been announced that the regiment will not disband as earlier announced as part of Army 2020 cuts.

Another note regards again the use of color code. Despite being an official document, the graphic contains a couple of errors: 106 Field Squadron, in 32 Regt, is shown in black, denoting regular forces. It should be written in green, as it is actually a reserve squadron.
In 33 EOD Regiment there's a second mistake, exactly opposite: 821 Sqn is written in green, denoting reserves, but it is actually a regular squadron, comprising two Air Assault and two Commando EOD troops for the support of 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3rd Commando Brigade.

In the EOD regiments, including 11 Regiment EOD Royal Logistic Corps, much is changing, as Search and EOD functions are combined in the squadrons, and RE and RLC elements get mixed and integrated together. 821 Sqn has been the first mixed RLC and RE squadron, born out of a wider restructuring process that saw the disbandment of 49 EOD Sqn in July 2013.
According to a Royal Engineers report, 11 Regiment RLC is assuming the responsibility for the provision of Search support to Special Forces for UK Resilience and work is ongoing to give it a UK Military Aid to Civil Powers (MACP) Search capability as well.
33 EOD Regiment is primarily tasked with EOD support to the Reaction Force, while 101 EOD Regiment supports the Adaptable Force.

In the EOD area there are also promising news regarding the future of the TALISMAN Route Clearance system. I have to thank MikeW for dropping me a comment in which he linked me to the website of the 101 EOD Regiment association, which contains information about the future:

As a result of OP Herrick EOD deveopments in support of Afganistan it is envisaged that the 'Talisman Troop' concept for route enablement and IED search and destroy missions will be retained and further developed. It is thought that 101 and 33 Engineer Regiments will each operate four enhanced Talisman Troops.
Talisman currently comprises 5 key equipment elements: Buffalo clearance vehicle, Mastiff 2 command and control 'Protected Eyes', T-Hawk micro UAV system, Talon robotic vehicle and a High Mobility Engineer Excavator.
It is probable that Talisman will be enhanced further in the near future with one or two 'Terrier' vehicles, and a 'Husky' vehicle equipped with ground penetrating radar. 

This brief passage does not quite contain all the information i'd like, but it does give good hopes. The Royal Artillery seem set to retain the T-Hawk micro UAV. The purchase of the proven, capable Husky would provide better capability than the current PANAMA system, made up by a number of Land Rover Snatch converted into remotely-operated vehicles fitted with ground-penetrating sensors.
The incorporation of a number of Terrier vehicles is not surprising. What remains in doubt is the future of the High Mobility Engineer Excavator, which was originally purchased as a gap-filler between the withdrawal of CET in 2008 and the entry in service of Terrier itself.
It might well be that a number of HMEE will actually stay, to provide a deployable wheeled capability to complement the tracked Terrier.
No details about another component of TALISMAN, the unmanned Mini Minewolf MW240.

Mini Minewolf with all its tools

Buffalo rummaging vehicle with PANAMA in tow

PANAMA in action

Husky: a possible future addition

The retention of TALISMAN elements (or even the interity of it) and its further evolution are a relatively cheap way to meet the  Route Clearance and Mine Countermeasure RCMC requirement of the wider Army 2020 plan. Thales UK, already Mission System Design Authority for TALISMAN, is working with the Army to develop the concept to bring forwards. There is the ambition to maintain the capability and further evolve it, and Husky with ground penetrating radar could well have a role to play.
However, there are alternatives: Pearson Engineering offers its impressive Pearson Engineering Route Opening and Clearing Capability (PEROCC) vehicle, which while expensive to buy new, would arguably replace at least two big parts of TALISMAN: the sensor (PANAMA or Husky) and the rummaging vehicle, currently the US-built Buffalo. It also has a full set of rollers.
PEROCC is a big vehicle, but is air portable inside the C-17, and replacing at least two different platforms with only one could well be actually advantageous.

The huge and very impressive PEROCC brings three capabilities into one vehicle: a complete set of rollers; ground-penetrating radar and sensors; and a powerful rummaging arm. On its own, it can replace two or three of the current TALISMAN vehicles, which could very well prove advantageous.

Other big changes in the Royal Engineers have taken place in 170 (Infrastructure Support) group, which has taken under command the Royal Monmouthshire RE (Militia) regiment and has seen the Specialist Teams (STREs) reorganized across Works Groups.
67 Works Group has been disbanded under the cuts, with the remaining STREs redistributed to concentrate all Heavy Teams (Power, Water, Fuel, Force Protection Engineering (FPE) and Materials)
all under 66 Wks Gp, leaving 62, 63 and 64 Works Groups as construction teams.

How 170 (Infra Sp) Group changes

20 Works Group, for support to air force deployments, sits under 12 Force Support group, alongside the Air Support regiment (39 Regt, paired with the reserve 71 regiment).
36 Regiment, which in these years had been "loaned" to EOD Search work, has moved back into Force Support role, mainly land. In support it has 75 Regiment, Army Reserve, which is receiving the M3 rigs to become the Army's sole Wide Wet Gap Crossing regiment, replacing the regular capability which used to come from the now disbanding 28 Regiment RE.

25 Group (Close Support) is wholly new, and is born out of the Army 2020 decision to centralize control of combat support units. It will have two Hybrid Adaptable Regiments, including reserve squadrons (21 and 32 Regt) and 3 regular Armoured Engineer Regiments, for support of the Reaction Force armored brigades.
Only 16 Air Assault and 3rd Commando are retaining direct control of their supporting units. 25 Group will anyway have coordinating authority over them.


Now, if only the Royal Artillery could produce a similar graphic with all the many changes at battery level, it would be very handy! As it stands now, there is still uncertainty regarding many of the details of the Royal Artillery reorganisation, from the unnamed new battery for 12 Regiment to the exact fate of the batteries in 4 RA [97 (Lawson's Company) Battery] and 3 RHA [J (Sidi Rezegh) Battery] that lose their guns but do not disband. These two batteries become additional TAC Groups, but it would be nice to have clarity on this and other things. If the two regiments don't lose other batteries in exchange, they will both end up with two gun batteries each, and two or three TAC Batteries each, denoting that they will be containers for large numbers of Fire Support Teams.
This might be the result of the assumption that FSTs are better provided by regulars due to their more complex role (and training), while additional L118 Light Guns could be provided by the paired regiments of the Army Reserve: 4 RA is paired with 103 RA, and 3 RHA is paired with 105 RA.

The evolving budget situation: Reversing other bad decisions - 24 Commando Engr wins the day

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces

3: Helicopters

4: Force Structure 

5: Reversing bad decisions 

6: Army programs on the (slow) move 

7: Capabilities in the air  
8: GEOINTELLIGENCE improvements
9: Reassuring (with risks)


24 Commando Engineer regiment wins the day

I reported last year about the ongoing fight that Navy HQ and the Royal Marines were fighting to ensure the survival of 24 Commando Engineer Regiment. The news available in the open were few and sparse, but the delay in disbanding the formation was evident, and by november 2013 there was some optimism.

For once, this optimism has been rewarded, as a bit of common sense has won the day for once. Yesterday, the Minister for the Armed Forces, Mr Mark Francois, made a statement in Parliament that confirms that this battle is won: the regiment will not disband.

On 5 July 2012, Official Report, column 1085, the Defence Secretary made a statement to the House on the outcome of the Army 2020 review and laid out the future structure of the British Army. The announcement explained the need to restructure the Army to face an increasingly uncertain world and to create the agile and adaptable armed forces as set out in the 2010 strategic defence and security review. Included in the statement was the withdrawal of 24 Commando Engineer Regiment.

At the time of the Army 2020 announcement, the Army acknowledged that engagement with the Royal Navy was still ongoing, and this would refine the allocation of Army manpower available to support Royal Navy tasks. This process is now complete and it has been decided that 24 Commando Engineer Regiment will be retained although the regiment will be reduced in size. This change will be achieved by rebalancing Army manpower within 3 Commando Brigade and allows for the best use of available resources to deliver the strategic defence and security review and Army 2020 capability.

We envisage that these structural changes will be implemented by no later than July 2015. 24 Commando Engineer Regiment will remain in Royal Marines Barracks, Chivenor (Barnstaple).

The regiment won't disappear, and this is a major step forwards. But it is still shrinking, and considering that it never even gained the second regular field squadron that was once planned and that remains very much needed, this is no good. It is a step in the right direction, but this regiment should actually be growing in size to better respond to the busy schedule of the high-readiness amphibious force.
There is also some worry behind the meaning of "rebalancing army manpower" within the brigade, which knowing politician language could hide unpleasant news, perhaps to hit 29 Commando Royal Artillery (which already had to win its own fight earlier, to ensure the survival of 148 Meiktila Bty).

But at least, it is a step in the right direction. Let's take away some joy and hope from it.